On the first day of Marheshwan, year six, at Masada, I divorce and release of my own free will, today I Joseph, son of Naqsan….
On the twentieth day of Sivan, year three of the freedom of Israel … I, Shelamzion, daughter of Joseph Qebshan from Ein Gedi, with you, you Eleazar son of Hananiah, who had been my husband before this time, that this is for you from me a bill of divorce and release.…
The Context: Permissiveness
Again, the problem is that the permission of Moses in Deuteronomy 24 to divorce on the basis of ʿerwat dābār (“something indecent about her”) had become too permissive. The later rabbis debated the extent of the ʿerwat dābār, with some making it nearly synonymous with the scriptural texts about sexual sin (adultery) while others found it to be stomping grounds for anything the husband didn’t like about the woman. Rabbis sometimes humorously chided the ease of a divorce by suggesting grounds could be found if a woman burned her husband’s food. Dale Allison sums up the historical setting with these words: “The impression one gains from ancient Jewish sources is that divorce was relatively easy and was not considered a grave misdeed.”10
This rather lengthy discussion of context best explains what Jesus means by the words he cites. “Anyone who divorces his wife must give her a certificate of divorce” means for Jesus, “You have heard that it was said that if a man wants to divorce his wife, he must simply give her a bill of divorce.” Jesus isn’t simply citing Moses; he’s using words that were used in his day for laxity and permissiveness when it came to a (Torah observant!) man divorcing his wife. What mattered most was not the grounds for the divorce, which is what Moses focused on in his permissions, but the necessity of giving the woman a certificate so she could be set free to remarry.
The View of Jesus
Into that context of Jewish males using the Torah to ground any reason they wanted to give for divorce, Jesus steps in, screeches the discussion to a halt, stands with the conservatives and with Moses—and even goes beyond and deeper than Moses. How so? Jesus prohibits permissiveness by well-nigh prohibiting divorce altogether. Matthew makes it clear that Jesus restricts the legitimate grounds for divorce to no more than what Moses says: “sexual immorality.” But what does that mean? Our second problem.
“Except for Sexual Immorality”
Instead of sorting out all the evidence and instead of cataloguing who believes what and what evidence supports each nuance, I want instead to sketch the basics.11 The Greek word here is porneia, which is used elsewhere for sexual immorality in Matthew 15:19 (parallel Mark 7:21); Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Corinthians 5:1 (incest); 6:13, 18 (where it means some kind of embodied sin); 7:2; 2 Corinthians 12:21; Galatians 5:19; Ephesians 5:3; Colossians 3:5; 1 Thessalonians 4:3; Revelation 9:21, and in other places in Revelation where physical sins and spiritual adulteries are combined. In the world of Jesus, porneia could mean:
1. premarital coitus, but that is not the meaning here
2. incest (as in 1 Cor 5)
3. more generally, sexual sins that destroy a marital covenant
The social context sketched above that focused on permissiveness for some makes the second option less likely, but we should consider the following observations.12 First, the word porneia and the word “commit adultery” (moichaomai) are not the same. In Matthew 15:19 the two are distinguished. This might suggest that in porneia something more specific is in mind and that what is specific would not be the act of committing adultery. Furthermore, 1 Corinthians 5:1 uses this very term (porneia) for incest. One more consideration that for some tips the balance: the word porneia is used in Acts 15:20 to describe something Gentile converts were not to do. Most scholars today think the list of four items there—food polluted by idols, porneia, strangled meat, and blood—derive from Leviticus 17–18. In that context, porneia points to incestuous sins (18:16–18).
To sum this up, there is some evidence to suggest that the exception granted by Jesus in Matthew 5:32 is a very narrow exception; that is, Jesus grants divorce to a man only if his wife has committed incest! In effect, Jesus would then have narrowed ʿerwat dābār, the permissible grounds of divorce, to the most heinous of sexual sins. He has virtually shut the door on divorce in the face of many in his day. Such a rigor comports with how Jesus both understands divorce (only a permission) and understands marriage (an inviolable, divine union). In effect, Jesus would be teaching that divorce is wrong, and his contemporaries’ reading of Deuteronomy 24:1–4 is also wrong.
