70 . Israel, South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom, p. 172.
71 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, pp. 151-74; Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid, ch. 2; Johnson, South Africa, pp. 169-72.
72 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, pp. 105-6, 110-11; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 559.
73 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, pp. 37-8.
74 . On Cunhal see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 283-4.
75 . Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, pp. 235-40. Nazhestkin’s assessment was very similar to that of a senior Portuguese army officer who admired Neto’s ‘generous idea’ and ‘struggles against fascism and colonialism’ but doubted his ‘ability to lead the country through such a complex [independence] struggle’; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 236.
76 . Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, pp. 165-7.
77 . k-12, 269.
78 . Kirpichenko, Razvedka, pp. 205-8.
79 . Politburo resolution No. P-46/KLU of 10 July 1967 and USSR Council of Ministers resolution No. 1657 RS of 10 July 1967; k-14, 38.
80 . k-14, 599.
81 . Finnegan, A Complicated War, pp. 108-13.
82 . Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, pp. 240-41.
83 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, pp. 38-40; Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, pp. 99-100, 165-7; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p 243.
84 . Finnegan, A Complicated War, p. 111.
85 . Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements, p. 270.
86 . k-12, 600.
87 . k-17, 113.
88 . Ibid.
89 . Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the SRC was a clan-based regime, sometimes derisively referred to by the acronym MOD: M for Mareehaan (Siad Barre’s clan); O for Ogaden (the clan of Siad Barre’s mother); and D for Dulbahante (the clan of Siad Barre’s son-in-law, Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah, head of the NSS). These three clans dominated the government.
90 . k-17, 113.
91 . Ibid. Whether KERL was an agent or a confidential contact is unclear.
92 . k-17, 113-14. Ironically, there was speculation at the time that Ainanche and Kedie were executed ‘on the strong advice’ of Moscow; Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 121.
93 . Ghalib, The Cost of Dictatorship, p. 127.
94 . vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
95 . Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, pp. 113-14, 180-86.
96 . ‘Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78’, p. 58.
25. From Optimism to Disillusion
1 . FNLA’s main support came from the Kikongo-speaking people in the north, UNITA’s from Umbundu speakers in the central plateau. Though the MPLA had a more national appeal, its strongest base was among Kimbundu-speaking people around the capital, Luanda.
2 . Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, p. 245.
3 . Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, pp. 99-100. On Cunhal and the KGB, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 283-4.
4 . k-14, 601.
5 . Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis’, pp. 24-5; Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, pp. 245-6. On Castro and Angola, see above, pp. 95-6.
6 . Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 365.
7 . Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis’, pp. 25-6.
8 . According to Dobrynin: ‘The Soviet Foreign Ministry had nothing to do with our initial involvement in Angola and looked at it with some scepticism. ’ Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 362.
9 . Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, pp. 246-55.
10 . Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 411-17; Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 65-9.
11 . Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 364.
12 . Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, p. 105.
13 . Ibid., p. 113.
14 . Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis’, pp. 28, 32 n. 60.
15 . Courtois et al., Le livre noir du communisme, pp. 757-63; Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 265-6.
16 . Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, p. 170.
17 . k-18, 202. VOMUS’s case officers in the Luanda residency were Sergei Bodrinskikh and Valentin Yevsenin.
18 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, p. 59.
19 . Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, pp. 239-41.
20 . Westad, ‘Moscow and the Angolan Crisis’, p. 28.
21 . Nazhestkin, ‘V ognennom kol’tse blokady’, pp. 240-41.
22 . k-14, 601.
23 . Cabrita, Mozambique, part II, chs. 3-6, part III, ch. 4; Courtois et al., Le livre noir du communisme, pp. 763-7; Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 265-6. During a restructuring of SNASP in 1977, the main responsibility for training its personnel passed from the Stasi to the Cubans; Cabrita, Mozambique, pp. 90-91.
24 . Krause, ‘Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa’.
25 . vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, p. 320.
