Book Read Free

The World Was Going Our Way

Page 64

by Christopher Andrew


  Appendix A

  KGB Chairmen, 1917-91

  Appendix B

  Heads of Foreign Intelligence, 1920-2005

  Appendix C

  The Organization of the KGB in the later Cold War

  Source: Desmond Ball and Robert Windren, ‘Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint): Organisation and Management’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 4 (1989), no. 4; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, paperback edition (London: Sceptre, 1991); and Mitrokhin.

  Appendix D

  The Organization of the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)

  Source: Desmond Ball and Robert Windren, ‘Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint): Organisation and Management’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 4 (1989), no. 4; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, paperback edition (London: Sceptre, 1991); and Mitrokhin.

  Appendix E

  The Organization of a KGB Residency

  Notes

  Foreword: Vasili Mitrokhin and His Archive

  1 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 1.

  2 . Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 4.

  3 . Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 Dec. 1966; Reuter reports, 10 Dec. 1966.

  4 . Though Dr Kennedy-Pipe mentions the KGB’s role in the invasion of Afghanistan, she devotes only two sentences to other KGB Cold War operations; Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991, pp. 163-4, 168, 203.

  5 . The article on ‘Intelligence’ is similarly overwhelmingly concerned with US rather than with Soviet or Russian intelligence. Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, pp. 122, 396-7.

  6 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield , ch. 1; there are some further details in the introduction to the paperback edition.

  7 . Russian literature, unsurprisingly, is much richer in winter-forest poetry than English literature. Among the poems which best capture Mitrokhin’s sense of the magic of the winter forest is one by the nineteenth-century Slavophile Fyodor Tyutchev (translated by F. Jude):

  The forest is entranced

  by Winter the Magician.

  Under velvet snow

  it’s mute, immobile, glistening

  wondrously with life,

  standing enchanted,

  neither dead nor alive,

  entranced by a magic dream . . .

  8. When Mitrokhin began his career, the foreign intelligence arms of the MGB and the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) were temporarily combined in the Committee of Information (KI).

  9 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, chs. 19, 20, 2 8.

  10 . Ibid., p. 367- 8.

  11 . Ibid., pp. 10 - 11.

  12 . Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 4.

  13 . Before her retirement, Mrs Mitrokhin had worked as an oto-rhino-laryngologist, attending several medical congresses in the West.

  14 . Mitrokhin later found similar plans in KGB files to injure and end the dancing career of another celebrated defector from the Kirov Ballet, Natalia Makarova. Andrew and Mitrokhin,The Sword and the Shield, pp. 369 - 70.

  15 . On my early meetings with Mitrokhin, see the introduction to the paperback edition of volume 1.

  16 . Further details of the various sections of Mitrokhin’s archive are given in the Bibliography (p. 595). The extensive endnotes make clear the contribution both of the archive and of other sources to each chapter of the book.

  17 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. xviii.

  1. Introduction

  1 . Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy, pp. 16-17.

  2 . Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, ch. 4.

  3 . Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, vol. 3, chs. 84-5; Weiner, ‘Comintern in East Asia’, pp. 168-79; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 126-7.

  4 . Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, vol. 1, pp. 296-307; Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics, pp. 71-3. On Münzenberg’s flair for front organizations, see Andrew and James, ‘Willi Münzenberg, the Reichstag Fire and the Conversion of Innocents’. On Gumede, see Davidson, Filatova, Gorodnov and Johns (eds.), South Africa and the Communist International, vol. 1, p. xxii.

  5 . Though much of the Comintern archive is now open to researchers in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, its intelligence files remain classified.

  6 . McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, p. 145; Davidson, Filatova, Gorodnov and Johns (eds.), South Africa and the Communist International, vol. 1, pp. 19-22.

  7 . See below, pp. 270-71.

