by James Johns
Of the nine investigations into Pearl Harbor, and with most of them influenced by heavy political agendas, only the army and navy inquiries exonerated Admiral Kimmel and General Short of most charges, mainly because security information available to these boards had not been made available to the prior civilian investigation. Their findings blamed some in Washington that would cast a shadow on the administration. The army and navy boards concluded their hearings, making their decisions available shortly before the 1944 presidential election, when FDR was running for his fourth term. Stalling tactics were used, however, to delay publishing the reports until after the election, as such a release might have guaranteed Republican New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey the presidency. In Roosevelt’s opinion, the reports and opinions should be “sealed up”2 in the name of the public’s interest.
This book also addresses the disparity in judgment, not only by the administration during the war, but also by the media and the American public. Why was crucial information shared with some leaders and not others? What made some military leaders scapegoats of disaster while another, caught in similar circumstances, was branded a hero? Who actually held the power to determine how many lives were expendable in the name of a perceived greater good?
And finally, the reader is provided an overview of world and political events, including those on Capitol Hill, that led to disaster. Illuminating the facts, many of which have been ignored or disputed for decades, the author makes it clear that Pearl Harbor elevated deceptive statesmanship to a new level.
Chapter 1
* * *
Dereliction of Duty
At 0600 on December 7, 1941, approximately two hundred thirty nautical miles north of Oahu,1 the first wave of 183 aircraft2 took off from the decks of six Japanese aircraft carriers. They orbited, and when all were in the air, they headed south.
At 0700, the second wave of 167 planes3 started taking off, and when all were airborne, they, too, headed south approximately forty-five minutes behind the first wave. Their mission: to eliminate the American Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor, which had the ability to retaliate or prevent future Japanese aggressive moves in the western Pacific.
The attack force itself consisted of six aircraft carriers, the Akagi, the Hiryu, the Kaga, the Shokaku, the Soryu, and the Zuikaku, accompanied by approximately fifty support vessels including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, oilers, and an umbrella of submarines.4 Five of the submarines carried the new, two-man midget subs strapped to their decks. Their mission would be the most dangerous, to actually attempt to get into Pearl Harbor itself. Named the Kido Butai, it was the largest naval attack force that had been assembled to date. (By the end of the war, only one ship from the entire attack force, the Ushio, a destroyer, would survive.)
The primary objectives of the attack force were the three American aircraft carriers, the USS Enterprise (CV-6), the USS Lexington (CV-2), and the USS Saratoga (CV-3), giving the Japanese a two-to-one superiority, and the eight battleships in port which were of about equal strength to the Japanese. The U.S. battleships mounted fourteen-inch guns, with the exception of the USS West Virginia (BB-48) and the USS Maryland (BB-46), which employed heavier, sixteen-inch batteries. The Kido Butai also had the speed to outrun the American ships, but on their way to the attack, they were committed to only fourteen knots so the slower support ships could keep up.
The most important question was if the Americans were warned, at what point would the mission be scrubbed? To reduce such likelihood, it was decided that all ships’ transmitter keys would be locked in such a way that no accidental signals could be sent to alert listening ears of their approach.
On December 3, Japanese intelligence indicated that the tensions with the United States had continued to mount. The Enterprise had left port with two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and twelve destroyers. The two battleships returned, but on December 5, the Lexington left port with five cruisers. Where were they? The Saratoga had already been gone for some time. Had they just casually left port so as not to arouse undue suspicions?
Three submarines that were part of the Japanese attack force each carried one float plane in a waterproof hangar on deck. Capable of patrolling up to two hundred miles ahead, the planes had seen nothing. Was that good or bad? Actually, the decision had been made before departing Japan that if they were spotted before December 7, the fleet would turn around. But what if the American carriers were spotted after takeoff en route to Pearl? Would the carriers be attacked? The answer was that the actual circumstances would have to dictate the decision and solution. Japanese agents in Honolulu would provide the U.S. alert status by way of Tokyo.
Protecting Pearl Harbor itself would be three army airfields: Hickam, which adjoined Pearl Harbor; Bellows, located on the east coast of the island just five miles south of Kaneohe; and Wheeler, located in the middle of the island. The Marines also had an airfield at Ewa, just west of Pearl Harbor. And the navy had two airfields: one at Pearl Harbor itself; and one on the east coast at Kaneohe. It was from these last two that they conducted their long-range reconnaissance.
The three hundred fifty aircraft employed by the Japanese strike force included three varieties of aircraft, all single-engine. The Nakajim B5N (Kate) would be employed in two roles. The first wave would include fifty Kates in the level-bombing role, and forty were armed with torpedoes. The second wave placed all fifty-four Kates in the level-bombing role.5 At the time, the Kate was considered the most advanced torpedo bomber in the world. Much of its credit was due to its torpedo that could be released and dropped farther and faster than U.S. torpedoes, thus requiring less run-in time to the target.