26 . Significantly, the FCD directive came one month after a visit to Moscow by a high-level Ethiopian delegation.
27 . Orizio, Talk of the Devil, pp. 144-5.
28 . Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 151.
29 . Ibid., p. 173.
30 . Ibid., ch. 5.
31 . Lefort, Ethiopia, p. 257.
32 . Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, pp. 195-6.
33 . Courtois et al., Le livre noir du communisme, pp. 748-57; Orizio, Talk of the Devil, p. 151.
34 . ‘Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78’, pp. 79-81.
35 . Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, pp. 202-3.
36 . The Soviet Union cut off aid to a secessionist group in the north, the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF), a more genuinely Marxist movement than any in Ethiopia; Donham, Marxist Modern, pp. 136-7.
37 . Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, ch. 6.
38 . Ottaway and Ottaway, Afrocommunism, p. 175.
39 . Ehrlich, ‘The Soviet Union and Ethiopia’; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 560.
40 . k-14, 260.
41 . Orizio, Talk of the Devil, pp. 150-51; Lefort, Ethiopia, p. 226.
42 . Though Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the information provided by DYUK on the policy of Mengistu and the Derg, he was clearly regarded as an important source. DYUK was given an ISKANDER signal device concealed in the handle of a souvenir knife with which to make contact with the Addis Ababa residency. He had three case officers in the mid-1970s: I. I. Muzykin, A. I. Oroshko, and I. Ya. Pavlovsky; k-12, 528. Other apparently disillusioned KGB agents included the diplomats KHARIS and STRELOK. k-12, 251; vol. 6, app. 1, part 27.
43 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, p. 123.
44 . k-18, 413. On the ZAPU War Council, see Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’, p. 54.
45 . k-17, 27.
46 . k-12, 540.
47 . k-12, 543.
48 . k-17, 28.
49 . k-12, 124. The KGB’s other confidential contacts in ZAPU were LOR, a ZAPU official who was in Moscow in 1973 and was subsequently based in Tanzania (k-12, 540); COLLINS, a radio announcer (k-12, 486); MODEST (k-18, 165) and YAN (k-14, 66), both of the ZAPU External Relations Department.
50 . Nkomo, Nkomo, pp. 175-6; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 559. There is no mention of Solodovnikov in the Mitrokhin material.
51 . Turner, Continent Ablaze, ch. 1; Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War. For a more sympathetic assessment of ZAPU military strategy, see Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’; Bhebe and Ranger (eds.), Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, pp. 7-16.
52 . Flower, Serving Secretly, pp. 173, 185-6.
53 . Dabengwa’s correspondence with Andropov was later discovered, along with secret arms caches, by Zimbabwean
security forces. Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid, p. 104.
54 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 559.
55 . In 1966 the UN General Assembly voted to terminate South Africa’s mandate. Five years later, the International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa’s continued occupation was a violation of international law.
56 . Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements, pp. 272-3. Small-scale Soviet support for SWAPO had begun a decade earlier.
57 . k-14, 492; KASTONO believed he had been recruited by the GRU rather than the KGB.
58 . k-27, 486; GRANT became increasingly reluctant to operate as a KGB agent and was discovered to be working for the East Germans. KGB contact with him was suspended, probably in 1982.
59 . Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements, pp. 272-3.
60 . Turner, Continent Ablaze, p. 99 n. 13.
61 . Leys and Saul (eds.), Namibia’s Liberation Struggle, pp. 55-6, 104-6.
62 . Turner, Continent Ablaze, pp. 69-84.
63 . ‘How to Master Secret Work’: www.sacp.org.za/docs/history/secretwork.
64 . Slovo had been an uncompromising supporter of the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. He informed an SACP militant who, after she had visited Hungary in 1955, told him of the corruption and cynicism of the pro-Soviet regime, that she had turned into a reactionary, ‘as if that epithet absolved him from any further discussion’. Israel, South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom, p. 149.