  8 . Probably among the first victims, four years before the beginning of the Great Terror, was one of the most able interwar African Communists: Albert Nzula, the first black General Secretary of the Communist Party of South Africa. Jomo Kenyatta recalled seeing him dragged out of a meeting in Moscow, in full view of the participants, by two OGPU officers. He was never seen alive again, and it was officially claimed that he had died from pneumonia after collapsing drunk in the street in sub-zero temperatures. Kenyatta claimed that Nzula’s death had turned him against Communism. Nzula was only twenty-eight at the time of his death. Had he lived, he would undoubtedly have gone on to play a leading role in the early struggle against apartheid. Nzula, Potemkin and Zusmanovich (ed. Cohen), Forced Labour in Colonial Africa, pp. 15-16. (We are grateful for this reference to Professor John Lonsdale.) On other South African victims of the OGPU and NKVD, see Davidson, Filatova, Gorodnov and Johns (eds.), South Africa and the Communist International, vol. 1, pp. 17-21.

  9 . McClellan, ‘Africans and Blacks in the Comintern Schools’, p. 388, n. 64. Though founded by the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs in 1921, the University came under Comintern jurisdiction in 1923.

  10 . Suchkov, ‘Dzhomo Keniata v Moskve’, p. 120.

  11 . McClellan, ‘Africans and Blacks in the Comintern Schools’, pp. 380-81. On Kenyatta’s years in Moscow, see below, p. 424.

  12 . Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy, pp. 19-20, 238-9.

  13 . Fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945-80, p. 85. Professor Fieldhouse provides a notably balanced analysis of African economic history during this period.

  14 . Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 23-4.

  15 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 228.

  16 . Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 427.

  17 . Foot, Bevan, vol. 2, pp. 646-7.

  18 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 240.

  19 . Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 378.

  20 . Khrushchov [sic], World without Arms, vol. 1, pp. 165-7.

  21 . The complaints against Russian racism by African and black American students at the interwar Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow were little publicized; McClellan, ‘Africans and Blacks in the Comintern Schools’.

  22 . Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 16. In 1961 Attwood was appointed US Ambassador to Guinea.

  23 . Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy, pp. 86-7.

  24 . See, e.g., Khrushchov, Communism, vol. 1, p. 152.

  25 . Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 475-6. The tale of Khrushchev’s shoe banging has grown with the telling. It has been wrongly claimed, for example, that he banged his shoe on his desk during an earlier speech to the General Assembly by the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. On that occasion, however, he merely banged his fists repeatedly and suffered a classic Macmillan put-down when the Prime Minister asked to have the banging translated. Though no newsreel film remains of the shoe banging on 13 October 1960, a photo survives of the shoe on Khrushchev’s desk. A KGB report confirms the contemporary account of the shoe banging by Benjamin Welles of the New York Times, though some have since expressed scepticism about the episode. For a summary of the evidence, see Taubman, ‘Nikita Khrushchev and the Shoe’.

  26 . Beschloss, The C
risis Years, p. 60.

  27 . Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 436.

  28 . See below, p. 40.

  29 . On the remarkable achievements of the Soviet intelligence offensive against the United States during the Second World War, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, chs. 6-8.

  30 . Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.

  31 . vol. 1, app. 3.

  32 . Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 404-5. In the pre-Gorbachev era, the International Department was chiefly concerned with relations with foreign Communist parties, other parties and movements. In the Third World, however, it was also involved in state-to-state relations. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 213-14.

  33 . Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 138, 292; Dobrynin, In Confidence , pp. 404-5. Suslov’s increasing age steadily decreased his chances of succeeding Brezhnev. He died in January 1982 at the age of 79, leaving the way open for Andropov to become General Secretary after Brezhnev’s death ten months later.

  34 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 141.

  35 . Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 408, 209-10.

  36 . Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 33-4.

  37 . ‘Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted at the Meeting of Heads of Service [FCD]’, 1 Feb. 1984; Andrew and Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre, p. 7.

  38 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 336, 354-5. ‘Active measures’ ranged from covert media manipulation to assassination.

  39 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 152-4. Many Soviet diplomats were also ‘deeply surprised at America’s acceptance of this final humiliation’; Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 350-51.

  40 . Ford, A Time to Heal, p. 256.

  41 . During a discussion between the ‘free officers’ who seized power in Egypt in 1952, Nasser declared, ‘The people only know British imperialism. Why should we confuse them by talking about the Americans?’ ‘American imperialism’, he said, was ‘a phrase used by the communists only’. El-Din, Memories of a Revolution, p. 60.

