After RAVI and ZUBR came operation PADMA, which was designed to persuade the Yahya Khan regime that the Chinese were inciting rebellion in East Pakistan. Service A fabricated a Chinese appeal to ‘Bengali revolutionaries’, urging them to take up arms against ‘the Punjabi landowners and the reactionary regime of Yahya Khan’. The original intention was to write the appeal in Bengali but, since no KGB officer was sufficiently fluent in the language and the operation was considered too sensitive to entrust to a Bengali agent, it was written in English. A copy was posted to the Indian ambassador in November 1969 in the knowledge that it would be opened by Pakistani intelligence before arrival and thus come to the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities. A further copy was sent to the US ambassador in the hope that he too would personally bring it to the attention of the Pakistanis. Simultaneously, KGB agents in Kabul warned Pakistani diplomats of Chinese subversion in East Pakistan. The Pakistani representative in the UN was reported to be taking similar reports seriously. A post-mortem on PADMA concluded that the operation had been a success. The supposed Chinese appeal to Bengali revolutionaries was said to have become common knowledge among foreign diplomats in Pakistan. The Centre concluded that even the Americans did not suspect that the appeal was a KGB fabrication.22
New entrants to the FCD South Asian Department were often told that, when shown a map of the divided Pakistani state after the partition of India in 1947, Stalin had commented, ‘Such a state cannot survive for long.’23 By the late 1960s the Kremlin seems to have come to the conclusion that the separation of Pakistan’s western and eastern wings would be in Soviet, as well as Indian, interests.24 The KGB therefore set out to cultivate the leader of the autonomist Awami League, Sheik Mujibur Rahman (‘Mujib’). Though Mujib was unaware of the cultivation, the KGB claimed that it succeeded in persuading him that the United States had been responsible for his arrest in January 1968, when he had been charged with leading the so-called ‘Agartala conspiracy’, hatched during meetings with Indian officials at the border town of Agartala to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help. Through an intermediary, Mujib was told in September 1969 that the names of all the conspirators had been personally passed to Ayub by the US ambassador. According to a KGB report, Mujib was completely taken in by the disinformation and concluded that there must have been a leak to the Americans from someone in his entourage.25
Late in 1969 Yahya Khan announced that, though martial law remained in force, party politics would be allowed to resume on 1 January 1970 in preparation for elections at the end of the year. The Centre’s main strategy during the election campaign was to ensure the victory of Bhutto’s PPP in the West and Mujib’s Awami League in the East.26 In June 1970 V. I. Startsev, head of the FCD South Asian Department, jointly devised with N. A. Kosov, the head of Service A, an elaborate active-measures campaign designed to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and Awami League. The President of the Qaiyum Muslim League, Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who had been Chief Minister from 1947 to 1953, was to be discredited by speeches he had allegedly made before 1947 opposing the creation of an independent Pakistan. The founder and leader of the religious party, Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Syed Abul Ala Maudidi, was to be exposed as a ‘reactionary and CIA agent’. The head of the Council Muslim League, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, was to be unmasked as a veteran British agent (presumably because of his past residence in London) and accomplice in political murders. The leader of the Convention Muslim League, Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry, was also to be implicated in past political murders as well as in plans to murder Bhutto. (Ironically, in 1973 he became President of Pakistan with Bhutto’s backing.) The President of the Pakistan Democratic Party, Nurul Amin, in order to discredit him in West Pakistan, was to be unmasked as a leading figure in the ‘Agartala conspiracy’.27
Though the elections of December 1970 produced the result for which the KGB had covertly campaigned, there is no evidence that active measures had any significant impact on the outcome. It would, however, have been out of character if the Centre had failed to claim substantial credit when reporting on the election to the Politburo. The PPP won 81 of the 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan; the runner-up in the West, the Qaiyum Muslim League, won only nine seats. In the East, the Awami League won an even more sweeping victory with 160 of the 162 seats. Though Mujib had failed to contest a single seat in West Pakistan, he thus won an overall majority in the National Assembly and was entitled to become Prime Minister. Bhutto colluded with Ayub and the army in refusing to allow Mujib to take power. On 25 March 1971 Yahya Khan ordered Mujib’s arrest and began savage military repression in East Pakistan. The Centre reported to the Central Committee that the end of Pakistani unity was imminent.28 While Bhutto naively - or cynically - declared, ‘Pakistan has been saved’, Bengal was overwhelmed by a bloodbath which compared in its savagery with the intercommunal butchery which had followed Indian independence in 1947. India provided a safe haven for Bengali troops resisting the Pakistani army. In November the civil war between East and West Pakistan turned into an Indo-Pakistani war. On 16 December Dhaka fell to Indian troops and East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh.
