by Ying-shih Yü
44b.
155. See Sakai Tadao
, Chūgoku no zensho no kenkyū
(Tokyo:
Kōbundō, 1960), 282.
156. See Cynthia J. Brokaw, The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit, Social Change and Moral Order
in Late Imperial China (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 1991), 212–215.
157. Zhang
Xiumin,
Zhongguo yinshua shi, 466–470; 605–608.
158. MCHS, 216.
159. Ye Sheng
, Shuidong riji
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 213–214.
160. Gu Xiancheng, Jinggao canggao
, SKQS, juan 21: 117.
161. Gu Yanwu
, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 15.
162. Gu Yanwu, Yuan chaoben Rizhi lu
, punctuated by Xu Wenshan
(Taipei: Minglun, 1970), 68.
163. Li Weizhen, Taibi shanfang ji, 105:28a. At the end of the epitaph, Li Weizhen describes
Yu Xian as a sufeng
, or “untitled nobility,” a term Sima Qian coined specifi cally for
rich merchants. See SJ, vol. 10, juan 129: 3272.
272 busine s s c ul t ur e a nd c h ine s e t r adi t ions
164. Kongtong ji, juan 46: 420. Zhang Siwei
(1526–1585), a Shanxi scholar- offi
cial
from a salt merchant family, expressed a view almost identical to that of Wang Xian. See
Ono Kazuko, Minki tōsha ko, 77–78.
165. Yuanluo ji, juan 7: 447.
166. Jinggao canggao, juan 17: 196.
167. Xiaoxinzhai zhaji, juan 2: 44.
168. Li Hua
, comp., Ming- Qing yilai Beijing gongshang hui beike
(Beijing: Wenwu, 1980), 16.
169. Fu Yiling
, Mingdai Jiangnan shimin jingji shitan
(Shang-
hai: Renmin, 1957), 107–108; Lien- sheng Yang, “Economic Justifi cation for Spending: An
Uncommon Idea in Traditional China,” in his Studies in Chinese Institutional History,
58–74. An En glish translation of Lu Ji’s essay may be found on 72–74. This article was
originally published in HJAS, vol. 20, 1957.
170. Christopher J. Berry, The Idea of Luxury: A Conceptual and Historical Investigation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 130–131.
171. See Lu Shen, Yanshan ji
, SKQS, vol. 2, juan 81: 516–517; 520–521, juan 82:
523–527.
172. For examples, see ibid., 97, 631; juan 99: 640; 642.
173. See Fashihshan, Taolu zalu
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 161. I have not been
able to locate Li Yuheng’s Tuipeng wuyu
. For Li Yuheng, see SKQS zongmu
tiyao
, WYWK, vol. 24, p. 58, where Tuipeng wuyu is mentioned.
174. Gu Gongxie, Xiaoxia xianji zhaichao
, Hanfenlou miji
, 2nd ser.,
juan shang, 27.
175. Ibid., 44.
176. Chongxiu Yangzhou fu zhi
(Yangzhou, 1810), juan 3: 2b. See also Wang
Zhenzhong
, Ming- Qing Huishang yu Huaiyang shehui bianqian
(Beijing: Sanlian, 1996), 137.
177. For a discussion of this prob lem, see Yü Ying- shih, Xiandai Ruxue lun
(River Edge, N.J.: Global Publishing, 1996), 1–59.
12. Re orientation of Confucian Social Thought
in the Age of Wang Yangming
Wang Yangming (1472–1529) was the center of attention in the Chinese
intellectual world from the sixteenth century to the early de cades of the
eigh teenth before the rise of Qing philology. During this long period of two and
a half centuries, Confucian scholars either argued against him or with him, but
rarely without him. I therefore propose to call this period the age of Wang
Yangming.
My topic today, however, does not deal primarily with Wang Yangming and his
philosophical views, which have been amply and thoroughly examined by other
scholars. The task that I set for myself is of a diff er ent kind. In recent years, I have
been engaging in a more comprehensive study of Ming- Qing social and intellec-
tual history, with par tic u lar emphasis on the interplay between social changes on
the one hand and the emergence of new ideas on the other. As a result, I am more
certain than before that in the realm of social and po liti cal thought, Confucian-
ism took a decidedly new turn in the sixteenth century, and this new trend con-
tinued well into the eigh teenth century.1
To begin with, I wish to point out that there was a subtle shift of interest
and attention from the imperial state to society among the creative minority of
the Confucian elite. They seem to have come to the realization that the tradi-
tional Confucian proj ect known as “bringing Dao to the world with the sup-
port of the throne” ( dejun xingdao
) was but an illusion.2 As Confu-
cians, however, they did not retract their fundamental commitment to the
274 r e or i e n tat ion of c on f uc i a n so c i a l t hou gh t
ideal of “the amelioration of human aff airs”—to borrow the apt phrase of J. S.
