by Tom Clancy
Refueling on the move (ROM) was another thing that units worked hard to perfect, and our soldiers' skill in execution would have made a pit crew at the Indy 500 proud. By G-Day, ROM was a well-choreographed drill, practiced many times in training in the desert: Fuel trucks were brought forward and set up at spots in the desert, then unit vehicles lined up at these "pit" stops and took on fuel on either side of the truck. Simultaneously, tank crews, before or after refueling, removed air filters (twenty- to thirty-pound metal boxes) from tanks, blew compressed air through them to clean out sand, and performed other maintenance while also checking the tank's main gun boresight (to ensure that the cannon and sights were both on the same spot).
VII CORPS JUMP TAC CP
At around 0100, I went back to the two M577s to see if there had been any change while I was gone. The rain and high winds continued, and the soldiers were wet and cold. The official weather data said we were to have 81 percent illumination, but with cloud cover and rain, I could barely see Toby a few feet away as we stumbled around in the rain getting back to the TAC. I could picture the commanders and soldiers trying to keep the units together while continuing to move and refuel in this weather.
Though the bad weather had caused cancellation of our deep aviation attack, other actions continued.
Since 1500 the day before, 1st AD had attacked the almost 140 kilometers to al-Busayyah and destroyed the better part of a reinforced Iraqi brigade and other Iraqi units in their zone. They had reported destroying 2 tanks, 25 armored personnel carriers, 9 artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 14 air defense pieces, and capturing over 300 prisoners (the accounts of prisoners continued to vary widely). Before the violent rainstorms, their aviation brigade Apaches had struck hard at Iraqi positions in al-Busayyah, and the division was continuing to pound Iraqi targets in the town with cannon and MLRS artillery. Ron had them exactly where I wanted them. The division was in an excellent logistics posture, and the troops were reasonably fresh, although there would not be much rest with the weather that night.
Second ACR had also been active in combat. Though Don Holder had had to cancel a planned Apache attack into the Tawalkana, he had managed to launch a successful MLRS raid that night as a follow-through on my order to keep the pressure on the RGFC. He'd sent Company M of 3rd Squadron to escort the nine-launcher MLRS battery C/4-27 FA.
The unit commanders remembered the action like this: C Battery:
"Guarded by the tank company from 3/2 ACR, C Battery moved outside the regimental defenses to fire the missions. The first two, at 2230 and 0100, were executed unimpeded. The third, at 0430 on the twenty-sixth, was interrupted as the launchers moved behind the tank company through the regimental defenses. An MTLB unit of estimated company size was moving up the MSR to investigate the rocket fires. The MTLBs ran into the tank company and a short, violent fight ensued. The launchers quickly returned to the regimental sector while the 3rd Squadron tanks destroyed the MTLBs."
The account by Company M reads, "At 0135 the first platoon reported five possible enemy vehicles… The vehicles had been positively identified as two T-55s, MTLB-PC, jeep, and a truck by several gunners in the company and reported their ranges varying from 3,000 to 3,500 meters and moving out of the effective direct-fire range. The gunners' fingers were getting itchy as the commander gave permission for the first platoon elements who could observe the enemy vehicles to engage. The weather was still zero from cloud cover. The first rounds from the M1A1 120-mm main guns rang out and declared target hits. Brilliant sparks flew from targets as M829A1 sabot rounds found their mark. The engagement lasted all of ten minutes, as twenty-three sabot rounds traveled downrange, destroying the enemy vehicles at ranges from 3,000 to 4,100 meters… The enemy had been completely surprised and seemed confused as vehicles moved in every direction. It had been a simple ambush that had taken place, and was so effective and ran so smoothly that the men of Mad-Dog developed unimaginable confidence and were actually ecstatic that the mission went so well in such miserable weather. At 0530, Company M conducted stand-to and at 0615 moved out due east… All of the men were silent as we made our way through the area. Vehicles were still burning and bodies were strewn about the sand. We found two survivors in the area and brought the medics forward to treat them. We felt no regrets. We had done our job and done it well. We were alert that night and were alive to see the next day."
