(see D.D., i., No. 10, Griesinger to Bethmann Hollweg).
Herr Wendel refers (Die Habsburger und die Südslawenfrage, p. 60) to another
circular of 10 July, in which the Serbian Government undertakes to bring before
the courts any Serbian subjects mixed up in the murder, and to introduce
legislation against the misuse of explosives, But of this there is no trace in the
Serbian Blue Book.
135
check
propagandist
excess.
Despite
warnings
of
its
Minister in Vienna, Mr. Jovan Jovanovié,1 it remained
inactive for three weeks, and when at last, on 20 July, it
presented at Berlin a Note formally inviting the German
Government to use its good offices at the Ballplatz and
affirming a desire to meet Austria's demands wherever
possible.1 It was already far too late to produce any
effect either in Berlin or Vienna, and, in point of fact,
merely brought down a severe snub from Jagow upon the
head of the Chargé d'Affaires. The Note was unexcep-
tional in tone, and concluded by promising compliance
on every point save only where Serbia's " dignity and
independence
"
might
be
threatened.
Reading
the
ultimatum in the light of this document, one is instantly
reminded of Berchtold's secretly expressed resolve to
frame it in such a manner as would make acceptance
impossible.» Moreover, unless the German Government
had already identified itself with Berchtold's views, such
a document would have provided ample ground for a
peaceful settlement; for its terms could easily have been
interpreted as committing Serbia to as stringent an
enquiry as European opinion might desire. The only
obscure point which it contains is the assertion that the
Serbian Government had " at once declared its readiness
to take legal proceedings " against any Serbian subject
who might be implicated. It is quite true that Samou-
prava, the official Government organ, gave abstract
expression to such a view when deploring the murder;
and there is no evidence, either in the Serbian Blue Book
1 See Serbian Blue Book, Nos. 23, 25, 31.
2 D.D., I., No. 86. The main portions of this Note, supplemented by other
details not given in the Berlin copy, were also circulated to all Legations abroad
(see Serbian Blue Book, No. 30). It is very strange that the version published in
the Serbian Blue Book also contains the pledge to introduce " a more drastic
law against the misuse of explosives," but that this does not occur in the Berlin
version.
Hermann
Wendel
(Die Habsburger und die Südslawenfrage, p. 60)
quotes the former only, assigning to it the date of 10 July instead of 19 July —
a very important discrepancy, due perhaps to a misprint.
3 See infra, p.p. 187, 194.
136
or elsewhere, of any official action having been taken from
Belgrade in this sense.
In point of fact, this passive attitude was entirely in
keeping with the character and political tactics of the
Serbian Premier. Mr. Pasic has always preferred to wait
upon events rather than commit himself to a definite line
of action; and he has also always shown a truly Oriental
indifference to public opinion both about himself and
about his country. The repeated failure to make the most
of Serbia's case before Europe, even when it most lent
itself to favourable presentment and when its enemies
were active in misstatement, must be ascribed in large
part to this indifference. Of all the subsequent collec-
tions of diplomatic documents the Serbian Blue Book
holds a record for paucity of material and inadequacy;
though it is but fair to add that in preparing it for
publication the Government was seriously handicapped
by its precipitate withdrawal from Belgrade to Nis, many
documents having perforce been left behind.1
Energetic action by Mr. Pasic during the week or even
fortnight following the murder would not, of course,
have led the war party in Vienna to renounce its aims;
but it would undoubtedly have deprived it of its tactical
position, and increased the chances of friendly mediation
from the outside. To this extent, then, the Pasic Cabinet
must share the responsibility for what befell. It could no
doubt plead absorption in an electoral campaign which
threatened the whole future of the Radical party; but a
true grasp of European realities should have shown that
infinitely more was at stake. Yet Pasic remained passive,
took no steps to put himself in the right at Vienna, and,
on the other hand, allowed the reservists to be dismissed,
1 It is only in the year 1925, since the completion of a new and adequate
Foreign Office in Belgrade and the recovery of the documents removed during
the Austrian occupation, that it has been possible to reorganise the Serbian
archives on modern lines. When this process is complete, the Serbian Government
will at last be able to fulfil its promise, and publish an adequate collection of
documents on the origin of the war.
