The centre of the army was composed of its strongest component, the heavy infantry of the legions and alae. There were perhaps 55,000 heavy infantry supported by 15,000 velites, allowing for the contingents left out of the battle for various reasons. They were in the usual triplex acies, but with one major difference, for Polybius tells us that the maniples were placed closer together than usual, each one's depth 'many times' wider than its frontage. We do not know the precise dimensions of this formation and estimates have varied from a total depth for the three lines of between fifty and seventy ranks, giving a frontage for the centre of perhaps half a mile to a mile, with perhaps each maniple deploying five men abreast. There were several reasons for adopting this formation. The first was simply one of space, for the flat land between the hills and the river was narrow and would not have permitted all of the legions and alae to deploy in their normal, shallower formation, but given that the Romans had chosen to fight in this position they clearly did not believe this to be a major problem. The deeper, narrower formation allowed both the individual maniples and the army as a whole to move more quickly whilst the ranks kept their dressing, for the wider a formation is, the quicker it will fall into disorder as it marches across even the flattest ground. Although some of the Roman soldiers had been in service since 218, and a good number had experience from the previous year, more than half the army consisted of recent recruits whose standard of drill cannot have been high. Moreover, the entire army had had little or no time to train together, and none of the officers had experience of leading or serving in such an unprecedentedly large force. The formation adopted was simple enough to work with such material and was able to create tremendous forward pressure. Visually it was intimidating to any enemy in its path, whilst the Roman soldiers enjoyed the security of being surrounded by so many of their comrades. The deep formation would also make it harder for any of the soldiers to flee. The men in the front ranks would be unable to escape until the men behind them had given way and these were removed from the immediate risks and stress of combat. Once the Roman mass had begun its lumbering advance it would be difficult to stop. At the very least it ought to have far greater staying power than Hannibal's less numerous infantry. The price was a loss of flexibility, for the reduction in the gaps between the maniples made it virtually impossible for these to change formation or wheel to face another direction.
Varro placed himself at the head of the Latin cavalry, whilst Paullus commanded the Roman horse and the proconsul Servilius Geminus led the infantry centre. Paullus' position with the prestigious Roman cavalry has been used as evidence by those who believe that the battle was fought on his day of command, but it is actually uncertain whether there was a normal position for the supreme commander of an army. In the few battles where both consuls were present they do not appear to have placed themselves in any particular precedence, since traditionally they were not expected to fight together.11 The entire army must have occupied a frontage of between 1 and 2 miles and it is distinctly probable that it was angled back from the river, facing roughly south-west, to allow it to fit into a plain which was no more than 1/3 miles wide. The Roman plan was simple and based upon their experience in earlier battles. At Ticinus and Trebia the Roman cavalry had been outnumbered and outfought, allowing the enemy cavalry to outflank the entire army. Yet at Trebia the Roman infantry had broken through the enemy centre, whilst even in the disorganized fighting at Trasimene they had put up a strong resistance and the vanguard had actually smashed through the Punic line. The strengthened Roman centre should be able to repeat these successes and crush the Carthaginian centre. All that was required of the cavalry wings was for them to protect the flanks of the infantry long enough for them to win the battle in the centre. Terrain prevented the cavalry wings from being outflanked by their numerically superior enemy and the Roman tactics here were to be purely defensive, designed to hold their ground for as long as possible. It was probably for this reason that the two consuls held command of these critical positions, their presence intended to inspire the cavalry to stand against their more numerous foes. With his infantry beaten and scattered, Hannibal's army would be permanently defeated, even if his cavalry were eventually successful in their combat with their Roman counterparts. Varro's plan was not subtle, and nothing illustrates Polybius' earlier comment on the Romans' reliance on brute force better than their tactics at Cannae, but it might easily have worked and anything much more sophisticated would have been impossible with the army under his command. Hannibal had been brought to battle on ground of the Romans' choosing where they hoped to negate his cavalry superiority and could be sure that no ambush lay behind their lines. He no longer had the elephants which had panicked earlier Roman armies and now he would be crushed by the numbers and courage of Rome's greatest strength, her sturdy citizenry of farmer-soldiers.12
There was no guarantee that Hannibal would accept battle in the narrow plain. Paullus left 10,000 men to guard the larger camp which remained on the same side of the river as the enemy. It is not certain whether these were a whole unit, perhaps a legion with its ala, or detachments from several units. There is no good reason to believe that the entire triarii were given this task, since, contrary to some claims, this was not their normal role. Paullus is said to have ordered them to attack the Punic camp if Hannibal took the bait and crossed the river to fight. If this is true, then this was a bold plan, but characteristically Roman, and the capture of Hannibal's camp and baggage would make sure that the enemy had no chance of reforming his army to continue the struggle. At the very least it might compel the enemy to weaken their force by leaving a detachment to protect the camp while the rest of the army fought the main battle. In fact, the Punic commander quickly decided to accept the challenge to battle and does not seem to have made any special provision for the defence of his base.13
Hannibal responded quickly to the sight of the Romans crossing the river, which may suggest that his army was at least partially prepared to move out in any case. His slingers and javelin-men were sent across the river as a covering force to allow the remainder of his army to move out and deploy. The main body forded the Aufidius in two places, which suggests that they were formed into two columns. The army then wheeled into line facing the Romans, its left flank resting on the river. The 10,000 cavalry were divided between the wings, but in this case Hannibal put all of his Numidians opposite the Latin Horse and concentrated his close order cavalry, who rode with saddles and bridles, on the left. It is unclear just how many of each nationality were present, but at least 4,000 of the cavalry were Gallic and several thousand Spanish, so it is probable that the Punic left wing significantly outnumbered the Romans facing them. The Numidians may have been roughly equal in numbers to the Latins, but certainty is impossible. Hannibal had 40,000 infantry, but this total included the light infantry. He had had 8,000 of these at Trebia and it is doubtful whether his recruitment of Celts had added substantially to this total, for skirmishing was not common in Gallic warfare. This left 32,000 close order foot, of whom the majority were Celts, perhaps as many as 20,000, for he had received no more drafts of Libyans or Spanish. Possibly there were 8-10,000 Libyan infantry and around 4,000 Spanish.
