Canaris made an honest attempt to place the USPD in immediate proximity to ‘the ringleaders of the mutiny’. At the end of the first part of his speech he summarised: ‘The Fleet was inwardly sound. The virus for the unrest was brought in from outside.’ He was interrupted repeatedly by laughter and indignant catcalls, but continued by alleging that the mutineers in the Fleet had had ‘close contacts to the USPD’ and ‘groups further left of it’ who were working towards ‘a Revolution after the Soviet example’. ‘It is certain that radical-left groups conspired to bring about the events in the Fleet, used them to the full and distributed many leaflets of a revolutionary character . . . an exact division between the USPD and the radical-left groups with regard to their effect on the crews in the Fleet cannot be found.’49
For Canaris and the Navy in the years after the war, the enemy was the left. Therefore Canaris defended the death sentences meted out to the ringleaders, and Committee Chairman Albrecht Philipp had difficulty in controlling ‘minutes-long storms of protest’.50 KPD deputy Emil Höllein shouted: ‘What about the murderer Leutnant Vogel, whom you let run for it?’51
After Canaris had finished speaking, SPD deputy Julius Moses said: ‘I consider it my duty at this point to ask the previous speaker if he is the same Kapitänleutnant Canaris who sat in judgement on the murderers of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and of whom it is said that he did more than most to ensure that Vogel escaped . . . if that were the case, we would view it as an affront to this inquiry by the Reichswehrminister.’52
Canaris attempted to side-step that attack: ‘I am here as the representative of the Marineleitung and not personally,’ but this only further infuriated his opponents, and shouts of ‘Rubbish! Coward!’ were hurled at him and a chant of ‘Murderers’ helper’s helper!’ resounded across the chamber. Finally KPD deputy Arthur Rosenberg declared:
It is an occurrence without parallel . . . that here in the inquiry into such a difficult and historical legal question Herr Reichswehrminister Dr Gessler finds it acceptable to send here a representative against whom the most serious accusations of a criminal nature have been raised . . . I propose that the session be suspended, for in my opinion the majority of the committee cannot find it compatible with their dignity to dally with a government representative of the ilk of Kapitän Canaris.
The chairman brought the session to an end by offering Canaris the opportunity to speak in his defence, but he kept to the script: ‘The completely unjustified allegations against me will be clarified without delay upon application to my superior office, the Marineleitung. Therefore I have nothing to add. I will not defend myself, the answer will be supplied by the Reichswehrminister.’53
Minister Gessler issued a declaration to the Committee at once, denying the involvement of Canaris in ‘the flight of the suspect in the Luxemburg murder’.54 In the press campaign that followed, every kind of accusation was aimed at Canaris, and he was soon the no. 1 whipping-boy of the leftist anti-military press. Gessler was obliged to issue another communiqué to back up the first:
1. Neither as First Officer of the cruiser Berlin nor in any other office did Korvettenkapitän Canaris make available to the leader of Organisation Consul either money, weapons or uniforms in any manner whatsoever.
