[Blessed be Beatty.]
Beatty himself remained bitterly disappointed—the annihilating, Nelsonic victory had shriveled, in Ralph Seymour’s words, to “an indecisive fight in our favor”—but the admiral’s prestige in the navy soared. When Churchill visited Lion ten days after the battle, he found Beatty’s senior officers enthusiastic. “Well do I remember,” Churchill wrote, “how, as I was leaving the ship, the usually imperturbable Pakenham caught me by the sleeve, ‘First Lord, I wish to speak to you in private,’ and the intense conviction in his voice as he said, ‘Nelson has come again.’ ”
The Dogger Bank was the first sea battle between dreadnoughts whose high speed and heavy gun power dominated the action. Both the British and German Battle Cruiser Squadrons were accompanied by flocks of light cruisers and destroyers, but except in the opening moments near dawn and, at the end, in delivering the death strokes to Blücher, they played little part in the fighting. Neither submarines nor mines were involved, although fear of their presence affected British tactics. The preponderance of heavy gun power favored the British: Beatty’s five battle cruisers carried twenty-four 13.5-inch and sixteen 12-inch guns to Hipper’s eight 12-inch and twenty 11-inch guns. During the battle, the five British battle cruisers fired a total of 1,150 13.5-inch and 12-inch shells. The Germans fired 976 12-inch and 11-inch shells. Lion was hit by sixteen heavy shells from the German battle cruisers and one 8.2-inch shell from Blücher. Six heavy shell hits were recorded on Tiger and none on any of the other British ships except one 8.2-inch hit on Indomitable by Blücher. Seydlitz was hit by three heavy British shells—two from Lion (one of these nearly destroyed her) and one from Tiger. Derfflinger also was hit three times, once each by Lion, Tiger, and Princess Royal. Obviously, accuracy on both sides was poor: 3½ percent of the shells fired by the Ger-man battle cruisers hit a target while on the British side the percentage achieved by the three Cats firing at the three German battle cruisers was below 2 percent.
[A number of shells fired by the Cats were aimed at Blücher, while New Zealand and Indomitable fired only at Blücher.]
The dismal gunnery figures on both sides do not take into account the circumstances of the battle: high speed, long range, smoke, and the fact that no one on either side had ever fought this kind of battle before. Neverthe-less, Lion was hit sixteen times and no German ship more than four times. Discussion of comparative gunnery began on board Lion even as the ship was being towed home. “My impression,” said Filson Young, “was that the German gunfire was better than ours initially, and they got on the target sooner. . . . To anyone sitting, as I was, on the target surrounded by the enemy’s shells, his shooting appeared to be painfully accurate; and, indeed, towards the end of the action, when two and possibly three ships were concentrating on Lion, she was very nearly smothered by their fire.” Young believed that one cause of poor shooting was that “we had no director firing [“a device by which all the guns can be aimed and fired simultaneously and accurately from one central position, generally on the foremast well above the smoke,” according to Young’s footnote definition] in any ship except Tiger.” Yet Tiger, using the new system, had scored only three hits and Lion, which lacked it, had scored four. The result was an erosion of confidence among British naval officers in their equipment, training, and tactics. “Every one of them,” said Young, “had been brought up on the theory of the big gun, the first blow, etc. We had the biggest guns and we got in the first blows, but none of the results that . . . [we] had been taught to believe as gospel had happened. . . . We had gone on hitting, and hitting, and hitting—and three of their four ships had got home. Why?”
After the battle, Young and his shipmates assumed that its results and the lessons learned “would immediately have been fastened upon by the . . . navy and the Admiralty. . . . Doubtless throughout the fleet there were hundreds of officers who were keen to get all the information and technical data that they could. . . . Every gunnery officer in the fleet wanted to know exactly how the great ranges, and the high speeds of the ships engaged affected the existing organization for fire control.” Accordingly, immediately after their return to the Firth of Forth, the officers of the Battle Cruiser Squadron wrote detailed reports. A wealth of technical data was forwarded to the Admiralty, but, said Young, “the Admiralty, having acknowledged the receipt of the masses of material, made no further sign.” After the war, Churchill himself blithely reported: “The result of the engagement confirmed and fortified my own convictions of the great strength of the British line of battle, and in particular of the ships armed with 13.5-inch guns.”