Together the Spanish and Gallic infantry formed the army's centre, deployed in alternate companies. Polybius uses the word sperae, one of the terms he uses to mean 'maniple', and it is likely that he uses it to mean units of a few hundred men, although there was probably no standard size. This interspersion of companies from two distinct ethnic groups suggests that Gauls were now fully absorbed into Hannibal's army, so that there was no need to place them in larger, tribal contingents. The Libyans were split into two halves, each roughly the strength of a Roman legion, and placed on the wings, formed into deep columns. Although this is not clear from our source, it is probable that they were actually behind the edges of the line of Spanish and Celts, out of sight of the Romans. They may well have composed the second of Hannibal's columns, crossing the river upstream
of the main force, concealed from enemy gaze. Once the army had reached its positions, Hannibal led forward the centre companies of his infantry, causing the whole line to bulge towards the enemy, the units echeloned back on either side of the new, narrow front. The general himself, with his brother Mago, was with the Gauls and Spanish, while Hasdrubal led the heavy cavalry, and Livy says that Maharbal controlled the Numidians. Hannibal had rightly guessed that the main Roman effort was to be made in the centre and had adjusted his deployment and issued orders accordingly. His plan was to use the enemy's own strength against him, but it is easier to describe how this was achieved than it was to anticipate the action.14
It must have taken hours for both the armies to reach their positions and deploy into battle, the tribunes scurrying about to join the two Roman armies together and jostle the men into place. When they were ready, over 125,000 men and 16,000 horses were gathered in an area no larger than 5 or 6 square miles, whilst more soldiers and tens of thousands of slaves, servants and camp followers looked on from the three camps. The noise of their movements drowned out the constant chirruping of the cicadas which fills the air on summer days in this plain. So many feet and hoofs threw up clouds of dust which swirled in the strong gusts of the hot Volturnus wind which blows from the south-east. The dust was another irritant to men beginning to swelter in their heavy armour under the hot glare of the sun. On the Roman side the army presented a fairly uniform appearance, although we must remember that these were citizen soldiers and there is no good reason to believe that they wore tunics of the same colour or that shields were painted with unit insignia. Our sources were most struck by the diverse dress of the enemy army. On the one hand were the Libyans, dressed in Roman helmets and armour, and with oval scuta, then the Gauls stripped to the waist (since this is probably what Polybius means by 'naked'), and the Spanish in their white tunics with purple borders, to which we might add the unarmoured Numidians with their distinctive hairstyles and riding their small, shaggy horses. It is uncertain how accurate this picture is. The Spanish had left home two years before and one may wonder how many still wore their native garb and had not replaced it with whatever was available locally or could be made in camp. However, they probably had retained their native weapons, the Spanish carrying their short-stabbing swords, and perhaps a few of the curved blades similar to the Greek kopis, whilst the Gauls had their long slashing blades.
