by Robin Moore
The headquarters of a Special Forces group in action against the enemy is known as the Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB). It performs all the basic functions of a regular unit headquarters—personnel, intelligence, operations and supply. It also has a staff of Area Specialist Officers (ASOs), each of whom is intimately acquainted with the area of operations in which he specializes. In South Vietnam there is one B detachment to each corps area, and four corps areas from IV Corps (the Mekong Delta) to I Corps (called “eye” Corps) in the northernmost mountain region bordering the 17th Parallel, which divides Communist North from free South Vietnam. Thus there are four ASOs at the SFOB in Saigon.
The B team acts as a higher headquarters for approximately ten A teams. The B team is not an operational detachment, but supplies, administers and coordinates the activities of the A teams.
The Green Berets shows Special Forces in both its guerrilla and anti-guerrilla roles against the background of the Vietnam war in 1964.
It may help the reader’s understanding to review, for a moment, the political background this book covers.
In January of 1964 South Vietnam was being run by a military junta headed by General Duong Van (“Big”) Minh that had overthrown the dictatorship of President Ngo Dinh Diem. President Diem came to power in 1955 after Vietnam was divided into two separate states—North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
Under Diem important cabinet and civil service jobs were self-perpetuating, acquired through heredity, wealth, and connections with the Roman Catholic Ngo family. The Army was no exception to this so-called Mandarin system. Competency, bravery, and training had little or no bearing on promotions or the assignment of commands and desirable posts. Advancement in Diem’s burgeoning U.S.-advised and -financed Army depended upon an officer’s closeness to the President, his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame Nhu: thus the phenomena of so many colonels and generals in their twenties and thirties, and lieutenants and captains in their late thirties and forties.
On January 30th “Big” Minh’s junta was toppled after exactly three months in power by General Nguyen Khanh, an aggressive, businesslike young officer. Both Minh and Khanh were seriously hampered by incompetent holdovers from the Diem regime who had become too powerful to depose or jail.
President Diem and his brother Nhu had used the politically well-connected LLDB officers as palace guards and terrorist police—Buddhists were a prime target. In order to procure them the finest hardware, Diem and Nhu aligned the LLDB with the U.S. Special Forces, even to the point of calling them the Vietnamese 77th Special Forces Group, after the first U.S. Special Forces Group to be activated.
When U.S. Special Forces teams began setting up camps on a large scale, their job of fighting Communist guerrillas was made far more difficult and dangerous because Diem saddled them with the untrained, combat-shy, and—by U.S. standards—corrupt LLDB as counterparts.
The elaborate system of kickbacks, payroll juggling, and misappropriation of equipment—all considered standard operating procedure by so many Vietnamese officers—are shown in some detail in this book.
Obviously, strife and ferment often resulted from such diametrically opposed philosophies—especially when highly trained and dedicated Special Forces men were thrown together with the LLDB in isolated outposts. The Americans could only advise and hand out money and supplies. The LLDB officers were in command, and all too often many of them seemed allergic to firefights, considering themselves members of an elite unit.
That there was occasional bitterness between the men of the U.S. Special Forces and many of their LLDB counterparts should be understandable. At the same time, it is important to understand that Special Forces men do not comment on their counterparts to the outside world. Only after I had become one of them did they talk freely to me.
Since this book is an honest attempt to give the reader a vivid picture of the problems faced by the green berets, and since the relationship between the American advisers and their Vietnamese counterparts is as basic to these stories as the combat tactics described, I decided not to dodge this ticklish issue. The ability of an American to get along with his Vietnamese counterpart and persuade him to accept advice frequently is a matter of life or death to Americans and Vietnamese alike.
There are, of course, many honest and heroic Vietnamese officers, and with General Khanh’s appointment of the experienced Colonel Lam Son to head up LLDB in mid-1964 the quality of the unit began to improve. However, Colonel Lam Son faced a long and frustrating struggle, still far from won, to make LLDB the true Vietnamese equivalent of the United States Special Forces.
The yo-yo that is Vietnamese politics isn’t much help in establishing permanent improvements. In September General Khanh was replaced by a civilian government headed by Tran Van Huong which early in 1965 relinquished control to the selfsame General Khanh. Then, shortly thereafter, Khanh resigned. No one can tell how long these power shifts will continue.
The Green Berets tells the story of Special Forces fighting the Vietnam War in Indo-China from 1964 to 1972. It could well have been written about the wearers of the green beret in many other countries and many other missions throughout the world in the final quarter of the 20th century.
In essence, these stories are as true of the political problems and combat situations Special Forces men are facing in Vietnam as in later conflicts throughout the world, particularly in Somalia where the then Secretary of Defense thought it would “be sending the wrong message” to give them the full armament they needed to accomplish their mission. As a result a Green Beret team was massacred following orders to apprehend an African warlord.
As we head toward the last days of the 20th century, new threats of terrorism are hurled against America. It is the Special Operations Forces that must contend with terrorists, the so-called wars of national liberation and the burgeoning “fatwas” or religious wars declared frequently by fundamentalist fanatics.