Jellicoe, whose career specialty had been gunnery, was not so complacent. Battle reports indicating superior accuracy on the part of the Germans confirmed his “suspicion that the gunnery of our battle cruiser squadron was in great need of improvement, a fact which I very frequently urged upon Sir David Beatty.” Beatty needed no convincing, having, from the day he took command of the battle cruisers in 1912, urged that gunnery exercises be conducted at long range and high speed. Nevertheless, despite these admonitions and good intentions, the need for excellence in gunnery was never hammered home. “We went out to sea for fleet exercises with the same totally inadequate monthly allowance of ammunition to be expended,” said Young. “[After the battle] Lion was fitted with . . . director fire control and other improvements, but with the Grand Fleet there was no development or modification of tactics and the reliance was still on the fallacy that all was well with our [matériel] and that we had more of it than the enemy. The result was that . . . our gunnery . . . showed the same disappointing results at Jutland as it had at Dogger Bank.”
If a deficiency in the ability of the British battle cruisers to deal out punishment was recognized by some and ignored by others, ominous flaws in their ability to survive punishment remained hidden. Since the building of Invincible, British battle cruisers had been structurally flawed by Jacky Fisher’s demand that weight in armor plate be sacrificed to weight invested in larger guns and heavy propulsion machinery that could generate higher speeds. The Germans, obeying Tirpitz’s dictum that a warship’s first duty is to remain afloat, had taken a different course, accepting lower speed and smaller gun caliber in return for heavier protective armor. Thus, at the Dogger Bank, Lion had 9-inch armor over her amidships belt, New Zealand 8-inch, and Indomitable 7-inch, while Derfflinger was shielded in this area by 13-inch armor and Seydlitz and Moltke by 11-inch. Ironically, the Battle of the Dogger Bank failed to illuminate this design flaw; indeed, it encouraged Fisher and the Royal Navy to believe that their choice had been correct. Lion, despite her weaker armor, had absorbed sixteen heavy hits, had suffered few casualties, and had survived, while the better-protected Seydlitz had been hit only three times, but had lost two turrets and 200 men. This was one fact that permitted Churchill to preen himself on the capabilities of the 13.5-inch gun.
On both sides, the vulnerability of ships to shells fired at long range in a high, arching trajectory before plunging steeply down on enemy decks had been unknown before the battle. When dreadnought battle cruisers and battleships were designed, naval tacticans and designers had assumed that battles between capital ships would be fought at ranges of around 10,000 yards. Shells, therefore, were expected to travel on flatter, more horizontal trajectories and explode against or penetrate the sides of target ships. The sides of ships, accordingly, were more heavily armored than the decks. But at the Dogger Bank, the first dreadnought action, the British battle cruisers opened fire at 18,000 yards. Despite their heavier armor, even the German vessels lacked adequate deck armor, which was why a shell lofted from 17,000 yards away had pierced Seydlitz’s after deck.
Another defensive design fault manifested itself in ships on both sides at the Dogger Bank. No one in Britain or Germany had realized the menace of an explosive flash fire within an enclosed gun-turret system. In Lion, Seydlitz, and their sisters in both fleets, shells and powder journeyed upward on hoists from the magazines, through the tur
ret lobbies, and into the turrets to the breeches of the guns. These separate compartments remained open and unsealed. A flash fire at any point along this extended route could spread quickly to all other points, including the magazines. Such a fire had occurred in Lion at the Dogger Bank and might easily have destroyed her. The fire in her A turret lobby, which caused most of her casualties, could have spread downward into her ammunition handling rooms and from there into her magazines, where a cataclysmic explosion would have destroyed the ship. Fortunately, little ammunition was present in the turret lobby and the resulting fire was small and rapidly extinguished. As a result of this escape, the intrinsic danger of fire transmission went unrecognized on board the ship and at the Admiralty and no effort was made to install antiflash devices in turret trunks to prevent flames from spreading. Not until after Jutland sixteen months later, when the battle cruisers Queen Mary, Invincible, and Indefatigable blew up from this cause, were these corrections made in British ships.
