33 . Among those with whom the KGB lost contact after the Six-Day War were the agents DITA and GRANT and the confidential contact BOY, a Mapam (Israeli Labour Party) journalist; k-14, 538-9, 541.
34 . Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 257.
35 . Sachar, A History of Israel, pp. 735-7.
36 . Memorandum by Andropov and Gromyko, dated 10 June 1968 and approved by Central Committee on same date; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, pp. 65-6.
37 . Statistics of Jewish emigration cited in this chapter are taken from Ro’i (ed.), Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union, p. 359.
38 . Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration’, pp. 51-6; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, p. 359.
39 . Andropov to Central Committee, enclosing report by F. D. Bobkov, head of the KGB Fifth Directorate (Dissidents and Ideological Subversion), 17 May 1971; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, p. 6.
40 . Excerpt from Politburo minutes, 20 March 1973; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, pp. 170-76.
41 . See above, p. 160.
42 . Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 193-4. Kalugin is probably referring to agents infiltrated into Israel after the breach of diplomatic relations. Klingberg, who had emigrated to Palestine in 1947, continued to provide significant intelligence until his arrest in 1983.
43 . Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 257.
44 . t-7, 290.
45 . vol. 7, app. 2, 40; k-19, 407; k-16, 76-7; k-18, 135; t-7, 5.
46 . k-19, 407; k-16, 75. The spelling of Linov’s alias is unclear; Mitrokhin’s notes refer to both ‘Motl’ and ‘Mottl’.
47 . k-14, 39; k-12, 448.
48 . vol. 6, app. 1, p. 590.
49 . k-12, 339, 449.
50 . t-3, 46; k-12, 10.
51 . k-14, 116; k-16, 74.
52 . KIM left for the United States, where he remained in contact with the KGB through correspondence containing secret writing and microdots sent to accommodation addresses. In December 1979 he failed to turn up for a meeting in Vienna with G. P. Kapustyan, deputy head of FCD Department 18 (Israel and the Middle East), and may subsequently have broken contact with the KGB; vol. 6, app. 1, p. 590.
53 . k-12, 448.
54 . k-12, 44.
55 . k-14, 116.
56 . k-16, 75.
57 . k-11, 56; the dates at which YASAI’s deployment to Israel was first decided and then cancelled are unclear.
58 . k-16, 536; k-24, 76; Time, 16 Sept. 1974.
59 . k-9, 237.
60 . Memorandum by Andropov, 5 June 1975; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, pp. 214-15.
61 . Andropov, ‘Personal for Comrade Chernenko’, No. 547-A, 11 March 1975. We are grateful to Vladimir Bukovsky for supplying us with a photocopy of this top-secret communication from his personal collection of KGB documents found in the Kremlin archives.
62 . Memorandum by Andropov, 5 June 1975; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, pp. 214-15.
63 . Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 375. Shevchenko defected in 1978.
64 . A useful chronology of the Jewish Defense League’s activities is to be found on the website of the Anti-Defamation League: www.adl.org/extremism/jdf.
65 . vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
66 . Ibid.; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 23 8.
67 . k-25, 148.
68 . Ibid.
69 . vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, p. 469.
70 . Jakobovits, ‘If Only My People . . .’, ch. 5.
71 . The codenames of the agents were VOSTOKOV, LVOV, SHIROKIKH, LEVIN, SERGEI, GNOM, ILYIN, MARK, ELEKTRON, PROFESSOR and PETROV; k-25, 153.
72 . Jakobovits, ‘If Only My People . . .’, p. 43.
73 . k-25, 153.
74 . Jakobovits, ‘If Only My People . . .’, p. 54.
75 . Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 348.
76 . Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration’, pp. 52-3.
77 . Politburo minutes, 22 June 1978; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, pp. 228-9.
78 . Shcharansky, Fear No Evil, pp. 205-6, 224-5.
79 . Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 399-400. Shcharansky was freed and allowed to emigrate in 1986; see below, p. 244.
80 . Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration’, p. 53.
81 . Memorandum by Andropov, 10 May 1981; Morozov (ed.), Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration, pp. 238-9 (cf. pp. 236-8, 241-5).
82 . See below, pp. 131-2.
83 . k-9, 112.
84 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 91-8.
85 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 7.
86 . Ibid., p. 19.
87 . Oleg Gordievsky heard Zamoysky put these views in an address to the London KGB residency in January 1985. Zamoysky’s conspiracy theories about the Freemasons, who, he claimed, ‘have always controlled the upper echelons of government in Western countries’, especially the United States (‘the most “Masonic” country of all’), were published in 1989 in his book, Behind the Facade of the Masonic Temple.