The political transformation of the Indian subcontinent caused by the divorce between East and West Pakistan suited Moscow’s interests. The Indo-Soviet special relationship had been enhanced and Indira Gandhi’s personal prestige raised to an all-time high. Pakistan had been dramatically weakened by the independence of Bangladesh. Moscow’s preferred candidates (given the impossibility of Communist regimes) took power in both Islamabad and Dhaka. After defeat by India, Yahya Khan resigned and handed over the presidency to Bhutto. On 10 January 1972, Mujib returned from captivity in West Pakistan to a hero’s welcome in Dhaka.
Despite the fact that Bhutto nationalized over thirty large firms in ten basic industries in January 1972 and visited Moscow in March, the Kremlin had far more reservations about him (initially as President, then, after the 1973 elections, as Prime Minister) than about Mujib. The most constant element in Bhutto’s erratic foreign policy was friendship with China, which he visited almost as soon as he succeeded Yahya Khan. At his request, China vetoed Bangladesh’s admission to the United Nations until it had repatriated all Pakistani personnel captured after the war (some of whom it was considering putting on trial for war crimes). China also helped to set up Pakistan’s first heavy-engineering plants as well as supplying arms.
Somewhat incongruously in view of his largely Western lifestyle, Bhutto took to imitating Mao Zedong’s clothes and cap. In 1976 he even had a book of his own sayings published in the various languages spoken in Pakistan, much in the manner of Mao’s Little Red Book.29 Mildly absurd though Bhutto’s neo-Maoist affectations were, Moscow was not amused. As one of Bhutto’s advisers, Rafi Raza, later acknowledged: ‘The lack of importance attached by the Soviet Union to ZAB[hutto] was evidenced by the fact that no significant Soviet dignitary visited Pakistan during his five and a half years in government, despite his own two visits [to Moscow] . . .’30
So far as Moscow was concerned, Mujib’s relations with China, in contrast to Bhutto’s, were reassuringly poor. Bangladesh and China did not establish diplomatic relations until after Mujib’s death. As in India and Pakistan, the KGB was able to exploit the corruption of newly independent Bangladesh. For politicians, bureaucrats and the military there were numerous opportunities to cream off a percentage of the foreign aid which flooded into the country.31 Mujib once asked despairingly: ‘Who takes bribes? Who indulges in smuggling? Who becomes a foreign agent? Who transfers money abroad? Who resorts to hoarding? It’s being done by us - the five per cent of the people who are educated. We are the bribe takers, the corrupt elements . . .’32
Though overwhelmingly the most popular person in Bangladesh, Mujib was in some ways curiously isolated. Irritated by the personality conflicts within the Awami League, he increasingly saw himself as the sole personification of Bangladesh - the Bangabandbu. He was, it has been rightly observed, ‘a fine Bang
abandbu but a poor prime minister’.33 The Dhaka residency acknowledged in its annual report for 1972, after Bangladesh’s first year of independence, that it had failed to recruit any agent close to Mujib.34 Among its successes during that year, however, was the recruitment of three agents in the Directorate of National Security (codenamed KOMBINA T).35 The KGB also succeeded in gaining control of one daily newspaper (to which it paid the equivalent of 300,000 convertible rubles to purchase new printing presses) and one weekly.36 On 2 February 1973 the Politburo instructed the KGB to use active measures to influence the outcome of Bangladesh’s forthcoming first parliamentary elections. 37 The KGB helped to fund the election campaigns of Mujib’s Awami League as well as its allies, the Communist Party and the left-wing National Awami Party. Probably with little justification, it claimed part of the credit for the predictable landslide victory of the Awami League.38
In June 1975, doubtless to the delight of Moscow, Mujib transformed Bangladesh into a one-party state whose new ruling party, BAKSAL, incorporated the three parties hitherto secretly subsidized by the KGB (Awami League, National Awami Party and Communist Party) and one other left-wing party.39 By this time the Dhaka residency had recruited a senior member of Mujib’s secretariat, MITRA, two ministers, SALTAN and KALIF, and two senior intelligence officers, MAKHIR and SHEF. All were used against US targets.40
