by James Johns
And simply not to reply was equally not a valid alternative in that it would offer the same result as a complete rejection. Then suddenly, in the midst of near panic, Magic disseminated a new dispatch from Togo to the ambassadors in Washington:
To both you Ambassadors:
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth), if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.40
“Things are automatically going to happen.” Those authorized to read Magic read this on Saturday, November 22. What alternative could it have meant but war? Could Washington have been so consumed by a stopgap modus vivendi that they neglected to warn the Pacific commanders for two days that war could come in just a matter of days? The idea of the modus vivendi, a temporary agreement to buy time, certainly appealed to both Admiral Stark and General Marshall, but now it appeared to be too late.
That same day, Hull managed to muster the representatives of Britain, China, and the Netherlands (the ABCD powers), along with Australian representatives, and presented them with the modus vivendi, the Americans’ alternative to Proposal B, as well as the Japanese deadline. The plan called for an amnesty or temporary reprieve for three months, during which time Japan would make no military moves in any direction, they would evacuate southern Indochina, and they would reduce their occupation forces in the north. In return, the United States would suspend the freeze and export to Japan food, medical supplies, cotton, and enough oil to meet civilian consumption.
The Chinese ambassador to the United States was Hu Shih, an academic who had studied at both Cornell University and Columbia University in the States, and served as ambassador from 1938 to 1942. Although the issue of China was not approached in the modus vivendi, Ambassador Shih was at least consoled by the fact that the terms laid down in the modus vivendi would keep the Burma Road open for another ninety days. Secretary Hull admitted that the Japanese more than likely would not accept the offer of “a little chicken feed.”41 The other representatives at this meeting seemed satisfied.
Marshall and others pleaded with Secretary of War Stimson, who opposed the three-month stall, to add his recommendation to the president, but Stimson was convinced that it offered nothing more than appeasement.
Early that evening, the Japanese ambassadors were back in Hull’s office, at which time they were presented with the counteroffer and were informed that it already had the approval of the other foreign representatives. The ambassadors hurriedly returned to their embassy to forward the American counterproposal.
Hull spent the weekend making two more revisions to the modus vivendi, attempting to make it more digestible to the Japanese. But the ABCD and Australian representatives would disagree on technicalities affecting their respective geographical areas. Hull later wrote:
I remarked that each of their governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area. And yet I said their Governments … do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to co-operate.42
Tokyo wasted no time in answering the modus vivendi submitted by the ambassadors:
Our expectations … go beyond the restoration of Japanese-American trade and a return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B…. Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition. In view of the fact that this is a just demand, the fact that the Government of the United States finds it hard to accept makes us here in Japan suffer inordinately.43
Magic’s revelation of this communication now seemed like a blow to Stark and Marshall’s near demands for more time.
The chiefs of staff met and decided to send the first recorded alert by Stark to Admiral Hart in Manila and Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor:
Top Secret.
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff [Marshall] has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.44
And on Tuesday, November 25 (Wednesday, November 26, in Japan), the Kido Butai strike force departed the Kurile Islands for the Pearl Harbor mission. Its six carriers carried over four hundred aircraft of Japan’s First Air Fleet, of which approximately three hundred fifty would be used in the actual attack.
In addition to the five submarines carrying the two-man midget subs, three of the other submarines were each equipped with a float plane, tethered in a waterproof hangar on deck, which would be used for scouting ahead. Aboard his flagship, the Akagi, Admiral Nagumo was under strict orders: the task force could be recalled at any time during the ten-day trip in the event of a diplomatic breakthrough in Washington.
Vacant Sea (Vacant Sea Order route)
Also on November 25, there occurred what would become one of the most unbelievable events surrounding Pearl Harbor. An order, known as the Vacant Sea Order, was passed to the Fourteenth Naval District Hawaii to reroute all ship traffic from the regular, most direct shipping routes to and from the Orient to a most indirect route dramatically south through the Torres Straits, between New Guinea and Australia. The order was signed by Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Stark’s assistant chief of naval operations. In essence, it would clear the route of the Kido Butai in that if they were sighted by any commercial or military ship, it could blow the surprise, and Nagumo would be tempted to cancel the attack. In short, this order cleared the way for them. Such an order would certainly have been in accordance with FDR’s demand that Japan must strike the first blow. “Top Secret: Route all transpacific shipping through Torres Straits. CINPAC and CINAF provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.”45
The order applied to shipping originating as far east as the west coast. This order then ensured the attack FDR needed to justify a war with Germany to the American voters. This one event alone should refute any possible argument by those who insist that Pearl Harbor was a surprise, because this order actually vacated the route of the approaching Japanese.
