by Tom Clancy
I MEF seized the Rumaylah oil fields before the Iraqis could destroy them. Of the more than 1,000 Iraqi oil wells in the south, only nine were set afire, and they were all extinguished by the end of April (On Point, final draft, p. 127). It was a remarkable tactical feat with huge strategic implications for the future. As part of the I MEF, the British also seized Basra and the Iraqi ports in the Al Faw peninsula early in the fight.
Meanwhile, the 3d Infantry Division breached the berm in eleven different locations and attacked on two fronts. In the west, 3 ID was led by 3–7 Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Terry Ferrell, and in the east by Third Brigade (3 BCT), commanded by Colonel Dan Allyn. The 3 BCT quickly seized Tallil Air Base and the crossing site over the Euphrates and isolated An Nasiriyah (Blount, notes, February 2004). Following the 3 ID, the 101st first Airborne (On Point, final draft, p. 145) began a series of operations on 20 March to build refuel and rearm points and extended V Corps' reach all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad with attack helicopters. Having a mechanized infantry division combined with an air assault division and the 82d Airborne division with its brigade of parachute infantry in CFLCC reserve gave McKiernan and Wallace great versatility to adapt schemes of maneuver as the face of the enemy changed. It was a wise choice in unit combination.
Isolating cities along the way would be a continuing method of advance. On 22 March the 3–7 Cavalry reached As Samawah to the north and isolated it. The divisions' 3d Brigade relieved them on 23 March as division momentum continued north (On Point, final draft, pp. 161–167). At both As Samawah and An Nasiriyah, it became apparent that combat power would be necessary to deal with Iraqi irregulars attacking U.S. forces directly and also attacking along LOCs (lines of communication).
Adapting their plan as enemy actions became more clear and other options opened, McKiernan released his CFLCC reserve, the 82d Airborne Division to V Corps on 26 March along with 1/41 Infantry, a tank-Bradley task force (On Point, final draft, pp. 265, 268). Wallace immediately sent them into action to take As Samawah and release 3 ID to continue north. That urban fight in As Samawah by Colonel Arnie Bray's 82d Airborne 325th Parachute Infantry Brigade Combat Team was at close ranges, intense, and replete with small unit initiative so characteristic of U.S. infantry.
"The engagements included shots as close as ten feet… A Company 3d Battalion was ambushed on the northwest side of As Samawah, when the lead platoon executed a classic react to contact drill returning fire as the company dispersed to covered positions… the enemy continued to fire… without direction, the lead squad under SSG Pitts recognized that they needed to get closer and maneuvered to place effective fire on the enemy — keeping the enemy from accurately engaging the maneuvering platoons."
(Bray, Arnold, Colonel, U.S. Army, notes, 1 2/3 1/03)
A squadron from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed by air from their base at Fort Polk, LA, and later joined the 82d in this fight to secure LOCs on 8 April (On Point, final draft, p. 276).
Under heavy contact at An Najaf, the 3 ID attacked to isolate the city. Colonel Ben Hodges and his 1st Brigade Combat Team of 101st Airborne, reinforced by Company A, 2/70 Armor, a tank-Bradley task force, began to clear the city on 31 March in an operation with tough urban fighting, including a mini "Thunder Run" by a tank company they concluded five days later (On Point, final draft, pp. 326–332). Meanwhile the 3d Infantry Division continued north toward Baghdad and the U.S. Marines continued their advance to Baghdad on the east bank of the Euphrates River. On 28 March Colonel Greg Gass and his 101st Attack Aviation Brigade, conducted a successful two battalion (forty-eight Apaches) attack over one hundred kilometers against defending Republican Guard forces defending near Karbala and the approaches to Baghdad. And on 31 March, a daylight armed reconnaissance to protect the western flank (On Point, final draft, pp 248-49, 336).
