by Riazanovsky
The financial arrangement proved unrealistic and impossible to execute. Although liberated serfs kept meeting as best they could the heavy redemption payments, which were not related to their current income, the arrears
kept mounting. By the time the redemption payments were finally abolished in 1905, former serfs paid, counting the interest, one and one half billion rubles for the land initially valued at less than a billion. It should be noted that while officially the serfs were to redeem only the land, not their persons, actually the payments included a concealed recompense for the loss of serf labor. Thus, more had to be paid for the first unit of land, the first desiatina, than for the following units. As a whole the landlords of southern Russia received 340 million rubles for land valued at 280 million; those of northern Russia, where obrok prevailed, 340 million rubles for land worth 180 million rubles. The suspect Polish and Polonized landlords of the western provinces constituted an exception, for they were given slightly less money than the just price of their land.
The transfer of land in most areas to peasant communes rather than to individual peasants probably represented another major error, although this is an extremely complex issue. Arguments in favor of the commune ranged from the Slavophile admiration of the moral aspects of that institution to the desire on the part of the government to have taxes and recruits guaranteed by means of communal responsibility and to the assertion that newly liberated peasants would not be able to maintain themselves but could find protection in the commune. While some of these and other similar claims had a certain validity - indeed, as a practical matter the government could hardly have been expected to break up the commune at the same time the serfs were being freed - the disadvantages of the commune outweighed its advantages. Of most importance was the fact that the commune tended to perpetuate backwardness, stagnation, and overpopulation in the countryside precisely when Russian agriculture drastically needed improvement and modernization.
The emancipation reform disappointed Russian radicals, who considered it inadequate, and it also, apparently, failed to satisfy the peasantry, or at least many peasants, for a rash of agrarian disturbances followed the abolition of serfdom, and the misery, despair, and anger in the countryside remained a powerful threat to imperial Russia until the very end of imperial rule.
Other "Great Reforms"
The emancipation of the serfs made other fundamental changes much more feasible. Alexander II and his assistants turned next to the reform of local government, to the establishment of the so-called zemstvo system. For centuries local government had remained a particularly weak aspect of Russian administration and life. The arrangement that the "Tsar-Liberator" inherited dated from Catherine the Great's legislation and combined bu-
reaucratic management with some participation by the local gentry; the considerable manorial jurisdiction of the landlords on their estates formed another prominent characteristic of the pre-reform countryside. The new law, enacted in January 1864, represented a strong modernization and democratization of local government, as well as a far-reaching effort on the part of the state to meet the many pressing needs of rural Russia and to do this largely by stimulating local initiative and activity. Institutions of self-government, zemstvo assemblies and boards, were created at both the district and provincial levels - the word zemstvo itself connotes land, country, or people, as distinct from the central government. The electorate of the district zemstvo assemblies consisted of three categories: the towns, the peasant communes, and all individual landowners, including those not from the gentry. Representation was proportional to landownership, with some allowance for the possession of real estate in towns. The elections were indirect. Members of district assemblies, in turn, elected from their own midst, regardless of class, delegates to their provincial assembly. Whereas the district and provincial zemstvo assemblies, in which the zemstvo authority resided, met only once a year to deal with such items as the annual budget and basic policies, they elected zemstvo boards to serve continuously as the executive agencies of the system and to employ professional staffs. A variety of local needs fell under the purview of zemstvo institutions: education, medicine, veterinary service, insurance, roads, the establishment of food reserves for emergency, and many others.
The zemstvo system has legitimately been criticized on a number of counts. For example, for a long time it encompassed only the strictly Russian areas of the empire, some thirty-four provinces, not the borderlands. Also, it possessed a limited, many would say insufficient, right to tax. In broader terms, it represented merely a junior partner to the central government, which retained police and much administrative control in the countryside; a governor could in various ways interfere with the work of a zemstvo, but not vice versa. The smallest zemstvo unit, the district, proved too large for effective and prompt response to many popular needs, and the desirability of further zemstvo subdivision soon became apparent. The democracy of the system too had its obvious limitations: because they owned much land, members of the gentry were very heavily represented in the district assemblies, and even more so in the provincial assemblies and the zemstvo boards, where education, leisure, and means to cover the expenses incurred favored gentry delegates. Thus, according to one count, the gentry generally held 42 per cent of the district assembly seats, 74 per cent of the seats in the provincial assemblies, and 62 per cent of the positions on the zemstvo boards. Yet, even such a system constituted a great step toward democracy for autocratic and bureaucratic Russia. It might be added that
the zemstvo institutions functioned effectively also in those areas, such as large parts of the Russian north, where there were no landlords and where peasants managed the entire system of local self-government.
