The reduction of the German Army to 100,000 men and the handing over of alleged war criminals to the victorious powers were unacceptable to the majority of senior military officers. Led by the Prussian War Minister Reinhardt, many of them considered the possibility of refusing the conditions, which would have led to a resumption of hostilities. General Groener was vehemently opposed to such an idea, and even Noske warned of the ‘desperado politics’ of the military.2
The Cabinet session of 3 June found a majority in favour of signing the Treaty, but ‘under protest to avoid force’.3 Even Noske went along with this, although Scheidemann refused to sign while the victorious powers were unwilling to make substantial changes. On 16 June the Allies rejected the German counterproposals and gave the Reich Government an ultimatum either to accept the terms within seven days or face a resumption of the war. The German peace delegation led by Foreign Minister Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau recommended to the Reich Government that the peace treaty be declined; Scheidemann and the DDP threatened to leave the Cabinet if it were signed.
On 19 June 1919 Noske and Reinhardt convened a meeting of thirty-three generals and senior officers at Weimar to discuss the military situation. Noske’s adjutant, von Gilsa, attended and Canaris was also probably present. The generals considered themselves ‘a political force of the first rank’4 but for Noske the meeting was primarily a means to gauge their mood.5 He informed them that a majority of the National Assembly was in favour of accepting the peace treaty. Since Scheidemann would not sign, a change of the Cabinet would be necessary; it had been suggested that he, Noske, might be Scheidemann’s successor as minister-president. This question, of whether the Army would support the government in such a situation, asked for a vote of confidence from the generals and would decide Noske’s political future – a ‘somewhat shadowy proceeding for a Republic but, in view of the political power constellation, a not entirely misconceived approach by the Reichswehrminister’.6
Reinhardt, von Lüttwitz, von Trotha and others declared that under no circumstances would they accept the ‘blame paragraph’; the cautious Groener, while pleading ‘for politics to run its course’, agreed, even though it contradicted his pledge of loyalty to Noske. Groener declared he would stand by Noske through thick and thin, but the other generals chose their words more circumspectly. Once Noske had left, the officers discussed openly the counter-measures the Army might take should the politicians accept the peace treaty.7
On his departure, Groener said to Noske, ‘The salvation of Germany lies in the hands of the Reichswehrminister.’8 ‘Best of all as dictator,’ General von Below added, as Oberstleutnant von den Bergh noted in his diary that evening.9 Previously, Noske – speaking of his possible elevation to minister-president in personal union with the office of Reichswehrminister – had said that this would be a development ‘which introduced a sort of dictatorship’10 and Pabst had urged Canaris ‘to keep Noske thinking along those lines’.11
It was Major von Gilsa, speaking against accepting the peace treaty immediately before the National Assembly session of 23 June who, with the support of the leader of the Volunteer Landjägerkorps, Generalmajor Georg Maercker, made a final appeal to Noske. Maercker encouraged him to ‘take the destiny of the fatherland in his strong hands, declare himself dictator and decline to sign the treaty’.12 If he did so, the Reichswehr would stand behind him to the last man.
Noske reflected for a while before slapping the table: ‘Herr General, I am sick of this crap’, and Maercker left him with a feeling that he might be prepared to seize power as dictator if the circumstances demanded. Majors von Gilsa and von Feldmann (liaison officer between Army High Command and the Reich Government) also approached Noske; a military revolt might topple the government should it accept the Allied ultimatum. General von Lüttwitz had sent similar warnings to Noske, but the latter would not allow himself to be pinned down.
It was finally Groener’s intervention that brought the solution. During the session of 23 June 1919 the National Assembly had to decide whether to sign the Versailles Treaty. Groener stated that the military weakness of Germany precluded any other course, and he combined his assessment with an appeal to Ebert: ‘Minister Noske must take over the leadership and the responsibility for the peace treaty.’13 The same day Noske advised the Reichswehr that together with War Minister Reinhardt he had voted against the imposed peace, but had been outvoted. His letter of resignation had been declined by the Reich president, the minister-president, the Cabinet and the majority parties of the National Assembly. That day there followed a turbulent discussion involving all ‘senior Army commanders, regimental commanders etc from Berlin and its environs’,14 von Lüttwitz, Pabst and Ehrhardt leading the confrontation; whether Canaris was present is not known. The next day, 24 June, may be regarded as the day when the first deep rift appeared in the relationship of trust between Noske and the Army leaders.