Political and geographical considerations may vary from month to month and year to year; but in the global stalemate created by nuclear power, these wars will be fought by dedicated soldiers like the men of Special Forces under conditions similar to those described in this book.
In the course of my narrative I have used a number of terms and abbreviations which are standard in Special Forces. Most of these will be familiar to most readers, but to avoid confusion I have listed them here for ready reference.
Agency, The—No one ever refers to the CIA. They say “The Agency,” or in Southeast Asia they use the name of the CIA’s operating entity known as CSG (Combined Studies Group).
AR-15—New high-powered light automatic rifle used by Special Forces. Officially designated the M-16 by the Army.
ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
Asset—An individual, not a member of a Special Forces team, who has first-hand knowledge of the people and geography of a Special Forces operating area and works with the team.
BAR—Browning automatic rifle.
Concertina—Barbed wire in rolls placed about the perimeter of fortified areas.
Country Team—When the United States gives military and economic aid to a country such as Vietnam, it is administered by what is known as the Country Team. The Country Team is made up of five individuals: the U.S. ambassador, who nominally heads the team; the commanding general of Military Assistance Command; the head of USOM; the head of the United States Information Service in the country; and the station chief of the CIA in that country.
DA—Department of the Army.
Dai-uy—(Pronounced Di-wee) The Vietnamese word for captain.
DoD—Department of Defense.
DRVN—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
DZ—Drop zone for parachuted supplies or personnel.
Flash—The patch on the green beret which by color designates the group to which a Special Forces man is attached.
FOB—Forward operating base.
KIA—Killed in action.
> Leg, or Straight Leg—A soldier who is not a parachute jumper.
LZ—Landing zone for an airplane or helicopter.
MAAG—Military Assistance Advisory Group. MAAG is, in effect, the operational arm of MAC-V MAAG is in charge of training and operations, and it is to MAAG that American officers and men working directly with ARVN as advisers are attached. Originally Special Forces was independent of MAAG, reporting directly to the Commanding General of MAC-V and certain unconventional warfare boards, in southeast Asia and Washington D.C. Then on May 1, 1964, some of the conventional generals in Saigon and Washington decided that in the interest of “streamlining,” Special Forces should be put under MAAG.
MAC-V—Military Assistance Command Vietnam. This is the advisory and decision-making command in Vietnam that reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States.
Okie—Okinawa, also known as “The Rock”; home of the 1st Special Forces Group.
Piastre—Vietnamese money; one p. in 1965 is worth $.01 U.S. currency.
Province chief—Vietnam is divided into forty-two provinces and each province is ruled over by a military governor or province chief, usually a major or lieutenant colonel. The American adviser to the province chief, usually a major, is known as a sector adviser and provinces are referred to as sectors.
SEATO—South East Asia Treaty Organization.
Short—When a soldier is “short” he has almost finished his tour of duty and is ready to ship.
SOG—Actually Special Operations Group but camouflaged by the words Studies and Observations Group to hide its real behind enemy lines, cross border ops, and other operations the U.S. did not officially recognize.
STRAC—Officially standing for Strategic Army Command, the word has come to mean neat, shipshape, in order.
USOM—United States Operations Mission. This is the overseas operating arm of AID (Agency for International Development). It is a civilian agency which supervises spending money and giving assistance to the people of a country. Everything from overhauling the police system to providing healthy pigs comes under USOM.
Yard—American abbreviation of Montagnard, a hill tribesman.
1
A Green Beret—All the Way
1
The headquarters of Special Forces Detachment B-520 in one of Vietnam’s most active war zones looks exactly like a fort out of the old West. Although the B detachments are strictly support and administrative units for the Special Forces A teams fighting the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas in the jungles and rice paddies, this headquarters had been attacked twice in the last year by VC and both times had sustained casualties.
I was finally keeping my promise to visit the headquarters of Major (since his arrival in Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel) Train. I deposited my combat pack in the orderly room and strode through the open door into the CO’s office.
“Congratulations, Colonel.”
Lieutenant Colonel Train, looking both youthful and weathered, smiled self-assuredly, blew a long stream of cigar smoke across his desk, and motioned for me to sit down.
Major Fenz, the operations officer, walked into the office abruptly. “Sorry to interrupt, sir. We just received word that another patrol out of Phan Chau ran into an ambush. We lost four friendlies KIA.”
I sat up straight. “Old Kornie is getting himself some action.”
Train frowned thoughtfully. “Third time in a week he’s taken casualties.” He drummed his fingertips on the top of his desk. “Any enemy KIA, or captured weapons?”
“No weapons captured. They think they killed several VC from blood found on the foliage. No bodies.”
“I worry about Kornie,” Train said, with a trace of petulance. “He’s somehow managed to get two Vietnamese camp commanders relieved in the four months he’s been here. The new one is just what he wants, pliable. Kornie runs the camp as he pleases.”
“Kornie has killed more VC than any other A team in the three weeks since we’ve taken over here,” Fenz pointed out.
“Kornie is too damned independent and unorthodox,” Train said.
