by Ying-shih Yü
the transition eventually ended in classical philology? Neither of these ques-
tions is answerable in terms of an internal approach to intellectual history
alone. As I have said elsewhere: “The external functioning of Dao in terms of
putting the world in order . . . transcended the realm of thought and depended
for its fi nal solution on external factors, which were by defi nition beyond the
control of Confucian thinkers as individuals.”38 I believe the fi rst question is
closely related to what Thomas A. Metzger calls “the prob lem of linkage,” an
impor tant idea worthy of further explorations.39 To comment on the second
question, I merely wish to call attention to the fate of the Yan- Li school in the
early Qing. Unfortunately, with all his emphasis on “practicality” and “utility,”
Yan Yuan’s enthusiasm to reorder the society led him nowhere because he
failed to establish any “linkage” between his inner world of Confucian ideas
and the external world of po liti cal real ity. Ironically, with all his strong feelings
against “the world of paper and ink,” Yan Yuan was not even successful in pre-
venting his leading disciple, Li Gong, from getting involved in philological con-
in t e l le c t ua l t r a nsi t ion in s e v e n t e e n t h - ce n t ury c h ina 371
troversies, for as long as Yan Yuan and Li Gong claimed that their ideas were
derived from Confucius and Mencius, they could never get away from all sorts
of philological prob lems inherent in the Confucian text. External forces apart,
here we see that the Yan- Li school was also pushed by its own logic from the
world of jingshi to the world of kaozheng.
Limited by the nature of my topic, I have not discussed Lynn’s perceptive
study of Wang Shizhen’s theory of poetry, which certainly deserves the close
attention of both literary and intellectual historians. Therefore, a brief note is in
order. Free from modern “organic” bias, Lynn shows cultural sensitivity in his
evaluation of the Chinese poetic tradition as a whole. In his attempt to establish
a link between Chinese poetics and philosophy, his essay adds another dimen-
sion to the unfolding of Neo- Confucianism. He is undoubtedly right in sug-
gesting that “enlightenment” ( wu
) in either philosophy or poetics is essen-
tially the same thing (256). Thirty years ago, Qian Zhongshu
(1910–1998)
also struck a similar note and quoted Gao Panlong and Lu Shiyi to support his
argument in Tanyi lu
(On the art of poetry), a modern classic of literary
criticism apparently not consulted by Lynn.40 In fact, On the Art of Poetry con-
tains extensive discussions on Wang Shizhen’s
theory of poetry and its
antecedents, including Lu Shiyong’s
use of the term shenyun as noted in
Lynn’s essay (p. 264, n. 112).
Fi nally, it is in ter est ing, as Lynn points out, that Yuan Hongdao
(1568–1610) wished to elevate drama and vernacular fi ction to the same exalted
position as Tang poetry (237). In this regard, attention may be called to the fact
that a century later, Liu Jizhuang
(1648–1695) even went further by
comparing drama and fi ction to the Six Classics.41 Such a change in attitude
toward drama and fi ction, it seems to me, must also be understood against the
background of the intellectual transition in seventeenth- century China.
not e s
1.
On Wang’s philosophy of history, see articles by Yao Weiyuan
and Xiao Jiefu 5
in Wang Chuanshan xueshu taolun ji
(Beijing: Zhonghua,
1965), 285–331. [Romanization changed to Pinyin in quotations from Professor de Bary’s
book.— Eds.]
2.
This point was fi rst noted by Zhang Binglin
(Taiyan
) in one of his lectures
on Sinology. See his Guoxue lüeshuo
(Hong Kong: Xianggang huanqiu wen-
hua fuwushe, 1972), 157.
3. Huang
Zongxi
, Mingru xue- an
(hereafter MRXA), WYWK, 2:89.
4.
Tu says that Liang Qichao’s lecture on Yan Yuan in 1923 aroused the interest of Zhang
Binglin (513). This is erroneous. Zhang’s fi rst essay on Yan Yuan entitled “Yanxue”
is included in his Qiushu
, written before the end of the Qing in 1910.
5.
Yan Xizhai xiansheng yanxing lu
, Yan- Li congshu
, hsia, 6a.
372 in t e l le c t ua l t r a nsi t ion in s e v e n t e e n t h - ce n t ury c h ina 6. Ibid., hsia, 8b.
7. Shao Tingcai, “A Letter in Reply to Li Gong” (Da Lixian Li Shugu shu), in Sifu Tang ji
, Shaoxing xianzheng yishu edition (1887–1893)
, 7:1, 10b.
8. See Wm. Theodore de Bary, “A Reappraisal of Neo- Confucianism,” in Studies in Chinese
Thought, ed. Arthur Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 105–106.
9. Pi Xirui
, Jingxue lishi
, annotated by Zhou Yutong
(Hong Kong:
Xianggang huanqiu wenhua fuwushe, 1973), 283–294. See also Edward Ch’ien’s trans-
lation in The Unfolding of Neo- Confucianism, ed. William Theodore de Bary and the
Conference on Seventeenth- Century Chinese Thought (New York and London: Colum-
bia University Press, 1975), 293.
10.