Redactional?
Another problem: the meaning of porneia is complicated by the redactional problem. Here are the basic facts: the expression “except for sexual immorality” is found only in Matthew. It is not found in the (probably earlier) Markan parallel at Mark 10:11–12, nor is it found in the (probably Q) Lukan parallel at Luke 16:18. Nor is this exception found in Paul’s discussion of what Jesus said about divorce in 1 Corinthians 7:10. That this precise expression is found in Matthew alone both of the times he deals with this subject (Matt 5 and 19) gives good grounds to think Matthew added the exception clause as a redactional gloss.
While some might think this means Matthew has tampered with the holy language of Jesus, we need to think harder. If our reading of 5:31 is correct—that Jesus quotes a text that was understood to be the basis for gross permissiveness—and if our reading of 5:32 is correct—that Jesus is all but denying any grounds for divorce because he believes marriage is an inviolable covenant13—then it is entirely possible that Jesus originally prohibited divorce in a general manner, but Matthew added the exception clause because he knew Jesus’ intent was not to deny the rightness of Deuteronomy 24:1–4, but to bring to a halt a widespread permissiveness when it came to divorce.
Sexual Immorality in General?
Not all agree with the incest view. In fact, more think that the word porneia cannot be restricted to incestuous relations but refers instead to the more general sense of sexual sins that break down the marital covenant. So to the view that porneia means sexual behaviors that constitute adultery 14 we now turn.
In spite of the attractiveness of connecting the word porneia to Leviticus 17–18, the word porneia does not occur in the Greek translation of that text. More importantly, the word porneia often means “adultery.” In addition, the contemporary reading of Deuteronomy 24:1–4 was along the line of “sexual infidelity” and not the more narrowly defined “incest” mentioned above. And this is how Shammai, if the tradition is accurate about him for the first century, rendered Deuteronomy 24:1 as recorded in Mishnah Giṭṭin 9:10:
A. The House of Shammai say, “A man should divorce his wife only because he has found grounds for it in unchastity,
B. “since it is said, Because he has found in her indecency in anything (Dt. 24:1).”
C. And the House of Hillel say, “Even if she spoiled his dish,
D. “since it is said, Because he has found in her indecency in anything.”
E. R. Aqiba says, “Even if he found someone else prettier than she,
F. “since it is said, And it shall be if she find no favor in his eyes (Dt. 24:1).”
To summarize a complicated discussion, all of which emerges when pastors and churches are wading into this issue (because someone in the church is filing for divorce): while the narrow sense of porneia as incest can be supported by evidence, that evidence is not substantial enough to overturn the rendering of porneia as a more general term for sexual behaviors that express infidelity to the marital covenant. Jesus grants divorce for a general reason, “sexual sins,” and that means a variety of sexual sins would constitute grounds for divorce.
This brings us back to the apparently redactional addition of “except for sexual immorality.” If Jesus is standing against the tradition of permissiveness and his view is essentially that divorce is wrong, then with a more general sense of porneia, Matthew may well have added this exception clause because he knew that Jesus was against divorce but, like Moses, knew that God had permitted divorce, though only for
sexual sins.15 In effect, Jesus would be permitting divorce only for sexual sins, which would restrict divorce permissions dramatically. Again, Allison gets this right: Jesus’ “purpose was not to lay down the law but to reassert an ideal and make divorce a sin, thereby disturbing the current complacency.”16 It is best to see this, then, as an Ethic from Above that lays before the disciples the expectation that kingdom living entails an Ethic from Beyond—his disciples were not to divorce.
