by Tom Clancy
Meanwhile, I had forecast we would be at Phase Line Smash the next day. At that point we would know whether we had been successful in surprising and fixing the Republican Guards. Late in the day, I would make the decision about which FRAGPLAN to use to destroy the RGFC. As for now, I was continuing to maneuver the corps to keep all my options available until the following afternoon. All of this was clear to my commanders. It also was in the heads of my two key maneuver operators at my command nodes, Stan Cherrie at the TAC and John Landry at the main CP. In short, I was pleased at our progress to this point and felt good about the coherence of our formations and our logistics, even though we had had to advance our attack by fifteen hours.
One last piece of maneuver remained. Did I order Tom Rhame to continue to attack to New Jersey? I got both Tom and Rupert Smith on the TACSAT radio from the TAC:
Enemy contact was light, Tom told me, and they had taken many prisoners. I asked him about continuing.
"I recommend we wait until daylight," he answered, "to avoid the night passage forward of 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division." Tom had gotten his 3rd Brigade from northern Germany in USAREUR. "We can have New Jersey secured and be set to support a passage of the 1st (UK) AD by noon on the twenty-fifth."
When I talked with Rupert Smith shortly afterward, he concurred. He could use more time — and daylight. All day he had been aggressively moving his division forward. Considering his unplanned early move forward with his almost 5,000 vehicles, he preferred a late-morning passage. When they had moved forward, they'd been arranged in column — i.e., they were pretty strung out. Then they'd had to regroup for the twenty-four-lane passage through the breach, and coordinate that passage, and then later they'd had to link up and get fires coordinated with the U.S. 142nd Artillery Brigade of about 600 vehicles from the Arkansas National Guard, with their two eight-inch battalions and an MLRS battalion. Following their participation in the breach prep fires, I had ordered the brigade to be in direct support of the British. It had turned out to be a great combat arrangement (even though it had sparked some laughs when the British troops and our troops from Arkansas and Oklahoma talked on the radio).
After I thought for a moment about what Rupert and Tom had told me, I ordered Tom to continue his attack at first light. He would then pass the British through at noon tomorrow.
I knew this was a gamble, but it was the best choice I had then, given the alternatives. Here is how I weighed them quickly in my head.
On the one hand, it was a gamble not to continue. If the Iraqis fired chemical or biological agents into the breach that night, then we would not be able to recover from it. In addition, if the Iraqis had already discovered the strength of the wide enveloping attack, it would give them twenty-four to thirty-six hours to set their defenses more skillfully, and to make our coming attacks more costly.
By continuing, we might keep them from firing those chemical or bio-logical weapons, and we would get to the RGFC twelve hours sooner. But continuing was also a gamble.
The major phase lines used by Fred Franks to control the movement of forces within VII Corps. To further coordinate their actions, subordinate units supplemented these measures with graphics of their own (2nd ACR named all its phase lines after beers, for instance, and 1st INF after states). The legend indicates the average distance between the phase lines, which was dependent on the location of the force.
By continuing, we could get ourselves physically tangled up expanding the breach at night — by trying to fit a brigade in between two others while marking cleared lanes and moving the rest of the Big Red One forward. While we were untangling them, our enveloping force would be so far ahead, they would hit the RGFC while we were still getting the British through the breach. Even if the two armored divisions were successful in staying close behind the 2nd ACR, the rear of the enveloping forces would still be vulnerable to Iraqi attack from the east. In addition, the situation would prevent needed fuel from coming through the breach, and cause the enveloping attack to grind to a halt at the beginning of their RGFC attack. It also would deny our two armored divisions fire support from the two artillery brigades, which would be stuck behind the breach and thus be unable to join them for the RGFC attack.
It also was possible that the two divisions would not be able to close quickly behind the rapidly advancing 2nd ACR. In that case, the regiment would likely find itself way out ahead of those two follow-on divisions, and it would hit the RGFC, alert them, and give them time to react before I could mass the corps.