The FCD’s analytical department, Service 1, had forecast after the 1973 elections that the Awami League would retain power for the full five-year term and that the main opposition to it would come from the pro-Chinese left (always a bête noire of the KGB). A series of Service A forgeries were used in an attempt to persuade both Mujib and the Bangladeshi media that the Chinese were conspiring with the left-wing opposition.41 The real threat to Mujib, however, came not from Maoists but from his opponents within the armed forces. On 15 August 1975 a group of army officers murdered both him and much of his family. The KGB immediately began an active-measures campaign, predictably inspiring newspaper articles in a series of countries claiming that the coup was the work of the CIA.42 Within twenty-four hours of Mujib’s murder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the first to recognize the new military regime - deluding himself into believing that Bangladesh might now be willing to form a federation with Pakistan. Bhutto was later to repent of his early enthusiasm as it became clear that Bangladesh’s links with New Delhi would remain far closer than those with Islamabad. It also dawned upon him that the coup in Bangladesh might set a bad example to the Pakistani military - as indeed it did.43
During the mid-1970s the KGB substantially increased its influence in the Pakistani media. In 1973, according to KGB statistics, it placed thirty-three articles in the Pakistani press - little more than 1 per cent of the number in India.44 By 1977 the number had risen to 440,45 and the KGB had acquired direct control of at least one periodical.46 The main aim of active-measures operations was, once again, to increase Pakistani distrust of the United States. Disinformation fed to Bhutto’s government claimed that the United States considered Pakistan too unreliable an ally to deserve substantial military aid. Washington was, allegedly, increasingly distrustful of Bhutto’s government and regarded the Shah of Iran as its main regional ally. The Shah was said to be determined to become the leader of the Muslim world and to regard Bhutto as a rival. He was also reported to be scornful of Bhutto’s failure to deal with unrest in Baluchistan and to be willing to send in Iranian troops if the situation worsened. 47
By 1975 the KGB was confident that active measures were having a direct personal influence on Bhutto.48 On 16 November the Soviet ambassador informed him that, in view of ‘the friendly and neighbourly relations between our two countries’, he had been instructed to warn him that the Soviet authorities had information that a terrorist group was planning to assassinate him during his forthcoming visit to Baluchistan. Bhutto was profuse in his thanks for the ambassador’s disinformation:
I was planning to fly to Baluchistan tonight or tomorrow morning for a few days. I shall now cancel the visit to get to the bottom of this matter in order not to put my life at risk. I am particularly conscious of the genuine and friendly relations between our countries at this difficult stage in the political life of Pakistan which is also difficult for me personally. I am doubly grateful to your country and its leaders.49
The KGB reported that Bhutto had also been successfully deceived by disinformation claiming that Iran was planning to detach Baluchistan from Pakistan and had stated as fact supposed Iranian plans to destabilize Pakistan which, in reality, had been fabricated by Service A.50 Agent DVIN was reported to have direct access to Bhutto to feed him further fabrications.51
Despite Bhutto’s susceptibility to Soviet disinformation, however, Moscow continued to regard him as a loose cannon. As one of Bhutto’s ministers and closest advisers, Rafi Raza, later acknowledged, ‘Neither superpower considered him reliable.’ Among the initiatives by Bhutto which annoyed the Kremlin was his campaign for a ‘new economic world order . . . to redress the grave injustice to the poorer nations of the world’. Kept out of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by what amounted to an Indian veto, Bhutto appeared to challenge its authority. On the eve of the NAM summit in Colombo in August 1976, Bhutto published an article entitled ‘Third World - New Direction’, calling for a Third World summit in Islamabad in the spring of 1976 to discuss global economic reform.52 The Centre feared that, by bringing in non-NAM members under Bhutto’s chairmanship, such a summit would damage the prestige of the NAM, which it regarded as an important vehicle for KGB active measures. Following a Politburo resolution condemning Bhutto’s proposal,53 the Centre devised an active-measures operation of almost global dimensions. KGB agents were to inform the current Chair of the NAM, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and other Sri Lankan politicians that Bhutto’s aim was to undermine her personal authority as well as to divide NAM members and weaken the movement’s commitment to anti-imperialism. Disinformation prepared by Service A designed to discredit Bhutto’s initiative was to be forwarded by the local KGB residencies to the governments of Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cyprus, Yemen, Mexico, Venezuela, Iraq, Afghanistan and Nepal. The Centre was also confident that its active measures would persuade President Boumedienne of Algeria to spread the message that an Islamabad conference would weaken the NAM and diminish the influence of ‘progressive’ leaders in the movement. Delegates attending a NAM planning conference in Delhi were to be given statements by Indian groups prepared under KGB guidance condemning Bhutto’s initiative as a threat to the unity of the NAM.54