Meanwhile, I knew that the British were having some actions as well, but I didn't know the nature of them. My British liaison team was with the main TAC, caught in the middle of the 3rd AD mass of vehicles. Rupert's passage had begun around noon, and given the usual friction of lanes closed or wrong-way traffic, I figured that both his 7 Brigade and 4 Brigade were through the breach by now and well into the attack. Rupert had planned a generally due-east attack on two axes out of the breach, one in the north for 7 Brigade and one on the south for 4 Brigade.
I found out later that 7 Brigade had passed at about midday, immediately run into enemy contact, and had destroyed tanks and other armored vehicles. They had been joined just after dark by 4 Brigade attacking south of them on a due-east axis.
All this was happening as we listened to the rain crash on the canvas extensions and watched the water run through the sand all around our feet.
For a time, I stared at the map in silence, focusing on what we had to do the next day and the decisions I needed to make then, and trying to think ahead to the day after that. So far I was really pleased with our tactical situation: the hastily defending enemy versus our available combat power, our ability to focus it on the enemy, and the general condition of our troops. Based on the developing clearer picture of the Iraqis, we were in the right place at the right time in the right combination; and I knew I had picked the right time and place for our RGFC battles. We had the Iraqis where we wanted them.
By midnight on 25 February, 1st (UK) Armored was through the 1st Infantry Division, and both were directing their actions east. Second ACR had uncovered from the front of the 1st Armored Division, and the regiment was now searching for the lead elements of the Republican Guards. The 1st Armored Division began pounding the al-Busayyah logistics base, which contained armored vehicles and special forces units, as well as resupplies for the Iraqi army.
The rain showed no signs of letting up. Shortly after 0100, I decided to get some rest.
Because John Landry had not been able to make the trip back to the main CP, he and I shared a small tent with two canvas GI cots and no lights that Toby had gotten from 3rd AD. It was better shelter than most of the soldiers of VII Corps had that night. At least we were dry. I slept on the cot minus only my shoulder holster, which I set down in my Kevlar, within easy reach.
0400 VII CORPS JUMP TAC EIGHTY KILOMETERS INTO IRAQ
It was a short night. Toby shook me awake at about 0400 with some black coffee he had scrounged up from somewhere. I used a portable elec-tric razor to shave quickly, then strapped on my shoulder holster and Kevlar and went the fifty feet to the jump TAC. John Landry joined me, and we got a tactical update before John went back to the corps main CP. It had stopped raining, but it was still dark. I could not hear any weapons firing, but I could hear sounds of tracked and wheeled vehicles moving. Third AD would be rolling into the attack.
The plan for 26 February was to continue to press the attack toward the east. The 1st Cavalry Division was "chopped" from CENTCOM reserve to VII Corps, and was immediately moved through the recently deserted 1st Infantry Division breach sites toward the left corps boundary. While the corps logisticians continued to develop the log bases that would provide the much-needed fuel and bullets to combat vehicles proceeding into the attack, all combat units would continue toward establishing the formation that would provide the "fist" for hitting the Republican Guards.
My sleep had probably been longer and more comfortable than what most of the soldiers in VII Corps had gotten. Since we were right out there in the middle of the corps, I had a good idea of how most of the soldiers and leaders
had spent the night. Many were in combat. Others were refueling and doing maintenance. Commanders were collecting units, planning for their next move, and looking to execute their part of FRAGPLAN 7.
I wondered what picture they had in Riyadh of what we were doing.
The comms were still not good, but the troops were working as best they could to fix them. The long-haul comms continued to be intermittent, so I could not talk reliably either to the main CP or to Third Army, but we could get through; nor did I have consistent communications with the British or 1st INF.
In one respect, the fragile comms were a consequence of a deliberate choice I had made. I had wanted to be up front so that I could talk face-to-face with my commanders, feel the tempo of the fight and of our own movement, and monitor the condition of my soldiers. I had known the comms would be fragile from time to time, but had decided it was a risk I was prepared to take rather than be where my comms were good but I was out of personal touch with commanders and soldiers and the rapidly changing situation. What I lost in comms, I gained in "fingerspitzengefuhl."