For a while the armies stared at each other, whilst their light infantry skirmished between the lines. Neither side seems to have gained much advantage in this combat and eventually the skirmishers pulled back behind the main lines of their infantry. Hannibal's light troops may then have moved to support his cavalry on the wings as they did at Trebia, for early in the fighting Paullus was hit in the face by a slingstone cast by one of the Balearic slingers. The Roman velites seem to have pulled back through the small intervals left in the line of hastati. However, the first close combat occurred when Hasdrubal led his Spanish and Gallic cavalry against the Roman horse. A vicious melee developed, the sources once again stressing that it was unlike most cavalry combats, consisting not of charges and pursuits, but of a standing fight. Again we hear of men dismounting to fight on foot. Eventually the ferocity of Spanish and Gallic horsemen proved too much and the Romans were killed or put to flight. It is unclear how much advantage Hasdrubal had from his numbers, for the confined space between the infantry centres and the river may have prevented him from bringing them to bear. It may simply be that the Roman cavalry had got as used to being beaten by the Punic horsemen as the latter had to winning. In hand-to-hand combat confidence was often of greater importance than numbers or equipment. The Romans fled, but many found that their escape was cut off by the river and were slaughtered by their exultant opponents. The combat had been fierce, but according to Livy had not lasted very long, although it is always difficult to know what to make of such vague allusions to time. Before it was finished the heavy infantry had met in the centre.15
Hannibal's men do not seem to have advanced further once he had formed his convex line pointing towards the enemy, so it was probably the Romans who marched forward, eager as they were to decide the combat before their cavalry were beaten. The cacophony of noise can only have been appalling as the Romans cheered, blew their trumpets and clashed their weapons against their shields, the Celtic and Spanish warriors answering them with their own war cries as each side tried to terrify the other into submission. As they came closer, the Roman line checked and began to hurl their pila, the enemy replying with showers of their own javelins. Despite their numbers the Romans did not throw many more missiles than their opponents, for the men in the rear ranks even of the maniples of hastati could not do so without severe risk of hitting their own front ranks. Soon the Romans, encouraged by their officers and the men behind, surged forward into contact. The combat fell into the usual pattern, with brief flurries of savage hand-to-hand fighting, after which the exhausted participants pulled back a few yards to draw breath, taunting and lobbing missiles at their enemies, until they regained the confidence and energy to renew the fight. Livy speaks of the Romans 'for a long time repeatedly pushing forward', before they began to win ground against strong opposition.16 The Gauls were renowned for their ferocity in the early stages of battle, but supposed to weary quickly and lose heart if they did not seem to be winning. At Cannae, as at Telamon, they confounded the literary cliche of the fickle and easily tired barbarian, and put up a long and sturdy resistance. There were several reasons why they were able to do so. In numbers they were roughly equal to the Roman hastati and, since they occupied roughly the same frontage, their companies were formed in similar depth. The stiffening of experienced Spanish infantry may also have helped to steady the Gauls, and they were inspired by the presence of Hannibal and Mago, who rode around, close behind the righting line, yelling encouragement to their warriors. Pride probably had a lot to do with it, for both the Gauls and Spanish were products of warrior societies which prized military glory above all else. At Cannae these men had been specially chosen as the first to meet the enemy, even being advanced ahead of the main army where all could witness their valour, in a gesture not unlike that of the Gaesatae at Telamon, running naked ahead of the whole army, challenging the enemy and daring them to come on.
Only slowly did the Romans force the Celts and Spaniards back, and at first they did so step by step, still facing forward. The bulge in Hannibal's line was flattened, and still the Romans pushed on, till in the centre they drove the enemy back further, so that now the line was concave instead of convex. More of the front lines were in contact and the fighting general, but the main effort was still in the centre where the two sides had first met and where the Romans were winning. Roman officers, including the many tribunes, the proconsul, and Paullus himself who had ridden to the centre after the defeat of his cavalry, urged the legionaries on, led them in charges, and fed in maniples from the reserve lines to support the hastati, desperate to keep the forward momentum going and exploit this success. Gradually the Roman infantry lost their neat formation, as the narrow gaps between the maniples vanished and the units merged into one great crowd. The intervals between the three lines had probably also been reduced by the deep formation of the individual maniples. There was always a tendency for very large mass formations to lose order and degenerate into a mob of men pushing forward, (as Napoleon's army was to discover when the declining quality of its infantry led to the use of gigantic formations at Wagram, Albuera and Waterloo). Yet the forward pressure created by the densely packed mass of Roman infantry was inexorable and, eventually, the Gauls and Spanish began to break. In the centre they at last gave way, and the Romans surged forward, victory in sight. It was probably now that the Gauls suffered a good proportion of the many casualties, as those who did not run quickly enough or were slowed by their wounds were hacked down by the elated legionaries. The Roman mass burst through the centre of the enemy army and, in the rear, the Roman commanders urged more men
on to support them.
On either side of the victorious Roman infantry were the columns of the Libyan infantry. We do not know whether Hannibal had given their commanders instructions to begin to move when the enemy reached a certain point, or whether he now sent orders by courier for them to do so. Calmly, the columns turned to face inwards, and although there has been considerable debate over precisely how this manoeuvre was performed, this need not concern us, since so much depends on the details of the formation they started the battle in, concerning which we have no precise information. Then, ranks neady dressed, they advanced to take the mass of Roman infantry from both sides. The disorganization amongst the Romans was appalling and no one was able to assemble a coherent fighting line to face these new threats. The maniples were hopelessly confused and the men turned as individuals and small groups to confront the advancing Libyans. Most of the Romans were weary from the fighting, since even those not actually in the front ranks had endured the stress of close combat, and now they faced men who were well formed and fresh. It is even possible that they did not immediately realize that these new troops were enemies, for the African soldiers were dressed in Roman equipment and in battle men often become disorientated and lose their sense of direction. All forward movement in the Roman centre ceased, the two bodies of Africans compressing the mass of soldiers like a vice. In the lull, the Gauls and Spanish who had broken began to rally and return to the fight.17
The Fall of Carthage Page 27