While the sandstorm of 25–27 March was blowing, the Coalition forces pushed needed fuel, ammunition, and water forward while continuing local attacks. On 30 March LTG Wallace ordered five simultaneous attacks, three by the 101st, one by the 3ID, and one by the 82nd, which included those attacks described above and which apparently confused Iraqi forces into believing the main attack was coming from a different direction and causing them to begin repositioning forces. LTG Wallace said these were "key to the fight… maintaining offensive tempo and spirit…" (Wallace, William, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, notes, January 2004). During this Iraqi repositioning, and also during the sandstorm, Coalition air forces hit Iraqi formations with precision attacks. It was lethal teamwork of ground forces conducting maneuvers that caused the enemy to be more vulnerable to coalition air strikes (On Point, final draft, pp. 316-40).
NORTH AND WEST
As vital as air power was to the advance from the south, it was even more instrumental to allied successes in the west and north. In the west thinly supported Special Operations Forces quickly over-ran airfields and neutralized potential Iraqi missile strikes. Packing little organic firepower themselves, they depended heavily upon aerial precision strikes to offset their shortcomings… Operations in both west and north progressed well, and distracted appreciable Iraqi forces while the climactic battle was shaping up in the south.
(Brown, John, Brigadier General, American Military History, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), coordinating draft, 2003, Washington, D.C., pg. 36)
In the west Special Operations Forces were joined by Team tank, in a precedent-setting combination of special operators and a tank company to continue their operations there. Beginning on 2 April, that company team of 10 M1A1 tanks was airlifted to an airfield in the west by Air Force C-17 aircraft to join special forces. (On Point, final draft, p. 311).
LOGISTICS
Major General Hank Stratman, CFLCC Deputy, and Major General Dave Kratzer, commander of 377 Reserve Theater Support Command, and their logisticians and commanders were able to open this theater of war, a formidable challenge by itself requiring anticipation and forward planning by the U.S. Army even as the Afghanistan operation was ongoing. Stratman, Kratzer, Major General Claude Christenson, CFLCC C-4, McKiernan's logistics commanders and logistics operators overcame many hurdles during the operation to sustain momentum of the attack. In 1991 VII Corps attacked 250 kilometers in 89 hours with each division consuming about 800,000 gallons of fuel daily. We certainly had our logistics challenges, most notably in fuel distribution, location of spare parts, and mail delivery documented earlier in this book. This attack would be over longer distances. These logistics challenges were met as in 1991 with teamwork, ingenuity, anticipation, skill, courage, and what I always liked to call "brute force logistics." Christenson would have high praise for the troops driving the trucks to get supplies forward (On Point, final draft, pp. 201-03). But logisticians and operators by necessity hold themselves to the highest standards.
Logistics is a difficult and complex area to transform and early indicators were that 1990s transformation in logistics to support offensive operations in what the Army calls "distributed battlespace" is a work in progress. Much was done in the 1990s to provide more "total asset visibility." Despite that and the extraordinary effort by soldiers and commanders, there were shortcomings as before. Moreover, the battle ambush and subsequent rescue of soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company showed the asymmetry of the modern battlefield and other focus areas. In addition, "mobilization and deployment decisions slowed arrival of many logistic units or resulted in their elimination from the troop list altogether." (On Point, final draft, pp. 471–475). LTG Christensen, now Army G-11, and General Paul Kern, Commander of Army Material Command, have accelerated logistics transformation for the future.
Medical care with hospital surgical teams was pushed well forward to be immediately available to wounded troops. Evacuation care capabilities were put into action to ensure top care all the way to major hospitals such as Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., where the best continuing treatment and rehabilitation care continues to
be available. On the battlefield, medics risked their lives to aid fellow soldiers, as did Specialist Dwayne Turner of the 101st Airborne Division near the town of Al Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad. Although wounded by automatic weapons fire multiple times and weakened by loss of blood, Turner continued to risk his own life, saving the lives of at least three of his fellow soldiers (On Point, final draft, pp. 441).
