by Ying-shih Yü
sive Legalist politics of the (Cao) Wei
dynasty. For many members of the
elite, survival demanded a turn away from their Confucian commitments to so-
cial and po liti cal order; refuge was found in the metaphysical speculation of Laozi
and Zhuangzi, which had no immediate bearing on the worldly aff airs of their
time. As a result, the po liti cal discourse of “Pure Criticism” ( qingyi
) in the
second century gave way to the philosophical discourse of “Pure Conversation”
( qingtan
) in the third. The intellectual transition from Confucian classical
scholarship to Neo- Daoist metaphysics was thereby realized.48
While much of this well- established view is indeed accurate, it nevertheless
fails to take suffi
cient account of the positive contributions of the Han- Wei in-
tellectuals to the rise and growth of the movement. It is not entirely true that
the intellectuals of the period were coerced into Neo- Daoism by po liti cal cir-
cumstances; many actually chose to develop this new mode of discourse as a
natu ral outgrowth of their recent self- discovery as individuals. This contention
is supported not only by the fact that “conversation” evolved as a way of life for
the Han- Wei intellectuals but also by the central philosophic issues that were
to be crystallized later in Neo- Daoism (see below).
To begin with, it may be pointed out that the historical relationship between
Pure Criticism and Pure Conversation in the traditional view appears to have
been somewhat misrepresented. Like the verse and the letter, conversation
acquired new importance in the middle of the second century as a medium
through which ideas were exchanged between intellectuals. It was not the case,
as has often been assumed, that conversation at this time focused only on po-
liti cal and characterological criticisms and then, as a result of the persecution
of its prac ti tion ers, shifted to philosophical discussion in the third century. On
the contrary, the evidence clearly indicates that both ele ments were already
pres ent in late Han conversations. As Wang Fu
(90?–165?) complained,
“Scholars nowadays like to talk about matters concerning vacuity and nonbeing
( xuwu
).” 49 Hence, by the middle of the second century at the latest, it had
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 145
already become an established practice for intellectuals to discuss Daoist philo-
sophical topics in their daily conversations. In 159 c.e., Zhou Xie
, who had
from youth admired Laozi’s teachings of “mystery and vacuity” ( xuanxu
),
earned a great reputation for his generous hospitality. He always invited friends
to his home and enjoyed conversations and other entertainments with them.50
This early case clearly shows how re orientation in thought (i.e., the shift from
Confucian learning to Daoist philosophy) and conversation as an art had com-
bined to form an impor tant part of the elite’s new lifestyle.
The phenomenal growth of the student body in the Imperial Acad emy
(Taixue
) in the middle of the second century also contributed to the rise of
this new mode of intellectual discourse. After 146 c.e., as the Hou Hanshu
(History of the Later Han Dynasty) succinctly summarizes it: “Students in the
Acad emy steadily increased to over thirty thousand. However, they gradually
turned away from textual analy sis ( zhangju
, lit., ‘sentences’) of the Classics
and came to venerate what was frivolous and ornate ( fouhua
); the Confu-
cian mode of learning was thus on the wane.”51 It is prob ably inappropriate to
identify the “frivolous and ornate” type of intellectual pursuit with “pure con-
versation,” which was to be referred to pejoratively as “frivolous and vacuous”
( fouxu
) in the third century. Nevertheless, there are sure indications that it
may well have been a prototype of the latter. For instance, when Fu Rong
came to study at the Imperial Acad emy in 168, his intellectual brilliance im-
mediately drew the attention of Li Ying
, a leader among the offi
cials. Each
time Fu Rong came to call, Li Ying listened to his talk with such intense inter-
est that he sent other guests away in order to avoid distractions. The conversa-
tion between Li and Fu always ended with the former holding the latter’s hands
and sighing with admiration. It is particularly signifi cant that Fu Rong’s style
of conversation is vividly depicted as follows: “Wearing a kerchief and swing-
ing his sleeves, his words gushed forth like clouds.”52 As is immediately ap-
parent, this is a typical description of Pure Conversation as we encounter it in
later lit er a ture, except that from the late third century on, the “fl y whisk” or
“sambar- tail chowry” ( zhuwei
) was to replace the “sleeves” as an insepa-
rable accoutrement of the conversationalist.53 Fu Rong’s conversation was ex-
tremely infl uential in the Imperial Acad emy. His dormitory room was always
swarming with visitors. Very much annoyed, a neighbor once chided him thus:
“Is it the intention of the Son of Heaven to found this Imperial Acad emy just
for people to engage in conversations?”54 It is diffi
cult to imagine that all these
spirited conversations were devoted exclusively to discussions on politics and
personalities ( qingyi
) and had nothing to do with the fermentation of new
thought ( qingtan
) that was under way at the time.