Rong Zhaozu
, Mingdai sixiangshi
(Taipei: Kaiming, [1962] 1966),
291–292.
11. Xie Guozhen
, Ming-
Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao
(Shanghai: Shangwu, 1934), 148.
12. See Shang Yanliu
, Qingdai keju kaoshi shulue
(Beijing: Sanlian,
1958), 238–241.
13. Quoted in Xie Guozhen, Ming- Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, 159.
14. In early Qing, Lü Liuliang
(1629–1683) also made a creative use of the bagu
essay as a popu lar vehicle to preach his version of the Cheng- Zhu teachings. See Qian
Mu
, Zhongguo jin sanbainian xueshu shi
(hereafter ZJSNXS)
(Shanghai: Shangwu, 1937 [1948]), 1:177.
15. Liang Ch’i- ch’ao, Intellectual Trends in the Ch’ ing Period, trans. Emmanuel C. Y. Hsü
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 84.
16.
Gu Yanwu, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 103.
17. Ibid., 95. En glish translation in Liang, Intellectual Trends in the Ch’ ing Period, 32.
18. See Li Yong
, Erqu ji
(Beijing: Tianhuaguan daiyin,, 1930), 16:7a–9b. Li
Gong
, Shugu houji
, Yan- Li congshu, 13:5a–6a.
19.
Erqu ji, 16:8a. Gu’s reply is quoted on 9a.
20. MRXA, 6:100.
21. See chapters 13 and 14 in the Cangshu.
22. Shugu houji, 13:4a.
23. See Lu Baoqian
, “Lun Qingdai jingxue”
, in Lishi xuebao
3
(February 1975): 1–22.
24. “Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of Qing Confucian Intellectualism,” Tsing
Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s., 11, nos. 1 and 2 (December 1975): 105–146; Lishi yu
sixiang
(Taipei: Lianjing, 1976), 87–165; Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng
(Hong Kong: Longmen, 1976).
25. On the anti- intellectualism of the Wang Yangming school, see Xiong Shili
, Shili
yuyao
(Taipei: Letian, 1971), 4:24a.
26. For further clarifi cation of these two terms, see “Qing Intellectualism,” 137–144.
27. See my Fang Yizhi wanjie kao
(Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo, 1972),
64–65.
28. MRXA, 7:46.
in t e l le c t ua l t r a nsi t ion in s e v e n t e e n t h - ce n t ury c h ina 373
29. See Yizhi’s son Fang Zhonglu’s proposal to build up a library at Qingyuan mountain in
Qingyuan shan zhilüe
(1669 edition), 3:33a–35b.
30. Ibid., “fa- fan” section, 4b.
31. “Qing Intellectualism,” 126.
32. Liu Zongzhou
, Lunyu xue- an
, in Liu Zi quanshu
(1824 edition),
29:31a.
33.
Shen Zengzhi
, Hairi Lou zhacong
(Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1962), 214.
34. Quoted in Qingyuan shan zhilue, “fa- fan”
section, 5a.
35.
Zhang Shengyan
, Minmatsu Chûgoku bukkyo no kenkyu
(Tokyo: Sankibo busshorin, 1975), 283–286.
36. Chen Yuan
, Mingji Dian Qian Fojiao kao
juan 2, esp. pp. 92–96
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962).
37.
Ibid., 86.
38. “Qing Intellectualism,” 120.
39. Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo- Confucianism and China’ s Evolving
Po liti cal Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
40. Qian Zhongshu, Tanyi lu (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1948), 115–119.
41.
Guangyang Zaiji
(Shanghai: Shangwu, 1941), 98.
ac k now led g m e n t s
Chapter 1 originally appeared in Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds.,
Confucian Spirituality (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2003), 62–80. This is
volume 11A of World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest.
Chapter 2 originally appeared in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 25 (1964–
1965): 80–122.
Chapter 3 originally appeared in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47, no. 2
(December 1987): 363–395. We have not reproduced the accompanying
fi gures.— Eds.
Chapter 4 originally appeared in Journal of Asian Studies 41, no. 1 (November
1981): 81–85. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
This is a review of Michael Loewe’s Ways to Paradise: The Chinese Quest for Im-
mortality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979).
Chapter 5 originally appeared in K. C. Chang, ed., Food in Chinese Culture:
Anthropological and Historical Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977), 53–83.
Chapter 6 originally appeared in George Kao, ed., The Translation of Things
Past: Chinese History and Historiography (Hong Kong: Chinese University of
Hong Kong Press, 1982), 49–61. This article was translated by T. C. Tang and is
from a Festschrift in honor of Professor Shen Gangbo
, Shen Gangbo
xiansheng bazhi rongqing lunwen ji
(Taipei: Lian-
jing, 1976). Figures have not been reproduced.— Eds.
376 ac k now led g m e n t s
Chapter 7 originally appeared in Donald Munro, ed., Individualism and Holism:
Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1985), 121–155.
Chapter 8 originally appeared in Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks, and
Ying- shih Yü, eds., The Power of Culture (Hong Kong: Chinese University of
Hong Kong Press, 1994), 158–171.