Mill. Thus, they had no sooner turned their eyes away from the imperial court
than they began to explore the new possibilities of opening up and expanding
social and cultural spaces. Some founded private academies, some tried to con-
vey their messages directly to the masses through public preaching or even
quasi- religious activities, others devoted their lives to the rebuilding of local
communities (including the well- known xiangyue
, or “community com-
pact”), and still others threw themselves into the business world. In short, they
steered Confucianism into a new course, which led to what I interpret as a pro-
found re orientation of Chinese social thinking.
To obtain a holistic understanding of the cultural and intellectual changes
in the age of Wang Yangming, I propose to examine the new turn of Confucian
thinking in its historical context. In what follows I shall therefore deal with
four distinct but closely interrelated aspects of the whole pro cess of transforma-
tion, namely, Ming despotism, Wang Yangming’s revision of the Confucian
proj ect, the rise of merchants, and re orientation of Confucian social thought.
T H E S H I V I S - À - V I S M I N G D E S P O T I S M
I N C O N T R A S T T O S O N G P O L I T I C A L C U LT U R E
The Ming imperial system has often been described as “autocratic” or “des-
potic” in the sense that the emperor exercised his ultimate and absolute power
in a cruel and repressive way, about which a great deal has been written.3 In the
pres ent context, however, I shall examine Ming despotism with special refer-
ence to how it stood in relation to the educated elite— shi
(scholar)—of the
Ming times as a whole. More specifi cally, I wish to gauge the plight of shi in the
po liti cal world vis- à- vis the absolute authority of the throne.4
The best way to begin such a discussion is to contrast the po liti cal culture of
the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) to that of the Song dynasty (960–1279) under
which the shi as the cultural elite was able, to the best of my knowledge, to form
a nearly equal partnership with the emperor in governing the empire for, argu-
ably, the fi rst and only time. This partnership is
nowhere more clearly shown
than in the relationship between Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085) and Prime
Minister Wang Anshi
(1021–1086) during the reform period when both
men were making joint eff orts to carry out the New Policies ( xinfa
).
As generally known, it was Wang Anshi who took the initiative to propose
and formulate the bold reform program, whereas Emperor Shenzong, having
enthusiastically embraced it, not only put his full authority into its implementa-
tion but often yielded to his prime minister whenever serious diff erences of
opinion occurred between them. The re spect so generously shown by Emperor
Shenzong to Wang Anshi was not purely personal as traditionally held. As a
matter of fact, the Song imperial re spect for the shi as the cultural elite was
r e or i e n tat ion of c on f uc i a n so c i a l t hou gh t 275
symbolically expressed in the person of Wang Anshi. There can be no question
that during the early stage of the reform movement, Wang was generally ac-
knowledged as the leader of shi. Even prominent conservative scholars who later
turned against him, such as Cheng Hao
(1032–1085), Su Che
(1039–1112),
and Liu Yi
(1017–1086) all participated in the work of the Finance Com-
mission (Sansi Tiaoli Si
), the headquarters of the reform movement,
in 1069.
It is by no means an exaggeration to say that by the middle of the eleventh
century, there was a general consensus among Confucian scholars that the time
for a thoroughgoing po liti cal reform had arrived. Shenzong as a sensitive young
emperor responded to the needs of the time more positively than his pre de ces-
sors. It was under such circumstances that he readily accepted the reform pro-
posals from Wang Anshi. With Shenzong and Wang being thus allied to
the idea of reform, a new form of po liti cal partnership between the shi and the
throne emerged that was identifi ed by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi
(1033–
1107) as the classical example of what Mencius once called “bringing Dao to the
world with the support of the throne” ( dejun xingdao).
At this juncture, a word about the nature of the Song dynasty is necessary.
This sustained belief in dejun xingdao as a real possibility among Song Confu-
cians grew and developed in the course of the steady civilianization of imperial
governance that began with the founding of the dynasty. In the late Tang and
during the Five Dynasties (907–960), the empire in the north as a whole was
under the domination of the military, which extended from the imperial court
to local governments of all levels. Ironically, even the administration of the civil
ser vice examinations had been shifted from the Board of Rites to the Board of
War. As a result, the legitimacy as well as the authority of the central court
throughout the entire period depended mainly on the allegiance and support of
the military, especially the regional commanders.
The founding emperor, Zhao Kuangyin (r. 960–976), who had also been
placed on the throne by the armed forces under his command, was neverthe-
less determined to get rid of the military threat hanging over his new dynasty
once and for all. Thus, he made it a cornerstone of the Song Empire to entrust,
almost exclusively, its administration to the shi scholars chosen through civil
examinations.
By the early de cades of the eleventh century, there was a general awakening
on the part of shi that it was they who must assume the responsibilities of put-
ting the empire in good order, as explic itly expressed by Fan Zhongyan
(989–1052). It is particularly worth noting that out of this new awareness, the
very idea of partnership between the emperor on the one hand and the shi on
the other was crystallized later during the reform period. Two examples will
suffi
ce to illustrate our point.
