by James Johns
On Monday, December 1, the America First Committee advertised that it would enter the primary and general election the following year pledging support of an isolationist candidate. It argued that Americans had been too content to do nothing while the real threat of going to war “lay in the irresponsible and dictatorial leadership of the ‘one man,’ Franklin D. Roosevelt.”20 In addition to Charles Lindbergh, their ranks had swelled with powerful names like Alfred Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential candidate; Senator Robert Taft; and Republican Minority Leader Joseph Martin, Jr. It was also announced that the nationwide rail strike set for Sunday, December 7, had been settled.
Ambassadors Nomuru and Kurusu arrived at the State Department on Monday and were set upon by an army of correspondents asking if they were armed with Tokyo’s answer to the Ten Point Plan of November 26. They replied that it would be another two or three days.
The big question that still looms after seventy years is what the president and top military leaders actually knew by reading Magic. With the Allies all counting on the United States to save them in the military emergency when it could happen at any moment, why was there no attempt to organize the Australians, British, Dutch, Chinese, and Americans? It cannot be accepted that it would have been considered as warlike to the American voter opposition. The Allies knew that their fate hung in the balance of negotiations being conducted in Washington. Was the American government looking after their best interests? With their resources of oil, rubber, and tin, as valuable to the Americans as to the Japanese, why there was no attempt to keep them from falling into Japanese hands so quickly defies any form of rationale. If the president was negotiating for the Allies, he was not keeping them informed, and not even FDR’s staff knew what possible deals were being negotiated in the almost daily conversations with Churchill on the scrambler phone. Maybe the isolationists were right: he was dealing the country into certain oblivion.
To create a solution by adding the knowns with the unknowns and achieving the correct answer was in reality going to be total guesswork. The two knowns were the attack force headed for Pearl Harbor and the one headed south that had departed northern Indochina on November 26, which the Japanese had made no attempt to hide so all attention would be on it. But what was its destination: Malaya, the Kra Isthmus, or the Dutch East Indies? If the strike force aimed at Pearl Harbor attacked first, the United States was legitimately in the war, but what if the southerly force hit first and not directly at America? How would FDR rationalize any retaliation to the voters? Obviously, it would be strategically desirable to hit an invasion force at sea before it landed, using the thirty-five B-17s at Clark Field, Luzon.21
Under the provision of the current war plan, Rainbow Five, in which the United States was allied with Britain and France, Europe would represent the primary target, and until mastery was achieved, any Pacific action would be mainly defensive. If Japan, a member of the Tripartite Pact, shot first at the United States, that would trigger the action FDR had hoped for, justifying an offensive war in Europe. There were two lines on the map that could activate this action. If a Japanese invasion force sailed south of ten degrees north latitude or west of one hundred degrees east longitude, their motive would obviously be aggressive. With the advantage of hitting them while at sea, the burden of this response would fall on the president, who had failed to organize the Allies. If he responded with the B-17s, he would be branded a warmonger by U.S. voters. If he did nothing, he would encourage the resentment of the Allies, the ABCD powers, and Australia for breaking a moral commitment. The obvious answer was to make sure that Japan shot first directly at the United States. Because his information from Churchill indicated that the attack at Pearl Harbor would not commence until December 8, a move against the southerly force couldn’t wait.
On December 3, FDR sent a secret message to Admiral Hart in Manila to immediately prepare and dispatch three seagoing yachts. The yachts would have three requirements: they must fly the American flag; they must be commanded by American naval officers (the crews could be Filipinos who would volunteer for the money); and the yachts must have mounted on them what could easily be recognized at a distance as a deck gun. It was also required that at least one flexible machine gun be mounted. The yachts were to sail out into the South China Sea with the mission to sacrifice themselves by encouraging Japan to shoot first. It was even hoped that the loss of the crewmen would rally the Philippines behind the war effort. If the yachts were attacked in short order, orchestrating an international incident or act of war, it would hopefully leave time to meet Admiral Nagumo’s force head-on.
By December 7, only Admiral Hart’s personal yacht, the USS Isabel (PY-10), had been dispatched in time. FDR had personally ordered their destinations in harm’s way. To her captain, John Walker, it was puzzling as to why he should be ordered to sail the coast of Indochina, virtually daring to be shot at. His understanding was that he was going to be monitoring and reporting Japanese shipping. He was sighted several times by Japanese aircraft, but none took the bait, so the Isabel was recalled from her failed mission.
The second yacht, the Lanikai, was one day out at sea when she was recalled, and the third, the Molly Moore, was still in port. The Lanikai’s captain, Kemp Tolley, recalled that with a questionable receiver and no operative transmitter, he would have had to sail all the way back to Manila to report a sighting.