Yet, in spite of its deficiencies - and it should be noted that most of the above-mentioned criticisms refer in one way or another to the insufficient extent of the reform and not to substantive defects in it - the zemstvo system accomplished much for rural Russia from its establishment in 1864 until its demise in 1917. Especially valuable were its contributions to public education and health. In effect, Russia obtained a kind of socialized medicine through the zemstvo long before other countries, with medical and surgical treatment available free of charge. As G. Fischer and other scholars have indicated, the zemstvo system also served, contrary to the intentions of the government, as a school for radicalism and especially liberalism which found little opportunity for expression on the national, as distinct from local, scene until the events of 1905 and 1906.
In 1870 a municipal reform reorganized town government and applied to towns many of the principles and practices of the zemstvo administration. The new town government, which was "to take care of and administer urban economy and welfare," consisted of a town council and a town administrative board elected by the town council. The town council was elected by all property owners or taxpayers; but the election was according to a three-class system, which gave the small group on top that paid a third of the total taxes a third of the total number of delegates, the middle taxpayers another third, and the mass at the bottom that accounted for the last third of taxes the remaining third of delegates.
At the end of 1864, the year that saw the beginning of the zemstvo administration, another major change was enacted into law: the reform of the legal system. The Russian judiciary needed reform probably even more than the local government did. Archaic, bureaucratic, cumbersome, corrupt, based on the class system rather than on the principle of equality before the law, and relying entirely on a written and secret procedure, the old system was thoroughly hated by informed and thinking Russians. Butashe-vich-Petrashevsky and other radicals attached special importance to a reform of the judiciary. A conservative, the Slavophile Ivan Aksakov, reminisced: "The old court! At the mere recollection of it one's hair stands on end and one's flesh begins to creep!" The legislation of 1864 fortunately marked a decisive break with that part of the Russian past.
The most significant single aspect of the reform was
the separation of the courts from the administration. Instead of constituting merely a part of the bureaucracy, the judiciary became an independent branch of government. Judges were not to be dismissed or transferred, except by court action. Judicial procedure acquired a largely public and oral character instead of the former bureaucratic secrecy. The contending parties were to present their
cases in court and have adequate legal support. In fact, the reform virtually created the class of lawyers in Russia, who began rapidly to acquire great public prominence. Two legal procedures, the general and the abbreviated one, replaced the chaos of twenty-one alternate ways to conduct a case. Trial by jury was introduced for serious criminal offenses, while justices of the peace were established to deal with minor civil and criminal cases. The courts were organized into a single unified system with the Senate at the apex. All Russians were to be equal before the law and receive the same treatment. Exceptions to the general system were the military and ecclesiastical courts, together with special courts for peasants who lived for the most part by customary law.
The reform of the judiciary, which was largely the work of the Minister of Justice Dmitrii Zamiatnin, his extremely important assistant Serge Za-rudny, and several other enlightened officials, proved to be the most successful of the "great reforms." Almost overnight it transformed the Russian judiciary from one of the worst to one of the best in the civilized world. Later the government tried on occasion to influence judges for political reasons; and, what is more important, in its struggle against radicalism and revolution it began to withdraw whole categories of legal cases from the normal procedure of 1864 and to subject them to various forms of the courts-martial. But, while the reform of the judiciary could be restricted in application, it could not be undone by the imperial government; and, as far as the reform extended, modern justice replaced arbitrariness and confusion. Russian legal reform followed Western, especially French, models, but, as Kucherov and others have demonstrated, these models were skillfully adapted to Russian needs. It might be added that the courts, as well as the zemstvo institutions, acquired political significance, for they served as centers of public interest and enjoyed a somewhat greater freedom of expression than was generally allowed in Russia.
A reorganization of the military service in 1874 and certain changes within the army have usually been grouped as the last "great reform." Inspired by military needs and technically complex, the reform nevertheless exercised an important general impact on Russian society and contributed to the modernization and democratization of the country. It was executed by Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin, Nicholas Miliutin's brother, who wanted to profit by the example of the victorious Prussian army. He introduced a variety of significant innovations, of which the most important was the change in military service. The obligation to serve was extended from the lower classes alone to all Russians, while at the same time the length of active service was drastically reduced - from twenty-five years in the beginning of Alexander II's reign to six after the reform of 1874 - and a military reserve was organized. Recruits were to be called up by lot; different exemptions were provided for hardship cases; and, in addition,
terms of enlistment were shortened for those with education, a not unwarranted provision in Russian conditions. Miliutin also reformed military law and legal procedure, abolished corporal punishment in the army, strove to improve the professional quality of the officer corps and to make it somewhat more democratic, established specialized military schools, and, a particularly important point, introduced elementary education for all draftees. Measures similar to Miliutin's were carried out in the navy by Grand Duke Constantine.
