by James Johns
By early summer, American patrols had increased in both numbers and distances into the Atlantic. There were rumors of confrontations at sea, but nothing would be officially verified. Articles would appear in leading national newspapers on incidents reported from unnamed sources, and again, no confirmation from the administration.
In a radio broadcast to the nation on May 27, President Roosevelt announced that U.S. naval patrols were, in fact, trailing Axis vessels and broadcasting their positions in efforts to protect Lend-Lease shipments. “All additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken.”61 Then came a bombshell: “Therefore, with profound consciousness of my responsibilities … to my country’s cause, I have tonight issued a proclamation that an unlimited national emergency exists and requires the strengthening of our defense to the extreme limit of our national power and authority.”62 Again, what did that mean?
By the middle of 1941, the Washington Post, the journal that had been most supportive of the president’s policies, was now criticizing his actions of provoking an incident that would serve as the pretext for war in the Atlantic. The paper even suggested that such an event had already occurred when an American destroyer had attacked a German submarine. The Post accused the president of hoping that the Germans would shoot first in an episode that he could document in order to activate the escalator clause, “if we are attacked,” of the Democratic platform, which would put the country at war. The incident involved the sinking of a British ship in the vicinity of Greenland. An American destroyer arrived on the scene, and while it was picking up survivors, the destroyer’s underwater detection gear disclosed the presence of a submarine, most likely German. Fearing an attack, the American commander ordered the dropping of depth charges. The overseeing naval committee concluded that the destroyer captain was only exercising the right of self-preservation.
Now there were follow-up stories that up to 40 percent of British ships carrying American manufactured supplies were never reaching their destination, giving more fuel to the anti–Lend-Lease advocates in Congress, a figure that Roosevelt insisted to be excessively high.63 In addition to confrontations and accusations, stories appeared that ships from the Pacific Fleet were being sent to the Atlantic, not by way of the Panama Canal where they could be monitored, but all the way around Cape Horn. Secretary Knox now served notice to a group of about 40 newspaper correspondents at a press conference. He informed them that they were to print only such news about navy operations as his office considered proper, clearly a censorship of news.
The next step to war, stoking the congressional fires, was the Americans’ occupation of Iceland. In agreement with their government on July 7, 1941, the U.S. First Provisional Marine Brigade landed in Iceland along with elements of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Their mission was twofold: to protect the sea area shipping from German U-boats, and to free up British troops that were desperately needed elsewhere. FDR’s critics had a field day. For occupying Iceland, he was compared to Hitler and the Japanese, because he was simply marching into foreign lands because it suited the American goals. The real reason for the U.S. occupation was to aid Lend-Lease deliveries. Lend-Lease could now be sent as far as Iceland, now an American satellite, with the British picking it up from there.
On July 8, Americans learned of the Marine landing that now occupied Iceland. The British invaded Iceland in May 1940 and then occupied the island, historically under Danish control, as a base for their North Atlantic operations. Now, U.S. forces would take over from the British with the logic that American shipping would be protected all the way. Iceland would also have a U.S. naval force that would include two battleships, two cruisers, and twelve destroyers.64 The navy would now escort merchant ships of any country participating in aid to Britain.
For the Germans to occupy west in the Atlantic, or for the Americans or Canadians to occupy east, both sides recognized what the Vikings had ten centuries earlier: that Iceland was an important stepping stone either way. And now with British losses in Greece and North Africa, their troops were unquestionably needed elsewhere. Reinforcing this argument was the rumor that Germany was now planning the occupation of Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese government was signaling a move to the Azores.
With a stretch of the imagination, Iceland could certainly be encompassed into the Monroe Doctrine area necessary for U.S. defense. The Monroe Doctrine had been established in 1823 to protect North and South America from external acts of aggression. It further stipulated that the United States would refrain from interfering in European internal conflicts. This, along with the Neutrality Act of 1939, would allow the Americans to send vessels anywhere with anything. The War Council met in Washington with the president and asked General Marshall for his recommendation. He had preferred Iceland to the Azores.
Republicans in Congress instantly charged that not only was the occupation of Iceland illegal, but it was an unlawful step toward an undeclared war with Germany. Now it was the turn of Senator Robert Taft (R–OH), one of Roosevelt’s most bitter opponents. He accused the president of taking militant action without the consent of Congress, contrary to his 1940 campaign pledges. In a radio address on May 28, Taft reminded Americans:
The Constitution provides that only Congress can declare war, and rightly so, because the Members of Congress are the most direct representatives of the people whose vital interest is at stake; rightly so, because no nation should go to war unless a majority of the people approve that action. The President has no right to declare war whether a national emergency exists or not. It follows inevitably that he has no right to engage deliberately in military or naval action equivalent to war except when the country is attacked.