88 . Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 331-2.
89 . Ro’i, ‘Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration’, pp. 62, 67 n. 56.
90 . Salitan, ‘Soviet Emigration Policy, 1968-89’, pp. 77-8, 85 n. 38.
91 . Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 86.
92 . Lewin-Epstein, Ro’i and Ritterbrand (eds.), Russian Jews on Three Continents, appendix, p. 451.
13. Middle Eastern Terrorism and the Palestinians
1 . See above, pp. 48, 53.
2 . Codename in k-24, 344.
3 . Follain, Jackal, pp. 20-21.
4 . Mitrokhin’s mixture of notes on and extracts from Haddad’s file (no. 90248) reveals that the KGB’s first contact with Haddad occurred in 1968 but does not identify the month; k-24, 365, para. 50.
5 . k-24, 365, para. 51.
6 . Follain, Jackal, p. 22.
7 . k-24, 365, paras. 28-44; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 380-2.
8 . k-24, 365, paras. 1-24; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 380-2.
9 . vol. 6, app. 1, p. 610.
10 . k-24, 59; vol. 6, app. 1, p. 610. It has not proved possible to confirm the English spelling of Korda’s name, which appears in the FCD file in Cyrillic transliteration.
11 . vol. 6, app. 1, p. 610.
12 . Though the KGB accepted this arrangement, it had some reservations from the point of view of security about leaving the choice of the location for these meetings to Haddad; k-24, 365, para. 52.
13 . k-24, 365, para. 50.
14 . Follain, Jackal, pp. 26-8; Dobson and Payne, War without End, p. 242.
15 . Mortin to Andropov, no. 164/1430, 24 June 1971; k-24, 365, paras. 25, 45-8.
16 . Dobson and Payne, War without End, p. 160.
17 . PLO codename in k-24, 344.
18 . k-24, 360. By 1980 Arafat’s codename had been changed to BESKOV; vol. 2, ch. 6, para. 47.
19 . Rubin and Rubin, Yasir Arafat, pp. 42-3. Arafat told a Western intelligence officer that he had first visited Moscow in the 1950s as part of a student delegation.
20 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 547-8.
21 . GIDAR had been recruited in Moscow in 1968 (possibly during Arafat’s visit, though this is not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes); k-24, 338, 341. Hart, Arafat (p. 4), refers to Hasan as ‘Arafat’s most trusted adviser’.
22 . k-24, 360. During his first open visit to Moscow in 1970 Arafat was received not by representatives of the Soviet government or Communist Party but by a front organization, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee; Barron, KGB, p. 77.
23 . Rubin and Rubin, Yasir Arafat, ch. 1.
24 . Pacepa, Red Horizons, chs. 1-2. Pacepa defected to the United States in 1978.
25 . k-24, 361.
26 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 547-8. See illustrations.
27 . Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, p. 112.
28 . Andropov to Brezhnev, no. 1071, A/OV, 23 April 1975. Manuscript notes on the document record that five other members of the Politburo (Suslov, Podgorny, Kosygin, Grechko and Gromyko) had also been informed, and that approval had been given on 26 April. We are grateful to Vladimir Bukovsky for supplying us with a photocopy of this top-secret communication from his personal collection of KGB documents found in the Kremlin archives.
29 . k-24, 365, paras 54-7. KGB operations in the 1970s to liquidate defectors, whether directly or through the use of proxies, appear to have achieved nothing of significance. The Centre was unwilling either to abandon its traditional policy of executing ‘traitors’ who had fled abroad or to take the risks necessary to ensure their execution; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, ch. 23.
30 . k-24, 365, paras. 57-8. Andropov to Brezhnev, no. 1218, A/OV, 16 May 1975. (We are grateful to Vladimir Bukovsky for supplying us with a photocopy of this top-secret communication from his personal collection of KGB documents found in the Kremlin archives. Mitrokhin noted only a summary of the copy in the FCD archives.)
31 . k-24, 365, para. 60.
32 . k-14, 141.
33 . Ibid.; k-24, 351.
34 . k-24, 346.
35 . Mitrokhin noted a further reference to ‘co-operation’ with the DFLP and PFLP-GC in 1977; k-19, 313. His notes contain no reference to later contacts with Hawatmeh and Jibril.
