Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq sic-1

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Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq sic-1 Page 36

by Tom Clancy


  I had previously cleared all of our forward movements across the Iraqi border with John Yeosock. The main attack on G-Day was in the east — the Marines and the Arab forces of JFC-East, together with a very well planned and, as it turned out, well-executed Navy and Marine amphibious deception maneuver toward the Kuwaiti coast. Since the aim of that attack was to freeze the RGFC in place and to draw their attention to Kuwait, and since General Schwarzkopf rightfully wanted a synchronized first- and second-day ground attack scheme, John had directed both us and XVIII Corps to clear any such forward movement with him. If the eastern attack was successful in its aim, the Third Army heavy forces attack on the second day could better achieve positional advantage to destroy the RGFC.

  That was my running estimate that morning of G-Day, and everything looked in place. After a paper cup of coffee brought over by Staff Sergeant Dave St. Pierre, my driver, I strapped on my leg, pulled the leg of my tanker's Nomex suit over it, strapped on my shoulder holster containing my 9-mm Beretta, and put on my Kevlar helmet. Today we'd get into our coiled spring. Tomorrow we'd attack.

  I walked the thirty feet through the sand in the early-morning cold and quiet darkness to get a quick breakfast before the morning update. John Landry and a few other members of the corps staff were in the small van where we took meals and sometimes had short meetings. As we ate a hot breakfast of B rations and coffee, we talked informally. At this point, most of the corps were eating two hot meals a day, breakfast and supper, with Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) during the day. That was about to change. Until the war was over, we all ate a steady diet of MREs.

  We talked about our activities for the day. Nothing unexpected had happened during the night. I would get a complete staff update shortly.

  0600 VII CORPS MAIN COMMAND POST

  After breakfast, I walked the short distance to our newly arranged CP, two Army general-purpose tents hooked together and pitched over sand, where I would get a quick morning update before moving on to the TAC CP.

  I took a fast look around. The CP was a working area, and work continued even as we had our meeting. The atmosphere was informal. We had been at this for three months now, and during that time I'd lived there, often just wandering around and chatting with people, so by this morning, I knew nearly all personnel by their first names, and the feeling was relaxed. We were like a family in many ways, and the meeting was much more like a family gathering than the stereotypical image of some Prussian war council — the supreme field marshal marching in and arranging himself grandly in the highest-backed of a line of high-back chairs. Our chairs, in fact, were mainly gray metal fold-up things, with a lot of dents and chipped paint from constant use. Since there weren't many of them, people dragged up their own or stood.

  The various corps staff seated themselves. Standing behind them were most of the rest of the tent's staff, who'd left their stations so that they could be present for the update on this first day. Also standing were the liaison officers from the various corps units, there to report any orders back to their commanders. By this time, everyone knew what to expect when I had a briefing. On this day, as usual, I was serious, but I also wanted to project the confidence I genuinely felt… and wanted everyone there to feel. I looked at the faces around me. What a talented team, I thought, their skills developed through years of schools and training exercises. It had taken our Army almost twenty years to get here.

  I sat in the middle chair, about ten feet in front of a 1:250 000-scale situation map with the latest enemy and friendly situation posted. To my right was my deputy, Brigadier General Gene Daniel, and to my left was Brigadier General John Landry, chief of staff. The tent was quiet in anticipation, except for the occasional radio and phone calls coming in on this first day.

  Normally, I liked to start with the G-2 for a picture of the enemy.

  So far, based on what I'd seen, we had the Iraqis where we wanted them, and we had the right moves for that day and the next. But I was searching now for any indicators that would cause me to make last-minute adjustments, as I looked ahead to the next day and the day after that. Tactics is always a series of adjustments, as you attempt to get an edge on the enemy and keep that edge.

