by Riazanovsky
Absolute personal dictatorship set in. While the Politburo remained by far the most important body in the country, because its fourteen or so members and candidate members were the general secretary's immediate assistants, there is much evidence that they, too, implicitly obeyed their master. Other Party organizations followed the instructions they received as best they could to the letter. Significantly, no Party congress was called between 1939 and 1952. The so-called "democratic centralism" within the Party, that is, the practice of discussing and debating issues from the bottom up, but, once the Party line had been formed, executing orders as issued from the top down, became a dead letter: even within the Communist party framework no free discussion could take place in the Soviet Union, and almost every personal opinion became dangerous.
Through the Communist party apparatus and the several million Party members, as well as through the political police, Stalin supervised the government machine and controlled the people of the country. The peculiar relationship between the Party and the government in the Soviet Union, in which the Party is the leading partner as well as a driving force in carrying out state policies, has been elucidated in such studies as Fainsod's analysis of the Soviet regime in the Smolensk area, based on the Smolensk Party archives which had fallen into Western hands, and Armstrong's investigation of the Communist party in Ukraine. Not in vain did Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 declare:
… the most active and most politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state.
The Party, as will be shown in a later chapter, in fact dominated the social and cultural, as well as the political and economic life in the Soviet Union.
The Constitution of 1936
The Stalinist Constitution of 1936, which replaced the constitution of 1924 and was officially hailed as marking a great advance in the development of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, retained in effect the "dictatorship of the proletariat," exercised by the Communist party and its leadership, specifically Stalin. At the same time it was meant to reflect the new "socialist" stage achieved in the Soviet Union, based on collective ownership of the means of production and summarized in the formula: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." It gave the ballot to all Soviet citizens - for no "exploiters" remained in the country - and made elections equal, direct, and secret. In fact, it emphasized democracy and contained in Chapter X a long list of civil rights as well as obligations. Yet, as has often been demonstrated, the permissiveness of the new constitution never extended beyond the Communist framework. Thus Chapter I affirmed that the basic structure of Soviet society could not be challenged. The civil liberty articles began: "In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system…" - and could be considered dependent on this condition. The Communist party, specifically recognized by the Constitution, was the only political group allowed in the Soviet Union. Still more important, the niceties of the Constitution of 1936 mattered little in a
country ruled by an absolute dictator, his party, and his police. Ironically, the height of the great purge followed the introduction of the Constitution.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remained a federal state, its component units being increased to eleven: the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and ten Soviet Socialist Republics, namely, Ukraine, Belorussia or White Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia, and the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek republics in Central Asia. While the larger nationalities received their own union republics, smaller ones obtained, in descending order, autonomous republics, autonomous regions, and national areas. Altogether, fifty-one nationalities were granted some form of limited statehood. Yet, like much else in the constitution, this arrangement was largely a sham: while important in terms of cultural autonomy - a subject to be discussed in a later chapter - as well as in terms of administration, in fact it gave no political or economic independence to the local units at all. The Soviet Union was one of the most highly centralized states of modern times.
A bicameral supreme Soviet replaced the congresses of Soviets as the highest legislative body of the land. One chamber, the Union Soviet, represented the entire Soviet people and was to be elected in the proportion of one deputy for every 300,000 inhabitants. The other, the Soviet of Nationalities, represented the component national groups and was to be elected as follows: twenty-five delegates from each union republic, eleven from each autonomous republic, five from each autonomous region, and one from each national area. The two chambers received equal rights and parallel functions, exercising some of them jointly and some separately. Elected for four years - although with the Second World War intervening the second Supreme Soviet was not elected until 1946 - the Supreme Soviet met twice a year, usually for no more than a week at a time. In the interims between sessions a Presidium elected by the Soviet had full authority. Almost always, Supreme Soviets unanimously approved all actions taken by their Presidiums. In the words of one commentator: "The brevity of the sessions, already noted, the size of the body, and the complexity of its agendas are all revealing as to the actual power and place of the Supreme Soviet." Still more revealing was the acquiescence and obsequiousness of the Soviet legislature in its dealings with Soviet rulers.
In the Constitution of 1936 the executive authority continued to be vested in the Council of People's Commissars, which had to be confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. Commissariats were of three kinds: Union - that is, central - Republican, and a combination of the two. Their number exceeded the number of ministries or similar agencies in other countries because many branches of Soviet economy came to be managed by separate commissariats. In general, heavy industry fell under central juris-
diction, while light industry was directed by Union-Republican commissariats.
The Soviet legal system, while extensive and complicated, served Party and state needs both explicitly and implicitly and had only an extremely limited independent role in Soviet society. Besides, the political police generally operated outside even Soviet law. It might be added that the Soviet central government served as the model for the governments of the union republics, although the latter established single-chamber, rather than bicameral, legislatures by omitting a chamber for nationalities.
