Canaris, Beck, Oster and Gisevius fed Brauchitsch, the new Army commander-in-chief, with information about the Gestapo inquiry as they received it, hoping to recruit him to their conspiracy, but he ignored Canaris’s plea to intervene when Fritsch was summoned to Gestapo Headquarters for more questioning, although he did manage to secure the release from custody of Fritsch’s valet and his housekeeper.51
Outwardly, Canaris remained a good National Socialist, and on 3 March at OKW he addressed the heads of the Abwehrstellen and Abwehr officers at Wehrkreis commands.52 As the expansion of Abwehr jurisdiction involved ‘an internal restructuring of the Wehrmacht53 he requested comprehensive reports on all political measures ‘affecting the Wehrmacht and its prestige’, and in cases of dispute with NSDAP heads it was to be made clear that ‘we front-soldiers of the State belong amongst the best, least self-seeking and selfless National Socialists.’54 Regarding the Blomberg and Fritsch affairs he cautioned them:
As to the events leading to the dismissal of the Reich Minister for War and Generaloberst Freiherr von Fritsch, you have been advised by the commanding generals on the basis of a discussion with the Führer. In the first place we have to be content with that. It is very important that you answer in this sense everything you are asked. You must not give anybody anything more, even if you are in a position where you ought to know more.55
Canaris was concerned about the Nazi press, like the Volkischer Beobachter, which spoke of‘the melting process between Wehrmacht and party’,56 and he instructed his officers: ‘Should other statements in the press, in speeches or elsewhere in public, talk of the events of 4 February 1938 in such a manner as if those events represent a victory by the party over the Wehrmacht, or place the Wehrmacht under the guardianship of the party, you must report it immediately.’57
The previous evening, Rittmeister Frisch had admitted under interrogation to having been the true victim of Schmidt the blackmailer. He even produced the receipts for his 2,500 Reichsmarks, signed by Schmidt. Frisch swore an affidavit there and then; after weeks of tireless searching and the struggle with the Gestapo, this was the breakthrough the defence had been seeking. Lawyer von der Goltz then hurried, beaming with joy, to present his client with a bouquet of roses, but Fritsch held back his jubilation until the official verdict. The case began on 10 March, but was adjourned the same day because of the German invasion of Austria.58 Under the weight of the defence evidence, the prosecution case collapsed; the judges, who included the three heads of the Wehrmacht services, Goering, Raeder and von Brauchitsch, acquitted Fritsch on 18 March on the grounds of ‘his proven innocence’.59 Even Goering, who had made it known often enough that he was glad to be rid of Fritsch, assented to the acquittal.60
The blackmailer Schmidt remained in custody. Fristch speculated that Himmler might extract him for use as a witness against Goering, who was involved in the scandal,61 but a few years later the SS executed him instead.62
On 31 March Fritsch received a letter from Hitler confirming the acquittal but containing no expression of regret nor apology. Fritsch wrote to a friend: ‘I can neither forgive the Führer nor forget that he considered my word of honour to be worthless against the testimony of a blackguard.’63
Canaris and others considered that the rectification fell far short of that which honour demanded, and they attempted to do what they could for his rehabilitation. Together with Hitler’s former adjutant Hossbach, who had meanwhile been dismissed, Canaris drew up some proposals for Brauchitsch, which were shown first to Beck,64 in which it was observed: ‘The conclusion of the proceedings is thoroughly unsatisfactory from the point of view of the restoration of the honour of Generaloberst Freiherr von Fritsch, for the prestige of the Army as well as the whole Wehrmacht, and to liberate him from this Cheka nightmare.’ They demanded a ‘special gesture’ by ‘the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht’ (Hitler), the public rehabilitation of Generaloberst von Fritsch ‘in an impressive manner’, preferably through ‘a personal visit by the Führer at the earliest opportunity’ and deemed ‘intolerable’ any ‘further thriving collaboration of the Wehrmacht with those leading personalities of the Gestapo responsible for the defamation of Generaloberst Fritsch and the damaging and demeaning attack on the Army.’65 Neither Brauchitsch nor Beck wished to embrace such a far-reaching demand – no basis existed amongst the generals, nor elsewhere in the Wehrmacht, for a revolt against the Gestapo, the SS or even against Hitler. On the contrary, in Hitler’s policy planning, the Wehrmacht was destined to have a star role.