2. There is no link between Korvettenkapitän Canaris and the assassination attempt on General von Seeckt.
3. There was no financing of the Schleswig-Holstein pro-Fatherland groups including the Wikingbund . . . The revelations at that time in Weltbühne were not refuted because basically I do not react to reports in periodicals like Weltbühne. Accept the expression of my esteem. Gessler. 55
It was not easy to keep Canaris out of the headlines. The recommendation i n his personal file not to use him for the time being on military-political secret missions was ignored. His contacts to the heads of Spanish politics and economy overrode any idea of disengaging him from the outstanding projects, while even at the height of the press campaign in the later summer and autumn of 1927 he had been on visits to Spain56 and was involved in attempting to set up the joint air-traffic monopoly, an anti-aircraft system for the Spanish military and plans for the manufacture of sea mines and depth charges.57
At the end of the year the Marineleitung arranged for Canaris to visit Spain for several months after Baron del Sacro-Lirio considered making him a ‘quasiofficial naval attaché’. This was unusual, for Germany had had no military attachés abroad since the end of the war, but Sacro-Lirio himself was hoping to acquire the position of naval attaché in Berlin.58 The Foreign Ministry had not decided on the military attaché question despite pressure from the Marineleitung to appoint naval attachés to London, Paris, Rome and Madrid.59
In Madrid, Ambassador Welczeck was opposed to ‘any quasi-official or even official appearance of Kapitän zur See Canaris’;60 support for Canaris from the embassy was limited exclusively to economic and not military matters. Baron del Sacro-Lirio had been imprudent enough to inform the ambassador of the necessity to have Canaris come to Spain to found a secret military mission but Welczeck was uncertain whether the king’s chamberlain wanted to make himself appear important or knowingly compromise the embassy by ‘letting it in on the secret’, but in any case Welczeck considered the idea ‘derailed’.61
Canaris arrived again in 1928 and spent most of his time in negotiations about the lagging torpedo, submarine and tanker projects. Then the Spanish interior minister, General Severiano Martinez Anido, introduced him to the head of the Spanish security police,62 who made Canaris aware of the joint treaty between Spain, Italy and France to combat Communist influence, a treaty to which it was hoped that Germany would also subscribe. Since ambassador Welczeck was in favour of it, Canaris and the Spanish police chief worked on a draft63 binding the two countries to a mutual exchange of intelligence about those suspected of being ‘devoted to the Cause’, and provided Canaris with committal warrants for several persons implicated in a plot to murder dictator Primo de Rivera and the interior minister. He also drew Canaris’s attention to certain Italians living in Argentina who liaised between Spanish and German Bolshevist activists.64
Early in 1928 Echevarrieta finally received from Alfonso XIII and the Spanish dictator the contract to build a 750-tonne submarine to a German design. Because Berlin had grown concerned whether the Spanish armaments industry was up to the job, Canaris was sent to Argentina in May 192865 to see if a stronger collaboration with Spain were possible. He had met the leader of the Argentine naval mission in 1927 while the latter was touring European shipyards66 to study ship types and prices. Canaris brought the Argentine admiral, Echevarrieta and the Weser shipyard together,67 but the hoped-for U-boat deal never materialised.68
Immediately after his return from South America, the first era of Canaris’s secret missions came to an end. The Marineleitung wanted him out of the public spotlight and the Foreign Ministry probably shared their view. On 22 June 1928 Canaris was appointed first officer aboard the old battleship Schlesien. Chief of Staff Donner noted in his personal file: ‘To avoid the creation of a legend, it is as well to mention that Canaris is not the kind of person who does things in the dark of his own volition, but is always careful to inform his superiors and the competent Reich office, and seeks their approval,’69 but the Foreign Office did not quite see it the same way.70 Donner recommended – since Canaris’s name had often been ‘mentioned in connection with operations of a discreet nature . . . and recently in anti-military periodicals etc mostly with the addition of completely misleading links – that all proposals to involve him in special missions should be rejected out of hand, and he should only be used on routine naval duty’. It was best to hide him away from the public gaze; even his trip to South America had been noted by Weltbühne.71
In April 1928, the naval secret service, until then an independent office of the Marineleitung, was merged with the Army Abwehr section to form the new Abwehr section at the Reichswehr Ministry.72 The German–Spanish journalist Dr Ritter von Goss
reported on military affairs, while the secret links to the Spanish Navy remained the province of Canaris’s agent Messerschmidt.73 The same month a ministerial adviser to the Reichswehr Ministry returned to Berlin from a ‘fact-finding mission’ to Spain and reported doubts within German industrial circles in Spain as to the reliability of Echevarrieta and Canaris’s other Spanish partners,74 which von Goss set down in a letter shortly afterwards:75 ‘Canaris’s trusted people were almost exclusively in circles . . . whose German-ness had not always withstood trial by fire,’ and who ‘in the case of a call from the home country would hardly be likely to answer it, even if it were serious.’ Goss was especially critical of Canaris for his alleged inability to conspire properly and keep secrets secret: ‘Herr C. is an open book. He is rumoured to be a secretive personality, with a nod and a wink: you know, the naval man, looks for and has contacts, information, important man.’76