  I still anticipated that my next big decision would come in about twenty-four hours, when I ordered the corps into a maneuver to attack and destroy the RGFC. I anticipated selecting one of the seven FRAGPLANs we had proposed — I still preferred FRAGPLAN 7, which turned VII Corps ninety degrees east, formed a three-division armored fist, then attacked into the flank and rear of the RGFC if they remained fixed or defended where they were. Over the next twenty-four to forty-eight hours, I needed to maneuver the corps so that when we executed that FRAGPLAN, we would be in a continuous rolling attack and wouldn't have to stop and form the fist. The only two missing pieces from FRAGPLAN 7 were the Iraqi RGFC dispositions and the third division for my fist. If CENTCOM didn't release the 1st CAV — or if they didn't do it in time — I'd have to come up with another division from somewhere.

  Why three divisions? For two reasons: First, if the RGFC and the 10th and 12th Iraqi Armored Divisions stayed fixed, we would be attacking into five heavy divisions (with our three), with XVIII Corps to our north attacking three RGFC infantry divisions. Even if CENTAF had succeeded in reducing the Iraqi divisions by 50 percent, that would still leave a 1:1 fight (again with our three). We could defeat the Iraqis with two divisions instead of three, but at a risk of sustaining many more casualties. The second reason I wanted the three divisions was so that we could sustain our combat power for at least two or more days. I did not want our attack to run out of combat power after twenty-four hours. Our mission was to destroy the RGFC in our sector, not just defeat them.

  As for the question of which would be the third division, I had always kept open the possibility of using the 1st INF somehow in the RGFC attack after they completed the opening-up of the breach. The issue there had to be how well they came through their breach attack. If they got hurt badly in the breach, then I would leave them there. If, on the other hand, they came through all right, then I wanted to use them. In fact, I hoped to use them — possibly as reserve — even if the 1st CAV had been committed to us earlier than they in fact were.

  "OK, John, what have you got?" I asked Colonel John Davidson, the G-2.

  After John gave us a complete enemy lay-down, he concluded, "Sir, the Iraqis have not moved and show no reaction in our sector so far to Coalition attacks or to our early movements. Iraqi VII Corps remains fixed in front of us. RGFC still has capability to relocate. Looks as though they are remaining in place and will stay that way. Estimate main force Iraqi units at between 50 and 75 percent strength. Morale continues to be low in Iraqi VII Corps. RGFC will fight."

  Let me expand on this a little: First, it looked as though our 1st CAV deception into the Ruqi Pocket was working. The Iraqis weren't aware that the main attack would come from west of there. Good. Next, we had predicted that a brigade of the armored division in reserve (the 52nd) could reinforce Iraqi units defending against our breach, and that prediction still held. I had instructed fire support and G-2 to hammer it relentlessly. The Iraqis had five frontline infantry divisions in our sector. Their tactical reserve was the 52nd, positioned in the Wadi al Batin and stretching westward behind the frontline divisions. One brigade of the 52nd was positioned close to the place where the British would turn east as they left the breach. If that brigade was left alone, they could hold up the British and clog the whole breach. That is why I had ordered our fire support people to make it "go away."

  We also estimated that deeper in their strategic theater forces, the Tawalkana, Medina, and 17th Armored Divisions could reposition west to the vicinity of our Objective Collins. Collins was a corps "way point" — or the place where I had estimated I would commit the corps to one of the FRAGPLANS. It was a large circle on the map to indicate a corps concentration point, about 150 kilometers from the line of departure, and it had significance only as a point of orientation. Th
ere was no attack to "seize" Collins, for example. Rather, in the absence of towns or crossroads or some other orienting feature, we had to create "features" of our own. Collins was one of these.

  And lastly, we continued to think that they would attempt to defend in depth in successive positions from the border over to Basra and use chemical weapons against us, either at the border or as we attacked the RGFC.

  John was followed by the staff weather officer, Air Force Major Jerry Thornberg, who gave a not-too-encouraging picture of the February desert weather: High winds would develop later, with blowing sands limiting visibility, plus low clouds and chance of rain. Temperatures were to climb into the low fifties during the day and go down to close to freezing that night. He predicted more of the same all week.[20] I knew that would probably complicate movement and resupply, and might interfere with aviation. But I also knew there wasn't much you could do about the weather except work around or through it.