In Washington, the military intelligence estimates focused on the Kra Isthmus as the Japanese destination. The question was asked if the overseas commanders had been adequately warned. Admiral Stark and his war plans director, Admiral Turner, advised to the affirmative.
In Tokyo, all that remained was submitting the plan of the Pearl Harbor attack to Emperor Hirohito himself. In doing so, Admirals Nagano and Yamamoto emphasized with Hirohito that it was essential to neutralize Pearl Harbor, explaining many of the details. The date that hostilities would commence would be December 8, to which the emperor seemed comfortable. Thus the order was issued:
From: The Chief of the Naval General Staff
To: C-in-C Combined Fleet
The hostile action against the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands shall be commenced on 8 December. Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.22
This order leaves no question that virtually up to the last minute the recall order could go out in the event of a breakthrough in talks in Washington. But in relatively short order, it seemed so obvious that any favorable outcome in negotiations seemed so remote that on the night of December 2, Admiral Nagumo received his final order, “Climb Mount Niitaka, 1208 Repeat 1208,” which confirmed that diplomacy had failed, and the attack was set for December 8 (Tokyo time).
By this time, the Japanese fleet was located nine hundred forty miles north of Midway Island. Mount Niitaka was the highest mountain, not only in Japanese-held Formosa, but in all of the Japanese Empire. To climb its thirteen thousand feet was considered the most formidable challenge. Back in Japan, it would be recognized that to win at Pearl Harbor would be considered an act of genius. To lose the attack would be labeled ludicrous.
On Tuesday, December 2, General Brereton’s B-17s were patrolling north toward Formosa, but not actually over it. The crews were reluctantly following the orders of General MacArthur, who only allowed reconnaissance as far as the international boundary so as not to create an overt act in defiance of his actual orders. Hart’s PBYs operating out of the Philippines were patrolling the South China Sea, where they identified nine Japanese submarines heading south, and in Camranh Bay, twenty-one Japanese transports were spotted at anchor.
This was also the day that those in Singapore gave a sigh of relief with the arrival of the HMS Prince of Wales, Britain’s capital battleship of thirty-five thousand tons, along with the cruiser HMS Repuls
e. The promise of a battle fleet had become a reality.
There was more intrigue in Washington. The Japanese ambassadors were given a message from the president to pass on to Tokyo: “The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression…. Please be good enough to request the Japanese ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government.”23
Undersecretary Sumner Welles, filling in for Cordell Hull, who was down with a cold, reminded the Japanese ambassadors that the American government still had not received any answer from the Ten Point Note of November 26. For a couple of days, FDR had been considering sending a message directly to the emperor. In casually mentioning it, he had received no support. As a matter of fact, everyone on his war council was against it.
To keep the Americans guessing and to throw off American intelligence, the Japanese had changed all of their call signs on November 1, and on December 1, they did it again. But on the contrary, this helped alert U.S. combat intelligence that something was up. Kimmel asked his fleet intelligence officer, then Captain Edwin Layton, for a chart on the approximate location of the principal Japanese ships, and on December 2, Layton reported back that he was drawing an absolute blank on the location of the carriers. They could be in home waters, but he didn’t know. Kimmel fired back, “You mean they could be coming around Diamond Head, and you wouldn’t know it?”24 Almost apologetically, Layton replied, “Yes, sir, but I hope they’d have been sighted before now.”25
Early on December 3, Nagumo’s task force refueled at sea. Once this operation was completed, having no further need of the tankers, the Kido Butai could pick up the pace for the balance of the mission.
Over the next three days, conversations took place between Kimmel and Short that would refute the Roberts Commission claim that the two never conferred in coordinating commands. On Monday, December 1, both officers received word from Washington to start making arrangements for the replacement of the Marines in the farther western islands with army personnel. With those Marines presently under navy command, once they were replaced, the issue arose as to who would control the islands under army occupation. Kimmel wanted his Marines back, but not at the expense of surrendering control of his harbors to the army. Nor was Short interested in placing army troops under navy command. “The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases,”26 Kimmel retorted. Hawaii was an excellent case in point. Both individually communicated with Washington and shared their messages with each other. This was an excellent example of the army relying on the navy to warn of an attack. Their meetings continued for three days, but there was so little time remaining that it would become a dead issue.
FDR’s previous demand for an answer to Japanese troop movements prompted this message from Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo: “I presume of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply…. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them from taking a bold step…. I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider … and wire me at once.”27
Whereas on Monday, Magic had revealed the two messages about destroying the code machine, Tuesday, December 2, brought a third order from Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu:
1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of “O” code and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)
2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.