36 . Mitrokhin’s notes record that the KGB was informed of Haddad’s plans for ‘a petroleum war’, but give no further details; k-24, 365, para. 61.
37 . Follain, Jackal, ch. 1.
38 . Had Carlos ever been either an agent or confidential contact, this fact would doubtless have been recorded, following Mitrokhin’s normal practice, when Mitrokhin noted his file. The only details noted by Mitrokhin relating to Carlos’s period at the Lumumba University were his affair with a Cuban student, Sonia Marine Oriola (by whom, though Mitrokhin’s brief notes do not mention this, he had a daughter), and his involvement in a 1969 Moscow demonstration which broke windows at the Iranian embassy; k-3, 67, 133.
39 . Follain, Jackal, chs. 1-4; quotation from p. 9.
40 . Ibid., chs. 5, 6.
41 . The course syllabus covered intelligence, counter-intelligence, US intelligence agencies, interrogation, operational equipment, surveillance, organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare, leadership protection, mines, sabotage, military training, Marxism-Leninism, transmission, storage and destruction of secret documents, use of containers, and photography; k-26, 202. Though not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes, similar courses were probably arranged in subsequent years.
42 . k-24, 365, paras. 61-3.
43 . k-8, 617.
44 . k-24, 365, para. 64.
45 . k-8, 617.
46 . vol. 6, app. 1, p. 610. On KGB collaboration with Yunis, see above, p. 248.
47 . k-24, 365, para. 65. After Haddad’s death, his terrorist group fragmented. His former chief lieutenant, Salim Abu Salem (aka Abu Muhammad) founded a breakaway PFLP-Special Command (not to be confused with Jibril’s PFLP-General Command), which over the next few years specialized in attacks on Jewish targets, among them in 1980 a Paris synagogue and the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi (Dobson and Payne, War without End, pp. 160-61).
48 . k-3, 67.
49 . Follain, Jackal, pp. 117, 186-9. Carlos was eventually expelled from Syria in 1991. After a trial in France in 1997, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
50 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 553-4. Qaddafi had earlier provoked the ire of the Centre after publicly endorsing Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet advisers and condemning the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty in 1972. On that occasion the FCD implemented active measures against him; k-2, 298. Mitrokhin noted few files on Libyan matters. The only KGB agent inside the Libyan intelligence community identified in his notes was SERY, who broke contact in 1972; k-14, 434.
51 . k-24, 356. Mitrokhin’s notes record that Abu Iyad provided intelligence on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, but give no details. Markus Wolf acknowledges that he was initially impressed when Abu Iyad ‘boasted of his contacts at the heart of the US government, NATO, and the arms trade’, but was subsequently generally disappointed by the quality of the intelligence which he provided; Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 270.
52 . k-14, 143.
53 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 550.
54 . The 1981 report was one of a number captured by the Israelis; Adams, The Financing of Terror, pp. 48-9.
55 . k-3, 68.
56 . Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, p. 130.
57 . Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 271.
58 . Shlaim, The Iron Wall, ch. 10.
59 . Ganor, ‘Syria and Terrorism’; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 403. Mitrokhin did not see Abu Nidal’s file.
60 . Rubin, Transformation of Palestinian Politics, pp. 4-5.
61 . Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, p. 147; Vassiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East, pp. 318-19.
14. Asia: Introduction
1 . Kim Il Sung’s refusal to defer to Moscow was not accompanied by strident denunciations of Soviet revisionism on the Chinese model. From the early 1960s he found himself courted by both Moscow and Beijing, and generally tried to avoid taking sides. The lowest point in Kim’s relations with the PRC came during the Cultural Revolution when Chinese loudspeakers along the entire length of the Korean border broadcast denunciations of North Korean ‘revisionism’ and there were a number of unpublicized border clashes; Schäfer, ‘Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict’, documents 6, 8.
2 . Sebag Montefiore, Stalin, pp. 618-20.
3 . Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?”’; Andrew and Elkner, ‘Stalin and Intelligence’, pp. 83-4.
4 . See below, pp. 272-3.
5 . Chin et al., ‘New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia’, p. 450.
6 . See below, p. 286.
7 . Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. 2, p. 535.
8 . See below, pp. 298-9.
9 . k-27, 498.
10 . Gromyko wrote in January 1967 in a memorandum approved by the Politburo, ‘We should go on rendering comprehensive assistance to the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] in consolidating its defence capacity to resist the [US] aggression, without getting directly involved in the war.’ Dobrynin, In Confidence, appendix, p. 641.
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