  42 . Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy, p. 245.

  43 . Russell, War Crimes in Vietnam, pp. 112, 117-18; Hollander, Anti-Americanism , pp. 347-8, 374-5.

  44 . Warren, Imperialism, p. 1.

  45 . The three volumes of key texts on imperialism edited by Peter Cain and Mark Harrison, though including numerous non-Russian Marxist analyses, contain nothing by any Soviet writer since Lenin.

  46 . Warren, Imperialism, pp. 2-3.

  47 . Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 265, 281-2, 303.

  48 . Soviet Covert Action, p. 69.

  49 . In 1971 Andropov had informed his fellow hard-liner Ustinov that the United States was using the SALT talks to try ‘to preserve definite advantages in the most important kinds of strategic weapons’; Andropov to Ustinov, 19 April 1971, ‘More Documents from the Russian Archives’, p. 69.

  50 . See below, chs. 6, 21 and 25. The KGB was not, however, enthused by the victory of the Khmer Rouge and the establishment of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.

  51 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 131.

  52 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 324.

  53 . Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 116-17.

  54 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 324-6.

  55 . Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy, pp. 271-2.

  56 . vol. 3 pak, app. 3, item 410.

  57 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 402-4.

  58 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch. 14; Holland, ‘The Lie that Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination’.

  59 . According to opinion polls in 1992 on the thirtieth anniversary of Kennedy’s assassination, three-quarters of Americans believed the CIA had murdered the President; Moynihan, Secrecy, pp. 219-20. Oliver Stone’s film version of the conspiracy theory, JFK, was enormously influential. One enthusiastic US historian claimed that JFK probably ‘had a greater impact on public opinion than any other work of art in American history’ save Uncle Tom’s Cabin: Toplin (ed.), Oliver Stone’s USA, p. 174.

  60 . vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.

  61 . See below, p. 326.

  62 . Mitrokhin, ‘KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia’, pp. 193-4.

  63 . Bittman, The Deception Game, p. 23.

  64 . Moscow News, 1992, no. 25.

  65 . Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. 2, p. 641.

  66 . vol. 6, ch. 14, part 4. Oliver Tambo, Chairman of the African National Congress (ANC), for example, sent congratulations to the CPSU ‘and Leonid Brezhnev personally’ on ‘their unparalleled record of historic achievements . . . The latest of these achievements is the new constitution of the USSR; its provisions constitute yet one more triumph for the ideas of the Great October Soviet Revolution.’ BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts , 5 Nov. 1977, reporting English-language broadcasts from Moscow of 3 Nov. 1977.

  67 . k-9, 82. Brezhnev, unlike any of the other recipients, received two copies. The daily digest appears to have been instituted by Andropov in order to heighten the leadership’s appreciation of the KGB’s achievements abroad. Mitrokhin, who had a low opinion of the quality of the invariably politically correct Soviet intelligence analysis, did not note the contents of any of the daily digests. On the delivery of intelligence reports to the political leadership, see Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 130.

  68 . Nechiporenko, ‘Na rodine atstekov’, pp. 173-4.

  69 . Some senior KGB officers also aspired to chests full of medals. Vadim Kirpichenko, for example, who became first deputy head of foreign intelligence in 1991, chose for the front cover of his memoirs, Razvedka: litsa i lichnosti, published in 1998, a colour photograph of himself in full-dress general’s uniform with the left side of his chest entirely covered in decorations; as of 1998 there was still space for a few more medals on the right.

  70 . k-3, 300.

  71 . For the lyrics of ‘Happy Birthday, Leonid Brezhnev’, see http://baez.woz.org/Lyrics/brezhnev.html.

  72 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 120-22.

  73 . Ibid., pp. 124-6.

  74 . See below, p. 479.

  75 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 129-31.

  76 . Interview with Vadim Kirpichenko, Vremia Novostei, 20 Dec. 2004.

  77 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p.555. Izvestia, 24 Sept. 1991.

  78 . See below, pp. 81, 83, 155.

  79 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 585.

  80 . Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 698.

  81 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 318-19, 333.

 

‹ Prev