The dive-bombing role would be fulfilled by the Aichi D3A (Val). The fighters, Mitsubishi A6M Zeros, would be responsible for the protection of the others, as well as for finding targets of opportunity. While the planes were still approaching Pearl Harbor, if it became evident that the Americans were not alerted, the message “Tora, Tora, Tora” (“Tiger, Tiger, Tiger”)6 would be transmitted back to the fleet.
At about 0645 on December 7, the destroyer USS Ward (DD-139), on patrol outside of the harbor entrance, identified, fired upon, and sank a submarine that appeared to be following the USS Antares (AKS-3), a general stores ship, into the harbor while the entrance net was open. This in itself was a very bold order for its new captain, to chance creating an international incident. But the target was definitely within the U.S. defensive zone and mostly submerged in an area where such was not authorized. The Ward passed a “fired upon” message ashore to the Bishop Point Relay Station where, somehow, all time advantage was lost because of a request for confirmation. The warning went unheeded.
At 0702 at the Opana Point mobile radar site at the northern most point on the island, two operator trainees identified a large formation of aircraft straight north, 132 miles out and closing in fast. They passed the sighting on to the information center at Fort Shafter, where the duty officer, himself a trainee in his job, told them not to worry about it because it was assumed to be a formation of twelve B-17 heavy bombers that had departed Hamilton Field, San Francisco.7 They had left the States on Saturday night and were due in at Hickam Field by about 0800 Sunday. After all, that’s why the Honolulu radio station had been on playing music all night to serve as a homing beacon. The Japanese were homing in on the same station, a second warning with no action.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor commenced at 0755 with the first bomb falling on the parked PBYs on Ford Island. About half of the entire Pacific Fleet was in port, roughly one hundred forty-five vessels including yard craft.8 In all, some twenty ships suffered various degrees of damage. Five of the eight battleships were sunk, three of which would eventually be refloated: the USS California (BB-44), the USS Oklahoma (BB-37), and the USS West Virginia (BB-48). Human loss of life and aircraft losses were appalling.
Of the navy personnel, 2,008 were killed, with 710 wounded. Of the army personnel, 218 were killed with 364 wounded. The Marines l
ost 109 men, with an additional 69 wounded. In addition to the military casualties, 68 civilians were killed with an additional 35 wounded. Nearly 200 aircraft had been destroyed. The navy lost 93 planes with an additional 31 damaged; the army lost 96 planes, while another 128 were damaged.9
By 1000, it was over. The Japanese had lost only twenty-nine aircraft and all five of the two-man midget subs. And essentially the Pacific Fleet was, at least temporarily, out of business as a fighting force.
How could an attack force the size of the Kido Butai avoid the American long-range patrols and get close enough to launch an attack that would neutralize the U.S. center of power in the entire Pacific? Could it have happened because the Americans’ guard was down due to the peace talks going on in Washington, looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific? Had the Hawaiian commanders not been on the alert for war? Or could the chain of command have broken down at the top in Washington? America and Congress wanted to know.
But now that the United States was at war, the Americans needed to exercise caution as to how much would be revealed to the enemy, especially the extent of damage done at Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt immediately sent Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to Hawaii to make a firsthand inspection and report back to him personally. Upon Knox’s return, a brief statement was made to the public, minimizing losses for public morale with no hints being made to indicate responsibility.
By the evening of December 7, panic had already spread across the nation. In San Francisco, two squadrons of enemy planes were reported making reconnaissance flights from the navy yard at Mare Island south of San Jose. The Panama radio reported such flights over the Panama Canal, but no bombs were dropped. In Seattle, crowds of people smashed windows and looted stores during the enforcement of the city’s first blackout. Bases on both coasts were put on full alert, and dependents were evacuated from some that were considered likely targets.
Representative John Dingell (D–MI) told the House that he would demand court-martials for Admiral Kimmel and General Short, those in command at Pearl Harbor. (Dingell had been a staunch Roosevelt supporter and had even suggested to the president in August of 1941 that the ten thousand Japanese-Americans on Hawaii be interned. In his opinion, this might get Japan to behave and come around to the Americans’ way of thinking.) Along with the court-martials of Kimmel and Short, Dingell demanded that Major General Hap Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces, and Major General George Brett, Assistant Chief of Army Air Corps in Washington, be included. How could this have happened? Had these commanders been asleep? When advised of dispatches that Japan had also bombed Philippine objectives heavily and hit gasoline stores, members of Congress demanded to know where American planes and patrols had been. On the evening of December 7, when FDR met with congressional leaders and cabinet members, Senator Tom Connally (D–TX), head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “banged a table with his fist and exclaimed: ‘How did they catch us with our pants down, Mr. President?’”10 By December 8, the United States would declare war against Japan.
