by James Johns
Frank Knox had been Republican Alf Landon’s vice-presidential candidate in 1936. Landon would suffer a humiliating defeat, carrying only 8 electoral votes to Roosevelt’s 523.25 While he was no New Dealer, Knox did believe in military preparedness, as well as providing aid to the Allies. In another attempt to generate bipartisan support, Roosevelt appointed him secretary of the navy in July 1940. Knox fully supported Roosevelt’s navy expansion but would not see the end of the war, dying of heart failure in May 1944.
In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s hearings concerning the Lend-Lease Bill, Secretary of War Stimson was of the opposite opinion. Nothing in the Lend-Lease Bill, he told the Senate committee, concerning manufacturing nor shipping would violate law nor constitute an act of war.
For almost three months, Congress argued the merits and demerits to the point where the only remaining arguable issue was that of delivery. To address this, Congress amended specific provisions of the bill to make it more palatable to those fearing its aggressive interpretation.
Included in the amendments to the bill were the stipulations: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying by naval vessels of the United States. (e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.”26
And for those who still did not trust the president, another provision was added, stating, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except in so far as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles.”27
Even by enacting the Lend-Lease law, Congress would not authorize the president to use American armed forces for combat purposes, nor would it authorize him to order them to commit acts of war. This would prevent him from ordering undeclared war. Those united in both Houses against the bill were convinced that it would grant to the president dictatorial powers over Americans’ human and material resources to wage declared or undeclared war where and when he so chose, with the end result of leading the country into another war.
Probably no one was more outspoken against Lend-Lease and the president’s abuse of power than Colonel Charles Lindbergh. As far back as September of 1939, Lindbergh had vocalized his opposition to intervention with radio broadcasts, appealing to Americans for neutrality and the need to build up American defenses. Roosevelt had attempted to quiet Lindbergh by offering him a cabinet position as secretary of the air, but Lindbergh declined. By April 1941, Lindbergh would officially join the America First Committee and become one of the organization’s key spokesmen, delivering thirteen speeches around the country.
Lindbergh’s isolationist posture would not be the first time he butted heads with Roosevelt. Even before his famous transatlantic flight of 1927, Lindbergh had established himself as a highly competent airmail pilot. After the organization of the U.S. Air Mail Service in 1918, the army had been designated the job of carrying the mail. When so many pilots were losing their lives in the effort, Congress opened the bidding process in 1925 for private companies to take over. Employed by Robertson Aircraft, Lindbergh would join the mail service in 1926.
During Roosevelt’s first term in office, rumblings began to stir of fraud and corruption between the Post Office and the airlines. Senator Hugo Black (D–AL), who was hungry for publicity, headed up the initial investigation to raise the issue to Roosevelt’s attention, and by January of 1934, the Air Mail Scandal was born. Without due process, Roosevelt used his executive power to cancel the existing mail contracts and forced the airmail delivery back onto the Army Air Corps. The chief of the Army Air Corps at that time, General Benjamin Foulois, advised Roosevelt of the unsuitability of the army for carrying the mail, but in spite of this and numerous other protests, Roosevelt insisted. And of course, the leading opposition of Roosevelt’s action came from Charles Lindbergh, who by now was on the payroll of both Transcontinental Air Transport (later known as TWA) and Pan American Airways, serving as a technical consultant in their route selections, flight testing, and equipment manufacturing.
Having served as an airmail pilot himself, Lindbergh was in a far better position to judge who should carry the mail, and he was vehement that Roosevelt’s actions were not warranted, pointing out that the contract cancellations “condemns the largest portion of our commercial aviation without just trial.”28 He went on to emphasize that actual guilt of the airlines that were supposedly corrupt had not even been established. In conclusion to his February 1934 message to Roosevelt, Lindbergh asserted that any illegal practices on the part if the airlines needed to be established and proven, and that “the condemnation of commercial aviation by cancellation of all air mail contracts and the use of the army on commercial air lines will unnecessarily and greatly damage all American aviation.”29 In Lindbergh’s opinion, Roosevelt was putting the cart before the horse, judgment without due process, not too different from Roosevelt’s actions after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
After several months, twelve army pilots had lost their lives trying to deliver the mail, and the public outcry over these deaths could not be ignored. Roosevelt was forced to go back to Congress, requesting that a bill be passed to return the airmail service to civilian companies. Bidding reopened, and by early May, the airlines resumed their control of the airmail. It was obvious that Lindbergh had been right, and Roosevelt had been wrong. And Roosevelt would not forget Lindbergh’s willingness to publicly denounce his earlier decision, which Roosevelt clearly considered as politically damaging. As the president had previously mentioned to his press secretary, Stephen Early, “Don’t worry about Lindbergh. We will get that fair-haired boy.”30
Since September 1940, membership in the America First Committee was growing significantly. Their ranks were swelled with prominence, and their arguments were tough to refute, using the assurance of President Wilson that the last war had been “the war to end [all] wars.”31 John Flynn, who headed up the publicity efforts for the America First Committee, took things a step further by promoting advertisements that reminded Americans of what the last war had done for the world. Hadn’t it only brought Communism to Russia, Fascism to Italy, and Nazism to Germany? What did Americans think another war would bring to America?