“That’s what they taught us at Bragg, Colonel,” I put in. “Or did I spend three months misunderstanding the message?”
“There are limits. I don’t agree with all the School teaches.”
“By the way, Colonel,” I said before we could disagree openly, “one reason I came down here was to get out to Phan Chau and watch Kornie in action.”
Train stared at me a moment. Then he said, “Let’s have a cup of coffee. Join us, Fenz?”
We walked out of the administration offices, across the parade ground and volleyball court of the B-team headquarters, and entered the club which served as morning coffeehouse, reading and relaxing room, and evening bar. Train called to the pretty Vietnamese waitress to bring us coffee.
There were a number of Special Forces officers and sergeants lounging around. It was to the B team that the A-team field men came on their way to a rest and rehabilitation leave in Saigon. Later they returned to the B team to await flights back to their A teams deep in Viet Cong territory.
Lieutenant Colonel Train had been an enigma to me ever since I first met him as a major taking the guerrilla course at Fort Bragg. His background was Regular Army. In World War II he had seen two years of combat duty in the Infantry, rising to the rank of staff sergeant when the war ended. Since his high-school record had been outstanding and his Army service flawless, he received an appointment to West Point. From the Point to Japan to Korea, Train had served with distinction as an Infantry officer, and in 1954 he applied for jump school at Fort Benning and became a paratrooper.
Almost nine years later, in line with Train’s interest in new developments, he had indicated that he would accept an assignment with Special Forces. I met him at Fort Bragg just after he had moved down Gruber Avenue from the 82nd Airborne Division to Smoke Bomb Hill, the Special Warfare Center.
It was obvious to those close to Train that he did not accept wholeheartedly the doctrines of unconventional warfare. But President Kennedy’s awareness of the importance of this facet of the military had made unconventional or special warfare experience a must for any officer who wanted to advance to top echelons.
As Train and I chatted and drank our coffee my interest grew in whether this dedicated officer was going to change and how he would operate in the guerrilla war in Vietnam.
“So you want to go to Phan Chau?” Train asked.
“I’d like to see Kornie in action,” I said. “Remember him at Bragg? He was the guerrilla chief in the big maneuvers.”
“Kornie has been one of the Army’s characters for ten years,” Train said sternly. “Of course I remember him. I’m afraid you’ll get yourself in trouble if you go to Phan Chau.”
“What do you mean by trouble?”
“I don’t want the first civilian writer killed in Vietnam to get it with my command.”
As I expected, Train was going to be a problem. “You think I stand a better chance of cashing in with Kornie than with some of the other A teams?”
Train took a long sip of coffee before answering. “He does damned dangerous things. I don’t think he reports everything he does even to me.”
“You’ve been here three weeks, Colonel. The last B team had him four months. What did Major Grunner say about him?”
Fenz, a Special Forces officer for six years, concentrated on his coffee. Train gave me a wry smile. “The last B team was pretty unorthodox even by Special Forces standards. Major Grunner is a fine officer; I’m not saying anything against him or the way he operated this B detachment.” Train looked at me steadily. “But he let his A teams do things I won’t permit. And of course he and Kornie were old friends from the 10th Special Forces Group in Germany.” Train shook his head. “And that’s the wildest-thinking bunch I ever came across in my military career.”
Neither Fenz nor I made any reply. We sipped our coffee in silence. Train was one of the new breed of Special F
orces officers. Unconventional warfare specialists had proven their ability to cope with the burgeoning Communist brand of limited or guerrilla wars so conclusively that Special Forces had been authorized an increase in strength. Several new groups were being added to the old Ist in Okinawa, 10th in Bad Tölz, Germany, and the 5th and 7th at Fort Bragg.
New officers were picked from among the most outstanding men in airborne and conventional units. Since every Special Forces officer and enlisted man is a paratrooper, it was occasionally necessary to send some “straight-leg” officers to jump school at Fort Benning, Georgia, before they could attend the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg prior to being assigned to a Special Forces group.
This new group of basically conventional officers in Special Forces were already beginning to make their influence felt early in 1964. Lieutenant Colonel Train was clearly going to be a hard man to develop into a “Green Beret—All the Way!”
I broke the silence, directing a question at Major Fenz. “When can you get me out to Phan Chau?”
Fenz looked to Train for guidance. Train smiled at me wryly. “We’ve got to let you go if you want to. But do us all a favor, will you? Don’t get yourself killed. I thought you’d had it on that night jump in Uwarrie . . .”
He turned to Fenz and told him the story. “They dropped our teams together on the ten-day field training exercise.”
Fenz nodded; the ten-day FTX was a bond shared by all Special Warfare School graduates.
“The School picked us a drop zone in Uwarrie National Forest near Pisgah—that was something else. It was a terrible night,” Train recalled. “Cold. And the wind came up before we reached the DZ. An equipment bundle got stuck in the door for six seconds so we had to make two passes. Our friend here was held at the door by the jump master and was first man out on the second pass. We were blown into the trees over a mile from the DZ. I got hung up, had to open my emergency chute and climb down the shroud lines to get on the ground. We had three broken legs and several other injuries on that DZ.”