After the Dogger Bank, the Royal Navy made changes in battle orders, in communications systems, signals, and fleet organization. Jellicoe issued new Grand Fleet Battle Orders regarding distribution of fire on enemy ships; he wanted no more mistakes such as Pelly’s. Beatty updated his Battle Cruiser Orders, emphasizing that captains must possess, “in a marked degree, initiative, resource, determination and fearlessness of responsibility. . . . War is a perpetual conflict with the unexpected, so that it is impossible to prescribe beforehand all the circumstances that may arise.” Along with director firing systems, all battle cruisers were to be equipped with an auxilary wireless set. And Nelson’s flag signal, “Engage the enemy more closely,” was restored to the signal book.
The admirals at sea resisted another change urged on them by Churchill and Fisher. The First Lord, concerned that the Grand Fleet’s base at Scapa Flow was too remote from the potential battlefield, wanted Jellicoe to move his ships down to Rosyth. The First Sea Lord concurred, telling Beatty that because Scapa was too far away, he doubted that “Jellicoe’s Battle Squadrons will be in this war.” Later, writing to Jellicoe, Fisher elaborated: “The fundamental fact is that you can never be in time so long as you are at Scapa Flow and therefore there will NEVER be a battle with the German High Seas Fleet unless von Pohl [who assumed command soon after the Dogger Bank battle] goes north especially to fight you and that he never will!!!” Jellicoe refused, citing the thick fogs in the Firth of Forth and his fear that Beatty “would be mined in” by the Germans. The Commander-in-Chief preferred to remain at Scapa Flow, now well protected, because the huge anchorage was so large that ships could carry out gunnery practice and torpedo drills inside the Flow, free of submarine menace. When Beatty supported Jellicoe, Churchill and Fisher backed off.
Beatty’s success stimulated the Admiralty to change the structure and name of the battle cruiser force. With no need now for battle cruisers anywhere in the world except in the North Sea—the one exception was Inflexible, now on guard at the Dardanelles against any sortie by Goeben—the Admiralty could now place all these ships under Beatty’s command. This new force was renamed the Battle Cruiser Fleet; Lion, once repaired, was set apart as its flagship. Captain Osmond de Brock of Princess Royal was promoted to commodore and a week later to rear admiral, and given command of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, comprising Princess Royal, Queen Mary, and Tiger. Admiral Pakenham, brought from the 3rd Cruiser Squadron to replace the disgraced Moore, went to the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which included New Zealand, Australia, and Indefatigable. Rear Admiral Horace Hood was given the 3rd Squadron: Invincible, Indomitable, and—when she could be brought home—Inflexible. Against Hipper’s four battle cruisers, Beatty now had nine, with a tenth to come.
Despite its new name and increased strength, the Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an organic part of the Grand Fleet and Beatty remained subordinate to Jellicoe. On March 23, the Commander-in-Chief, looking ahead and imagining the opening phases of a future battle, wrote to Beatty, employing his own particular blend of fatherly praise and gentle admonition:
I imagine the Germans will try to entrap you by using their battle cruisers as a decoy. They know that the odds are that you will be 100 miles away from me, and can draw you down to the Heligoland Bight without my being in effective support. This is all right if you keep your speed, but if some of your ships have their speed badly reduced in a fight with their battle cruisers, or by submarines, their loss seems inevitable if you are drawn into the High Seas Fleet with me too far off to extricate them before dark. The Germans know you very well and will try to take advantage of that quality of “not letting go when you have once got hold,” which you possess, thank God. But one must concern oneself with the result to the country of a serious decrease in relative strength. If the game looks worth the candle risks can be taken! If not, one’s duty is to be cautious. I believe you will see which is the proper course and pursue it vigorously.