Given that ships sailing west to east were also affected by the order, in anticipation of war, the USS Hugh L. Scott (AP-43) and the SS President Coolidge, loaded with American service dependents, were escorted by the heavy cruiser USS Louisville (CA-28) from Manila to Honolulu by way of the Torres Straits. Even Kimmel was caught in the web of the Vacant Sea Order.
The Vacant Sea Order issued from Washington to Admiral Kimmel, November 25, 1941.
Based on Kimmel’s own intelligence, he had ordered a search of the “vacant sea” area without White House approval. His attack force was in the exact area from which Admiral Nagumo would launch his aircraft within the week. When Washington got word of this, Kimmel was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor immediately. This event refutes the arguments that Kimmel did not conduct adequate searches. The war warning to Hawaii that followed on November 27, the warning that could have alerted the Hawaiian commanders to everything that FDR knew, had said nothing because they were based only on what the intelligence officers knew, which was next to nothing.
Then came the sudden order from Washington to Kimmel on the November 26 to get both carriers loaded and out of port immediately and to take with them only the fastest escorting ships. Kimmel was being ordered to “get the valuables out of the safe.”
In the interest of buying time to reinforce the Philippines, Tuesday, November 25, also brought a third modification to the modus vivendi for Japanese consideration which, like the first two, offered next to nothing. But before it could be presented to the Japanese ambassadors, it would first have to be approved by the war council and the president. At noon, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark met with Roosevelt at the White House. During the congressional investigation of 1945–46, Stimson’s testimony revealed that:
The President at once brought up the relations with the Japanese. Mr. Hull said that the Japanese were poised for the attack—that they might attack at any time. The President said that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might be attacked, say next Monday, for example.
One problem troubled us very much. If you know your enemy is going to strike you, it is not usually wise to wait until he gets the jump on you by taking the initiative. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so there should remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors.46
Off the record, Stimson wrote in his diary, “The difficult proposition was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”47
At the war council conference, the question arose as to how Americans would respond if the Japanese made an attack that was not specifically directed at the United States. Roosevelt responded by indicating that that would still be a violation of American safety.
Within a day or two, American allies started to unknowingly play into the hand of the Japanese in sabotaging the modus vivendi plan for time. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who criticized Churchill at times for the confidence he placed on the Americans for help, advised that the modus vivendi was not strong enough, asserting that total withdrawal of all Japanese forces from all of Indochina should be demanded. He did not have the spirit of buying valuable time, nor did the advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, Owen Lattimore. Lattimore, an expert on Chinese affairs, contributed significantly to the public debate on the Americans’ involvement with China, and he told one of FDR’s assistants that Chiang was livid. Any agreement between the United States and Japan could dissolve the Chinese trust in the Americans. China could go down as a result of American diplomatic treachery. Hull’s response was that China could be no worse off than she is now.
Stimson confided to Hull that not only would the Japanese not accept the new revision, but that the British and Chinese were determined that it shouldn’t even be presented. His only support had been from the Dutch.
Around midnight on November 25, a cable arrived from Churchill for FDR expressing his concern for the Chinese reaction to the latest proposal, as well as Churchill’s fear of Chiang Kai-shek’s potential collapse. In closing, however, he stated, “We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action.”48 Even Churchill was against it.
Now Stimson received a G-2 intelligence report of a Japanese expedition sailing from Shanghai south toward Indochina, and immediately he passed the report up to the White House, inquiring if the president had seen it. He had, and according to Stimson’s diary, FDR exploded, criticizing the Japanese for their bad faith “that while they were negotiating for an entire truce—an entire withdrawal (from China)—they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-China.”49 As far as Roosevelt was concerned, everything had changed. And this negated the entire principle of the modus vivendi, which would have been the relaxation of trade restrictions on Japan in exchange for no further Japanese aggressive moves in Asia.