  Since my G-3, Colonel Stan Cherrie, was at this point already about fifty kilometers northwest at the TAC CP, Colonel Mike Hawk gave the G-3 portionof the briefing. I would join Stan shortly and get from him a complete report on what the friendly units were doing. Mike reported that to this point the movements of our forces were proceeding without enemy contact and without problems.

  He added that reports of progress outside the corps early in the morning of 24 February were sketchy at best. As 2nd ACR had moved forward, they had maintained contact with 3rd ACR on our VII Corps western boundary (they were XVIII Corps's easternmost unit). And since we had a liaison officer directly linked to XVIII Corps in our main CP, we had reports of early success by the 82nd, 101st, and French 6th Division operation in the west of XVIII Corps.

  Meanwhile, effective midnight, 1st CAV had been placed back under control of CENTCOM as theater reserve. We continued to stay in communication with them, however, as I anticipated their coming back to us at some point. They were also still operating in our sector, and we were providing their logistics support.

  As for Marine actions or the Arab forces (JFC-E) on the east coast, we had no reports.

  Fire support came next: Colonel Ray Smith[21] reported that we would get a total of 350 sorties of air that day, 100 of them close air support.

  "What about targets beyond the FSCL?" I asked. The FSCL was a line usually drawn about thirty to forty kilometers forward of the line of enemy contact; beyond it, the air could attack targets of their choosing.

  "Sir, the correlation between what we asked to get hit and what got hit is still poor, less than 50 percent."

  The FSCL issue continued to be a point of great disagreement between me and CENTAF and had plagued our operations from the start (Gary Luck and Third Army were having the same problems). My ability to influence air interdiction attacks against ground targets beyond the FSCL was poor. CENTAF kept rejecting our targets and hitting their own. Though I had made my feelings on this well known to both Yeosock and Waller, I was not confident the situation with air would change. It did not.

  By now, the staff knew all this was a raw issue with me. I had no arguments with how many air sorties CENTAF flew in and beyond our sector. That was the CINC's decision. But I wanted to synchronize the sorties in our sector with my own assets in a well-orchestrated scheme of attack. I had the mission here, not the Air Force! So when the subject of targets beyond the FSCL came up, my reaction was likely to be heated and sharp. I thought I knew a hell of a lot better what targets should get hit in our sector than CENTAF in Riyadh, especially after the attack began and the situation started to change rapidly.

  In his brief, our chemical officer, Colonel Bob Thornton, reported that the orders were understood in the corps that forward of the line of departure (the Iraq-Saudi border), troops would be in MOPP 1 and would take the nerve gas (PB) pills. He continued to maintain that the Iraqis had the capability to use chemical and bio against us, and I believed him. I expected the Iraqis to use chemical weapons, and I never rested easy about it.

  G-4, Colonel Bill Rutherford, reviewed the status of major pieces of equipment. Availability was in the high 90 percentile, better than we'd ever had in Germany, and a testament to the hard work put in by soldiers and sergeants. It also showed pride: no one wanted to be left behind with a broken vehicle. Our biggest challenge, we all knew, would be fuel. Though consumption would be enormous — the divisions would burn up to 800,000 gallons a day — the problem would be distribution, not supply. I did not want to be the armored commander who ran out of fuel on top of the world's greatest supply of oil. Logisticians can work only so much magic, however, and I was very aware that my tactical decisions would be influenced by logistics.

  Over the past few days, I had ordered a number of operations to prepare for our attack on G+1, but because of the diplomatic maneuvering and the constant possibility of last-minute changes, I had been in the habit of confirming those orders each day. That day, I knew I needed to confirm that: 2nd ACR was to continue to execute a movement to contact twenty kilometers to Phase Line Grape (their Busch), 3rd AD was to conduct a planned deep attack that night against artillery in range of the breach with their Apaches, and 11th AVN BDE was to execute CONPLAN Boot, an attack the following night against Iraqi VII Corps tactical reserves, their 52nd Armored Division (this would complement both the 1st INF breach on G+1 and the subsequent attack east by the British).

  It was a quick staff update, perhaps twenty minutes in all, and when it was over, I made a brief recap. This was an important day, I said, the last day for us to get ready for our attack. The diplomatic maneuvering was over, I told them. Now it was up to us. I thanked them for all their hard work, and said, "JAYHAWK."