German reaction in the fleet, the press, and—where it counted most—with the kaiser was greater embarrassment and deeper depression. The Dogger Bank proved that the British fleet had not evacuated the North Sea, although this boast by the German press had never been believed in the German navy. “The dominant feeling in the [German] fleet,” says Arthur Marder, “was that an inept operation had met the fate it deserved.” All Germans had reason to be proud of the gallant fight put up by Blücher; and, in general, in this first clash of dreadnoughts, the German navy had proved—as it had with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—that its fighting abilities, discipline, and courage were superb. The ships were splendidly handled, the guns well aimed, and signaling and damage control expert. But nothing could obscure the facts that the German navy had fled the field, lost a heavy armored ship, and left behind over a thousand men.
German seamen had special reason to be proud of their gunnery. “Our own fire was very effective,” Hipper reported after the battle. “Hits could be repeatedly observed on the first and second [British] ships and fire in the second.” Long before they knew that they had scored twenty-two hits on Lion and Tiger to only seven received by their own three battle cruisers, the Germans had seen their shells exploding on Beatty’s flagship and had watched her turn out of the line with a heavy list. Twice, they had watched Commodore Goodenough’s light cruisers come within range and then retreat; they had seen Meteor struck and other British destroyers give up and fall back. Finally, when they witnessed the entire squadron of British battle cruisers turning away, it naturally appeared that the British had given up the fight. Admiral Scheer observed, “There seems no obvious reason why the English battle cruisers would so soon have stopped fighting after their leader fell out and when the number of our [battle] cruisers had already dwindled to three, unless it was because our guns had severely handled them.” In addition, when Hipper entered the Jade, he believed that he had sunk Tiger. Officers on board Moltke declared absolutely that they had seen the second battle cruiser in the enemy line sink. Moltke’s log recorded: “11:52: Hits on Tiger aft of third funnel and fire observed. 12:23: . . . an enemy battle cruiser which did not appear to be in the line, but to have drawn off . . . disappeared after heavy explosions.” The airship L-5, hovering overhead, bolstered this report by reporting that it witnessed only four large British ships withdrawing after the battle. “I cannot confirm the view of Moltke that the second ship of the enemy line sank,” Hipper reported, “though I think it is possible.” Hipper reported this possibility to Ingenohl, and Ingenohl reported it to the kaiser. When, in time, it became apparent that Tiger was still afloat, Hipper was mortified; it underlined the fact that Blücher, alone of all the ships in the battle, had been abandoned.
Ingenohl endorsed Hipper’s conduct of the battle. Reporting to the kaiser, he said, “The tactical dispositions were in my opinion correct; the leadership during the action was irreproachable. Further, the difficult decision to leave the damaged Blücher to her fate must in the circumstances be approved.” Some in the navy grumbled at Hipper’s abandonment
of Blücher, but these criticisms were muted. Scheer endorsed Hipper’s decision, saying, “Seeing so many [British] ships assembled, he [Hipper] must have considered it extremely probable that still more forces were behind.” As Captain Ludwig von Reuter of Derfflinger pointed out, “With the Dogger Bank only eighty sea miles from the English coast and two hundred sea miles from Wilhelmshaven . . . the stern action chosen by Admiral Hipper was tactically correct.” The real fault, most German officers believed, lay in the absence of the High Seas Fleet.
Hipper’s official postbattle report and those offered by Derfflinger’s captain and the captains of other battle cruisers sounded similar themes. A general, urgent recommendation was that when the battle cruisers went out, they be supported by the High Seas Fleet even at the risk of a major battle with the British Grand Fleet. With this in mind, Reuter recommended that no important offensive operations go forward until all German battle squadrons (he referred to the absence of the Königs) were available. In addition, Hipper suggested the careful placement of a line of submarines able to attack before or during the battle. Reuter added that “in English waters, our forces should be accompanied by submarines which in the case of a chasing action as took place on January 24 might reap a rich harvest.” Only efficient ships, Hipper believed, should take part in battle: “All ships other than the most modern must, in view of the tremendous effectiveness of modern naval artillery, fall an easy prey to the enemy.” Hipper, of course, had Blücher in mind.
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