First, trying to persuade the conservative Sima Guang (1019–1086) to agree
to his reform program, Emperor Shenzong appealed to the ancient concept of
276 r e or i e n tat ion of c on f uc i a n so c i a l t hou gh t
guoshi (
literally, “What is right for the state”). He pointed out that the re-
form as guoshi, a policy decision of the highest order as well as a matter of the
utmost importance to the destiny of the empire, was not unilaterally imposed
by him in his capacity as emperor. On the contrary, it was a joint decision made
through deliberations between him and ranking shi- offi
cials in the imperial
court. Clearly, this reference to guoshi as a joint decision implies partnership.
Second, toward the end of a heated argument in 1071, Wen Yanbo (1006–1097),
another conservative leader, emphatically stressed the following point to Em-
peror Shenzong: “Giving the world a good order is the shared responsibility be-
tween Your Majesty and the shi- offi
cials!” The emperor acquiesced to this sharp
remark. Here we see the same idea of partnership expressed in a diff er ent way.
Fi nally, a classical formulation of the idea by Cheng Yi is worth quoting: “The
way to be an emperor is basically to select and appoint the worthy and the tal-
ented to the government. Once they are found, he must then share with them the
responsibilities of bringing order to the world.” This formulation sums up all the
basic Song Confucian views with regard to the relationship between the emperor
and the shi to which practically all scholars of diff er ent philosophical persua-
sions subscribed. It was this po liti cal culture that provided the fertile soil in
which the dejun xingdao proj ect could grow and fl ourish.5
By contrast, the Ming po liti cal culture is of an entirely diff er ent nature. Ming
Taizu (r. 1368–1398), the founding emperor, came from a peasant family with
little or no education during childhood. He rose to power from the rank and fi le
of a millenarian rebel group known as Mingjiao
(Teachings of Light), a
popu lar religious sect consisting of mixed beliefs taken from Buddhism and
Manichaeism, whose followers were recruited mainly from among the unedu-
cated masses.6 In short, he did not have much contact with the shi circles until a
few years before the founding of his dynasty in 1368. Guided by a keen po liti cal
sense, however, he did indeed make serious eff orts to cultivate the friendship of
leading scholars in the south. Some of them, notably, Liu Ji
(1311–1375) and
Song Lian
(1310–1381), served as his se nior advisers. For he was fully aware
that, unlike a conquest dynasty based mainly on military power, an indigenous
dynasty must of necessity seek and obtain the cooperation of Chinese shi for
eff ective imperial rule.
Nevertheless, the peasant- turned- emperor’s alliance with shi proved to be an
extremely uneasy one from the beginning. Generally speaking, he was highly
suspicious of shi and found remonstrative Confucians in the imperial court
particularly intolerable. His suspicion of shi- offi
cials in the central government
as potential or actual usurpers of his imp
erial power grew with time and cul-
minated in the bloody purges of 1380 in which the prime minister Hu Weiyong
(?–1380) and thousands of his alleged followers were executed in the
name of “treason.”7 As a consequence, the emperor fi nally deci ded to do away
with the traditional offi
ce of prime minister ( zaixiang
), an institution that
had begun with the unifi cation of the Qin in 221 b.c.e., if not earlier.
r e or i e n tat ion of c on f uc i a n so c i a l t hou gh t 277
Under the Song dynasty, Confucians such as Cheng Yi viewed zaixiang as
the institutionalized leader of offi
cialdom who, therefore, ought to be responsi-
ble for keeping the empire in good order. Ming Taizu, however, rejected this Con-
fucian notion outright, and moreover, from his Legalist point of view, the institu-
tion was a great mistake from the very beginning because it had ever since
seriously trespassed the absolute power of the throne. That he was a wholehearted
advocate for Legalism is now a well- established historical fact. As clearly shown
in many of his writings, especially the “Dagao”
( Great Announcements),
he not only held true to the Legalist princi ple of “the superiority of the sovereign
vis- à- vis the servility of the offi
cialdom” but also believed, with Han Fei, the
third- century b.c.e. Legalist thinker, that “reward” and “punishment” are the two
best methods for a ruler to exercise eff ective control over those who serve under
him.8 It was precisely for this reason that he found many passages in the Men-
cius so objectionable that in 1394 he ordered all of them excised from the origi-
nal text.9
Given this basic Legalistic orientation in the background, it is obvious that
Ming Taizu’s espousal of the Cheng- Zhu Confucian orthodoxy was more ap-
parent than real. He needed Confucianism for the legitimization of his newly
founded dynasty, but rejected each and every one of its critical functions as an
infringement on his absolute imperial authority. Similarly, his emphasis on the
importance of shi was also squarely placed on their instrumental value. He
needed shi to run the empire for him at all levels, but only as he willed it. On
the other hand, however, he diff ered decidedly from his counterpart under the
Song dynasty in making policy criticism in the imperial court a decidedly life-