However, one effect of the situation was that the official hard copy of the FRAGPLAN 7 execution did not reach all units until well past midnight. Third AD plans officer, Major John Rosenberger, wrote the 3rd AD attack order out longhand, three pages, double-spaced, and faxed it to subordinate units. Others made similar arrangements. Tom Rhame did much of his orally as his units began to move forward. It was no problem. From our meetings, I knew they knew what to do.
Today we would hit the Tawalkana and subordinate units hard. In fact, we had hit the security zone of the developing defense the day before at around noon; and 2nd ACR had continued to intercept units moving to get into the forming defense. With that in mind, I'd figured the 2nd ACR would be well into the fight by midmorning, which is why I had wanted Griffith and Funk on line to their north by that time. So that, later this morning, we would be in our fist, with 1st AD in the north, 3rd AD in the center, and 2nd ACR in the south. Later, the 1st INF (replacing the CENTCOM-held 1st CAV) would pass through the regiment and give us our three-division fist. By that time, in addition to the RGFC Tawalkana and other armored divisions in the area, we also would be fighting the RGFC Medina. We would do all that today, while maintaining the momentum of the attack through the following day to destroy the rest of the RGFC units in our sector.
Even though I was aware that the comms limited our information, I asked for a quick update on the battle activities of VII Corps units. I wanted to hear what they had, then go look for myself.
I was interested in the same questions discussed the morning before.
First I wanted to hear about the enemy, and I had a number of sharp questions for the assistant G-2, Captain Bill Eisel, about what the RGFC[36] was doing.
It was ever more clear that the RGFC theater command had a defensive plan and were executing it. They were not as skillful at the tactical level as our troops, but they had a plan! By now I figured they knew we were here. What they still did not know was the size of our force, the power of our rolling armor attack, or the direction from which we would hit them. They would find out the answers to those questions shortly. They were about to get hit by the largest combined-armored corps in the history of the U.S. Army ever to engage in an attack.
So, as battered as they might be from Coalition air attacks, the RGFC HQ was trying to set a defense in depth that would allow its forces to get out of Kuwait (as Don Holder had suggested yesterday) and would set a series of defensive belts in front of Basra, their only port. We knew from studying the Iraq-Iran War that the Iraqis had put up a tough defense of Basra.
The RGFC tactic was to throw armor/mechanized infantry in our way. As they could perform only limited maneuvers, it was mainly a brute-force defense thickened by all the units in the area (as confirmed by the Third Army intel feed and our own intel sources). That is why we ran into so many different units during the battles over the next two days. The 1st AD and the 3rd AD fought elements of the 12th, 17th, 52nd, and 10th Armored. In addition, the 1st AD fought the northern brigade of the Tawalkana, the Medina, and a brigade of the Adnan.
As what the Iraqis were doing became ever clearer, it also became clearer to me that our tactics and maneuvers had been exactly right. We had them where we wanted them. They had fixed themselves. The timing was perfect, and, further, the time we had taken to keep concentrated had not hurt us at all, for at that moment on the twenty-sixth, we were still catching the Iraqis trying to form a defense. In other words, our forecast had turned out right for both our own force and the enemy, and we had our force in the right place at the right time. It does not get much better than that in maneuver warfare!
Meanwhile, as we turned ninety degrees east, I also wanted to keep track of the progress of XVIII Corps. If their attack east did not move at the pace of ours, Ron Griffith and the 1st AD would have an open flank. Open flanks in the desert are no big deal, unless the enemy can do something about it. At that point, the RGFC still had its three Guards infantry divisions to the north of our attack zone (that is, in the XVIII Corps zone). As for the third heavy Republican Guards division, the Hammurabi, I was not sure where they were just then or how the RGFC would play them in the defense. (I learned later that they were in fact still east of the Tawalkana and Medina, standing between these divisions and Basra, and also moving north to reinforce the Nebuchadnezzar, which was an RGFC infantry division.) But it was at least clear that we had the Tawalkana and Medina in our zone now, along with three or four associated divisions of 50 percent strength or better. With the new Third Army boundaries, significant elements of the RGFC were now in the zone of attack of XVIII Corps, not just of VII Corps.