On 5 June Pabst made another attempt to induce Noske to seize power; the Army would support him to the hilt.15 At his refusal, Pabst threatened him: ‘It would be a misfortune, Herr Minister, if the national tide did not find you on the side of the officers.’16 Noske replied, ‘I suspect, Herr Hauptmann, that one day you will have the entire government, myself included, rounded up and imprisoned.’ Pabst answered, ‘Yourself under no circumstances, Herr Minister.’ Noske elected to treat the reply as a joke, but used a serious undertone when he told him, ‘You must see, Herr Hauptmann, that there is a considerable difference between us both. I cannot guarantee that one day I shall not have you arrested.’17
Noske was now alert to the danger of having 60,000 GKS-Corps troops stationed close to Berlin, and after his talk with Pabst ordered the corps to be split up and spread across the remotest garrisons of the Reich. Pabst responded by planning the putsch; he sought the support of Staff officers of Berlin Reichswehrgruppenkommando 1, which formed part of GKS-Corps. While the new Chief of the General Staff Hans von Seeckt was strongly opposed to a coup and threatened to have Pabst arrested, Generals von Lüttwitz, von Lossberg and von Below all agreed to discuss Pabst’s proposal at a ‘conspirators’ conference’ on 9 July. Using the pretext of a threatened Communist coup, Pabst had the GKS-Corps advance to the Berlin suburbs on 21 July. Although General von Lüttwitz sympathised with the scheme, he did not dare oppose Noske’s order, and with General Maercker aborted Pabst’s operation at the last minute.18 Pabst was neither punished nor arrested.
Shortly afterwards, Pabst left the Reichswehr19 and in August 1919 founded the Nationale Vereinigung, attracting to it various personalities who shared his political outlook, including von Lüttwitz, Ludendorff, former Chief of Staff Max Bauer, Korvettenkapitän Erhardt, General-Municipal Director Wolfgang Kapp, author and 2nd Naval Brigade member Friedrich Heinz and Wilhelm Canaris.20 Its purpose, according to Heinz, was ‘to prepare the counter-revolution’. Heinz, later an Abwehr-man under Canaris, stated that Canaris played a key role in the Nationale Vereinigung by having ‘leading men in German industry, and politicians of rank and standing approached or shadowed’ by himself and his intelligence service.21 This is one of the few indications that Canaris was running a spy network inside the Naval Brigades and GKS-Corps. Noske discovered the coup plans in the autumn and wanted von Lüttwitz pensioned off, but he was opposed by General Reinhardt, the new chief of Army Command.22 This resulted in a sharpening of the conflict between Noske and von Lüttwitz.
In February 1920 the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission demanded the disbanding of the Naval Brigades Ehrhardt and Loewenfeld; after a fierce argument with Lüttwitz, Noske ordered this to be done by 10 March.23 On the first anniversary of the founding of Naval Brigade Ehrhardt on 1 March, von Lüttwitz spoke to five thousand Freikorps men about the Reichswehrminister’s order: ‘I will not tolerate having such a hardened force broken up in such an unhealthy climate,’ he vowed. Other sources have him adding, ‘We will not allow ourselves to be disbanded, we would rather bring down the government.’24 Even in the face o
f this defiance, Noske did not discharge Lüttwitz, nor did he punish Admiral von Trotha and other senior officers who had heard Lüttwitz speak at Doberitz and had failed to report it.25
Five days later Noske insisted again that Lüttwitz disband the Naval Brigades.26 When Lüttwitz refused, von Seeckt, who had drafted the dissolution orders, Reinhardt and Admiral von Trotha suggested that Noske relieve Lüttwitz of command of the Naval Brigades and subordinate them instead to Admiral von Trotha. Noske went along with this idea, issued the order and informed Reich President Ebert,27 who invited Noske and Lüttwitz to talks on the evening of 10 March. Here Lüttwitz demanded the immediate dissolution of the National Assembly, the dismissal of General Reinhardt as chief of Army Command, his own appointment as Commander-in-Chief Reichswehr and the retraction of the disbandment orders. Noske brushed all this aside, informed Lüttwitz that he was relieved of command of the Naval Brigades and warned him against fomenting a military revolt.28 Lüttwitz was dismissed, but never arrested. The same day, as rumours of an imminent coup became current, Noske ordered Kapp, Bauer, Pabst, Schitzler and Grabowsky to be arrested. The first three were warned in advance from within police headquarters and went to ground, Pabst was sheltered by Ehrhardt at Döberitz, and Canaris hid out in Berlin. The suspicion that Ehrhardt had ideas of a putsch, so Canaris maintained during later trials and inquiries, was not apparent in his contacts with Ehrhardt.29
At that time, Canaris was on Noske’s staff and responsible for all Naval Brigade affairs. Accordingly he saw Ehrhardt regularly and discussed with him the threatened disbandment of his brigade. Canaris stated in evidence: ‘He often discussed with me the difficulties of the present times, but never said anything which might have led me to think that he was involved in any kind of political activity’; since everybody in the Naval Brigades was involved in political activity, the statement was absurd. Ehrhardt had also been summoned by von Gilsa to allay the latter’s suspicions, and even he could inform Canaris that Ehrhardt was simply running a bona-fide military unit and following orders.30