15
A Double Game
In February 1938 there was growing tension between Germany and Austria. During a house search the Austrian police had found evidence that Austrian Nazis were planning to simulate an assassination attempt on von Papen1 to provide the Wehrmacht with a pretext for invasion.2 The government published the documents and attempted to win over the lawyer and Nazi sympathiser Arthur Seyss-Inquart as an ally, but the latter was a loyal follower of Hitler and reported the details of Schussnigg’s approach to Berlin, adding that he was prepared to come to Germany to help in any inquiry.
On 12 February Schussnigg went to the Obersalzberg hoping to defuse the situation, but he found instead an elaborate theatre laid on for his benefit. When Hitler received the Austrian Chancellor in company with his military adjutants, he was also in the company of Ribbentrop and Keitel, the strongly Nazi General Reichenau, and the former commander of Legion Condor, Sperrle. In his study Hitler unleashed a tirade about Austria’s betrayal of the German people and culminated with the threat:
And I tell you, Herr Schussnigg, I am utterly determined to put an end to it. The German Reich is a world power, and I will not tolerate others suggesting otherwise when I am putting the frontiers in order. Do you honestly think you could hold us up for even half an hour? Do you want to make Austria into another Spain?3
Austria was required to fulfil the German demands by 15 February: the lifting of all restrictions on Nazi activities in Austria, an amnesty for Nazis in custody, the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as minister of the interior, with control of the police, the appointment of Nazi sympathiser Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as minister of war, Austrian foreign and economic policy to fall in line with that of the Reich, dismissal of chief of General Staff Jansa, an opponent of Nazism, and regular consultations between the respective General Staffs.4 If these conditions were not met, Hitler would march in.
When Schussnigg demurred and asked to consult his Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt, this was allowed while the intimidation continued, until the farce succeeded and the Obersalzberg Agreement was signed.5 General Jodl wrote in his diary: ‘Schussnigg with G. Schmidt are put under the heaviest military and political pressure. At 2300 Schussnigg signs the protocol.’
The next day, at Keitel’s flat in Berlin, Canaris, Keitel, Jodl and Goebbels discussed the implementation of military exercises ordered by Hitler for 15 February, the suggestions being agreed by Hitler by telephone the same night.6 Canaris then flew to Abwehrstelle VII at Munich with his adviser for southeast Europe, Erich Pruck;7 Jodl wrote: ‘In Austria the impression is developing of serious military preparations in Germany.’8 The measures planned by Canaris and Keitel involved the dissemination of false, but credible reports – VII Armeekorps had cancelled all leave; in Munich, Augsburg and Regensburg wagons and railway coaches were to be prepared for the transport of troops and supplies; all frontier police posts had received reinforcements; mountain troops had announced exercises and the German military attaché in Vienna had been recalled to Berlin for talks. The Canaris–Keitel proposals made it expressly clear that ‘no actual preparations were to be made by Army or Luftwaffe’, nor were there to be any ‘troop movements or advances towards the frontier’,9 but opinion was divided about whether all this actually deceived anybody, and Austrian intelligence officer Erwin Lahousen declared to Keitel and Jodl when in Abwehr service later, ‘We were not deceived by this bluff.’10
Canaris was active on many fronts
at this time. The Fritsch affair was still smouldering and he was involved in talks about Wehrmacht restructuring with Jodl and General Viebahn.11 On 15 February the Austrian problem seemed resolved when Schussnigg met all Hitler’s demands, while the new Austrian Security Minister Seyss-Inquart was already in Berlin, ready for orders. He was convinced that annexation could proceed only on the further threat of force.12
On 9 March Schussnigg announced a referendum on the question of Austrian independence,13 a hopeless attempt to recover what he had signed away at Berchtesgaden and a clear rejection of unification with Germany. He had not consulted beyond his own borders and did not expect support from Italy, or France, where the government had just been dissolved, nor from Britain, which had signalled that it would not oppose annexation. The transparent attempt to disenfranchise the supporters of a Greater German Reich and the Nazis by raising the voting age to twenty-four played into Hitler’s hands,14 and that same evening, probably at the instigation of Goering, he decided to invade.15
