82 . Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976’, p. 21.
83 . Gates, From the Shadows, p. 116.
2. Latin America: Introduction
1 . Reagan, An American Life, pp. 239, 474.
2 . Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, vol. 3, p. 958.
3 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 86-8.
4 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, p. 6.
5 . A few Latin American Communist parties had received subsidies in the Comintern era. The first Cold War subsidy secretly delivered by the KGB was to the Chilean Party in 1955. A similar payment was made to the Uruguayan Party in the following year. In 1957 the Chilean, Mexican and Argentinian parties received subsidies. The number of recipients increased substantially during the next two decades. Ulianova and Fediakova, ‘Algunos aspectos de la ayuda financiera del Partido Comunista de la URSS al comunismo chileno durante la guerra fría’.
6 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 60.
7 . Hollander, Political Pilgrims, pp. 224-5, 231-2, 237.
8 . Talbott (ed.), Khrushchev Speaks, pp. 490-91. Khrushchev identifies the KGB resident, Alekseyev, only by his cover profession as a journalist.
9 . Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
10 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 112.
11 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, chs. 6-9. Ferguson, Colossus, p. 103.
12 . Hollander, Anti-Americanism, pp. 264-5.
13 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 487-93.
14 . Seventeen per cent found the United States the ‘most unappealing’ country, 14 per cent Chile and 10 per cent the Soviet Union. The most admired country was Cuba (20.5 per cent), followed by France, then with a socialist government (12 per cent). Hollander, Anti-Americanism, ch. 9.
15 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 631.
16 . Hollander, Anti-Americanism, p. 363.
3. ‘The Bridgehead’, 1959-1969
1 . The full versions of Latin American names follow the Spanish system of given name, then patronym, followed by mother’s surname. Shorter versions give only the patronym.
2 . Quirk, Fidel Castro, p. 684; Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
3 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 469; Deas, ‘Spectacle of the Rats and Owls’.
4 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, pp. 12-13.
5 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 29.
6 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 469.
7 . Courtois et al., Le livre noir du communisme, pp. 711-12.
8 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 469; Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, p. 37. Leonov claims that he did not become a KGB officer until 1958. It is difficult to believe, however, that he had no earlier association with the KGB.
9 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, p. 25.
10 . Balfour, Castro, ch. 4; Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution , pp. 20-21, 248-9.
11 . Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa, pp. 340-41. Ashby, Bear in the Backyard, pp. 23-4.
12 . Alekseyev’s original surname had been Shitov but he was generally known within the KGB by the codename (or ‘workname’) ALEKSEYEV, which he had adopted during the Great Patriotic War. Szulc, Fidel, pp. 408-9. Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, pp. 25-9; Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, pp. 20-21.
13 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 47-55.
14 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, pp. 44-7.
15 . Sejna, We Will Bury You, pp. 45-50. General Sejna was in charge of the arrangements for Raúl Castro’s visit. He misremembers the date as 1959 rather than 1960.
16 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 57-9.
17 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, pp. 46, 62-3; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 71-2; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 471.
18 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 60. On the structure of the FCD, see Appendix D.
19 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, pp. 51-5; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 180 - 1, 607 - 8(n. 31).
20 . Geyer, Guerrilla Prince, p. 222.
21 . Castañeda, Compañero, pp. 146-7, 188-9.
22 . Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 65-6.
23 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 257-67; Thomas, Cuba, ch. 106.
24 . Shelepin to Khrushchev, Memorandum no. 1861-Sh, 29 July 1961. Decree no. 191/75-GS; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Cf. Zubok, ‘Spy vs. Spy’, pp. 28-30; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 253-5.
25 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Fonseca was co-founder of the FSLN, initially called the National Liberation Front. ‘Sandinista’ was added, chiefly at Fonseca’s insistence, in 1962 in honour of the interwar anti-imperialist hero, General Augusto César Sandino.
26 . Quoted in Valenta and Durán (eds.), Conflict in Nicaragua, pp. 7, 72-3. Hodges, Intellectual Origins of the Nicaraguan Revolution, pp. 161-7.