Stalin's Soviet regime, which took its definitive shape in the thirties, was to undergo before long the awesome test of the Second World War. In a sense it passed the test, although it can well be argued that the war raised more questions about the regime than it settled. But, before turning to the Second World War, it is necessary to summarize Soviet foreign policy from the time of Brest-Litovsk and Allied intervention to the summer of 1941.
XXXVIII
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1921-41, AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941-45
"Soldiers! isn't Moscow behind us? Let us then die on the approaches to Moscow, As our brothers knew how to die!"
LERMONTOV
Our Government committed no few mistakes; at times our position was desperate, as in 1941-42, when our army was retreating, abandoning our native villages and towns in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, the Leningrad Region, the Baltic Region, and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, abandoning them because there was no other alternative. Another people might have said to the government: You have not come up to our expectations. Get out. We shall appoint another government, which will conclude peace with Germany and ensure tranquillity for us. But the Russian people did not do that, for they were confident that the policy their Government was pursuing was correct; and they made sacrifices in order to ensure the defeat of Germany. And this confidence which the Russian people displayed in the Soviet Government proved to be the decisive factor
which ensured our historic victory over the enemy of mankind, over fascism.
I thank the Russian people for this confidence!
To the health of the Russian people!
STALIN
Soviet foreign policy can be considered in several contexts. To begin with, there is the Marxist-Leninist ideology. True, Marxism did not provide any explicit guidance for the foreign relations of a Communist state. In fact, it preached a world revolution that would eliminate foreign policy altogether. That Lenin and his associates had to conduct international rela-
tions after their advent to power represented, in Marxist terms, one of several major paradoxes of their position. Not surprisingly, they assumed for months and even for a few years the imminence of a revolution that would destroy the entire capitalist world system. The alternative appeared to be their own immediate destruction by the capitalists. When neither happened, the Soviet leadership, in foreign relations as in home affairs, proceeded to adapt ideology to circumstances. Marxism supplied the goal of world revolution, although the time of that revolution could no longer be predicted with exactitude. Marxism, especially as developed by Lenin, with such key concepts as finance capitalism and imperialism, provided also the framework within which the Soviet leadership sought to understand and interpret the world.
However, when Lenin and his associates seized power in Petrograd, they inherited an international position and interests that had nothing in common with Marxism. The Bolsheviks did their best to break the ties with tsarist Russia, repudiating treaties and debts and publishing secret diplomatic documents. Still, they could not entirely divest the country of its past or separate the communist from the noncommunist aspects of their new role in the world. In fact, as the Soviet regime developed and after Soviet Russia explicitly became the center of Communist interest following the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, Soviet foreign policy evolved, in the opinion of many observers, in the direction of traditionalism and nationalism, acquiring a pronounced "Russian" character. Or, to make a different emphasis and suggest yet another context for Soviet foreign relations, the U.S.S.R. can be analyzed simply as a gigantic modern state, and its foreign policy as a product of such considerations of Realpolitik as security, rather than considerations of Marxist ideology or of national tradition.
Soviet Foreign Policy in the Twenties
When Trotsky became commissar of war in 1918, his assistant, George Chicherin, replaced him as commissar of foreign affairs. Chicherin was to occupy that position until 1930; because of Chicherin's ill health, however, his eventual successor, Maxim Litvinov, directed the commissariat from 1928. Chicherin was of gentry origin and for many years of Men-
shevik, rather than Bolshevik, affiliation. In fact, he never entered the narrow circle of Communist leaders. Nevertheless, because of his ability and special qualifications for the post - Chicherin had originally begun his career in the tsarist diplomatic service and was a fine linguist with an excellent knowledge of the international scene - he was entrusted for over a decade with the handling of Soviet foreign policy, although, to be sure, he worked under the close supervision of Lenin, Stalin, and the Politburo. As mentioned previously, positions of real power in the Soviet system have been at the top of the Party hierarchy, not in any of the commissariats.
One of Chicherin's main tasks was to obtain recognition for the Soviet Union and to stabilize its position in the world. In spite of transitory successes in Hungary and Bavaria, Communist revolutions had failed outside Soviet borders. On the other hand, with the defeat of the White movement and the end of Allied intervention, the Bolshevik regime appeared to be firmly entrenched in Russia. "Coexistence" became a reality, and both sides sought a suitable modus vivendi. Yet the Soviet Union supported the Third or Communist International - called the Comintern - established in 1919 with Zinoviev as chairman, and it refused to pay tsarist debts or compensate foreigners for their confiscated property, demanding in its turn huge reparations for Allied intervention. In particular the Comintern, composed of Communist parties scattered throughout the world, who were bent on subversion and revolution and were clearly directed from the Soviet Union in Soviet interests, constituted a persistent obstacle to normal diplomatic relations. Most other states, on their side, looked at Soviet Russia with undisguised hostility and suspicion.