Canaris had surrounded himself with an assortment of people who were only interested in money. Echevarrieta especially was a thorn in Goss’s side; he had used German financial help to pay off his debts and otherwise had achieved nothing.77 The complaint was to no avail; Canaris’s successor as Marineleitung chief of staff noted at the foot of the letter: ‘The allegations received against C. contradict the facts. Not the merest shadow of an accusation falls on C.’78
After the SPD election victory of May 1928 and the departure of Gessler and Zenker, the wind at the Reichswehr Ministry changed. The new commander-in-chief, Vizeadmiral Erich Raeder, and the new Reichswehrminister, Groener, were opposed to using Canaris any further in Spain. Raeder particularly, long committed to Germany’s second rise to being a naval power, had good reason to come to an accommodation with the Weimar system;79 he needed to keep his distance from Canaris, particularly since, after taking office, he had been under fire for his role in the Kapp putsch.80 When in May 1929 Echevarrieta and Sacro-Lirio begged the Marineleitung to return Canaris to Spain for fear that without him the negotiations would founder, Groener and Raeder remained firm. When ambassador Welczeck appealed for Canaris to spend a few months in Spain, a conflict developed between the Foreign Ministry and the Reichswehr Ministry, and Groener complained of Welczeck’s attitude. Finally Groener had the last word – Canaris was under attack in Germany and sending him abroad was out of the question;81 after that Groener was promoted to Fregattenkapitän with effect from 1 June 1929.82 Having completed a thirty-month stint as first officer of Schlesien, Canaris was appointed chief of staff, Naval Station North Sea,83 a post that he found gave him little joy. No. 1 Admiralty Staff Officer Karl Dönitz recalled: ‘We used to say of him that he had several souls in his breast. And we were not wrong.’84
In 1931, Canaris’s past caught up with him. Once again it was his role as judge in the Luxemburg–Liebknecht murder trial and the accusations of complicity in the escape of Vogel that brought him back into the public eye. In 1928, journalist Berthold Jacob had made revelations about the Reichswehr and the radical-right, and a State attorney had claimed that his writings were treasonous.85 Jacob avenged himself with an anonymous article in the 24 March 1928 edition of the magazine Das Tagebuch, in which he accused Jorns of having perverted the course of justice in his inquiries into the murders of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, and assisting in the escape of Vogel. Jorns sued the editor of Das Tagebuch, Josef Bornstein, for defamation, but lost;86 the case was reinstated on appeal.
Georg Löwenthal, Bornstein’s defence lawyer, suspected that he was likely to lose the second trial. He called a fresh witness, Paul Bredereck, president of the National Union of German Officers, who testified that before the Luxemburg–Liebknecht murder trial, he had collected money from the officers’ union to assist in the escape of the accused. Bredereck stated that he had passed on a portion of the money, the rest was to be forwarded to the escapees once abroad. He had often visited the principal defendant, Pflugk-Harttung in prison in company with the latter’s sister. Here Bredereck’s testimony became less sure; he stated that in the end he had given the money to Fräulein von Pflugk-Harttung and an escort. Attorney Löwenthal asked, ‘Who was the escort?’ Bredereck replied, ‘Kapitänleutnant Canaris.’ Löwenthal asked him if Canaris knew for whom the money was intended. Bredereck said yes, but that Jorns, on the other hand, was ignorant of it. Only the anonymous donors, the officers’ union, Canaris and Bredereck had been informed.87
On the witness stand Canaris stated that the money was for the financial support of the Pflugk-Harttung family, which had fallen on hard times, but in a written statement for the Marineleitung he had another explanation, the deadly Communist threat to the accused and their families: ‘Under these circumstances a sum of money had to be held available so that in the case of a Communist takeover of the country, they would have the chance to save themselves from the ruthless terror towards all political opponents which is openly a point of their programme.’ A precaution of this kind in the interest of the personal security of the accused officers was not without precedent, he went on; Minister Erzberger as leader of the Armistice Commission had issued courier passports in assumed names for the same humane reasons.88 This was not very convincing, even when Canaris emphasised that the proceedings had nothing to do with the trial or his being one of the trial judges. After talks with Canaris and the Marineleitung, Bredereck changed his story. Now he remembered that Canaris had not been present when the first amount was paid to the prisoners, but only when the second amount was paid. He added that he had never discussed the purpose of the money with Canaris; he had merely assumed that Canaris knew what it was for.89 At last it was all perfectly clear, and the Reichswehr Ministry supported Canaris; with the approval of Reichswehrminister Noske, Canaris had paid over the money for the Pflugk-Harttung family so that they could leave Berlin.90
On 1 October 1931, Canaris was promoted Kapitän zur See.91 The character assessment of 1 November was unsparing of the accustomed superlatives for this ‘most talented officer’ with ‘pronounced leadership qualities’ who could be ‘warmly recommended for a position of command’.92
PART III
RISE UNDER THE SWASTIKA
11
Hitler’s Military Intelligence Chief
The year 1932, the last year of the Weimar Republic, would be decisive for Germany’s future. Five great electoral campaigns took place, keeping the population saturated with political propaganda, and heightening the political crisis.
