by James Johns
News of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached Berlin later that night, and at first, Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop refused to believe it. Initially, the question was whether or not it would even be necessary to declare war on the United States, now that Germany’s Axis partner had already done it.
Secondly, Germany was concerned as to whether or not Japan would attack Russia from the east to take the pressure off the western front. But the Japanese refused to be maneuvered into such a commitment.
At the onset, Hitler was excited to hear about Pearl Harbor because he now had an ally that had not been defeated in three thousand years. But his enthusiasm quickly cooled with the realization that Japan would now be busy in the Pacific. Japan could not consider the risk of relieving German armies at Moscow by diverting Russian divisions to the east that would be guarding from an attack by Japan.
The tide on the Russian front had already started to turn in November due to the dropping temperatures. Germany had not considered a campaign longer than six months to conquer Russia, so no thought had been given to the issue of winter clothing or cold-weather gear.
With much of German armor deployed to southern Russia, it was October 2 before General Field Marshal Fedor Von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, received the order from Hitler to start the drive for Moscow. This caught the Russians by surprise because they had expected an advance during the summer, not in the fall with winter setting in. Although a half million Russian troops had been captured, German commanders were, in the backs of their minds, remembering Napoleon in the winter of 1812, and they were suggesting a halt and dig-in for the winter.
General Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, agreed. Even General Field Marshal Wilhelm Von Leeb, commander of Army Group North, endorsed the plan. But with just Von Bock siding with Hitler, the offense was reinstated on November 15. The Germans had reached a point only twenty miles from Moscow, but they couldn’t move another inch. The winter of 1941–42 was Europe’s coldest winter in well over a century. With snow waist deep, temperatures plummeted to forty degrees below zero, which is the same for both Fahrenheit and Celsius.
German propaganda films showed the German Army advancing steadily, but letters home told an entirely different story. German troops were freezing to death or suffering from severe frostbite, and equipment refused to operate. Back in Germany, there was a mass winter clothing drive to do without so the troops at the front could have more. There was even a clothing confiscation drive in Norway, but with some trains being derailed before they even got to the front, the efforts made little difference.
And then Germany suffered even more setbacks. Field Marshal Walther Von Brauchitsch had a heart attack and asked to be relieved of command. The following week, Von Bock also asked to be relieved of command, and further into December, Von Leeb resigned after Hitler had rejected his request to withdraw his forces south of Leningrad. Hitler’s solution to these setbacks was to appoint himself overall commander.
At dawn on December 6, the Russian counteroffensive started along a five-hundred-mile Moscow front. Marshal Georgy Zhukov was the architect of the entire Russian counterattack that is unimaginable by today’s readers of war, particularly considering the subzero temperatures. The oil in General Guderian’s (German) tanks actually froze. No foxholes could be dug because the ground was like steel. Even weapons refused to fire because of their fine tolerances in working parts. In colder conditions, however, Russian tolerances were greater and presented fewer problems.
General Heinz Guderian would eventually fall out of favor with Hitler as well. During the final drive on Moscow, the Russians counterattacked with severe losses to the Germans. Guderian had requested to withdraw his forces, and when Hitler ordered him to stand fast, Guderian disobeyed the order and ordered withdrawals anyway. By December 26, he, too, was relieved of his command.
Because Germany had underestimated the Russians, the weather played a large part in the defeat of the Germans. Hitler, of course, blamed his generals for misadvising him as to the duration of operations. In the end, Germany would lose two-thirds of her army manpower in Russia to the harsh weather alone.
Returning to events in the Pacific, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was to be coordinated with simultaneous attacks on Malaya and the Philippines, which had originally been scheduled for 5:45 at Hawaii. But Admiral Nagumo’s pilots feared complications from takeoffs in the dark, so departure was delayed for two hours. Because the forces landing in Malaya never got the word, the Japanese troops landed on schedule in the dark, a full two hours before Pearl Harbor was attacked.
In the Philippines, General MacArthur received the warning sent at noon by Marshall, to which he did not respond. Three hours later, Marshall sent another message ordering MacArthur to initiate war plan Rainbow Five, and to cooperate with British and Dutch forces to the extent that it would not interfere with his primary responsibilities. He didn’t answer that message either. Washington now imagined that the reason for no response was that the Philippines were under attack. On Stimson’s order, a third message was sent to MacArthur to “reply immediately.”31 Now at Marshall’s direction, General Gerow made a direct call to MacArthur, who offered no excuses for not keeping Washington advised, and “No,”32 he had not been attacked. But he had received word of Pearl Harbor at his hotel at 3:30 that morning from Sutherland, and shortly after from Hart. No attack had come to the Philippines yet because the Japanese were grounded on Formosa by heavy fog.
Admiral Hart’s headquarters had monitored the “Air raid Pearl Harbor, this is no drill” alarm, and received a follow-up message from Kimmel informing him, “Japan has started hostilities.”33 And yet MacArthur neglected to respond to three messages from Washington and had to be personally called to confirm he had received them. Now, all Hart’s navy could do was wait.