All in all, I thought the gamble was far greater if we continued that night than if we continued the next day. I would gamble that we had silenced all the Iraqi artillery and that, even if they noticed, the RGFC would probably underestimate the size of our force and that our three-division fist would overcome any time advantage on the RGFC side and smash them anyway. It was more important to preserve the three-division fist.
One other consideration operated as I made this decision. In the back of my mind, the idea was forming that if I did not get the 1st CAV in time, the third division of my three-division fist would be Rhame's Big Red One.
I recalled something Tom Rhame had said to me before the attack: "Boss, don't leave us behind in the breach." It was beginning to look as though Tom would get his wish.
Though the Big Red One had always seemed a possibility for that mission, I couldn't make that choice until I knew how much the breach mission had taken out of them. If they'd taken heavy casualties, for instance (some estimates had them losing up to a brigade total in the breach), it would have been impossible to use them for my third division.
As it happened, the 1st ID's casualties turned out to be unexpectedly low. Though I never expected casualties as high as some of the estimates, I still anticipated more than Tom actually reported — which was the best news I got all day. Now that it was clear that the division was in relatively good shape, I wanted to preserve them for use against the RGFC. Continuing that night might remove that option.
I consulted my commanders, but it was my decision alone. It was the right one.
At about 2000, the G-2 reported that all the Iraqi heavy units had remained in place. This included the three RGFC heavy divisions, the 12th AD, the 46th MECH (actually the 10th AD), the 52nd AD, and the 17th AD. There was, however, a report that a brigade of the Hammurabi was moving out for training. Based on tendencies we had studied from the Iran-Iraq War, such a move was usually a precursor to some offensive maneuver: they would set out from their locations, do some training — what we called rehearsals — and then attack. That got my attention.
Why? Because it was an indicator that the Iraqis might not be going to defend in place after all, but would try some kind of maneuver against us, a capability they still had. In that case, I would have chosen some other maneuver besides FRAGPLAN 7.
What did all this add up to? There was no indication at this point of an RGFC retreat. Of the three options we had originally given the RGFC, we were down to two. Every indication was that they were going to stay and fight from where they were or maneuver against us. It heightened my sense that I needed to keep the corps balanced to preserve my options for the attack tomorrow.
Shortly after the G-2 update, Stan reported that at this point our line of advance put the 2nd ACR on Phase Line Grape; both 1st AD and 3rd AD were on Melon; 1st INF was on Apple (their Colorado), with twenty-four lanes completed; and 1st CAV was conducting another feint into Iraq. Total prisoners reported were 1,000 in 1st INF, over 300 in 2nd ACR, over 100 in 3rd AD, and 50 in 1st CAV. (Throughout the course of the war, prisoner totals were very inaccurate. Rather than tie down combat formations to process prisoners, units would disarm the Iraqis, give them food and water, keep the officers, and point the rest south. Some estimates placed our prisoner totals at almost double the official figures.)
From the first moment of my involvement in Desert Shield, and all during Desert Storm, I had been in frequent communication with John Yeosock. John and I had agre
ed that I would call him as often as possible during the ground war to keep him informed. It was especially important for me to try to talk to him around 1800 so that he would have the latest when he went to General Schwarzkopf's regular 1900 evening briefings.
I called John Yeosock that evening to report what I was doing and why — a simple conversation between two cavalrymen who understood what it took to maneuver VII Corps. I told John that in my judgment the immediate situation and complexity of what we had to do at night was not worth the risk of continuing the attack. Just as he had done a few hours before, he told me he agreed with what I was doing and trusted my judgment.
We kept our higher headquarters informed in other ways, as well. As a matter of routine, and of Third Army rule, just as we had done throughout Desert Shield, at midnight, every twenty-four hours during the war my main CP sent a written "Commander's SITREP (Combat)" to Third Army. It was the official report of what had gone on in VII Corps for the previous twenty-four hours and a forecast of what we would be doing for the next twenty-four. An info copy also went to CENTCOM. As it happened, this was not well timed, as the CINC got his daily briefing at 1900 and an update the first thing in the morning.