Next morning Keitel and Jodl arrived at the Reich Chancellery with ‘Fall Otto’, some old theoretical plans for an invasion of Austria.16 Chief of Staff Beck was desperate: ‘We had absolutely nothing prepared, nothing had been done, nothing.’17 He had been told by Blomberg to draw up plans for ‘Sonderfall Otto’ in 1937, but the General Staff had not wanted to take on the task then,18 and now found itself having to improvise something within a few hours. Hitler wanted to enter his former homeland on Saturday, the day before the planned referendum; already it was Wednesday, and so the plans were needed by the same evening.19
On Thursday 11 March 1938 Canaris informed his Abwehrstelle leaders that the Führer had decided to resolve the Austrian question by force if necessary. Hauptmann Paul Leverkühn, later Abwehr chief in Instanbul disguised as a consul and head of the war organisation Naher Osten, recalled: ‘The seriousness of the situation and the Admiral’s deep concern were unmistakable for everybody at the discussion.’20
That morning Hitler gave Schussnigg an ultimatum demanding the postponement of the plebiscite for two weeks, Schussnigg’s resignation and the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as federal chancellor. In the afternoon Schussnigg deferred the plebiscite but refused to step down; Goering gave him a second ultimatum. That evening, after receiving a telegram from London in which the new Foreign Minister Lord Halifax made it clear that he could not count on British support, Schussnigg resigned, but Austrian President Wilhelm Miklas refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart chancellor and a third German ultimatum followed. During the night Hitler received Mussolini’s assurance that he would accept the intervention. Since Hitler had already ordered his troops to march, the invasion proceeded even when Miklas gave in towards midnight and made Seyss-Inquart chancellor. Goering had convinced Hitler some time previously that he had to act.21
When Canaris received the report in the early hours that Heydrich and Schellenberg were on their way to Vienna, he flew at once to the Austrian capital. While the other two proceeded to the Interior Ministry, Canaris went with Oberst Graf von Marogna-Redwitz, the new head of Austrian intelligence, to the Defence Ministry where Generalmajors Ronge and Lahousen had spent the night sorting and burning papers. Canaris retrieved a number of important files including personal dossiers on Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich and Goering. Schellenberg came a few hours later as Heydrich’s envoy, but Ronge and Lahousen both declined his invitation to join the SS.22
Canaris spent the night of 13 March on the campbed in his study while Pruck waited in an ante-room for reports from Abwehr spies outside Germany;23 the messages gave no grounds for concern. The Foreign Office had been informed that evening that France would not act ‘unless Czechoslovakia was attacked’24 and British ambassador Henderson wrote to Goering on 13 March that he had passed to the British Government Goering’s assurance that the troops would be withdrawn from Austria as soon as the situation was stable, after which there would be free elections.25 The German business attaché in Rome reported that the Italian press had fallen into line: ‘Invasion by German troops and visit by the Führer are being reported cordially in all details.’26
On 14 March 1938, Hitler arrived in Vienna to a jubilant reception; the archbishop had the bells rung and swastika flags adorned the church towers and the next day Hitler addressed ‘an almost deliriously happy crowd’27 from the Heldenplatz. Some weeks before the invasion, Best and Canaris in close cooperation had arranged for mobile police units to follow the troops into Austria in order to implement ‘police security measures’. The Abwehr, SD, Sipo and NSDAP had been gathering information on political opponents for some time previously and now the joint Gestapo–SD Detective Force struck; the operations were ‘sharp, brutal and accompanied by excesses and atrocities kept out of sight’.28 Six months later in the Sudetenland these units were called Einsatzgruppen for the first time and behaved in such a manner that Heydrich had to order them to moderate their activity.