General Brereton had been awakened at 4:00, and by 5:00 was in MacArthur’s outer office, asking for permission to go to war by launching his B-17s for a strike on Formosa. Sutherland responded by authorizing him only to prepare for war, but to stay on the ground. At 7:15, Brereton was back in Sutherland’s office demanding to see MacArthur, who was actually in and alone. The answer was still, “No.”34 There was not sufficient data on Formosan targets to justify an attack. Any lack of target information was because MacArthur had not authorized reconnaissance flights. Previously, he had authorized flights north only to the International Treaty Line, which would only put them in view of Formosa but accomplish nothing. For now, the Americans could only attack when they themselves were attacked. Somehow, the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor didn’t seem to count, and after all, the Philippines were not the United States. Although Brereton did issue an order for three B-17s to make a photoreconnaissance flight to Formosa, the actual origin of that order is not clear.
It was during the preparation for the reconnaissance mission that Brereton received a call from General Arnold in Washington. The destruction of the American air force in Hawaii had prompted the call, warning Brereton not to get caught on the ground. The only bright spot had been that on Brereton’s order the night before, sixteen of his B-17s, in an effort to disperse them, had been ordered to the new airfield at Del Monte on Mindanao. On Monday morning, many of the balance of his remaining bombers were ordered into the air just to get them off the ground, while Brereton waited for MacArthur’s order to do something.
Admiral Kimmel would be held in judgment for an attack that he did not know was coming, but the absence of leadership in the Philippines, when it was known that an attack was expected, is incomprehensible. After the war, General MacArthur would insist that Brereton had never recommended an attack on Formosa, which he further insisted would have failed in any account for lack of target intelligence and fighter protection for that distance. But that is why the B-17s were there. They constituted the best and only offensive weapon. There were those in Washington, including the president, who had originally insisted that the B-17s be sent to Britain. If th
ere were no plans for them in the Philippines, it was the duty of the overall commander to insist on one. And MacArthur would later maintain that it was his idea to send some of the aircraft to Del Monte. Yet it was understood that for any offensive action, the B-17s would have to return to Clark for fuel and maintenance. Recognizing that Clark would have to be defended, Brereton had ordered fifty-four of his fighters into the air with thirty-six being held in reserve.35 They saw nothing.
On Formosan airfields, five hundred miles to the north, over two hundred more Japanese aircraft were waiting, all gassed up and armed, and the pilots prepared with target photos.36 With engines warm, the planes were just sitting on the ramps waiting for the heavy fog to lift. Their attack on the Philippines and Malaya was supposed to be timed to the Pearl Harbor attack. And what was worse, the weather over their targets was forecast to be beautiful, which most certainly meant that upon hearing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American B-17s were at this moment flying toward Formosa to catch them on the ground with full gas tanks. It could have been a Pearl Harbor in reverse, a perfect opportunity for the Americans, but where were they? At any moment, bombs may come whistling down through the overcast, but there was nothing.
As the morning passed, the fog over Formosa lifted, and by 10:15, all aircraft were in the air headed for Luzon, still expecting to encounter the Americans coming from the other way, which would complicate matters.
At about 9:30, the radar station at Iba, west of Clark Field, reported a large formation of enemy aircraft approaching from the north. The U.S. fighters were scrambled to cover both Clark Field and Manila. But the Japanese formation suddenly banked to the left and bombed the Philippine summer capital at Baguio, some distance to the north. There had been no interception, and the Japanese had escaped their first major attack unscathed.
As the American fighters were being recalled, Brereton again called Sutherland. Either the B-17s had to go to war or they would be destroyed on the ground. The reconnaissance mission to Formosa was now authorized. All B-17s were ordered back to Clark to refuel. The phone rang. MacArthur now authorized bombing missions to Formosa. Upon return, the B-17s were gassed up and bombed up for a 2 p.m. departure for Formosa. By now it was almost noon and ten hours since the Oahu attack.
Years later, General Sutherland would insist that all B-17s had been ordered to Del Monte with a plan to bomb Formosa, using Clark as a fuel stop. But it was Brereton who insisted on photos first. Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day, according to Sutherland, was all Brereton’s decision.
At about 11:20, Iba called again and reported the approach of another big attack. The fighters were again scrambled from neighboring fields, but once in the air, they were vectored toward Manila.
It was exactly 12:35 when personnel at Clark Field looked up to the sounds of approaching aircraft. There were two waves. In the first, there were fifty-three medium bombers and thirty-four Zero fighters, followed by fifty-three Zeroes in the second wave.37 Everyone ran for cover and watched helplessly as the pride of the American air force was reduced to skeletons. It ended as fast as it had started, with MacArthur’s heavy, long-range punch suffering total defeat in its first encounter.
As with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese controlled the sky, destroying 50 percent of American bomber and fighter strength. From the start, any intended offensive of American missions against Japanese shipping wound up to be more defensive in nature.
Typical of the odds was the example of just one B-17 on just one mission in an attempt to slow down the Japanese landings at Legaspi, southeast of Manila. While over the target area, First Lieutenant Hewitt Wheless was attacked by eighteen Japanese fighters. One of his crew members was killed, and two were wounded. A gear-up crash landing was imminent to try to save the lives of the wounded aboard. Wheless made a night belly landing on unfamiliar terrain on a field scattered with obstacles to prevent Japanese landings. On inspection, the aircraft had over a thousand bullet holes, and Wheless was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for this action.