Before the attack, I had been in the habit of writing the commander's evaluation portion of the SITREP — or at least going over it. (These were often brutally candid: I complained about poor intel and about logistics shortages — lack of spare parts, medical supplies, and transportation. This at times got the CENTCOM staff in hot water, thus not making me a popular guy with some of them.) But during the war I stopped this practice, relying on John Landry and Stan to listen to me and to capture the essence of what was going on in the corps. Besides, I was talking directly to John Yeosock so much that he was getting commander's evaluations directly from me. Though I wasn't aware of this at the time, after the war I found out that John Yeosock had had his staff pay close attention to these reports, and had often had them follow up on the key items that he would need for the CINC's regular 1900 briefings. But I have no idea of the effect of all this at CENTCOM.
All commanders make a choice about what to pay attention to and what to ignore. There was no lack of information at Third Army about what was happening in VII Corps. They got it by way of direct calls from me to Yeosock; direct calls from the Third Army liaison, Colonel Dick Rock, to Third Army HQ; direct calls from Stan Cherrie, John Landry, Colonel Mike Hawk, and others to Brigadier General Steve Arnold and others in Riyadh and Third Army TAC CP in King Khalid Military City; periodic situation reports from staff officers to Third Army; and finally, from the written summary submitted as of midnight each day. (As a practical matter, this report was prepared much earlier than that, so by the time it went in, much of the friendly information was less than current, especially as the action picked up tempo. That meant that the information reported at the CINC's morning briefing could be as much as twelve hours old if the CENTCOM staff did not update their reports.)
2300 VII CORPS TAC CP SAUDI ARABIA
That evening, I continued to monitor reports of corps activity coming into the CP over the radio. Per my orders to Don and his assessment of his situation, 2nd ACR kept up attacks and combat activities all night. In other words, they did not stop at sundown, get out their sleeping bags, and get eight or ten hours of sleep. They continued movement to adjust unit formations, get better force protection, and also put out reconnaissance. They also fired artillery and pushed aviation forward, and some units even advanced forward if the local commander thought it would improve his posture for his operations the next day. Many of the leaders and the troops were up all night. Few would get more than three or four hours of sleep… and that was "combat" sleep, without tents or cots.
By the close of the first day, the 1st Infantry Division breach was completed to twenty kilometers, and the 1st (UK) Armored was flowing toward the passage points to continue to push the attack. The 2nd ACR had advanced well forward toward Phase Line Smash, and the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions were continuing to maneuver into attack formation and getting their vehicles through the berm choke points. First AD had combat actions on the west of the corps sector.
They also had some combat actions. Later that night, at 0200, in order to keep the Iraqis off balance, and to keep them from being set when the regiment attacked at first light, they were planning to attack the eastern half of their Objective Merrill, about sixty kilometers into Iraq, with the AH-64 battalion from 1st AD that I had placed under Don's operational control.
Meanwhile, they reported their lead aircraft scouts were at Phase Line Smash — or at the 78 Easting[27] longitude line — where it was vital to me to have immediate intelligence because of the proximity of the RGFC. At 2200, they reported their 2nd Squadron had taken 385 prisoners. At 2359, an Iraqi infantry battalion surrendered to their 2nd Squadron in Objective Merrill, and soon after that, they reported that they were inundated with prisoners all across their area. Later, after I went to get some rest at 0324, the aviation battalion reported destroying a building with antennas, numerous bunkers, a BMP, and six trucks; one AH-64 was hit by ground fire.
The rest of the corps was not idle that night. Other combat activities were going on:
• In 1st AD, the lead unit, 1–1 Cavalry, had pushed sixty kilometers into Iraq, well forward of the rest of the division. Elsewhere in the division, three soldiers were wounded when a vehicle struck a mine just over the border. Meanwhile, refueling operations and movement forward of the division into their division wedge would continue until after 0200 on the twenty-fifth. The division had taken prisoners, but by now the count was not accurate.