27 . ‘Inside Perspective on the Legacy of Che Guevara: Piñeiro’s Last Interview’; Manuel Piñeiro Losada became head of the DGI on its creation in 1961. http://pw1.netcom.com/~hhenke/news4.htm.
28 . Zimmermann, Sandinista, pp. 183, 193.
29 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. In 1945 Torres (PIMEN) had been exiled from Nicaragua to Guatemala, where he occupied a succession of posts in the Ministry of Education until the overthrow in 1954 of the left-wing regime of President Jacobo Arbenz Gúzman in a coup organized by the CIA.
30 . Zimmermann, Sandinista, pp. 55, 87, 94.
31 . Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify LOT.
32 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
33 . Ibid.; t-7, 320.
34 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
35 . Ibid.
36 . Ibid.
37 . Interview with Piñeiro, Tricontinental [Cuba], Dec. 1997. On the organization of the DGI, see FAS Intelligence Resource Program: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/cuba/dgi/ .
38 . k-11, p.170. In the mid-1950s Grinchenkohad to be withdrawn successively from the United States and France after breaches of security (Andrew andMitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 170). Thereafter he seems to have been used as an illegal trainer.
39 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, pp. 172-89; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp.72-3; Andrew and Mitrokhin,The Sword and the Shield, pp. 237-41; Castañeda, Compañero, pp. 182- 4.
40 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, p. 292; Castañeda, Compañero, p. 229.
41 . Quirk, Fidel Castro, pp. 456-70.
42 . Speech by Castro in Red Square, 28 April 1963. The text of this and other of his speeches cited in this chapter is available on the Castro database http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html.
43 . Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964, p. 724.
44 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 511.
45 . Castañeda, Compañero, pp. 236-41. On Che’s ineffective attempts to spread revolution in Africa, see below, pp. 433-4.
46 . Borge, ‘La formación del FSLN’, p. 31; Black, Triumph of the People, pp. 47, 77-8.
47 . Mitrokhin’s notes identify PIMEN as ‘one of the leaders of the ISKRA Group’, but his exact relationship with it is unclear; t-7, 320.
48 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5; t-7, 318, 320.
49 . Fursenko and Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’, p. 353.
50 . Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, p. 94.
51 . Castañeda, Compañero, pp. 331-4.
52 . Mitrokhin’s notes contain statistics on the passports and identity documents used by 327 of the Cuban illegals deployed through Czechoslovakia between 1962 and 1966. Of these, 140 were Venezuelan, 70 Dominican, 60 Argentinian, 50 Colombian, 5 Peruvian, one American and one British (k-20, 61). During a visit to Moscow in 1972, the deputy head of the Cuban Illegals Directorate told
the KGB, ‘In the past, the Cuban illegal operations had primarily engaged in helping the nationalist freedom movement in the Latin American countries . . .’ (k-20, 62).
53 . k-11, 130.
54 . Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, pp. 285-93.
55 . Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 116.
56 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5; t-7, 318, 320.
57 . Black, Triumph of the People, pp. 80-81.
58 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5; t-7, 318, 320.
59 . Pezzullo and Pezzullo, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 111-15.
60 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 251-2.
61 . Castañeda, Compañero, ch. 10.
62 . Gerassi (ed.), The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, p. 268.
63 . Ashby, Bear in the Backyard, p. 46; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 512-13.
64 . Castañeda, Compañero, chs. 10, 11; Quirk, Fidel Castro, chs. 19, 20; Ryan, The Fall of Che Guevara.
65 . Balfour, Castro, p. 90. Quirk, Fidel Castro, pp. 590-91.
66 . vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 363- 4.
67 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, chs. 15, 16.
68 . Speech by Castro, 26 August 1968.
69 . Quirk, Fidel Castro, ch. 20.
70 . Lockwood, Castro’s Cuba, Cuba’s Fidel, p. 260.