Japan’s attack on the Philippines provided Lieutenant Buzz Wagner of the Seventeenth Squadron the distinction of becoming the Americans’ first flying ace of World War II. By December 18, and flying a P-40, which is less agile than a Zero, he would bring down his fifth enemy fighter while destroying many more Japanese planes on the ground, earning himself the Distinguished Service Cross as well.
Six hours had passed since the Japanese had attacked the Philippines, and Washington still had not been informed of the disaster. General Marshall, totally unaware of what had occurred, sent another message to MacArthur: “Request report on operations and results.”38 This was followed by a message from General Arnold: “Reports of Japanese attacks all show that numbers of our planes [referring to Pearl Harbor] have been destroyed on the ground. Take all possible steps at once to avoid such losses in your area including dispersion to maximum possible extent, construction of parapets and prompt takeoff on warning.”39
Then finally to Marshall, MacArthur reported his interpretation: “Experienced heavy attack by fifty-two, two-engine bombers at high altitude coordinated with forty dive bombers. Damage heavy and casualties reported at about twenty-three dead, two hundred wounded. Our air losses heavy and enemy air losses medium. Now have available seventeen heavy bombers, fifty to fifty-five P-forty and fifteen P-thirty fives. Am launching a heavy bombardment counter attack tomorrow morning on enemy airdromes in southern Formosa.”40
And to Arnold, it would take MacArthur two days to respond. It took time to compose an alibi for getting caught on the ground, ten hours after the attack on Oahu, especially with all of the warnings. But he insisted that he had exercised every precaution considering the limited time and reserves that were available. His aviators had “fought from fields not yet developed and under improvised conditions … and under the severest handicaps.”41 Although he defended his pilots, he was not able to answer the most important question: when on full alert with ten hours to prepare, and being notified in advance of the approach of an enemy formation, how had he gotten caught with all those aircraft on the ground?
General Claire Chennault, legendary leader of the Flying Tigers, who had gone to the aid of Chiang Kai-shek in 1941, later wrote: “If I had been caught with my planes on the ground, I could never have looked my fellow officers in the eye. The lightness of which this cardinal sin was excused by the American High Command has always seemed to me one of the shocking defects of the war.”42
The air force that Washington had pinned its hopes on to save the Philippines had vanished within thirty minutes. Yet MacArthur was later promoted to four stars in December, and Sutherland was promoted to two stars. In the interest of saving the remaining American aircraft in the Philippines to fight another day, fourteen B-17s took off from Del Monte and relocated to Australia.
If MacArthur was not being taken to task, General Brereton would be. On December 11, Brereton received an irate call from General Arnold in Washington. Even by then, Washington had not been fully informed of what had happened, and clearly, Arnold thought it was Brereton’s fault that so many planes had been destroyed. “How in the hell could an experienced airman like you get caught with your planes on the ground?”43 After all, the reason they had sent Brereton to the Philippines was to avoid that very situation. Brereton asked Arnold to withhold his judgment until he received the final report, confirming to him that he had “done everything in our power to get authority to attack Formosa on 8 December but had been relegated to a ‘strictly defensive attitude’ by higher authority.”44
After the call, Brereton met with MacArthur, asking him to call Hap Arnold to set the record straight. What actually transpired in that phone call is not known. In Brereton’s final meeting with MacArthur, however, before leaving for Australia on December 24, MacArthur’s parting words to him were, “I hope you will tell the people outside what we have done and protect my reputation as a fighter.”45 Whether or not Brereton held any a
nimosity toward MacArthur for the catastrophe in the Philippines, he responded, “General, your reputation will never need any protection.”46 A good response, considering that Brereton, too, could have been scapegoated for the disaster in the Philippines, as Kimmel and Short would be for the disaster at Hawaii.
Brereton would later attribute the downfall of the Philippines to lack of security and mobility, adding that had the war plans to reinforce the Philippines not been delayed, additional air bases would have allowed for plane dispersion, and concluding that even a few months’ delay would have entirely upset the Japanese attack schedule. “So long as we held the Philippines and had a heavy bomber force intact, it would have been extremely hazardous for the Japs to by-pass them, leaving an air force remaining on their flank and rear.”47
The question of MacArthur’s defense plan for the Philippines may never be resolved. President Quezon reportedly told Dwight Eisenhower in 1942 that it was MacArthur who had hoped that the Philippines could remain neutral. Yet MacArthur himself stated that there was no question that the Philippines would be attacked. If this is true, why was no offensive action taken against the Japanese during their bombing raids prior to the invasion?
Reflecting on the blunder in the Philippines, it is important to look at MacArthur’s defense strategy. He had rejected the defensive nature of War Plan Orange-3 and Rainbow 5, which focused on defensive measures for Central Luzon only, with the ultimate goal to hold Manila Bay and delay any Japanese landings. Defense plans for the Philippines were in existence long before MacArthur returned to the islands. The most updated revision of War Plan Orange-3 (WPO-3) of April 1941 was the ideal plan for what was available.