Our own situation was still good.
The British 1st Armored Division had completed its passage of lines through the 1st INF at about 0300. My division commanders had estimated it would take twelve hours, but it had actually taken them fifteen.
It was then that I learned that the British had been in contact with the Iraqis almost from the time 7 Brigade had exited the breach the afternoon before. Rupert had then had 7 Brigade attack in the north of the British sector, since that sector contained the Iraqi forces that could threaten the rear of our envelopment force. Four Brigade soon followed and attacked in the southern half of the British sector. The lead units of 4 Brigade had had combat actions the previous night, even as the rear of the brigade and division support units were clearing the breach. Both brigades were continuing to attack elements of what was left of the Iraqi VII Corps frontline infantry divisions (the 48th, 25th, 31st, and 27th) and the deeper-positioned tactical reserve, the Iraqi 52nd Division.
Later I would know the details. According to Brigadier Patrick Cordingly of 7 Brigade, that afternoon at 1500, after passing through the breach, "It was cold; it was wet and it was overcast and we were wearing NBC suits and quite expecting the enemy to use chemical weapons against us… During the ground war, the brigade was involved in six formal… attacks in the first thirty-six hours… We destroyed some 150 tanks and armored vehicles and took over 3,000 prisoners (in an attack that covered over 300 kilometers)." He relates the first of those attacks (actually the first tank and armored infantry attack in British army history) early on the evening of 25 February by the Scots Dragoon Guards on an Iraqi communication and logistics site: "As night fell, the columns of tanks closed up. Only the red turret lights betrayed the presence of the mass of moving armor. Suddenly, reports of the enemy came in from D Squadron (Challenger tank company) on the right. It wasn't a preplanned attack, but we knew that there was a defended divisional headquarters in the area. As we advanced into the mine belt, the tanks began to pick up the objective with their thermal sights… It was a particularly unpleasant night; it was raining quite heavily, and visibility was down to about fifteen meters before you could see anything the size of a Warrior. It was absolutely black. Thirty seconds before we went in, the tanks opened up, and when the vehicles they hit started burning, the inf
antry had a reference point to aim for… And when the infantry debussed and stepped into the blackness, it was a step into the unknown for them… Bullets, both friendly and enemy, seemed to be flying everywhere. Private Evans's life was saved when an AK-47 bullet lodged in a rifle magazine in his breast pocket… We also had another tank and one of the Milans grouped together, putting down fire support as that platoon ran in. As soon as another position was identified, fire was put down… Some of the assaults were very tight and it was undoubtedly a concerning time… although we had taken five casualties, we all knew that whatever else happened, we had done it, and despite atrocious conditions, it had worked."
Here is another battle account by Major Simon Knapper, commander of A Company, Staffordshire Regiment — an armored infantry battalion comprising two Warrior and two Challenger tank companies commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Rogers, 7 Brigade. The time was approximately 2100 25 February. "It wasn't a preplanned attack. We knew that there was a communications site in that area and we knew our battle group had been tasked to clear it… The whole area was quite clearly still occupied, and therefore we went into a quick attack on it… Thirty seconds before H-Hour, the tanks opened fire, destroying the vehicles and generator… The tanks led us to exactly the right places, and in the last 300 meters, the Warriors broke forward of the protective screen of tanks and opened up with their chain guns. We debussed the men on site… All the time there was this incredible noise of firing; cannon fire and small arms and tracer bouncing everywhere." As part of 7 Brigade, this battalion had crossed Phase Line New Jersey out of the 1st INF Division breach at 1525 on 25 February, and attacked east. The attack described by Major Knapper was conducted in a driving rainstorm, lasted about an hour and a half, and resulted in one British soldier wounded. They captured about fifty Iraqis, and the battalion destroyed the CP complex. Other units of the 1st UK had been in similar engagements. "I am very proud of what the company achieved that night," Major Knapper ends his account. "It was the first armored infantry attack of the war, and it worked."