  It was a great team. As I had said many times, I was confident we would do what we had to do, and save the talk for later. I was proud to be with them, as well as with the larger team, the 146,000 (counting 1st CAV) American and British soldiers who were the JAYHAWK VII Corps.

  After a brief huddle with John Landry and Gene Daniel to go over that day's key operations and review my expectations of the next two days, I departed for the twenty-minute Blackhawk trip to our TAC CP.

  VII CORPS COMMAND POSTS

  Though we had spent considerable effort to think our way through command post arrangements and to keep each other informed during the anticipated fast-moving operation, these arrangements, we knew, were fragile. Even so, I was confident they would work. While there was still time, though, I took one final look at them:

  Of our three command posts, the rear CP would stay at Al Qaysumah, a town with an airfield about thirty kilometers east of Hafar al Batin on the Tapline Road; the main would stay right where they were, about forty kilometers south of the border; and the TAC CP and the two "jump TAC" CPS would move and stay physically close to the battle.

  The TAC CP would initially remain close to the middle of the 3rd Armored formation. It would move late on G+1, after the success of the breach was assured and I shifted the main effort of the corps to the enveloping force.

  One "jump TAC" would stay well ahead with the 3rd Armored, so they could communicate with 2nd ACR, 1st AD, and 3rd AD. The other "jump TAC" would be at the breach site, where Brigadier General Gene Daniel was to command passage through the breach of the appropriate corps units — the British, our two artillery brigades moving to join their divisions, the 400-plus vehicles that would make up Log Base Nelligen, the 1st CAV (as I hoped), as well as other corps units needed north in the attack. We also needed two-way traffic in the breach to evacuate prisoners and for resupply.

  My personal plan was to stay closest to the corps main effort. That meant I would spend that night at the main CP (its location was closer to the breach than the TAC's), then shift to the TAC on G+1. I planned to use the main TAC and the two smaller jump TACs as my operating bases and command the corps from the front. To ensure a positive link to my nerve center at the main CP, we had arranged for my executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Russ Mulholland, to make two courier runs to the ma
in TAC daily, at 0900 and at 1700 (John Landry had directed the staff to have information current as of 0830 and 1630). In this way, I could be forward to command face-to-face, get my "fingerspitzengefuhl" of the battles, and obtain the latest information from the corps main, which had much better long-haul comms.

  We also planned to use aerial retrans capability — a helicopter relay of line-of-sight comms, like a manned low-orbiting satellite, to essentially double our comm range. This worked reasonably well, except when weather kept the helos on the ground (quite often, it turned out).[22]

  STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND TACTICAL COMMANDER

  During the flight to the TAC CP, I shifted my thoughts to our part in a larger theater campaign plan. We were not operating alone, and I could never let myself lose sight of that.

  Nobody in an operation this vast and important was a free agent. We all operated within the context of a mission and objectives, and the discipline to stay within those. That applied to me as well as to Generals John Yeosock, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and even to President Bush. I always had the opinion to go to my commander and try to get something changed if I thought it was getting in the way, but in reality, as a senior commander, you have to pick your spots, and you don't do it often. Otherwise, you're either a whiner or a disruption to the operation. So, as in any operation, there were some constraints (must-dos) and restraints (do-nots).

  They were not unreasonable, and I agreed with them.

  The major constraint on us was to reinforce the theater deception scheme. That meant we had to stay hidden from the Iraqis out west until we attacked and reinforce the 1st CAV deception.

  As for our major restraint, this had been set out to us in an order that my chief of staff, John Landry, had gotten from Third Army on 22 February. We were directed not to conduct any "irreversible" actions — that is, actions that would throw off the theater attack timetable. During a call to Cal Waller (when he was Third Army commander in Yeosock's absence), I told him I assumed that meant we were not to conduct any operations that might affect the diplomatic maneuvering then going on. Cal agreed but left further interpretation up to me. My choice then was to interpret the restraints as very tight. This was my interpretation and no one else's.[23]

 

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