Winston Churchill’s cable of November 25 would be followed up with a call to Roosevelt on November 26. Although the Americans had the ability to decode and read Japanese diplomatic intelligence and to conceivably piece together the overall picture, it would be the British who would actually shape the Americans’ response.
In 1937, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) had invented a scrambler system for telephone conversations. If monitored, each end would be unintelligible or jumbled, but crystal clear at the receiving end. The system was first purchased by Germany, and in September 1939, the scrambler system was installed in the White House. There were conceivably an infinite number of scrambling mechanisms, so to possess one did not give access to another. A seemingly innocent article appeared in the New York Times dated October 8, 1939, titled, “Roosevelt Protected in Talks to Envoys by Radio Scrambling to Foil Spies Abroad.”50 The Germans immediately saw this as a challenge to break that particular scrambler, and by late 1940, they were monitoring White House conversations between FDR and Churchill.
Interestingly or suspiciously, of all secret U.S. intelligence files and the massive recorded conversations between the two, all scrambler phone and telegraphic exchanges for November 26, 1941, were locked up and withheld from the Public Records Office in London for the next seventy years. The accompanying statement from the British foreign secretary simply said that to release it would harm national security. What is known is that the Germans had a descrambler monitoring station in the occupied Dutch coastal town of Noorwijk aan Zee.
As revealed in Gregory Douglas’s book, The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Muller, the Dutch station monitored a scrambler call to FDR by Churchill in the early morning hours of November 26 advising that British Far East Intelligence, and decoded Japanese secret messages, revealed that a large Japanese task force of six carriers and two battleships had departed northern Japan and were headed east toward Pearl Harbor. The confusing part was that the date given for the attack was Monday, December 8. FDR knew that the ships were mainly in port only on the weekends. Neither realized that December 8 referred to the date in Japan.
With less than two weeks left, the president expressed the concern that if one of his intelligence people got this same information, all intelligence people would know it and want to meet the Japanese head-on. And there would go the excuse to go to war with Germany, the number one enemy. FDR decided that he simply would have to be unavailable to make the decision to attack the Japanese task force if sighted. He then commented that he should distance himself from Washington while the scenario unfolded.
Gregory Douglas’s accounting of the Muller interrogation remains highly suspect by many to this day. Since Muller’s disappearance on May 1, 1945, there has been no documented proof of his whereabouts after the war or whether or not he even survived the war. And without that proof, many consider The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Muller to be fictitious.
And yet, the November 26 phone call between Churchill and Roosevelt has been corroborated by William Casey, who served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1981 to 1987. Casey mentions the call in his book, The Secret War Against Hitler, in which he discusses the war years while he worked for William Donovan. Donovan had been the head of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), which was the predecessor of the CIA, and at the time, Casey served
as head of the Secret Intelligence Branch for Europe. To refute a statement from such a personage would require an overabundance of conviction.
And finally, Rear Admiral Edwin Layton, still a captain in December 1941, would later describe an event on Wednesday, November 26, that changed everything by one hundred eighty degrees. An expert linguist and cryptanalyst, Layton had been assigned to Kimmel’s staff exactly one year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. A strong supporter of Admiral Kimmel, he would spend a considerable amount of time trying to determine how much intelligence Washington was withholding, blaming Admiral Turner specifically for controlling the flow of information to Hawaii. Layton would later be instrumental to the team of cryptanalysts who helped the Americans win the Battle of Midway in June 1942.
According to Layton, the modus vivendi suddenly turned into the Ten Point Note, and diplomatic accommodation took an about-face. Without specifically identifying the phone call from Churchill, Layton states that clearly something had happened: “An event occurred that caused the President to override his diplomatic and military advisors to stop negotiations.”51
Totally unaware of Tokyo’s plans for war, Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu, while waiting to hear from Secretary Hull for two days, impatiently sent a message to Tokyo indicating that “there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our ‘B’ Proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete.”52