S A R A J E V O
A STUD Y IN THE ORIGINS OF THE GREA Τ WAR
By R. W. SETON-WATSON
D.Litt. (Oxon), Hon. Ph.D. (Prague and Zagreb);
Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London;
Hon. Member of the Roumanian Academy
LONDON:
HUTCHINSON & CO. (Publishers), LTD.
PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.
Made and Printed in Great Britain by
The Camelot Press Limited,
London and Southampton
TO
MY WIFE
AS A MEMORY OF
FOUR JUGOSLAV JOURNEYS
TOGETHER
(1912, 1913, 1920, 1925.)
SARAJEVO
(A SERB FOLKSONG)
Sarajevo, whence comes thy gloom?
Tell me, has fire consumed thee?
Or has the flood engulfed thy streets?
Or has the plague laid hold on thee?
Softly Sarajevo gives answer:
" Had fire consumed me so sore,
My shining courts would rise again.
Had the fierce flood engulfed my streets,
My markets would be cleansed and fresh.
But plague has laid her murderous hand,
Her murderous hand on young and old,
And those I love has torn apart."
PREFACE
MUCH has been written on the immediate origins of the
Great War and the complicated diplomatic conflict which
preceded actual hostilities;
but till very recently the
Balkan aspect of the question has not received the
attention which it deserves. The two most authoritative
surveys in English — Mr. Headlam-Morley's The History
of Twelve Days (1915) and Sir Charles Oman's The
Outbreak of the War (1918) — are now both out of date,
owing to the subsequent publication of the German and
Austrian diplomatic documents, and of much supple-
mentary material of a less official character. Thus there
is great need of a book summarising all the latest evidence
on a question which is of burning importance in the
Europe of to-day.
The original German theory, which made of Britain
and of Sir Edward Grey the villains of the piece, has
long since been exploded, and, for the time at least,
abandoned even in Germany itself: nor is it ever likely
to convince any person who, with open mind, reads that
statesman's newly published memoirs. The attack was
then transferred to Russia, and the alleged methods by
which a general mobilisation was carried out behind the
back of the Tsar were treated as responsible for the
final catastrophe. The superficiality of this argument
was from the first apparent to all save the wilfully blind,
and was finally demonstrated by the critical study of
General Dobrorolski and other publications. The most
recent tendency has been to shift the main responsibility
on to the shoulders of Serbia; and it therefore becomes
all the more necessary to place the Serbian side of the
problem in the forefront of discussion, instead of treating
8
it as a mere accessory to general diplomatic history and
thereby missing the true significance of events.
The present volume, then, is an attempt to subject
much new and hitherto undigested material to a critical
and detailed analysis, and to place in their proper Euro-
pean perspective both the Austro-Serbian quarrel and
the crime of Sarajevo which resulted from it. I found
myself almost involuntarily driven to the attempt, while
engaged upon a larger work which traces the Jugoslav
national movement from its origins to the achievement
of unity and independence. It soon became obvious
that to treat the crisis of 1914 in that detail which alone
could ensure fairness and make it comprehensible would
utterly destroy the proportions of the proposed book,
and I therefore decided to detach it from the main
narrative and present it to the public in a form which
would leave freer play to the argument. During a long
visit to Jugoslavia last spring I was able to obtain much
additional
information
from
first-hand
sources,
and
especially from the survivors of the revolutionary move-
ment inside the Dual Monarchy, whose spontaneous
nature has been too often overlooked.
It is hardly too much to assert that one prime cause
of the disaster which befell Europe was the failure of her
leading statesmen to estimate truly the forces at work
in what was called the " Eastern " or " Balkan " Ques-
tion.
Without
any
accurate
diagnosis
there
could
obviously be no hope of applying an effective remedy;
and hence the measures adopted between 1908 and 1914
at best only postponed, and at worst actually aggravated,
the malady. One fact which emerges from the following
narrative is the superficial outlook of all the Powers
towards a problem so full of explosive elements as the
Southern Slav; and this may perhaps serve as a reminder
that similar national problems subsist in an acute and
unsolved form, even in post-war Europe, and deserve
close and constant attention.
9
In this connection I desire to make quite clear the
motives which prompted me to undertake this work.
After seven years of confusion and recrimination Europe
at last seems to be moving slowly in the direction of
peace and conciliation; and there is a tendency in some
quarters to regard the question of responsibility either
as a mere irritant which should now be relegated to the
background and replaced by the motto "Forget and
forgive," or as an insidious excuse for re-opening problems
which the war has solved. Both these views seem to
me fundamentally false. The question of war guilt is
likely to, and ought to, occupy some measure of the
attention of all who wish to see the European Common-
wealth placed on a sounder and safer basis; for it
provides the main clues by which we may judge and
compare the merits of the old system and the new. An
honest investigation of the causes of the war, however
severe the verdict to which it may lead, cannot properly
be regarded as a vindictive act towards our former
enemies; and I for one am perfectly prepared to co-
operate with German no less than Allied students of
the problem, with a view to the elucidation of the truth.
The stronger our condemnation of the old forces and
the old regime, the keener should be our desire to establish
a common basis of outlook and of action with the
new.
A considerable portion of the present volume had
already been completed when the publication of an
/> amazing article by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic aroused acute
controversy at home and abroad, and led to a determined
attempt ta saddle Serbia with the main responsibility
for the outbreak of the Great War. In chapter vi. I
have tried to reduce this incident to its true-proportions,
and. an appendix to the same chapter contains a summary
of subsequent developments. The silence of Mr. PaSic
and his Government — due apparently to intricate motives
of internal party politics and to a singular indifference
10
to moral considerations — reflects great discredit upon
them, and has gravely injured the reputation of their
country abroad, but none the less it cannot affect the
main issues involved.