Other reforms under Alexander II included such financial innovations as Valery Tatarinov's establishment of a single state treasury, publication of the annual budget, and the creation in 1866 of the State Bank to centralize credit and finance, as well as generally liberalizing steps with regard to education and censorship.
The "great reforms" went a long way toward transforming Russia. To be sure, the empire of the tsars remained an autocracy, but it changed in many other respects. Vastly important in themselves, the government's reforms also helped to bring about sweeping economic and social changes, which will be discussed in a later chapter. The growth of capitalism in Russia, the evolution of the peasantry, the decline of the gentry, the rise of the middle class, particularly the professional group, and also of the proletariat - all were affected by Alexander II's legislation. Indeed, Russia began to take long strides on the road to becoming a modern nation. Nor could the changes be undone: there was no return to serfdom or to pre-reform justice.
The Difficult Sixties
However, although the government could not return to the old ways, it could stop advancing on the new road and try to restrict and limit the effectiveness of the changes. And in fact it attempted to do so in the second half of Alexander II's reign, under Alexander III, and under Nicholas II until the Revolution of 1905. While the need for reforms had been apparent, the rationale of reaction proved less obvious and more complicated. For one thing, the reforms, as we know, had their determined opponents in official circles and among the Russian gentry, who did their best to reverse state policy. Special circumstances played their part, such as peasant uprisings, student disturbances, the unexplained fires of 1862, the Polish rebellion of 1863, and Dmitrii Karakozov's attempt to assassinate the emperor in 1866. More important was the fact that the government failed to resolve the fundamental dilemma of change: where to stop. The "great reforms," together with the general development of Russia and the intellectual climate of the time, led to pressure for further reform. Possibly the granting of a constitutional monarchy and certain other concessions would have satisfied most of the demand and provided stability for the
empire. But neither Alexander II nor certainly his successors were willing to go that far. Instead they turned against the proponents of more change and fought to preserve the established order. The "great reforms" had come only after the Crimean War had demonstrated the total bankruptcy of the old system, and they owed little to any far-reaching liberalism or vision on the part of Alexander II and his immediate associates. The sequel showed how difficult it was for the imperial government to learn new ways.
After the political stillness and immobility of Nicholas I's reign, and stimulated by the "great reforms," the early 1860's in Russia were loud and active. Peasant riots occurred with great frequency and on a large scale. In 1861 and 1862 disturbances, provoked largely by the clumsy and authoritarian policies of the new minister of education, Count Admiral Evfimii Putiatin, swept Russian universities. In 1862 the provincial assembly of the Tver gentry, led by Alexis Unkovsky, renounced its gentry privileges and demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly representing the entire people to establish a new order in Russia. And in the same year of 1862 a series of mysterious fires broke out in St. Petersburg and in a number of towns along the Volga. Also, in 1861 and 1862 leaflets urging revolution began to appear in different Russian cities. In 1863 Poland erupted in rebellion.
In Poland, too, Alexander II had instituted a liberal policy. Thus in 1862 much of the former Polish autonomy was restored. The change in the Russian attitude found favorable response among Polish moderates, led by Marquis Alexander Wielopolski, but failed to satisfy the nationalists, who wanted complete independence and the historic "greater Poland." Recent successes of Italian unification, the sympathy of Napoleon III and influential French circles, and the general nationalistic spirit of the age encouraged Polish extremists. Following a series of disorders, the government took steps to draft the unruly element, students in particular, into the army. A rebellion followed in January 1863. Although this time, in contrast to the situation in 1831, the Poles possessed no regular army and had to fight for the most part as guerrilla bands, the insurrection spread to Lithuanian and White Russian lands and was not finally suppressed until May 1864. Great Britain, France, and Austria tried to aid the Polish cause by diploma
tic interventions, but were rebuffed by Russia. As a result of the rebellion, Poland again lost its autonomous position and became fully subject to Russian administration. Nicholas Miliutin, Samarin, and Cherkassky were dispatched to conquered Poland to study the conditions there and propose appropriate measures. Of their recommendations, however, only those referring to the emancipation of the serfs and land settlement were adopted. Peasants in Poland obtained a more favorable arrangement than those in Russia, while the Polish landlords fared much worse than their Russian counterparts. Otherwise the government chose
to rely on centralization, police control, and Russification, with the Russian language made compulsory in Polish schools. A still more intense Russification developed in the western borderlands of Russia, where every effort was made to eradicate the Polish influence. A 10 per cent assessment was imposed there on Polish estates, the use of the Polish language was forbidden, and the property of the Catholic Church was confiscated. In 1875 the Uniates in Poland proper were forcibly reconverted to Orthodoxy.