Towards evening on 12 March 1919 during the Cabinet meeting at the Reich Chancellery, rumours began to accumulate that Brigade Ehrhardt would march on Berlin that night. Admiral von Trotha offered to go to Döberitz to see Ehrhardt but feared that if a putsch was actually planned he would be detained, and so requested that Noske detail a Staff officer to accompany him; Noske appointed Canaris.31 It was dark when they got to Döberitz, and von Trotha warned Ehrhardt against an unwise military action,32 but Ehrhardt denied such an intention and Canaris swore that during his inspection of the camp and his conversations with officers he saw and heard nothing to raise his suspicions.33
Noske was informed accordingly, although von Trotha and Canaris thought it wise to add that such an elite troop could be on the march at very short notice. It could not be proved that their report to Berlin was incorrect, although neither mentioned their sympathies and open collaboration with the putschists. Within a few hours, the brigade was marching on Berlin.34
Despite von Trotha’s report, Noske had taken steps to stop Ehrhardt by force should he come; government buildings were secured but no units positioned away from the centre.35 Officers of the Reichswehr and security police (Sipo) had declared meanwhile that they would not fire on Naval Brigade Ehrhardt, while Reichswehrgruppenkommando 1 and the Naval Brigade had agreed not to shoot at each other under any circumstances: ‘Our troops do not fire on our troops.’36 Naval Brigade Ehrhardt was well informed about the defensive measures, and towards midnight while the brigade was on its way into Berlin, on Noske’s orders generals von Oldershausen and von Oven were negotiating with Ehrhardt at Döberitz. Since Ehrhardt was not prepared to make any concessions, Noske and General Reinhardt wanted to meet force with force but were uncertain whether they had the loyalty of their military commanders and so they called a conference of officers for o1oohrs at the Reichswehr Ministry.
Von Seeckt, von Oldershausen, von Oven and Hammerstein considered resistance useless in view of the strength of the brigade and feared a split in the Reichswehr since leftist insurrections were also possible.37 Von Trotha stated that he supported the opinion of the four generals. Noske told him, ‘Herr Admiral, your Navy will hurl Germany into misfortune for the second time.’38 Only Reinhardt and Adjutant von Gilsa supported Noske, who abandoned the session ‘with a feeling of the deepest disgust’ and asked the Cabinet to meet at once.39
Towards 0400hrs the minister and members of the Prussian Government met in the Reich Chancellery. When von Trotha – who as chief of the Admiralty had constant access to Cabinet sittings – attempted to enter the chamber, Noske blocked his path: this ‘highly political sitting made it necessary to limit the participants to those gentlemen who had the unquestioned confidence of the government’.40 Von Trotha no longer had this support. The final decision of the Cabinet was to return troops to barracks, and General Reinhardt, who held out for resistance to the Naval Brigade, requested that Ebert and Noske relieve him of his duties forthwith.41
On the early morning of 13 March 1920, Ebert, Noske, Max Bauer and von Gilsa flew to Dresden. Shortly afterwards, Ehrhardt’s troops entered the government quarter. Kapp proclaimed himself head of the government and appointed Lüttwitz Reichswehrminister; Canaris had remained in Berlin with Trotha and the Naval Brigade.42 Under questioning later, Canaris would only confirm that he had spoken to Ehrhardt several times in Berlin after the government had fled and he stuck firmly to his story that Ehrhardt had known nothing of Lüttwitz and Kapp’s intentions, and that he himself had been able to draw no other conclusion from what Ehrhardt had told him.43 Faced with the choice between Noske and ‘the troops’, Canaris had decided in favour of ‘the troops’ without hesitation.44 One must doubt, however, that by this he meant anything other than Kapp’s troops, or that his loyalty extended any further than to a definite caste of the most reactionary officers.45
General Maercker, to whose Wehrkreis (military administrative district) Noske had fled, believing Maercker absolutely reliable, was also faced by a conflict of loyalty. Ordered by the new Reichswehrminister, von Lüttwitz, to take Noske and his escort into custody, he decided to sit on the fence and favoured negotiation, which was refused outright by Ebert and the other deposed ministers, who demanded the overthrow of Kapp unconditionally.46 On 14 March in a communiqué to the Reichswehr, Ebert and Noske described the coup as a ‘criminal proceeding by a small bunch of reactionary political adventurers.47 The deposed government now travelled to Stuttgart, where the president of the National Assembly, Fehrenbach, summoned a meeting for 18 March.