• Third AD also continued moving units forward over the border and refueling operations well into the night. Their lead unit, 4–7 Cavalry, had reported engaging twenty-nine tanks with close air support and later capturing more prisoners. Other prisoners, bypassed by 2nd ACR, also were captured by division units.
• As 1st INF continued to mark lanes, their aviation forward also conducted a screen of their ground elements so as to preempt any Iraqi artillery from firing on forces refueling for tomorrow's operation.
• The British reported closing into an area just south of the breach ready to begin passage of lines.
• Finally, I learned we had used forty-four close-air-support strikes today.
At midnight the commander's SITREP went in from our main CP. In it no casualties were reported (in fact, we had seven — two in 2nd ACR, two in 1st INF, and three in 1st AD). The report described major units of the corps as involved in security and reconnaissance operations that night and positioned to continue the attack on 25 February.
As for the Iraqis, we assessed that in their VII Corps there was little chemical capability. They could continue local counterattacks, but use of mobile reserves was limited to local repositioning. The report went on to say: "Indications of minefields and defensive positions in Tawalkana Division sector indicate intent to defend in place. Alpha Brigade, Hammurabi Division, has moved out of revetments and appears to be conducting local maneuver training… "
This report — like most of those from our main CP throughout the war — was right on the mark with respect to possible enemy courses of action and our own future plans. Although they were mostly out of direct radio contact, the troops there tracked the battle as well as they could. Because they were out of direct radio contact, there were some exceptions to the overall accuracy of these reports: Normally, reports of our own actions tended to understate what was going on — as, for instance, the destruction of Iraqi units and the numbers of Iraqi prisoners and KIA. Reports of our own casualties also lagged considerably.
In sum, I was pleased with the corps that day. Our agility in adjusting to the fifteen-hour advance in attack had been superb. Second ACR and lead elements of 1st AD were now sixty kilometers deep into Iraq and continuing actions. First INF had completed twenty-four lanes. Through these the 2,500 tracked vehicles and 5,000 wheeled vehicles of the British would move, followed by t
he 400 logistics vehicles (and the fuel that would allow the enveloping divisions to attack the RGFC without stopping) and the over 1,000 vehicles of the two-corps artillery brigades that would join the enveloping divisions. We were in the posture I wanted.
Later that night, I learned from Major Bernie Dunn, our Arabic-speaking liaison officer with the Egyptians, that the JFC-N attack on our east had not yet gone forward of the border. This information further reinforced my urgency to get the British out to the east before I got my enveloping forces logistics elements too far forward and vulnerable to an Iraqi move from that direction.
My decision not to continue with most of our offensive operations that night was a gamble. I knew that, yet I was convinced the risk was worth taking. To gain a massed three-division fist against the RGFC more than offset any advantage they might gain from a warning of our attack that gave them time to prepare. Meanwhile, they showed few signs of reacting, and Iraqi artillery fire was by now almost nonexistent — or quickly silenced by counterfire.
STILL later that night, I gave some more thought to the go-early order and to whether, because of that, the intent of my higher HQ had changed.
My conclusion: Everything I'd learned today from higher headquarters told me we were operating only with the intent of moving the attack up fifteen hours, nothing more.
John Landry was to tell me the next day that he was surprised by my decision because I had been so adamant about "no pauses" and would not even let the word be used.
He was right, I didn't want pauses. What I meant was I didn't want them in front of our main objective, the RGFC (as Burnside had paused before Fredericksburg in December 1862, during the Civil War, when he'd waited for bridging for two weeks while Lee built his defenses). I would not permit planned pauses because they might not be needed and would break the natural momentum of an attack once it got rolling. On the other hand, I was prepared to accept battle-event-caused pauses in order to keep the corps balanced and thus use them to adjust tempo to gain mass and continued momentum with our troops reasonably fresh and the corps supplied when we hit the RGFC.