Causes Her to Become an Adulteress
What would have grabbed Jesus’ contemporary listeners’ attention even more were the words “causes her to become an adulteress” (5:32 TNIV). We naturally ask: How does divorcing a woman make her an adulteress, or how does it make her a “victim of adultery” (NIV 2011)? The answer to this question seems obvious to the historian but deeply disturbs the pastoral situation. The instinctive answer is that a divorce certificate (geṭ) included the liberty for the woman to remarry. This generates two problems: first, Jesus does not explicitly say the certificate entails permission to remarry, and more importantly, this means permission to remarry for a divorced woman is rooted in an inference from the text instead of an explicit teaching. So it is.
It is obvious to any reader that divorcing a woman or a man does not make that woman or man an adulterer because to become an adulterer one must somehow engage in sexual relations with someone who is not your spouse. So, what Jesus says—virtually equating divorcing a woman with her subsequent adultery or making her a victim of adultery—logically requires remarriage. This reading of the text, of course, has been opposed by the church in major ways: remarriage has been considered impermissible for much of the history of the church. Some hold to the more strenuous view by saying that since God opposes divorce, any remarriage is adultery.17 But I’m not convinced the text teaches this. That is, what this text teaches is this: in the case of a permissible divorce, there was a permissible remarriage. This helps explain what follows, our next problem.
Anyone Who Marries the Divorced Woman Commits Adultery
If the woman committed porneia, she is an adulteress, and anyone who marries her would be entering a prohibited union. If she was divorced unlawfully, say because her husband just didn’t like her, then anyone who marries her is entering forbidden territory because he is making her a “victim of adultery.” Why? Because her union with her original husband has not been justifiably broken; she remains “married” to the man though she has been divorced.
In summary, then, Jesus is against divorce. He is for marriage. He believes marriage is a sacred, holy, and inviolable union created by God to make a man and a woman “one flesh.” Because he believes this about marriage, he believes divorce is always contrary to God’s creation designs. But it appears to me that Jesus goes along with the permission Moses granted to sinful Israel in permitting divorce for sexual immorality (porneia), and it appears as well that Jesus therefore also permitted remarriage for permissible divorces. But anyone who married an impermissibly divorced woman made that woman commit adultery. Permissible divorces lead to permissible remarriages; but impermissible divorces entail no remarriage.
LIVE the Story
The issues are complex and they are often complicated by struggling married people who deserve our understanding. Let’s review briefly how this issue is approached in the church today. The Catholic Church has held to a rigorous view because it believes marriage is an ontological union of a man and woman, a sacrament, and cannot be broken except in the rarest of cases (annulment). Divorce is wrong and remarriage is not permitted. Luther is not far from this, though he (unwisely in my view) connected marriage too much to the state.18 The Orthodox Church has been more accommodating to the sinfulness of humans, while the Protestant churches cross the entire spectrum from radical impermissibility of divorce or remarriage to a casual carelessness of permissibility of both divorce and remarriage. Among evangelicals there seems to be three basic views: the Bible does give permission to divorce but never to remarry; the Bible grants permission to divorce and to remarry, but only for adultery and desertion; and the Bible gives us permission to divorce and to remarry for justifiable reasons. There is no reason to add more options, so to some wisdom about marriage and divorce and remarriage we now turn.
Divorce and remarriage questions are about real persons. Once a friend of mine asked to play golf and said he’d pay—and he said, “Pick your course.” So I picked a good course with the kind of fees I rarely pay. As we approached the green on the first hole, he said, “Scot, the reason I asked to play golf was because I have a question.” I said back, “Sure,” but I was now a bit concerned with where my ball was on the green and whether I had a reasonable putt for a birdie. His question brought me back to the real world with real persons, and it was the only thing we discussed the rest of the day. The question: “Do you believe if I am divorced legitimately that I can remarry legitimately?” What he was asking was whether I, as a teacher of the Bible, believed the Bible taught permissible remarriage. This also meant one of the heavier responsibilities you—my reader—and I bear when we teach the Bible: if our listeners and readers do what we think the Bible teaches, we both need to double our efforts to be “biblical” and to realize that we will in part bear responsibility for our teaching. I recognize this in what I say, and it gives me a pause to consider all over again what I write, and that means I do so with a prayer for God’s grace.