3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word “HARUNA….”28
The problem in the intelligence business is that if the enemy senses that his intelligence is being read, its value comes to an end. It had taken almost two years to break the Purple code and to develop the Magic machine to quickly decode and translate the communications. And the greater the distribution of that intelligence, the higher the risk of security compromise became. These critical days were not the time to risk losing a primary source of intelligence. Therefore, the Americans had to be careful not to react to information that would reveal that intelligence personnel were reading the messages as fast as the Japanese ambassadors were. But now distribution suddenly seemed worth the risk.
On Wednesday, December 3, Admiral Stark sent a duplicated message to both Hart and Kimmel: “Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.”29
It is difficult to lay any blame on the Pearl Harbor commanders for what was to come when messages that they had never even seen were only decoded after lying in Washington for two weeks, messages that rang no bells or even lifted any eyebrows. There were a sufficient number of these accumulating in piles on the desks of both the army and the navy. And concerning the bomb plot messages, there were no such requests from Tokyo for ship information for any other location. Some of the messages were not even translated or distributed until after December 7, at which time they took on a frightening aspect. Additionally, when it was later revealed that these had been withheld from the Hawaiian commanders, more than one commander confirmed that the plotting information being requested by Tokyo was a clear sign that an attack plan was in the works.
On Luzon, Hart’s returning PBY patrols toward Camranh Bay reported that the Japanese transport that had been under U.S. observation for three days had virtually disappeared. But Iba radar on Luzon’s west coast, sixty miles due west of Clark Field, had been experiencing nightly visitors snooping in the direction of Clark. Being inaccessible to searchlights and fighter planes, they had to be Japanese. The order to let Japan fire the first shot would not apply here. If they returned, U.S. antiaircraft would respond.
At Clark Field rested the thirty-five B-17s of the Nineteenth Bombardment Group, so all the American offensive eggs were in one basket there.30 And with no spare parts, the flyable total had already been reduced to thirty-three. And about ninety fighters on Luzon, used to protect the bombers, were experiencing the same problems, not to mention the other issues with the Swedish P-35s. The fighters were all scattered across the six airfields on the southern half of the island, not the ideal arrangement for proper dispersal. Anything resembling desired defense was a major problem. Antiaircraft protection for the airfields was inadequate or missing altogether, as were the communications.
Telephone lines through the jungle were insecure and ground-to-ground radio was no better through the mountains. The enemy that faced them was all speculation, and since the Philippine forces were not allowed to reconnoiter Formosa, the odds against them were all guesswork. By December 8, only two of the seven radar sets in the Philippines would be operational.
With a total lack of training in the utilization of airpower, both MacArthur and Richard Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, were at odds with Brereton, who was subordinate to MacArthur. Major Sutherland had arrived in the Philippines in March of 1938 and was initially posted to the office of the military advisor. It wasn’t long, only a few months later, when he, too, was promoted to lieutenant colonel, easing out Lieutenant Colonel Dwight Eisenhower, and taking over the role as MacArthur’s chief of staff. Completely loyal to MacArthur, Sutherland served as an effective bootlicker, which antagonized American and Australian officers alike. Working his way up the ranks, Sutherland would eventually be promoted to major general by the end of 1941.
MacArthur maintained the typical infantry attitude that the B-17 was an extension of coastal artillery and not an offensive weapon. But it was obvious that the B-17s at Clark, which was overexposed and overcrowded, were a targeted disaster waiting to happen. The only alternative was to send the planes six hundred miles south to Del Monte Airfield on Mindanao. But with construction there still underway, there were as yet no refueling facilities. Thus any offensive action would require the B-17s to return to Clark to refuel, which brought them back to square one.
Although the Japanese were still unaware of the existence of Del Monte, to put Clark out of business would ground the B-17s no matter where they were. Sutherland recommended against the move, but with no alternative plan, he reluctantly approved the transfer provided, that they return as soon as conditions would allow. Thursday night, they waited for the irregular night intruder to return. It did not. The following evening, sixteen B-17s, eight from the Fourteenth Squadron and eight from the Ninety-Third Squadron, were prepared for a 2200 departure for the three and one-half hour trip to Del Monte.31 Ground personnel would go by ship.
Brereton had also been informed that two squadrons from the Seventh Bomb Group were to leave the States the first week of December for the Philippines, and these, too, would have to be based at Del Monte. But because they arrived at Hawaii in the midst of the Pearl Harbor attack, they would never make it to the Philippines.
Across the road from Clark was the army’s Camp Stotsenburg, General Jonathan Wainwright’s headquarters, where he was busy selecting a staff that would attempt to train inexperienced Filipino recruits into an army that would be capable of defeating an enemy landing force on the beaches, the task which MacArthur had years before reported to Washington was well under way.