Chapter 9 originally appeared in Wing- tsit Chan, ed., Chu Hsi and Neo-
Confucianism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 228–254.
Chapter 10 originally appeared in The Challenge of the 21st Century: The Re-
sponse of Eastern Ethics (Seoul, South Korea: Asian Foundation International
Symposium, 1998), 57–77.
Chapter 11 originally appeared in Wang Gungwu and Wong Siu- lun, eds.,
Dynamic Hong Kong: Its Business and Culture (Hong Kong: University of Hong
Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1997), 1–84.
Chapter 13 originally appeared in Ming Studies 25 (Spring 1988): 24–66. The
author would like to thank Professors F. W. Mote and Willard J. Peterson for
their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. For a re-
joinder from Professor Ch’ien, see “Neither Structuralism nor Lovejoy’s His-
tory of Ideas: A Disidentifi cation with Professor Ying- Shih Yü’s Review as a
Discourse,” Ming Studies 31 (1991): 42–86.
Chapter 14 originally appeared in Journal of the American Oriental Society
100, no. 2 (1980): 115–125, published by the American Oriental Society and re-
printed with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
a p p e ndi x
A D D R E S S O F P R O F E S S O R Y I N G - S H I H Y Ü O N T H E
O C C A S I O N O F R E C E I V I N G T H E J O H N W. K L U G E
P R I Z E AT T H E L I B R A R Y O F C O N G R E S S
I feel enormously honored to be a corecipient of the John W. Kluge Prize in
2006, for which I am grateful. After much refl ection, however, I have come
to the realization that the main justifi cation for my presence here today is that
both the Chinese cultural tradition and Chinese intellectual history as a disci-
pline are being honored through me. The former has been the subject of my
lifetime scholarly pursuit, and the latter my chosen fi eld of specialization.
When I fi rst became seriously interested in the study of Chinese history and
culture in the 1940s, the Chinese historical mind happened to be cast in a positiv-
istic and antitraditionalistic mold. The whole Chinese past was viewed negatively,
and what ever appeared to be uniquely Chinese was interpreted as a deviation
from the universal norm of pro gress of civilization as exemplifi ed in the historical
development of the West. As a result, studies of aspects of the Chinese cultural
tradition, from philosophy, law, and religion to lit er a ture and art, often amounted
to condemnation and indictment. Needless to say, I was at a complete loss as to
the Chinese cultural identity and, for that matter, also my personal identity. It was
my good fortune that I was able to fi nish my college education in Hong Kong and
pursued my gradu ate studies in the United States, now my adopted country.
378 a p p e ndi x
As my intellectual horizon gradually widened over the years, the truth was
beginning to dawn on me that Chinese culture must be clearly recognized as an
indigenous tradition with characteristics distinctly its own. The crystallization
of Chinese culture into its defi nitive shape took place in the time of Confucius
(551–479 b.c.e.), a crucial moment in the ancient world better known in the West
as the Axial Age. During this period, it has been observed, a spiritual awaken-
ing or “breakthrough” occurred in several highly developed cultures, including
China, India, Persia, Israel, and Greece. It took the form of either philosophical
reasonin
g or postmythical religious imagination, or, as in the case of China, a
mixed type of moral- philosophic- religious consciousness. The awakening led di-
rectly to the emergence of the dichotomy between the actual world and the world
beyond. The world beyond as a new vision provided the thinking individuals, be
they phi los o phers, prophets, or sages, with the necessary transcending point
from which the actual world could be examined and questioned, critically as
well as refl ectively. This is generally known as the original transcendence of the
Axial Age, of which the exact shape, empirical content, and historical pro cess
varied from culture to culture. The transcendence is original in the sense that it
would exert a long- lasting, shaping infl uence on the cultures involved.
As a result of the Chinese original transcendence in the time of Confucius,
the all- impor tant idea of Dao (Way) emerged as a symbol of the world beyond
vis- à- vis the actual world of everyday life. But the Chinese transcendental world of
Dao and the actual world of everyday life were conceived from the very beginning
to be related to each other in a way that was diff er ent from other ancient cultures
undergoing the Axial breakthrough. For example, there is nothing in the early
Chinese philosophical visions that suggests Plato’s conception of an unseen eter-
nal world of which the actual world is only a pale copy. In the religious tradition,
the sharp dichotomy of a Christian type between the world of God and the world
of humans is also absent. Nor do we fi nd in classical Chinese thought in all its
va ri e ties anything that closely resembles the radical negativity of early Buddhism,
with its insistence on the unrealness and worthlessness of this world. By con-
trast, the world of Dao was not perceived as very far from the human world. As
best expressed by Confucius: “The Dao is not far from man. When a man pur-
sues the Dao, and remains away from man, his course cannot be considered the
Dao.” I must hasten to add, however, that the notion of Dao was not the mono poly
of Confucius and his followers but was shared by all the major thinkers in the
Chinese Axial Age, including Laozi, Mozi, and Zhuangzi. It was their common
belief that Dao is hidden and yet functions everywhere in the human world; even
men and women of simple intelligence can know and practice it in everyday life to
a larger or lesser degree. Indeed, judging from the ever-