In the event the Islamabad conference failed to materialize and on 5 July 1977 Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup led by the commander-in-chief of the army, General Zia ul-Haq. On 3 September Bhutto was charged with conspiracy to murder the father of a maverick PPP politician. By now, most of the popular enthusiasm which had swept him to power seven years earlier had been dissipated by his autocratic manner and the corruption of his regime. As one of his most fervent supporters noted in December, ‘It was painful to see that while Bhutto stood trial for murder in Lahore, the people of the city were showing greater interest in the Test match being played there.’55 Bhutto was sentenced to death on 18 March 1978 following a trial of dubious legality and executed on 4 April 1979 after the sentence had been narrowly upheld by the Supreme Court. KGB active measures predictably blamed Bhutto’s overthrow and execution, like that of Mujib, on a CIA conspiracy.56
Neither General Ziaur Rahman (better known as Zia), who by the end of 1976 had emerged as the dominant figure in Bangladesh (initially as Chief Martial Law Administrator and from 1977 as President), nor Zia ul-Haq (also, confusingly, better known as Zia) was favourably regarded in the Kremlin. Both, in the Centre’s view, were far better disposed to Washington than to Moscow. One of Ziaur Rahman’s first actions was to change the constitution by replacing ‘socialism’ as a principle of state with a vaguer commitment to ‘economic justice and equality’. His economic policy was based on encouraging the private sector a
nd privatizing public enterprise. The increased foreign aid desperately needed by Bangladesh, Zia believed, could only be obtained by moving closer to the West (especially the United States), the Muslim world and China. Moscow was visibly affronted. Izvestia complained in 1977 that right-wing and Maoist forces in Bangladesh were conducting a campaign of ‘provocation and vilification against the Soviet Union’ .57 The KGB claimed the credit for organizing a series of protest demonstrations in September and October 1978 against an agreement signed by the Zia regime with Washington permitting the US Peace Corps to operate in Bangladesh.58
According to KGB statistics, active measures in Bangladesh increased from ninety in 1978 to about 200 in 1979, and involved twenty agents of influence. The KGB claimed that in 1979 it planted 101 articles in the press, organized forty-four meetings to publicize disinformation and on twenty-six occasions arranged for Service A forgeries to reach the Bangladesh authorities.59 The dominant theme of the forgeries was CIA conspiracy against the Ziaur Rahman regime. Operation ARSENAL in 1978 brought to the attention of the Directorate of National Security the supposed plotting of a CIA officer (real or alleged) named Young with opposition groups.60 Service A drew some of the inspiration for its forgeries from real plots by the President’s Bangladeshi opponents. During Zia’s five and a half years in power he had to deal with at least seventeen mutinies and attempted coups. In August 1979, for example, a group of officers were arrested in Dhaka and accused of plotting to overthrow him. Two months later Andropov approved an FCD proposal for Service A to fabricate a letter supporting the plotters from Air Vice-Marshal Muhammad Ghulam Tawab, whom Zia had sacked as head of the air force. Other material planted in the Bangladeshi, Indian and Sri Lankan press purported to unmask Tawab as a long-standing CIA agent.61 Service A also forged a letter from a CIA officer in Dhaka to the former Deputy Prime Minister, Moudud Ahmad, assuring him of US support for the right-wing opposition to Zia.62 In 1981 another disinformation operation purported to show that the Reagan administration was plotting Zia’s overthrow and had established secret contact with Khondakar Mustaque Ahmad, who had briefly become President after the assassination of Mujib and had been imprisoned by Zia from 1976 to 1980.63 There is no evidence that KGB active measures had any success in undermining the Zia regime. At the 1979 general election, which was generally considered to have been fairly conducted, Zia’s Bangladesh National Party won 207 of the 300 seats. Zia, however, never succeeded in resolving the problems posed by unrest in the armed forces. After several narrow escapes, he was assassinated while on a visit to Chittagong during an attempted coup led by the local army commander on 29 May 1981.64
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