In fact, philosophic reasoning was part and parcel of late Han conversation.
The case of a young poet named Li Yan
(150–177) may be taken as an il-
lustration. He is described as a person who was, among other things, sharp in
language and skilled in enunciating princi ples ( li
).55 Here the association of
146 indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t
speech with enunciation of princi ples is particularly noteworthy. As far as we
know, this small but solid piece of evidence provides the earliest historical link
between the art of conversation and the emergence of a new mode of thinking
in late Han times. It antedates by a century the kind of analy sis of “names and
princi ples” ( mingli
) that was central to the Wei- Jin pure conversation.56
Historically, the relationship between the art of speech and philosophic rea-
soning was a symbiotic one; both owed their development to the practice of late
Han characterology. According to Liu Shao, two impor tant ways of evaluating
the native intelligence of an individual are to “observe his speech” and “exam-
ine his argument.” “Speech” reveals the quality of a man’s training in language
and “argument” that of his reasoning power.57 Moreover, Liu Shao also relates
both speech and reasoning to analy sis of “princi ples” ( li) . He distinguishes four
categories of “princi ples”: cosmological princi ples ( daoli
), princi ples
of social institutions ( shili
), moral princi
ples ( yili
), and princi ples of
human feelings ( qingli
). In his view, the main obstacle to a reasonable settle-
ment in intellectual discussions often arises from the confusion of categories
of princi ples on the part of the discussants. Once this obstacle is removed, how-
ever, it is pos si ble to determine which side is truly convincing on the linguistic
level ( cisheng
) as well as on the philosophical level ( lisheng
).58
Since Liu Shao’s work is generally thought of as a synthesis of the character-
ological princi ples that evolved from the middle of the second century, the in-
fl uence of Liu’s discussions in the Treatise on Personalities on the origins of the
Pure Conversation movement must be taken seriously. They show clearly how
late Han conversation had in practice been pushed, step by step, into the realm
of thought by its own inner logic. It is impor tant to point out that Wei- Jin Pure
Conversationalists basically discussed philosophical topics in terms of Liu
Shao’s categories of “princi ples.” Moreover, the two terms cisheng (lit., “superior
in linguistic skill”) and lisheng (lit., “superior in philosophical reasoning”) are
also highly illuminating. They indicate unmistakably that a major technical
feature of later Pure Conversation had already been developed in late Han intel-
lectual discussions, namely, a “reasonable settlement” had to be reached in a
conversation so as to decide which of the participants was “superior” in lan-
guage and reasoning. Actually, from the fourth century on, Pure Conversation
became a standard intellectual game (like weiqi
, Chinese chess) played by
two or more participants. More often than not, someone would in the end
emerge triumphant— either linguistically or logically or both. The transition
from Confucian classical learning to Daoist metaphysics may well have been
precipitated by po liti cal events, but a purely po liti cal interpretation of an intel-
lectual movement of this magnitude can hardly stand up to close scrutiny.
By the last two de cades of the second century, it was becoming quite clear
that Han conversationalists were already intensely absorbed in philosophical
discussions. The sudden surge of interest in Wang Chong’s Lunheng
(Bal-
anced Inquiries) attests to this profound change of intellectual atmosphere.
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 147
Balanced Inquiries owed its great popularity during this period primarily to the
eff orts of two leading scholars. The fi rst one is Cai Yong
(132–192), who
discovered the work sometime between 179 and 189 while residing in Guiji (in
modern Zhejiang), the hometown of Wang Chong. Cai so cherished the work
that he always kept it to himself as an “aid to conversation” ( tanzhu
). The
second one is Wang Lang
(d. 228), who obtained a copy of Balanced Inqui-
ries when he was serving as prefect of Guiji from 193 to 196. After his return to
the north, as the story goes, his marked improvement in intellectual powers
took all his old friends by surprise. When they pressed him for an explanation,
he confessed that he had been greatly benefi ted by Balanced Inquiries.59
The accuracy of these perhaps somewhat dramatized accounts is corrobo-
rated by other evidence. Earlier in this study, we quoted a startling statement by
Kong Rong questioning the Confucian idea of fi lial piety— a statement based
entirely on Wang Chong’s argument. In view of the intimate friendship be-
tween Kong Rong and Cai Yong, it is almost certain that the former must have
owed his discovery of Balanced Inquiries to the latter.60 Wang Lang’s discovery
of the same work also contributed indirectly to the rise of Pure Conversation of
Wang Bi and He Yan
. Wang Lang’s son Wang Su
(d. 256), a leading
classical scholar of the period, played a crucial role in turning the study of the
Yijing
(Classic of Changes) in a new direction. He brought a newly devel-
oped cosmological framework to bear on the interpretation of that unique
Confucian classic (which was destined to form, along with the Laozi and the
Zhuangzi, the “three metaphysical works” [ sanxuan
] of the Wei- Jin era).