137
took no measures for the defence of Belgrade, and left
the Commander-in-Chief, Voivode Putnik, to pursue his
cure unwarned in an Austrian watering-place. All this
doubtless serves to show that Pasic was not preparing for
war, or even expecting it, till the very end; but it convicts
him of great remissness and lack of judgment.
Pasic's passive attitude was shared by the officials of the
Serbian Foreign Office. The British Chargé d'Affaires,
Mr. Crackanthorpe, reports on 2 July to London that
" high words " passed between Mr. Grujic and the
Austrian Counsellor, Herr von Storck, when the latter
broached the idea of an investigation.1 Much later, on
19 July, he himself discussed with Mr. Grujic The Times's
suggestion that Serbia would do well to institute a
Voluntary enquiry, and so forestall Vienna. But he was
"met by the doctrinaire view that until the Sarajevo
proceedings
were
published
the
Serbian
Government
"had no material on which such an enquiry could be
based." He added that while an influential party in
Vienna " wished to press Serbia to extremes," his
Government " had certain knowledge that restraint would
be exercised on Austria from Berlin,"* but unfortunately
he gives no indication as to the source of his infor-
mation.
This
disastrous
miscalculation
of
the
per-
manent officials combined with the political absorption
of their chiefs, and a golden opportunity was wasted.
There was, however, a further reason for the Serbian
Government's inaction at this critical time,
namely, the
rôle played by the " Black Hand."· This secret society
had been founded in 1911 by survivors of the group of
offeers which
had assassinated King
Alexander and
Gheen Draga in 1903, and which had been broken up
very largely by British diplomatic intervention. Its
1 Unprinted British Documents, Crackanthorpe to Grey, 2 July.
2 Unprinted British Documents, Crackanthorpe to Grey, 19 July.
4 This nickname was first given to it during a campaign launched in the
Belgrade Press by an Austrian Jew named Konitzer, at the instance of the
notorious Count Forgâch, then Austro-Hungarian Minister.
138
real name was " Union or Death " (" Ujedinjenje ili
Smrt "), and its adherents were drawn from those who
frankly accepted murder and terrorism
as the best
propagandist weapons, and were not content with the
more open and respectable methods of social and educa-
tional agitation for which the Narodna Odbrana (or
Society of National Defence) had been founded in 1909,
after the Bosnian crisis. It may be pointed out in passing
— as a proof of the unreliability of the Austrian Secret
Service — that both before and after the Sarajevo outrage
Vienna completely failed to distinguish between the two
organisations, though anyone at all closely acquainted
with conditions at Belgrade knew them to be not merely
distinct, but directly antagonistic to one another, and to
be conducted by persons who were poles apart in outlook
and policy.1
The Narodna Odbrana was founded on the initiative of
the dramatist Nusic, with the blessing of such tried
statesmen as Milovanovic and Ljuba Stojanovic and the
active
co-operation
of
young
idealists
like
Skerlic,
Bozo Markovié, and Marjanovic, and existed to combat
illiteracy and encourage popular education, temperance,
and hygiene, to establish village libraries, clubs, and
lectures, and, above all, to spread information and
interest regarding national questions in all sections of
the Slav race. This brought it inevitably into conflict
with the Austro-Hungarian authorities, but there was
nothing secret or subversive in its programme or tactics,
except in so far as all national movements are bound to be
subversive in a mixed state.
Very different was the " Black Hand." It was founded
in the first instance as a kind of protest against the
1 This crass blunder is repeated by Alfred von Wegerer in his elaborate
treatise " Der Anlass zum Weltkriege " (Die Kriegsschiildfrage for June 1925,
p. 356). He treats the " Black Hand " as " in connection with " the Narodna
Odbrana,
though
the
two
were
notoriously
at
enmity.