65 . Obadi was killed in a South African cross-border raid in Mozambique in January 1981. Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid, pp. 105-7.
66 . k-17, 30.
67 . k-17, 29.
68 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 560-61.
69 . Ibid., p. 561.
70 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 100-102. ‘A girl’s best friend. Claudia Wright explores the often secret relationship between US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and South Africa’ (with photograph of the forged letter to Kirkpatrick), New Statesman, 5 Nov. 1982. See illustrations.
71 . Godwin Matatu, ‘US and S. Africa in Angola Plot’ (with photograph of part of the forged document), Observer, 22 Jan. 1984; Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 138-9. See illustrations.
72 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630.
73 . See above, p. 340.
74 . See below, pp. 471, 473-4.
75 . Kirpichenko, Razvedka, p. 209.
76 . Kempton, Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa, pp. 68-9.
77 . Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 265.
78 . Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 373, 416-17.
79 . Sampson, Mandela, p. 332.
80 . Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 66-7.
81 . Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 562.
82 . Campbell, ‘Soviet Policy in Southern Africa’, pp. 208-9.
83 . Ibid., p. 228.
84 . See above, p. 135.
85 . Johnson, South Africa, p. 199.
86 . Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, chs. 97-8. Mandela did not formally become President of the ANC, in succession to Oliver Tambo, until Tambo stood down in July 1991.
87 . Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country; Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle.
88 . Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 113.
26. Conclusion
1 . vol. 1, app. 3. Soviet academic experts were equally optimistic. Yuri Semenov wrote in 1980 that as a result of the help provided by the Soviet Union and other ‘socialist countries’ to former colonial states, ‘many of them have adopted a socialist orientation and have entered on the path of non-capitalist development. The existence of a world socialist system provides the nations which are retarded in their development with a realistic possibility of a transition to socialism, which by-passes the long and tormented route by which mankind as a whole has passed.’ Semenov, ‘The Theory of Socio-economic Foundations and World History’, p. 52.
2 . Gates, From the Shadows, p. 174.
3 . See above, p. 121.
4 . See above, pp. 132-3.
5 . Boldin, Ten Years that Shook the World, p. 40. Boldin later became Gorbachev’s chief of staff, but took part in the unsuccessful coup against him in August 1991.
6 . Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 186-7; Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 330-31. On the political jokes of the Brezhnev era, see ‘Our Great Leaders and Teachers’: www.nctimes.net.
7 . In May 1982 Andropov left the KGB for the Central Committee Secretariat to displace his main rival for the succession, Konstantin Chernenko, a long-time Brezhnev crony, apparatchik and sycophant, as effectively second Party secretary to Brezhnev. Proof is lacking for suggestions that Brezhnev favoured Chernenko as his successor.
8 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 329-30, 358-9; Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 106; Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 551.
9 . Campbell, ‘Soviet Policy in Southern Africa’, p. 228. From September 1983, though still working from his sickbed, Andropov, by then terminally ill, was no longer able to chair Politburo meetings; Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 384.
10 . Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy, p. 238.
11 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 385-96.
12 . Leonov, Likholet’e, p. 141.
13 . Garthoff, ‘The KGB Reports to Gorbachev’, pp. 226-7; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 214-15;
14 . Volkogonov, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 495.
15 . Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, p. 196.
16 . See above, p. 417.
17 . Ostermann (ed.), ‘Gorbachev and Afghanistan’, p. 146.
18 . On the misbehaviour of the Czechoslovak minister see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, pp. 274-5.
19 . Kirpichenko, Razvedka, pp. 250-58.
20 . Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 56.
21 . Ibid., pp. 57-8. Unlike Gorbachev, Leonov and some other senior KGB veterans were still welcome visitors to Cuba in the early twenty-first century; ‘Cuba’s Comandante Turned Coma-andante’, Moscow News, 31 Oct. 2004.
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