I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Headlam-
Morley, who allowed me to read the advanced proofs
of the complete edition of British Diplomatic Documents
relating to the outbreak of the war, which he has pre-
pared for publication and which is due to appear shortly.
I was thus enabled to add valuable points of detail to
my narrative, and above all to assure myself that nothing
really material to the issue had been withheld by the
British Government in August 1914. Much has been
written for and against Lord Grey's policy, but even to
this day he has never received full credit for the publica-
tion of the frankest and fullest White Paper ever published
in our history. The moral effect of that publication was
simply incalculable, both at home and abroad; and the
publication of the German, Austrian, and Russian docu-
ments,
and
the
British
Government's
decision
last
December to entrust Mr. Gooch and Mr. Temperley
with a similar task, were, it seems to me, merely the
logical consequence of Lord Grey's initiative in August
1914 and of its decisive influence upon world opinion.
R. W. SETON-WATSON.
15 November, 1925.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONFLICT
The
Habsburg
mission
against
the
Turks–Serb
reugeees
in
Hungary
and
Croatia-Byzantium
and
Rome-The
Illyrian
and
Jugoslav
ideas-Prince
Michael-The
Eastern
crisis
of
1875-8
and
Austria-Hungary's
occupation
of
Bosnia-Sebia
under
Milan
and
Alexander-Croatia
under
Khuen–The
revival of 1903
– The „Pig War” – The Serbo-Croat Coalition –
Austro-Hungarian
and
Russian
rivalry
in
the
Balkans-
Aehrenthal
and
Izvolsky-The
annexation
of
Bosnia
–
The
Zagreb
and
Friedjung
Trials-William
II
„in
shining
armour”
–
The Southern Slav Question as an International issue …………………… 15
CHAPTER II. THE BALKAN WARS
The
Bosnian
Diet-Conrad
and
Italy-The
Balkan
League-
The
defeat
of
Turkey-Cuvaj's
dictatorship
m
Croaüa-
Tugoslav
enthusiasm
for
the
Balkan
allies
–
The
Prochaska
Affair-Serbia's
Adriatic
claims-Conrad
and
the
Southern
Slavs-Berchtold
and
Masaryk-The
Second
Balkan
War-
The
Treaty
of
Bucarest-Austria-Hungary
held
back
by
Italy
and
Germany-William
II
helps
Kings
Constantine
and
Charles
—
Berchtold,
Conrad,
and
the
war
party
in
Vienna-Pasic
s
overtures
rejected-Serbia
and
Russia-Balkan
megalomania-
Unrest in Bosnia and Croatia-Widespread conspiracy……………………….. 38
CHAPTER III. THE JUGOSLAV REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT
Serbian
sentiment
for
Bosnia-Kallay's
warnings
to
Vienna-
The
revolutionary
tradition
—
The
new
generation
—
Student
journals
—
Kocic
and Radulovic
—
Zerajic's attempt on the
Governor
–
The
Death
of
a
Hero
and
its
influence-The
spread
of
terrorist
ideas-Agitation
in
the
schools-Gacinovic
and
his group
—
Constant demonstrations and terrorist talk
—
The
conspirators in Sarajevo ……………………………………………… 63
12
CHAPTER IV. THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND
Character of the Archduke — Conflicts at Court — His desire for
political changes — His hostility to Hungary — His foreign
policy — His illness — William II and Francis Joseph — William
II
and
Francis
Ferdinand
— Discussion of the Roumanian
problem — Czernin's warnings — King Charles's alarm — The
meeting of Konopiâtë — The growth of a legend……………………………
80
CHAPTER V. THE MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE
The Bosnian manœuvres and Vidovdan — The murder — Inci-
dents of the funeral — The lack of precautions in Sarajevo —
General Potiorek — Outrages against the Serbs — The Wiesner
enquiry — The Austro-Hungarian dossier against Serbia — Press
polemics — The death of Hartwig………………………………………….. 101
CHAPTER VI. THE RESPON
SIBILITY FOR THE CRIME
Four
possibilities
—
The
Serbian
Government
absorbed
in
internal troubles — The problem of Montenegrin Union — Bel-
grade's inaction — The "Narodna Odbrana" — The "Black
Hand" — Colonel Dimitrijevic — Voja Tankosic — The Salonica
Trial and its connection with Sarajevo — The real initiative —
The Bosnian youth and their conspiracies — The reminiscences
of Mr. Ljuba Jovanovié — Could Belgrade have warned Vienna?............ 129
APPENDIX:
The "Revelations" of Mr. Jovanovic………………………………………… 155
CHAPTER VII. COUNT BERCHTOLD'S PREPARATIONS
FOR WAR
Berchtold's exposé of policy — Its revision after the murder —
Tisza's memorandum to Francis Joseph — Obstacles to warlike
action — Tisza's attitude — Berchtold and Berlin — The Hoyos
mission — William II and Vienna — William II's marginalia —
Berlin's
encouragement
of
Vienna
—
The
alleged
"Crown
Council" at Potsdam — The Joint Austro-Hungarian Council in
Vienna (7 July) — The gradual conversion of Tisza — Berchtold
and Tisza in agreement — Tschirschky keeps Berlin informed —
Reasons
for
postponement
— The Joint Council of July 19:
final decisions…………………………………………………………………. 160
CHAPTER VIII. THE DUPING OF EUROPE
Conrad and Krobatin go on leave — Berlin's connivance.
13
BERCHTOLD
AND
ST.
PETERSBURG:
Sazonovś
confidences
Poincaré's
visit-Szápáry's
evasions-Berchtold
misleads
Kudashev — German views of Russian unpreparedness.
BERCHTOLD AND PARIS:
BERCHTOLD
AND
LONDON:
Lützow's
warning
to
de
Bunsen
Sarajevo Page 1