The Soviet Union managed to break out of isolation in the spring of 1922. A Soviet delegation attended then for the first time an international economic conference, held in Genoa. Although the conference itself produced no important results, bogging down on the above-mentioned issues of debts and reparations, among others, Soviet representatives used the occasion to reach an agreement with Germany. The Treaty of Rapallo of April 16, 1922, supplemented later by a commercial agreement, established economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and Germany and even led to some political and military ties. It lasted until after Hitler's advent to power. While the Treaty of Rapallo produced surprise and indignation in many quarters, its rationale v/as clear enough and, as in the case of most other Soviet agreements, it had nothing to do with the mutual sympathy or antipathy of the signatories: both Soviet Russia and Germany were outcasts in the post-Versailles world, and they joined hands naturally for mutual advantage.
Early in 1924 Great Britain formally recognized the Soviet Union; it was followed by France, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Mexico, and China before the end of the year. In 1925 Japan established normal relations with the U.S.S.R., evacuating at last the Russian part of the island of Sakhalin, although retaining certain oil, coal, and timber concessions there. The recognition of Soviet Russia by many states marked simply their acceptance of the existence of the Bolshevik regime, accompanied sometimes by hopes of improving trade relations, rather than any real change in their attitude toward the U.S.S.R. Lloyd George's remark on trading even with cannibals has often been quoted. Moreover, other countries, including notably the United States and most Slavic states of eastern Europe, continued to ignore the Soviet Union and refuse it recognition. Still, all in all, Chicherin succeeded in bringing Soviet Russia into the diplomatic community of nations.
That the course of Soviet foreign policy could be tortuous and even paradoxical became clear in the case of China. There Stalin chose to support the Kuomintang, the nationalist movement of Sun Yat-sen and Sun's successor Chiang Kai-shek, sending hundreds of military specialists to help the Nationalists and directing the Chinese Communists to follow "united front" tactics. For a time Communist infiltration appeared successful, and Soviet position and prestige stood high in China. But in 1927 as soon as Chiang Kai-shek had assured himself of victory in the struggle for the control of the country, he turned against the Communists, massacring them in Shanghai and evicting Soviet advisers. When the Chinese Communists, on orders from Moscow, retaliated with a rebellion in Canton, they were bloodily crushed. Yet, although defeated in China, the Soviet Union managed to establish control over Outer Mongolia after several changes of fortune. Also, in the mid-twenties it concluded useful treaties of neutrality and friendship with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. It should be added that the Bolshevik regime renounced the concessions and special rights obtained by the tsarist government in such Asiatic countries as China and Persia. But it held on to the Chinese Eastern Railway, weathering a conflict over it with the Chinese in 1929.
Soviet Foreign Policy in the Thirties
Chicherin's efforts in the '20's to obtain recognition for his country and to stabilize Soviet diplomatic relations developed into a more ambitious
policy in the '30's. Devised apparently by Stalin and the Politburo and executed by Maxim Litvinov, who served as commissar for foreign affairs from 1930 until 1939, the new approach aimed at closer alliances with status quo powers in an effort to check the mounting aggression of the "have-nots." It culminated in the Soviet entrance into the League of Nations and Litvinov's emphasis on disarmament and collective security. To appreciate the shift in Soviet tactics, it should be
realized that the Bolshevik leadership had for a long time regarded Great Britain and France as their main enemies and the League of Nations as the chief international agency of militant imperialism. Indeed, the Politburo placed its hopes, it would seem, in the expected quarrels among leading capitalist powers, and in particular in a war between Great Britain and the United States! Under the circumstances, the Japanese aggression that began on the Chinese mainland in 1931 and especially the rise of Hitler to power in Germany in January 1933, together with his subsequent policies, came as rude shocks. The Soviet government, caught quite unprepared by the appearance of Hitler, was slow to appreciate the new danger - in all fairness it should be added that other governments, although not handicapped by Marxist blinkers, were equally surprised and slow. Yet, once the handwriting on the wall became clear, the Bolshevik leadership did what it could to counteract the Fascist enemy, for that purpose mobilizing Communist parties all over the world as well as using orthodox diplomatic means. Hence the celebrated "popular fronts" of the 1930's and the strange rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and Western democracies as well as a new cordiality between the U.S.S.R. and Chiang Kai-shek. Based on dire expediency rather than on understanding or trust and vitiated by mistakes of judgment on all sides, the rapprochement with the West collapsed in a catastrophic manner in 1938 and 1939 to set the stage for the Second World War.
As early as 1929 the Soviet Union used the occasion of the making of the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war to formulate the Litvinov Protocol, applying the pact on a regional basis. Poland, Rumania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey, Persia, and the Free City of Danzig proved willing to sign the Protocol with the U.S.S.R. In 1932 the Soviet Union concluded treaties of nonaggression with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland, as well as with France. In 1933 the United States finally recognized the Soviet Union, obtaining from the Soviets the usual unreliable promise to desist from Communist propaganda in the U.S. In the spring of 1934 the nonaggression pacts with Poland and the Baltic states were expanded into