There is another reason why this great issue today must be submitted to the people. Less than 7 months ago the President gave his pledge, “We will not send our Army, naval and air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas except in case of attack.” … The American people do not want war. They have no idea whatever of joining in any conflict, whether on the Atlantic or the Pacific. They are determined to keep America at peace. In this determination I stand with them…. We now face the fundamental question whether we shall abandon the position of both political parties in the last election. Surely that cannot be done without submitting the question directly to the representatives of the people.
The President’s broadcast last night was a disappointment to millions of people because it still avoided the basic issue. It still indicated an intention on his part to push further and further toward war without consulting the people. In recent months there has been a tremendous growth of public sentiment against war and against convoys. Because the President sensed that feeling, he carefully avoided any direct advocacy of convoys or of war. He talked of patrols and defense and freedom of the seas. His arguments with regard to Hitler, if they are valid at all, are arguments for war, but he did not dare to advocate war itself because the people are opposed to it. His speech contains vague threats of aggressive, warlike action to be undertaken in his sole discretion. He hints that the term “defense” will be interpreted by him to mean the occupation of islands 3,000 miles from our eastern shore, within 400 miles from Africa, belonging to a neutral nation. In short, he is suggesting that he may, in dictator style, take warlike action without submitting to the people whose vital welfare is concerned the question whether or not we shall go to war. That is not democratic procedure.65
And only a couple of months later, Roosevelt would engage U.S. naval operations in what could be described as closely resembling the “equivalent to war.”
On July 11, several days after Americans learned of the occupation of Iceland, the president issued a directive through his chief of naval operations that the navy would now protect U.S. shipping to and from Iceland, Greenland, and Newfoundland from hostile forces which threaten such shipping. The order included the protection of “shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys between United States ports and bases and Iceland,”66 an
d to wage war on any enemy forces that “threatened such shipping.”67 In essence, an order to shoot on sight was issued. This directive was announced to neither Congress nor the public. Even to the most uninformed, the occupation of Iceland was only the means of protecting ships between two U.S. ports that were involved in delivery of Lend-Lease. On August 28, this order would be broadened to include the southeastern Pacific.
While Congress had not approved, and the American public had not been officially informed, the U.S. Navy was now in the business of convoying, and the United States was at war, as the events of September and October would bear out.
Britain needed American war production and could continue to resist Nazi Germany only so long as it continued. If Hitler could eliminate Lend-Lease or reduce its effect, Britain would fall. But would sinking ships on the high seas bring on a declaration of war from America? Unknown to Washington at the time, and according to German naval-conference documentation, Hitler had ordered his naval commanders in 1941 that U-boat targets were to be absolutely identified as British before sinking to eliminate any possibility of provoking the United States. He wanted to avoid any incident that could result in war.
Any aggressiveness appeared to be on the part of FDR and his State Department with the reiterated statement assuring the American people, “We will not participate in foreign wars … except in case of attack.”68 But the Germans were under orders not to attack. FDR froze German assets in this country, and they did not attack. Then in June, he closed their embassy altogether, and they did not attack. He sent cash-and-carry war goods to Britain in direct violation of the U.S. Neutrality Act and international law, and they did not attack. Americans traded destroyers for bases in Newfoundland and the West Indies. Americans then occupied Greenland and Iceland and still, no attack. Now there were news reports of confrontations at sea, not coming from the administration but from eyewitness accounts. What was needed was a major confrontation at sea that could be documented to unite the anger of the American people, necessary to demand a state of war and send U.S. armed forces to Britain.
Perhaps that time had arrived on September 4, 1941, when the Navy Department announced that the American destroyer, the Greer, was attacked. The destroyer was part of the new Atlantic patrol established during July and was carrying passengers, freight, and mail for the Marines stationed in Iceland. While en route, she was attacked with two torpedoes, both of which missed, by an unidentified submarine. On the following day, the Greer arrived safely in Iceland, and that same day, the president issued orders to the navy to seek out and eliminate that sub, referring to the attack as deliberate.