On Tuesday, December 17, Admiral Kimmel was informed that he would surrender his command to his second in command, Admiral William Pye. Admiral Pye, thought by many to be the navy’s best strategist, would hold the position until Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived. Nimitz had just been appointed commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, and he would take permanent command about December 31. (Nimitz would later change the tide of the war in the Pacific, commanding the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the Solomon Islands Campaign.) On the same day, General Short received the news that he, too, would surrender his command. In Washington, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall had always wanted an officer of the Air Corps in command, and soon, Lieutenant General Delos Emmons, who would head up the Hawaiian Department until September 1943, was on his way to Hawaii.
When relieved of their commands, both Kimmel and Short were returned to their previous ranks. Admiral Kimmel was reduced to rear admiral, and Lieutenant General Short was reduced to major general.
The following day, December 18, the president, by his Executive Order 8983, selected a commission of five men, two army officers and two navy officers, headed by Owen J. Roberts, a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, to conduct a complete inquiry into the Pearl Harbor disaster. The official purpose of the investigation was to determine if “any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to”11 the success of the attack, and if so, who was responsible. By design, their mission was limited to the investigation of army and navy personnel only, which would exclude examination of any high-level civilian authorities in the chain of command. The order also pointed out that the investigative procedure to be used was up to the discretion of the commission. As a result, the initial interviews with senior military leadership in Washington were not recorded, nor were the participants sworn in. Congress, by executive order, granted additional power to the commission to gather witnesses and examine them under oath.
Referred to as the Roberts Commission, it consisted of Brigadier General Joseph McNarney, Major General Frank McCoy, Admiral William Standly, and Admiral Joseph Reeves. All but McNarney were retired from active service.
The committee held three meetings in Washington for three days and then spent three weeks in Hawaii gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses, operating out of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Fort Shafter, and the submarine base. They then returned to Washington for another week of wrapping up. The commission interviewed 127 witnesses12 resulting in over eighteen hundred typewritten pages13 and accumulated another three thousand pages of records and documents.14 Anyone who thought that he might have evidence worth contributing was invited to testify. The report, titled Attack Upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces, was completed, dated January 23, 1942, was delivered to the president the same day, and then released to the public on the following day. All information contained in the report fell into three categories or parts of the report, “Finding of Fact,” “Summary of the More Important Facts,” and “Conclusions.”
“Finding of Fact” detailed the meetings and investigative efforts of the Roberts Commission, as well as a list of circumstances on Oahu prior to the attack. This section closed with the military’s response to the attack itself.
Referring to the fact-finding efforts of the Commission, the Hawaiian Department (the army) had three types of readiness alerts: Alert No. 1 warned of acts of sabotage and internal uprisings; Alert No. 2 involved additional security preparations to defend against attacks from submarines, surface ships, or aircraft; and Alert No. 3, the highest level of alert, required that all field positions, on Oahu as well as the rest of the islands, be manned and ready for immediate enemy attack. At the time of the attack, Oahu was at Alert No. 1 when it should have been at Alert No. 3.
The report also identified the responsibilities of the army involving the installation of the aircraft warning system that would detect incoming airborne and waterborne craft. All the required installations had not been completed by the time of the attack. But by November 27, some of the mobile equipment had been set up, and these temporary installations were operating intermittently, from 0400 to 0700, to allow for personnel training.
The temporary installation radar site on Opana Point would have been closed Sunday morning, December 7, by 0700. But a noncommissioned officer in training requested to remain open longer, and he was given permission to do so. At 0702, he identified a large formation of aircraft slightly east of north, approximately one hundred thirty miles out and closing in fast. He reported this to the information center at Fort Shafter, where an inexperienced duty officer, having information that a formation of U.S. planes was due, assumed this was that identification and took no action.
The Roberts Commission determined that after November 27, there were sufficient, although only partially trained, personnel to have manned the temporary locations, which would have provided nearly three hundred sixty d
egrees of coverage around Oahu.
Up until December 7, Kimmel was under the impression that the aircraft warning system was in full operation by the army, but he had not confirmed this.
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan included aerial surveillance of the entire island, extending about twenty miles out beyond the coast. Pilot training took place each weekday, starting at 0800 and continuing throughout the day. No flights were conducted on Sunday.
When the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was put into effect, the navy was responsible for air reconnaissance of the island, extending seven to eight hundred miles out. Before December 7, however, there had not been any distance reconnaissance except for practice drills and maneuvers. During fleet operations away from Oahu, the fleet would conduct reconnaissance flights, but these distances of operations were not sufficient to meet the requirement of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. General Short was under the impression that the navy was conducting regular distance reconnaissance, but he did not confirm this with the navy.
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation was established in Hawaii, it was decided that the FBI would take over from army and navy intelligence operations in matters of the civil population regarding Japanese spies, with the agreement that the three services would cooperate. The FBI made efforts to uncover espionage activities in Hawaii, but because the United States was at peace with Japan, “restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan.”15