71 . Quirk, Fidel Castro, pp. 601-3, 649.
72 . Hollander, Political Pilgrims, pp. 260-61.
73 . Levinson and Brightman (eds.), Venceremos Brigade; quotation from p. 31.
74 . Ibid., p. 249.
75 . k-20, 62.
76 . Amuchastegui, ‘Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis’, p. 110.
77 . [US] Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, testimony of Orlando Castro Hidalgo, 16 Oct. 1969, pp. 1423-9; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, pp. 11, 24.
78 . Ashby, Bear in the Backyard, pp. 57-8; FAS Intelligence Resource Program: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/cuba/dgi/.
4. ‘Progressive’ Regimes and ‘Socialism with Red Wine’
1 . Minute by Andropov, 5 Jan. 1972; k-22, 92.
2 . k-22, 64.
3 . Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’.
4 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, p. 26.
5 . Ibid., ch. 4.
6 . The analysis of the role of the IPC and other US-owned businesses in Peru in Clayton, Peru and the United States, ch. 7, provides a convincing case study of the inadequacy of dependency theory.
7 . Compensation, however, was agreed five years later.
8 . Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, pp. 243-61. On the Velasco regime’s reform programme, see McClintock and Lowenthal (eds.), The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered.
9 . Leonov, ‘La inteligencia soviética en América Latina durante la guerra fría’; Leonov, Likholet’e, pp. 108-11.
10 . Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, pp. 243-61; Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, ch. 4.
11 . t-7, 192. Operations officers in the Lima residency increased in number from two on its foundation in 1969 to twenty in 1976; k-22, 184.
12 . k-22, 233.
13 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, p. 92.
14 . k-22, 226.
15 . k-22, 31.
16 . k-22, 42. By 1972 the residency had five Line PR agents and nine confidential contacts. Three years later Line PR was running ten agents. k-22, 21, 99, 184.
17 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 328-9.
18 . k-22, 184, 192, 233. The CPSU Central Committee resolution was No. P 7/77-OP, dated 14 June 1971.
19 . k-22, 188.
20 . k-22, 74.
21 . k-22, 233.
22 . k-22, 99.
23 . k-22, 184, 202. A KGB memorandum (No. 979-A) setting out details of co-operation with Peruvian military intelligence was approved by the CPSU Central Committee on 22 April 1975; k-22, 184. Gallegos has been described as ‘the “model” Peruvian army progressive of the Velasco era’. From 1974 to 1976 he was Minister of Agriculture, charged with overseeing the programme of agrarian reform. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, p. 249.
24 . k-22, 225.
25 . k-22, 99.
26 . k-22, 184.
27 . k-22, 233.
28 . k-22, 188.
29 . k-22, 99.
30 . k-22, 187, 188.
31 . k-22, 233.
32 . Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, pp. 258-9; Rudolph, Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis, p. 58.
33 . k-22, 99.
34 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 88n., 90, 329.
35 . Klarén, Peru, pp. 359-65.
36 . t-7, 192. Maoism in Peru, however, was far from dead. During the 1980s Sendero Luminoso established itself as the world’s most aggressive Maoist guerrilla force, responsible for approximately 25,000 deaths.
37 . Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, ch. 6; Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, ch. 12.
38 . k-22, 287-8.
39 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 272-3.
40 . k-22, 290.
41 . Ibid.
42 . Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile, pp. 258, 262-3, 330-31; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, pp. 114-18.
43 . k-22, 46.
44 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 162 - 3, 357 - 8.
45 . Bird, Costa Rica, p. 133.
46 . k-22, 46. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of whether or how the loan was repaid.
47 . t-7, 126.
48 . Figueres’s file describes the confidant as his ‘trusted representative’; t-7, 126.
49 . t-7, 126.
50 . k-22, 79.
51 . t-7, 126.
52 . k-22, 79.
53 . Record of conversation on 15 August 1976 between Piñeiro and Vladimir Konstantinovich Tolstikov, then head of the FCD’s Second Department; k-22, 9-11, 39.
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