In the interest of avoiding war, Berlin issued its own interpretation of the incident. Its submarine was operating in the German Blockade Zone when it came under attack by the Greer and was depth bombed until midnight. The German statement included the comment, “Roosevelt thereby is endeavoring with all the means at his disposal to provoke incidents for the purpose of baiting the American people into the war.”69 Of course, this was officially denied by Washington with the assurance that the sub had fired first.
In his address on September 4, FDR reminded the nation that with U.S. outposts in Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland, and Labrador, the U.S. naval convoys needed to do their part if Britain’s Royal Navy was to survive. The president’s official announcement of the Greer incident came on September 11 in a radio broadcast when he assured listeners that the Greer “was carrying American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable. She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine…. I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her…. We have sought no shooting war with Hitler.”70
Referring to the actions required to defend against Hitler and further losses at sea, Roosevelt made the comparison: “But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.”71 The more control Hitler gained over the high seas, the bigger the threat he became to the Western Hemisphere, and Roosevelt reminded Americans that the defense of the Americas was now imperative:
In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American Naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow—first….
The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.
But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.
The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy—at once…. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it….
I have no illusions about the gravity of this step…. It is the result of months and months of constant thought and anxiety and prayer.72
After a week of headlines, the gravity of the Greer incident led to hearings by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, after which Admiral Stark was directed to write a report. Released on September 20, Stark’s report revealed what he referred to as “a good picture of what happened.”73
On September 4, a British aircraft informed the Greer that a German U-boat identified ten miles ahead had just crash dived. The plane dropped four depth charges, and then departed. The Greer tracked the sub for a few hours, after which time the sub fired a torpedo well astern of the destroyer. The Greer then dropped a pattern of depth charges, after which the sub responded with another wide-shot torpedo. By early evening, the Greer fired a second salvo of depth charges, then departed the area and continued on to Iceland. FDR and his supporters for going to war, using the Greer incident as their ammunition, had officially fizzled out.
And yet, the Greer incident reinforced FDR’s desire for American ships to shoot on sight, a repeat of the original order from the chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, who had already ordered convoy escort ships to attack enemy submarines or surface raiders on sight.
In truth, Admiral Stark was well aware of the figures of the shipping that was actually arriving in Britain. Was it enough to sustain them? Stark considered it absolutely essential that the United States enter the war before Britain collapsed.
The next opportunity that would hopefully incite the American public presented itself about six weeks after the Greer incident. Another confrontation had taken place about three hundred fifty miles southwest of Iceland on October 17. Strangely enough, this was at a time when Congress was debating the arming of merchant vessels, which passed the House 295 to 138.74 One of the new destroyers, the USS Kearny (DD-432), arrived at Reykjavik, Iceland, with not only a gaping hole in her starboard side, but also with eleven crewmen dead and twenty-two wounded.75 The Kearny had been one of the five U.S. destroyers that went to the aid of Convoy SC-48, a convoy of fifty-two ships headed for Liverpool with most of its escorts scattered in a storm, when she was torpedoed by the German submarine U-568. Using the Kearny incident, Roosevelt made another statement for war on October 27:
Five months ago tonight I proclaimed to the American people the existence of a state of unlimited emergency.
Since then much has happened. Our Army and Navy are temporarily in Iceland in the defense of the Western Hemisphere.
Hitler has attacked shipping in areas close to the Americas in the North and South Atlantic.
Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One American destroyer was attacked on September 4. Another destroyer was attacked and hit on October 17. Eleven brave and loyal men of our Navy were killed by the Nazis.
We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired
the last shot.
America has been attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this Nation.
Illinois, Alabama, California, North Carolina, Ohio, Louisiana, Texas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arkansas, New York, Virginia—Those are the home states of the honored dead and wounded of the Kearny. Hitler’s torpedo was directed at every American, whether he lives on our sea coasts or in the innermost part of the Nation, far from the seas and far from the guns and tanks of the marching hordes of would-be conquerors of the world. The purpose of Hitler’s attack was to frighten the American people off the high seas—to force us to make a trembling retreat. This is not the first time he has misjudged the American spirit. That spirit is now aroused.
If our national policy were to be dominated by the fear of shooting, then all of our ships and those of our sister republics would have to be tied up in home harbors. Our Navy would have to remain respectfully—abjectly—behind any lines which Hitler might decree on any ocean as his own dictated version of his own war zone.
Naturally, we reject that absurd and insulting suggestion. We reject it because of our own self-interest, because of our own self-respect, because, most of all, of our own good faith. Freedom of the seas is now, as it has always been, a fundamental policy of your Government and mine.76