At first it appeared that the putsch would be successful. On 14 March, after a conference with senior naval officers, Admiral von Trotha cabled subordinate naval stations: ‘I have placed myself at the disposal of the new government and expect that as before the Navy will continue to obey my orders.’48 The responsible chiefs of the Wilhelmshaven and Kiel naval stations fell in behind von Trotha, claiming political neutrality and military subordination, in stark contrast to the lower ranks under their command.49 Their opposition, the general strike in all large German cities and the unyielding attitude of the deposed government and the president of the National Assembly brought the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch to its end and both men surrendered on 17 March. Trotha was deposed as Naval commander-in-chief and arrested at home.50 Canaris was also detained and questioned at Berlin police headquarters51 but gave nothing away; he remained in the Navy, his reputation untarnished. Noske was dismissed by Reich president Ebert, and von Gilsa his adjutant went too. At the end of May 1920, the new Reichswehrminister Gessler appointed Konteradmiral Adolf Zenker new commandant of the Wilhelmshaven Naval Station and Kapitän zur See Ernst Freiherr von Gagern to head the Baltic Station at Kiel.
By edict to the Reichsmarine on 15 June, Ebert proclaimed the restoration of military order in the Navy and in August an amnesty was promulgated to annul all proceedings against officers compromised in the putsch.52 By then, Canaris had a new
post; on 24 July 1920 he had been appointed Admiralty Staff Officer to Freiherr von Gagern.53
8
Agent of the Counter-Revolution
The situation of the Reichsmarine in the summer of 1920 was desolate, distrusted by left and right. At the beginning of August, Konteradmiral Michaelis, chief of the Admiralty Staff, stated to senior commanders that nobody was interested in naval rebuilding: ‘Right-wing factions blame the Navy alone for the November-Revolution . . . Democrats and the Majority-Socialists (MSPD) say the Kapp putsch was Navy inspired; the far left has fundamentally no interest in strengthening any of the military.’1 Many considered the Navy as a superfluous independent branch in the armed forces; Reich President Ebert actually appealed for the Navy to be abolished on the grounds of expense. An interim compromise was agreed whereby the Navy High Command was reestablished in October, headed by Admiral Paul Behncke.2
Canaris would help resurrect ‘a functioning apparatus of the Navy’3 by restoring discipline and obedience to orders, ensuring the technical competence of the officers and laying the material foundations for future naval rebuilding. He must have completed the task swiftly and well, for Korvettenkapitän Meusel, chief of Staff, Naval Station Baltic, wrote in his assessment of Canaris a year later: ‘Tireless and objective, perceptive and clear in his judgement, energetic yet of modest demeanour, with his sure-footed and forward-looking gift of organisation he has played an outstanding part, under the most difficult circumstances, in the successful restoration of discipline and the resolution of all military tasks and aims of the Station Command.’4
Canaris had quickly realised that under the conditions of the Versailles Treaty not only were special organisational skills required to fulfil the ‘principal task’, but one had to be prepared to act ‘unconventionally’ and if necessary cross the legal boundaries. Many former Freikorps men found their way back into the Navy – a sixth of German naval personnel had been members of the Naval Brigade Loewenfeld.5 There were those who rejected the new State, the Republic, while hoping to find room in the Reichswehr for their private political ideas. ‘Others said that every vacancy in the new armed forces was better filled by a Freikorps man than a November revolutionary. The first group was mostly scattered to the winds,’ Loewenthal wrote later; each member of the second group became ‘a fighter for the national revival . . . .’6 Fregattenkapitän Loewenfeld himself reentered the Navy and commanded the training cruiser Berlin. He helped speed the integration of the former Freikorps men but he had trouble with those from Naval Brigade Ehrhardt, whose politics were more extreme.7
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