by Carl Safina
21 “His experience was largely in land drilling” B. Casselman and Russell Gold, “BP Decisions Set Stage for Disaster,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2010; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266560
930780190.html?KEYWORDS=negative+test.
22 “I raised my concerns” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010,” testimony of Paul Johnson, transcript p. 205, lines 7–17, August 23, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/
903575/1/USCGHEARING%2023_Aug_10.pdf.
23 “Mr. Bob Kaluza called me to his office” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Leo Lindner, transcript pp. 272 and 313, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483/.
24 “Let’s face it” W. Semple, e-mail to Mark Loehr, September 19, 2010.
25 “We’re in the exploration group” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Ron Sepulvado, transcript p. 63, lines 5–6, July 20, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856499/.
26 Production zone between 18,051 and 18,223 feet BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
27 “The biggest risk associated with this cement job” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 87, lines 2–4, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
28 Nitrified foamed cement P. Parsons, “The Macondo Well: Part 3 in a Series About the Macondo Well (Deepwater Horizon) Blowout,” Energy Training Resources, LLC, July 15, 2010; https://www.energytrainingresources.com/data/default/content/Macondo.pdf.
29 The depth created concern D. Hammer, “Deepwater Horizon’s Ill-Fated Oil Well Could Have Been Handled More Carefully, Hearings Reveal,” May 29, 2010, NOLA.com; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hammer-hearings-cg.html.
30 “That nitrogen, it could be a bad thing” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Jimmy Harrell, transcript p. 72, lines 20–22, May 27, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670139/.
31 “We were concerned” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Mark Hafle, transcript p. 45, lines 8–12, May 28, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670171/.
32 BP held an in-house contest A. G. Breed, “The Well Is Dead, but Gulf Challenges Live On,” Associated Press, September 19, 2010.
33 “To see if adding more centralizers will help,” and related discussion U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, June 14, 2010, letter from Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak to Tony Hayward, 111th Congress, p. 7; http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100614/Hayward.BP.
2010.6.14.pdf.
34 “It was a bigger risk to run the wrong centralizers” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 307, lines 1–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
35 “The BP Macondo team erroneously believed” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 35, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
36 “That subject never came up” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 307, lines 1–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
37 “Well, we didn’t know if we could find them” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 205, lines 1–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
38 “I don’t know of any” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 356, line 22, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
39 “I never knew it was part of the report” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 269, lines 7–8, July 22 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
40 “Although the decision not to use twenty-one centralizers” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 35, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
41 Kill pill as spacer, and quotes about using it D. Hilzenrath, “Credibility of BP Oil Spill Study Is Challenged,” Washington Post, September 11, 2010; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/11/
AR2010091104579.html.
42 Spacer fluid abnormally used, and that spacer could have affected the blowout preventer, and “would have required disposal,” and “snot on the deck” D. Hammer, “Finger-Pointing over Deepwater Horizon Explosion Grows Heated,” July 19, 2010, NOLA.com; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/finger-pointing_over_deepwater.html. See also M. Kunzelman, “Federal Hearings Resume in Oil Spill Probe,” Chron.com, July 19, 2010; http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/7115149.html.
43 “To my knowledge—well, it filled a function” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Leo Lindner, transcript p. 321, lines 12–15, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483/.
44 “Why is all this snot on the deck?” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Steve Bertone, transcript p. 41, lines 1–4, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483/.
45 Douglas Brown’s statements and disparity about whether Vidrine
or Kaluza said they’d do it a certain way J. Harkinson, “The Rig’s on Fire! I Told You This Was Gonna Happen!” Mother Jones, June 7, 2010; http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/06/rigs-fire-i-told-you-was-gonna-happen.
46 “I didn’t have no doubts about it” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Jimmy Harrell, transcript pp. 57–58 and 74. He later says he doesn’t recall the remark: transcript p. 80, May 27, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/posted/3043/May_27_PDF.670139.pdf.
47 “If it’s a successful test” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Smith, transcript p. 267, lines 1–3, July 23, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856507/.
48 “And that was really the only discussion” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 156, lines 13–14, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
49 “I haven’t been a witness” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Leo Lindner, transcript pp. 286 and 288, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483/.
50 “a warning sign right off the bat” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Smith, transcript p. 279, line 10, July 23, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856507/.