BAGHDAD
Both U.S. Marine and U.S. Army forces were now speeding toward Baghdad. Battle commanders were all over the battlefield, up front with their troops talking directly with subordinate commanders. That face-to-face battle command method especially in a Force XXI electronic-networked system was key. V Corps commander LTG Wallace said he made "every attempt to see division commanders each day" (Wallace, notes, January 2004). 3d Infantry Division conducted a series of attacks to defeat and destroy Republican Guard units around the key choke point they referred to as the "Karbala Gap," a narrow piece of land between the town of Karbala and Bar al-Milh Lake (On Point, final draft, p. 304). All the way to Baghdad, more than 300 miles in two weeks, Major General Blount had maneuvered his 3d Infantry Division brigade combat teams and his cavalry squadron to sustain the momentum of the attack as the 82d Airborne and 101st teamed to free the division to maintain momentum. Simultaneously with the attack on As Najaf on 31 March, Colonel Joe Anderson and 2d Brigade Combat Team of the 101st conducted a successful feint into the town of Al Hillah, one of the five simultaneous attacks to confuse Iraquis about V Corps' main attack. For this operation they were reinforced by Company B, 2/70 Armor (On Point, final draft, pp. 332-36).
After crossing through the Karbala Gap, Blount ordered his 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Wil Grimsley, to secure the final crossing sites over the Euphrates and attack to seize Saddam International Airport, believed to be key to securing Baghdad. To close the gap in the north, Blount ordered Colonel Dan Allyn commander 3d Brigade to conduct an attack to secure that last spot in the noose around Baghdad (Blount, Buford, Major General, U.S. Army, notes, February 2004). That action by the Division's 3d Brigade was similar in audacity, professional skill, and courage as the attacks by the 2d Brigade a few days later into the center of Baghdad (On Point, final draft, pp. 374-81).
"On 4 April, both Lieutenant General Wallace and Lieutenant General Conway, commanding I MEF, could view their situations with satisfaction. V Corps and I MEF had successfully held at bay the paramilitary that had attacked the supply convoys and threatened the LOCs. Moreover they had nearly encircled Baghdad… The Marines in I MEF had crossed the Euphrates at An Nasiriyah and were fighting their way up the Tigris River, approaching the city from the southeast. V Corps' five simultaneous attacks had taken the corps through the Karbala Gap and Al Hillah… isolating Baghdad from the south and west."
(On Point, final draft, p. 391)
Blount was determined to see if the division could take Baghdad by shock, wanting to collapse it quickly, thus he and Wallace settled on a reconnaissance in force or what the troops call a "Thunder Run"(On Point, final draft, p. 397). There were two "Thunder Runs" into Baghdad. Thunder Run is a term from Vietnam, and refers to a rapid advance through a contested area or down a road without stopping even as small engagements popped up. The tactic uses shock and speed to surprise the enemy before they can react. The first of these actions by 1-64 Armor, a tank-heavy task force commanded by LTC Eric Schwartz took place on 5 April. At 0630 on 5 April, Schwartz and his leaders and soldiers carried out a "show of force," attacking up Highway 8 into central Baghdad, then back southwest to Baghdad International Airport. Greg Kelley of Fox News accompanied that attack on Colonel Dave Perkins's M113 (the 2d Brigade Commander who accompanied the raid to see for himself and provide Schwartz external communications so Schwartz could concentrate on commanding his own task force). The two-hour twenty-minute operation was intense from almost the time it was launched until completed. Courage and small unit initiative were shown everywhere as TF 1-64 completed its mission (On Point, final draft, pp. 402-07). The results showed that such tactics might indeed capture Baghdad. They also paid tribute to one of their own:
"SSG Stevon Booker, Tank Commander in Company A, 1-64 AR, and his platoon were in an intense direct firefight with a fanatical enemy using wave attacks and suicide tactics. He fired hundreds of rounds until his.50 caliber machine gun malfunctioned. SSG Booker exited the turret, assumed a modified prone position on top of the turret and began to engage the enemy with his M4 rifle. He protected the platoon's left flank and prevented the formation from being infiltrated by enemy vehicles. He continued to engage the enemy with his M4 until mortally wounded."