On 14 March in Vienna Canaris accepted Generalmajor Marogna-Redwitz’s suggestion that Lahousen might be useful at Berlin headquarters.29 In the presence of Major Helmuth Groscurth, head of sabotage sub-group and later, as head of the Abwehr Overseas Office to OKH, one of the most important liaison men to the early military Resistance,30 Canaris said to Lahousen: ‘Don’t bring any Nazis with you, especially not to Berlin headquarters. Bring Austrians, not Ostmärker’.31 Lahousen recalled that the annexation of Austria ‘was one of the few foreign policy actions of which Canaris did not disapprove . . . the Admiral was opposed only – and here vehemently – to the manner, namely the invasion, which brought about the fusion of the two states’.32 Hitler called for elections on 10 April and received a 99 per cent approval rating for the annexation from the electorates in the Old Reich and Austria, voting for ‘The List of Our Führer Adolf Hitler’.
Canaris, promoted to Vizeadmiral on 1 April, addressed the 1938 new entry to the Wiener Neustadt War Academy:33 ‘We are all now standing under the heart-lifting experience of the development of Greater Germany. It was dreamed of, worked for, fought for and found its fulfilment in the plebiscite of the 10 April in the slogan “Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer!” For us soldiers this slogan extends further to “Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer, Eine Wehrmacht!”’34 Canaris informed his listeners that this new Wehrmacht must be: ‘a model for the realisation of the National Socialist world-view’, for the ‘realisation of the unadulterated idea of the Führer’ and the ‘great training school for the young men of the State’, incorporating ‘the Volk-community in exemplary form’.35 The officer corps had to lead, ‘that is the only way to preserve its position as destined by the Führer and achieved by virtue of its earlier efforts’. He went on: ‘Just as the officer before the World War was obviously monarchist, just as he obviously laboured after that war to keep alive the legacy of his experience at the front, so obviously he desires today, when all our front experience finds its realisation in the National Socialist State, to be a National Socialist.’ A nonpolitical attitude on the part of the soldier in the National Socialist State was ‘sabotage and a crime’.36 Canaris thus appeared before the Austrian cadets as a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi who had mastered perfectly the partially impenetrable political rhetoric of the regime.
At the end of June 1938 the Abwehr counter-espionage section led by Rudolf Bamler issued his ‘Circular on Espionage, Counter-Espionage and Internal Treason’. The latter was defined as ‘the murder of comrades’; this offence could be committed premeditatively by act, or negligently by speech. ‘Whoever dares to raise his hands against the Fatherland, he is Death’s.’37 By mid-1938, more and more officers in Canaris’s Abwehr were ready to commit this ‘treason’.
The central figure was Hans Oster. He had experience of intelligence work from service as Ic (No 3 Staff officer, Counter-Espionage) at Münster in the 1920s, spying in the demilitarised Rhineland;38 Canaris knew him from his naval detachment in 1931.39 As an artillery major in 1932, Oster had been forced to resign after an affair with a married woma
n,40 but following a brief period in Goering’s ‘Research Bureau’ in 1933 he entered the Abwehr in a civilian capacity under Patzig on 1 October 1933, his passage having been smoothed by General Halder, Hossbach and Canaris.41 Once Canaris took over the Abwehr, Oster was reactivated as a serving officer in the rank of Oberstleutnant at the end of 1935.42 He had been sceptical at the rise of National Socialism and was soon disillusioned by Nazi terror methods.43 In 1938 Canaris appointed him Head of Abwehr Headquarters, responsible for administration and organisation. In wartime, he would become Abwehr chief of Staff.44
Canaris knew Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz from the GKSD. He was a former member of Brigade Ehrhardt, Org-C and the Wiking-Bund.45 He had become a journalist and author whose books were on the Proscribed Index and was considered politically unreliable, with adverse dossiers on him held at the Army Personnel Office. Contrary to expectations, however, he passed a Gestapo tribunal to obtain entry to the Abwehr, and passed his probationary period with the help of a false assessment from Canaris.46 Heinz began at Referat III C3, becoming its head in May 1937;47 his immediate superior was Hans Oster.
Lawyer Franz-Maria Liedig, a former naval officer, had been Ehrhardt’s ordnance officer and had been known to Canaris since 1919 when he acted as liaison between Canaris and Ehrhardt. Liedig was employed at Referat I M (Naval Reconnaissance) and was introduced by Canaris and Heinz to Oster.
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