51 “They attempted it again and got fluid back” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Leo Lindner, transcript p. 274, lines 3–4, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483.
52 My supervisor was explaining,” and “Where that U-tube’s at,” and “Bob tells Jason, No,” and “approximately a good hour” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Chris Pleasant, transcript pp. 115–116 and 264, May 28, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670171.
53 Don Vidrine believes J. C. McKinley Jr., “Documents Fill in Gaps in Narrative on Oil Rig Blast,” New York Times, September 7, 2010, p. A18; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/us/08rig.html?_r=2&hpw=&pagewanted=all.
54 “And if you don’t see that, you need to be very concerned, right?” and “So the symptoms are a successful test” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Smith, transcript p. 392 and pp. 289–90, July 23,2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856507/. See also “Video: Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Footage, July 23rd, Part 35,” posted on July 25, 2010; http://www.dvidshub.net. See also “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Lee Lambert, transcript pp. 290, 357, and 395, July 20, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856499/.
55 “The investigative team could find no evidence” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 40, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
56 “Go call the office” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Chris Pleasant, transcript p. 118, May 29, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670191/.
57 Cement bond log test’s importance and decision not to use it D. Hammer, “Costly, Time-Consuming Test of Cement Linings in Deepwater Horizon Rig Was Omitted, Spokesman Says,” NOLA.com, May 19, 2010; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/costly_time-consuming_test_of.html.
58 “Everyone on the rig was completely satisfied” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 43, lines 24–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
59 BP’s discussion of Halliburton’s cement BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
60 Halliburton and BP had prior knowledge that the cement failed tests J. M. Broder, “Panel Says Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill,” New York Times, October 28, 2010, p. A1. See also D. Cappiello, “Critical Test Not Done on Cement Before Blowout,” Associated Press, October 29, 2010. See also D. Hammer, “Oil Spill Commission Finds Halliburton’s Cement Was Unstable, Failed Several Tests Before Deepwater Horizon Disaster,” Times-Picayune, October 29, 2010. See also “BP, Halliburton Knew Oil Disaster Cement Was Unstable,” Agence France-Presse, October 29, 2010.
61 Even small cracks PumpCalcs, Orifice flow calculator: http://www.pumpcalcs.com/calculators/view/103/.
62 Events after 8:00 P.M. on April 20 BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 92, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
63 “eliminating all conventional well control” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Smith, transcript p. 409, July 23, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856507/. See also “Video: Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Footage, July 23rd, Part 49,” posted on July 25, 2010; http://www.dvidshub.net.
64 “Rig crew was not sufficiently prepared” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 108, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
65 Randy Ezell “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Randy Ezell testimony of Miles Ezell transcript, pp. 283–288, May 28, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670171.
66 Mud shooting out the top BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 126, September 8,
2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
67 Alarm inhibition R. Brown, “Oil Rig’s Siren Was Kept Silent, Technician Says,” New York Times, July 23, 2010 p. A1; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/us/24hearings.html?_r=1&hp.
68 “If I would have shut down those engines” R. Arnold, “Testimony: Safety System ‘Inhibited’ on Doomed Rig,” Click2Houston.com, July 23, 2010; http://www.click2houston.com/news/24373880/detail.html.
69 Mike Williams’s description of events “Blowout: The Deepwater Horizon Disaster,” CBSNews.com, May 16,2010; http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/16/60minutes/main6490197.shtml. See also R. Brown, “Oil Rig’s Siren Was Kept Silent, Technician Says,” New York Times, July 23, 2010, p. A1; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/us/24hearings.html?_r=1&hp. See also “Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Hearings Testimony Videos for July 23, 2010,” August 4, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/834139/.
70 Interchange between Pleasant and Kuchta D. Hammer, “Deepwater Horizon’s Ill-Fated Oil Well Could Have Been Handled More Carefully, Hearings Reveal,” NOLA.com, May 29, 2010; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hammer-hearings-cg.html.
71 Disconnect failed “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Jimmy Harrell, transcript p. 58, May 27, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670139.
72 Summary of the things that went wrong “Oil Spill: BP Engineers Partly Responsible,” ComodityOnline.com, September 10, 2010; http://www.commodityonline.com/news/Oil-Spill-BP-engineers-partly-responsible-31641-3-1.html.