(3 ID reference)
Two days later Perkins took his entire 2d Brigade Combat team into the heart of Baghdad. Their actions resembled those of TF 1-64 AR, which was also on this operation. Close combat ensued with Iraqi vehicles down side streets and charges by irregular troops at combat vehicles. During the operation their TOC (Tactical Operations Center) had significant casualties from a missile attack. They soon were back in operation despite losing three soldiers and two embedded reporters, and having seventeen wounded and twenty-two vehicles destroyed or damaged. Perkins, his commanders, and his soldiers would not be denied. They finished their attack and then stayed (On Point, final draft, pp. 409-22). This initiative to stay, supported by senior commanders, was one of those bold decisions in war, like capturing the Remagen Bridge in World War II, that has effects all the way to the strategic level.
"To give a sense of perspective, the 21-kilometer attack into Baghdad was equivalent to an attack on Washington, D.C., from the intersection of I-435 and I-95 in Springfield, Virginia, to the Mall in downtown Washington, D.C., seizing the area from the Capitol to the White House to the Lincoln Memorial to the Jefferson Memorial…"
(On Point, final draft, p. 416)
The end of this phase of the war was on 9 April 2003.
The Marines moved into the city from the other side, and the continuing route of the Iraqis in the west and north completed the isolation of the now fallen capital city. The campaign's cumulative casualties to that point had been 42 killed and 133 wounded for the Army, 41 killed and 151 wounded for the Marines, and 19 killed and 36 wounded for the British. On April 9 a tiny contingent of Marines and a crowd of jubilant Iraqis pulled down the Saddam Monument in the Shiite sector of Baghdad while breathless television commentary related the symbolism and decisiveness of the moment.
(Brown, p. 3 from 3rd Army History Group report as of 8 April)
NATION BUILDING
World War II concluded with unconditional surrender by both Germany and Japan. U.S. and allied forces in those two countries began occupation duties and set conditions for eventual peaceful and orderly transitions to new governments. The occupation of Germany officially concluded in 1955 after ten years. It concluded in Japan in 1952 after seven years.
Transition in Iraq would follow a different course. Combat formations rapidly transitioned to this new phase. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Colonel Dave Teeples) and 1st Armored Division (MG Marty Dempsey) joined formations already there also rapidly and with great skill and courage adapting to a new mission. In addition, the U.S. Army deployed its new Stryker Brigade, the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team. This formation had gone from a concept in the Army's vision announced in the fall of 1999, to a combat-ready brigade in four years, an impressive feat of Army transformation. This phase would also include combat operations even as soldiers reached out to help Iraqis regain control of their country and to improve their way of life. U.S. and allied forces would adapt quickly with tactics of their own to counter resistance while also helping rebuild Iraq. The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority sought to rebuild infrastructure and worked to transfer national control to free Iraqis on 30 June 2004. It is an impressive operation both for the courage of U.S. Army and allied soldiers and for their selflessness and ingenuity in performing their mission. To provide security, to help set conditions for that transition, and to assist
in nation building, Coalition Forces are conducting new missions, increasingly with our new partners, the Iraqis themselves, in an inspiring display of versatility and adaptability. MG Dave Petraeus, CG 101st Airborne, calls attention to four qualities in leaders and soldiers during the attack to Baghdad, and this phase of the operation: initiative, determination, innovation, and courage (Patraeus, MG, US Army, notes 02/04).
If you go on any given day to almost any sector in Iraq you find normalcy. You find schools open and children attending, you find teachers paid more than under Saddam's regime, and you find most of the propaganda removed from new textbooks and classrooms. You find health clinics and hospitals open, medical supplies available and doctors and medical personnel paid more than under Saddam's regime. You find freedom of expression on street corners, in town squares by demonstrators, in newspapers, and on television. You find local governments at work. You find local Iraqi police at work. You find the infrastructure of water, sewage, electricity, road repair, and public transportation at least as good as pre-war and perhaps better. You find Americans and allies, mostly soldiers and Marines, reaching out to Iraqis in ways that inspire us all with their ingenuity and compassion. You find Americans, who are there because they believe in what they are doing. And you also find Americans, who wonder when the Iraqis are going to get tired of the thugs, extremists, and former regime loyalists who disrupt their lives and who hold the country back, and make the effort to get rid of them.