Divorce and remarriage questions are also discussed in the context of real people. I am happily married to my grade school, junior high school, and high school sweetheart. Kris and I grew up together. Both of our families have seen divorce—four or five (depending on how you see long-term live-in arrangements) of our brothers and sisters are divorced. I have had colleagues who are divorced; I have friends who are divorced. I have known many more who have chosen to remarry than who have chosen to remain “single” (because of a belief that the first union is inviolable). But I do have a friend whose husband divorced her with two young boys many years ago, and she chose to pray for the restoration of her marriage and has waited beyond waiting years for that to happen. I have known people who have divorced recklessly and those who have divorced reluctantly; I have known people who virtually ran away from marriages with someone they shouldn’t have run away with—and I’ve seen one such couple find repentance and a flourishing ministry. You know these situations too, and they are the realities out of which these questions have to be discussed and decisions discerned.
Divorce and remarriage decisions are not to be left to the individuals but require both pastoral leadership and ecclesial discernment. Just broaching this point creates enough problems on its own, but the following discussion will seek to work this point out.
First, churches and pastors and followers of Jesus are challenged by these words to recommit themselves to the covenant nature of love and to marriage as a sacred union blessed and established by God. Too many Christians are divorced, are divorcing, and get married knowing divorce will always be an option. So I would urge churches to ramp up their teachings on the nature of covenant love and of the sacredness of marriage. Churches must have the courage to teach that divorce is never the will of God, and that divorce is only permitted because of the hard-heartedness of humans. These are the words of Jesus, and we do not have the option of toning them down (5:17–20) or pretending they don’t exist. John Stott has pastorally sensitive words of wisdom: “whenever somebody asks to speak with me about divorce, I have now for some years steadfastly refused to do so. I have the rule never to speak with anybody about divorce, until I have first spoken with him (or her) about two other subjects, namely marriage and reconciliation.”19
Second, we have an obligation as followers of Jesus of holding in balance the twin nonnegotiable virtues of mercy and righteousness. When we are confronted with a marriage that is failing, we are to be merciful, to listen, to probe, to “live with and through” those persons, and to do so in a way that reflects the Jesus Creed of loving God a
nd others with everything we’ve got. This does not mean tolerance. Instead, a nonnegotiable is righteousness, probably the single most important virtue of the Sermon on the Mount. Righteousness, once again, is a term describing behaviors and conditions that reflect doing God’s will. That will, according to Jesus our Lord, is that divorce is wrong. We are to hold fellow followers of Jesus to that standard. There is no question that the church has an awful time holding mercy and righteousness in balance. Some churches are demonstratively merciful, to the degree that divorce is condoned, overlooked, and even casually dismissed. Other churches are so rigorous in their commitment that they fail to show any mercy toward those who have gotten themselves into pits of desperation.
I have one word of advice here: every time a pastoral situation arises in which a person states they are thinking about divorce, it is important for the follower of Jesus to remind the struggling spouses that divorce is not God’s will. My experience is that this causes discomfort for all in the room, so it becomes the unspoken assumption, and as long as it’s unspoken it will easily drift into the unspoken acceptance. Still, the pastoral situation requires compassion and mercy on the part of the follower of Jesus. We are called to listen, to empathize, to probe, and to walk with a person whose relationships is breaking up in such a way that the person knows we love them, are with them, and want God’s will for them.
Third, no pastor, no leader, and no church should hold out a rigorous view of marriage, divorce, or remarriage without providing the resources, time, personal attention, and help that such a rigorous view entails. If you believe in one of the most traditional views—namely, that divorce is always wrong and remarriage not permissible—then you have an obligation not only to teach that view but also to support the persons who are entangled in marriage problems and potential divorce, and those rendered alone by divorce. Perhaps the most glaring contradiction of the more rigorous teachings about divorce and remarriage is the total absence of support, love, and ongoing attention required for those who suffer.
Sermon on the Mount Page 16