By December 1941, the AFC had grown to over four hundred chapters to support its (nearly) one-million-strong membership.32 Its principles were clear: to build a strong defensive posture, and to not allow foreign aid to weaken that strength and draw Americans into a foreign war.
Even before his direct involvement with the America First Committee, Colonel Lindbergh testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 23, 1941, and a couple of weeks later, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6. Lindbergh stood firm on the belief that the United States should not “police the world,”33 that Americans should promote a negotiated peace between Britain and Germany, and that by sending military armaments to Britain, Americans were only weakening their defense at home. When asked by a congressman in one of the hearings which side he would like to see win the war, he responded with, “I want neither side to win,”34 which only furthered the notion that he was pro–German.
On April 23, Lindbergh made his first speech for the America First Committee, reiterating that no amount of American aid could create a victory or even survivability for Britain. “I have said before, and I will say again, that I believe it will be a tragedy to the entire world if the British Empire collapses. That is one of the main reasons why I opposed this war before it was declared, and why I have constantly advocated a negotiated peace.”35
In Lindbergh’s opinion, Britain was only looking out for herself, and Americans needed to do the same. He stressed that Americans needed to view the European conflicts objectively, and that in his attempts to do so, he concluded that “we cannot win this war for Eng
land, regardless of how much assistance we extend.”36 At the base of Lindbergh’s opposition to Lend-Lease, he tried to impress upon his supporters that the passage of Lend-Lease would be a “major step in getting us into war.”37
Commentator Norman Thomas, the Presbyterian minister who became one of the most outspoken pacifists against Roosevelt, was even more emphatic that Lend-Lease would result in “total war on two oceans and five continents; a war likely to result in stalemate; perhaps in such a breakup of western civilization, that Stalin, with his vast armies and loyal Communist followers, will be the victor.”38 He further declared that FDR would “put us in war gradually, knowing that we would refuse to go into it all at once.”39 Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that for years he was of the opinion that neutrality or simply not getting involved was the best way to keep Americans out of war. But he had become gradually convinced that “the surest way to keep out of trouble [is] to prevent an invasion of this hemisphere…. I want you to know that in my view there is danger in any direction.”40 He was carefully steering down the middle of the road.
Secretary of War Stimson suggested to the Senate committee that he was locked into blind obedience. “As Secretary of War, I became a subordinate of the President and was directed to follow out his policies…. Now, so long as I remain his Secretary of War I shall endeavor loyally to follow out his policies.”41
In his attempts to solicit support, Congressman McCormack referred to the bill as a peace measure:
The real warmongers are those who oppose action, and in their blind opposition are attempting to divide our people. This is no time for division…. Suppose, in the papers of tomorrow or later on, the people of America should read of the defeat of Britain, what do you suppose will be their feeling? Will it be one of calmness, of safety and security, or will it be one of alarm, one with the feeling of fear, or impending danger? Would not their feelings be properly summed up in the words, “are we next?” That is the reason why this is a defense measure and a peace measure so that “we will not be next.”42
But similar to Democratic Senator Wheeler’s concerns of Roosevelt’s abuse of power, some of the Republicans in Congress were more concerned with the powers being transferred to the president than the merits of Lend-Lease being a war bill. One such congressman was Representative Usher Burdick (R–ND). Although Burdick supported the war after the attack on Pearl Harbor, he had been a confirmed isolationist, supporting Senator Nye’s neutrality legislation, opposing the build-up of arms, the Selective Service Act, and in turn, Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease. Expressing his concern about the powers this bill would transfer to the president, Congressman Burdick also stressed that “if we grant these dictatorial powers to the President, war is inevitable. A war for what? The last war was fought ‘to make the world safe for democracy.’ Did it make it safe? Is democracy safe now anywhere in the world, even including our own country? What will we enter this war for?”43
Congressman Hugh Peterson (D–GA) was another one of Roosevelt’s party who opposed intervention of European affairs, viewing Lend-Lease as a war bill as opposed to a peace bill. In his opinion, “This is no defense measure. It is a measure of aggressive warfare. If it is enacted into law and its provisions are really made effective the inevitable result will be the sending of the armed forces of this nation—the sons of this Republic—to stand guard or do battle even unto the uttermost parts of the earth. Only a miracle could save us from such a sad fate. And no one can predict what the final outcome would be.”44
The question of who drafted the bill had been overshadowed by the rest of the debates, but it was not forgotten. And Representative Thomas Jenkins (R–OH), one of Ohio’s longest-serving congressmen (1925–1959), still wanted to know who had actually authored the bill:
At first we were given to understand that this bill was drafted as a free handiwork of Congress. That is not true. This bill has been cautiously and clandestinely put together. Ostensibly the physical drafting of it was done by a group of Congressmen, but its genius was in the heart and mind of someone aside from the active membership of Congress. Its genius comes from those who want the United States of America involved in this world conflict. There are powerful influences in the United States of America that would not stop in their determination to involve us in war, regardless of how dire the consequences might be. The cry of American mothers against another war that would rob them of their sons is not heard by this group. The prospect of the loss of lives and the loss of property and the bankruptcy of the Nation do not deter this group. They want Hitler destroyed for a different reason than what most of us have for his destruction. That this bill had all been thought out is proven by the president’s message to Congress delivered on the sixth of January…. In this message he said that he would be compelled to ask Congress for money and materials that he might transfer them to the belligerents in this war. Through all these debates and through all these hearings I have been seeking to locate the real genius of this bill. Can it be the insatiable ambition of the President to want to have a hand in the domination of the world? Can it be in moneyed influences against whom Hitler has committed some special act which they resent? Or can it be as the result of fear of world domination from Hitler and his followers? I must confess that I do not know the answer, but I have a strong conviction that, as I have already stated, this bill has behind it and back of it some motives the purposes of which have not yet been disclosed…. There are some who think that the President wants this bill so that he may then be able to take from Great Britain, or at least to share with Great Britain, the active management of the war. If the President could, under threat of withholding money and supplies, demand that the war be carried on along certain lines, he would be in a position to have his demands recognized. If he assumes a position of collaboration and co-generalship with the war leaders of Great Britain, we are then actively in the war.45
Underlining this was the fact that Americans could manufacture all the planes, tanks, and guns that they wanted, but as soon as the government started transferring those weapons, either on American or British ships, Americans became an ally of Britain, and according to international law, subject to attack by her enemies. Senator Wheeler cautioned the Senate:
Everyone in his right sense will grant that power must reside in someone to take the necessary immediate measures to meet and beat back such assaults. But everyone else knows that such cases have nothing to do with the underlining premise of H.R. 1776, namely the fantastic claim that our frontiers are no longer our seacoasts; that they are no longer even in the Western Hemisphere, but lie along the Rhine, or on the English Channel, or at Salonika, or at Singapore. The people have a right to pause and think and choose for themselves before they plunge into war on any such theory.46
But after three months of debates and several amendments, both Houses by large majorities passed the Lend-Lease bill. In the House, the vote was 260 for and 165 against, and in the Senate, it was 60 for and 31 against.47 Titled “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States,” it was signed by President Roosevelt and became law on March 11, 1941. Technically, Roosevelt’s signature immediately put the United States at war with members of the Tripartite Pact. March 11, 1941, was the day Americans entered World War II, not December 7, 1941.
Almost immediately after signing, FDR asked Navy Secretary Frank Knox to transfer twenty-eight motor torpedo boats and sub chasers to the British, as well as guns and infantry equipment to the Greeks to also defend against the Germans. At this point, the Germans were planning to use Greece as a southern launching area for the upcoming invasion of Russia.
With the onset of Lend-Lease and continuing until Pearl Harbor, and in spite of massive orders to get the nation transitioned to a military economy, Great Britain would still outproduce the United States in weaponry.
Although one of the Lend-Lease amendments prohibited U.S. naval involvement, Congress continued to debate the means of deli
very. Opponents had feared that once passed, the next step would be an executive order from the president ordering the formation of U.S. naval forces to initiate convoys to Great Britain. The original bill had no provision for delivery, but as a means of resolving the issue, it will be recalled that Congress amended the bill with the provision that nothing should be construed as authorizing convoying.
In March of 1941, with the ink drying on Lend-Lease, the delivery question still needed an answer. At the same time, rumors abounded that British merchant ships were already being protected by the United States Navy. If just supplying Britain was an act of war, it didn’t involve shooting at that point. If the U.S. Navy participated in any way to get Lend-Lease to Britain, it would involve shooting. But anyone in authority denied that it was happening. Navy Secretary Frank Knox had openly stated to Congress that he was opposed to convoying and considered it as “an act of war.”48 The president himself had reiterated, “Convoying means shooting, and shooting means war.”49 FDR had assured Congress and the nation that Lend-Lease would not be administered as a war policy. But now, he was changing his wording. The word convoy now became patrols, which developed into neutrality patrols. So if and when the shooting started, the word neutrality would stand out to Americans. Would those neutrality patrols established back in 1939 now become convoys?
It was during the first week of the European war that FDR had established what he called the Neutrality Patrol. The German Army invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and shortly after Admiral Stark assumed his new role as chief of naval operations, he organized a task force of thirty battleships, destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers to patrol the U.S. Atlantic coast and the Caribbean. Appointed to head up the Neutrality Patrol was Rear Admiral A.W. Johnson.
With the patrol area initially broken down into seven zones, Johnson would lead the effort to, for outward appearances, protect American neutrality and report on any ship movements of belligerent nations. In reality, the Neutrality Patrols served, first, to help Great Britain in a limited way because of her access to the Atlantic, and second, to harass Germany to the point of declaring war on the United States. FDR regularly created situations using the Neutrality Patrols that he hoped would anger the Germans into declaring war. The patrol area would later be expanded to include the northeastern coast of South America.