The battle for the Reich presidency began in the spring; on 22 February, to the jubilation of thousands of supporters in the Berlin Sportspalast, Joseph Goebbels announced that Hitler was standing as a candidate. Under the motto ‘The Führer over Germany’, Hitler flew from city to city in a chartered aircraft, emulating the American example, addressing a million people from the hustings.1 Before the provincial elections in Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony-Anhalt and the municipal elections in Hamburg, Hitler spoke across the entire Reich. Never had the electorate been exposed to such an electoral organisation. The effort was well rewarded. In Prussia, the NSDAP became the strongest party; in Bavaria it ran almost neck-and-neck with the Bavarian Volkspartei, and in Saxony the NSDAP had their first provincial minister-president. Goebbels recognised that the highpoint of the mobilisation had been reached, now the National Socialists had to seize power before they burnt themselves out electioneering.2
Immediately after the presidential election, Reich Chancellor Brüning and Reichswehrminister Groener, who was also acting as minister for the interior, convinced Hindenburg to order the dissolution of ‘all paramilitary NSDAP organisations’. The 400,000-strong SA had kept up a violent presence in the election campaign, and the counter-reaction had worsened the crisis for the Brüning government. On 28 April, Hitler spoke secretly with Generalmajor Kurt von Schleicher, leader of the Wehrmacht section at the Reichswehr Ministry. Schleicher was opposed to the ban on the SA, which he considered a cadre organisation for an enlarged Reichswehr whose ultimate aim would be a military dictatorship created fro
m the people.3 He may have advised Hitler that Reich Chancellor Brüning no longer had the support of the Reichswehr leaders;4 Schleicher was close to Graf von Helldorf, leader of the Berlin SA and later Berlin police chief.5 On 8 May, Goebbels noted in his diary:
Brüning will probably fall within the next few days . . . the Reichstag will be dissolved, all the prohibitions will be swept away, we will have freedom to agitate and then deliver a masterpiece of propaganda. When the SA marches again in its brown shirts, we will have overthrown the Depression, and the enemy will soon sink to the ground under our blows.6
Hitler had agreed to tolerate a right-wing Cabinet under Reich Chancellor Franz von Papen if he lifted the ban on the SA and guaranteed new elections.7 Schleicher wanted to oust his superior, Reichswehrminister Groener, and in the Reichstag sitting of 10 May, Goering, presumably supplied by Schleicher with confidential information from the Reichswehr Ministry,8 launched a violent barrage against Groener. Feverish and unwell, confronted by the doublepronged attack of Nazis and generals, Groener defended the ban on the SA but made a poor impression. Next day Schleicher, after canvassing support, advised Groener that the Reichswehr was no longer behind him; upon being so informed Groener stepped down and Schleicher became Reichswehrminister.9 On 30 May 1932 Reich Chancellor Brüning resigned,10 succeeded by Fritz von Papen. His ‘Cabinet of barons’ had no parliamentary majority and he was obliged to rule by decree, tolerating the NSDAP.11 Goebbels wrote in his diary: ‘The Reichstag will be dissolved. That is the most important thing of all. Von Papen is seen as Reich Chancellor, but that is now of no interest. Vote! Vote! To the people! We are all very happy.’12
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