Wang Su’s interpretation was largely followed by Wang Bi in the latter’s com-
mentary to the Classic of Changes.61 Thus, it is clear that Wang Chong’s merci-
less dissection of Confucian values, his pointed rejection of the teleological
view of the cosmos, and above all, his emphasis on the Daoist idea of “natural-
ness” ( ziran
) were already dominant themes of late Han intellectual dis-
course. Through conversationalists such as Cai Yong, Kong Rong, and Wang
Lang, Balanced Inquiries exerted a shaping infl uence on the philosophical de-
velopment of Pure Conversation. The simple fact that Cai Yong used Balanced
Inquiries as an “aid to conversation” proves that conversations among intellectu-
als had assumed a philosophic tone even before the end of the second century.62
This active and enduring interest in the exploration of the world of ideas
suggests that there was indeed something profound in the consciousness of the
conversationalists that sustained it. From the point of view of this study, I am
inclined to think that this striking historical phenomenon can be most sensibly
explained in terms of the rising individualism of the period. Through the pro-
cess of self- discovery, the spiritually liberated individual embarked on a search
for a new world order in which he might feel completely at home. As clearly
shown in Liu Shao’s four categories of “princi ples” listed above, the individual
was seeking to redefi ne the relationship of the ego to the cosmos, to the state, to
the moral order, and to other individuals. Enunciation of the “princi ples” ( li) of
148 indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t
these categories, as we shall see, fi gured centrally in the philosophic discourse
throughout the period. This was the case because the liberated individual re-
fused to settle for anything less than a total understanding of these relation-
ships. Obviously, such princi ples could nowhere be found in Confucian classical
scholarship as it was received in the second and third centuries; it had by then
degenerated into meaningless fragments of textual analy sis. On the other hand,
Daoism, with its ontological concept of “nonbeing” ( wu
), its cosmological
views of “nonaction” ( wuwei
) and “naturalness” (or “spontaneity,” ziran
),
its po liti cal and social ideal of “nongoverning” ( wuzhi
), and, most impor-
tant, its general emphasis on the freedom of the individual, provided the Wei-
Jin individualist with precisely the right kind of spiritual resources. This point
will become clear as we identify the central issues in neo- Daoist philosophy.
I N D I V I D U A L I S M I N P U R E C O N V E R S AT I O N
Needless to say, this is not the place to discuss Neo- Daoism in all its diversity
and complexity. What follows will simply try to show, through a brief analy sis
of three pairs of key concepts in Pure Conversation, that there was a close connec-
tion between the discovery of the individual on the one hand and the Neo- Daoist
mode of thinking on the other. These three pairs are, respectively, “nonbeing”
( wu) and “being” ( you ), “naturalness” or “spontaneity” ( ziran) and the “teach-
ing of names” ( mingjiao
), and “feelings” ( qing) and “rituals” ( li). I under-
stand all three pairs as having primarily to do with the prob lem of the individ-
ual vis- à- vis order, but at diff er ent levels. Structurally, all three pairs share a
similar internal relationship. Just as the origin of being is based on nonbeing,
that of the “teaching of names” is based on “naturalness” and that of “rituals” on
“feelings.” In other words, in the Neo- Daoist view, nonbeing, naturalness, and
feelings are taken to be ultimate and primary, whereas being, the “teaching of
names,” and rituals are derivative and secondary. In terms of schools of thought,
the fi rst triad has traditionally been identifi ed with Neo- Daoism and the second
with Confucianism. In the pres ent context, however, it may be more fruitful to
associate nonbeing, naturalness, and feelings with the prob lem of the individual,
and being, the “teaching names,” and rituals with that of order. I am fully aware
that in historical inquiry such neat dichotomies can be made only at the risk of
oversimplifi cation. Nevertheless, in this case, the risk is a calculated one.
Let us fi rst look at the Neo- Daoist cosmology. According to the Jinshu (His-
tory of the Jin Dynasty):
During the zhengshi reign (240–248) of the Wei dynasty, He Yan, Wang
Bi, and others followed the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi. They estab-
lished the theory that Heaven, Earth, and all the myriad things have the
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 149
basis of their existence in nonbeing. That which is called nonbeing is the
beginning of things and the completion of aff airs: it exists everywhere. It
is by virtue of nonbeing that the yin and the yang transform into life, all
the myriad things take their forms, the worthy establishes his moral
worth, and the unworthy (i.e., the common man) keeps his person from
being injured.63