He
also
prints
quite
imaginary details regarding a secret section of the latter " for the execution of
terrorist acts."
139
Government's refusal to authorise an active terrorist
campaign in Macedonia, and its members were avowedly
conspirators who ignored scruples and did not stick at
crime. This tendency was increased by the melodramatic
method of admission to membership; the candidate had
to appear in a darkened room before a table draped in
black, and take a high-sounding oath by the sun and
earth, by God, honour, and life, while the symbol of the
conspirators was a rude representation of a death's head,
banner, dagger, bomb, and poison glass, surmounted
by the motto " Union or Death."1 The life and soul of
this society was Dragutin Dimitrijevic, a man of good
education
and
attractive
personality,
brave,
energetic,
and a fiery patriot, and possessing real powers of organisa-
tion, but entirely lacking in balance or common sense,
and ruthless in his ambition. Personal vanity and a love
of adventure also seem to have played their part, and he
possessed sufficient magnetism and plausibility to rally
round him some of the more unruly and reckless of the
younger officers.
These were troublous times for Serbia, and quite a
number of the group distinguished themselves in the two
Balkan Wars, and came to play an increasing part in
military circles. In 1913 Dimitrijevic himself, now a
colonel, became head of the Intelligence Bureau of the
General Staff, and all matters of espionage passed
through his hands. How much the Government knew of
the " Black Hand's " real organisation and aims it is
very difficult to determine, but for every possible reason
— -moral, political, and purely tactical — they looked upon
it with disfavour and suspicion, and there was already
acute friction between them early in 1913, because
Dimitrijevic and his friends, being specially interested in
1 For a full account of the " Black Hand " see S. Stanojevic, Die Ermordung
des Erzherzogs (1923), pp. 46-56; H. Wendel, Die Habsburgéi- und die Südslawen
Vx924); D. R. Lazarevic, Die schwarze Hand (Lausanne, 1917); and my own
article, " Serbia's Choice," in the New Europe for 22 August, 1918; but above
all, Tajna Prevratna Organizacija (the report of the Salonica Trial of 1917).
140
Bosnia, favoured concessions to Bulgaria. This friction
developed after the Second War into a quarrel between
the civil administration and the army commanders in
Macedonia. The new officials appointed from Belgrade
were quite unequal to an admittedly difficult task, and, as
the Serbian Constitution was not at first extended to the
new territories, there was a virtual interregnum in wThich
all kinds of sharp practices were tolerated. The dispute
sometimes assumed most petty forms, and early in 1914
a number of officers associated with the " Black Hand "
demanded that a ministerial order giving precedence to
the civil authorities should be rescinded.
By this time the Government was thoroughly alarmed
by the aggressive tactics of the " Black Hand," and,
though now seemingly near the end of its resources, made
a last effort to reassert its authority. In the spring
Protic, the masterful Minister of the Interior, seized the
club premises of " Union or Death " — a step virtually
equivalent to a declaration of war. He is said to have
concentrated 3,000 gendarmes in Belgrade as a safeguard
against possible action. Dimitrijevic on his side appears
to have wished to accept the challenge and to attempt a
sort of military coup d'état; and only the intervention of
the Russian Minister, Mr. Hartwig, who induced the
Government to withdraw the objectionable order, averted
more serious trouble.1 Protic's action, however, deserves
special emphas
is, as one of the many proofs that the
Serbian authorities, so far from being in league with the
terrorists, were in acute and open conflict with them.
Not merely this, but " Apis " has been accused of plan-
ning a military revolt and the overthrow of the Pasic
Cabinet, and, though this cannot be regarded as proved,
there is nothing in the least improbable in it.2
1 Stanojevié, op. cit., p. 54.
2 Herr von Wegerer, in the article already quoted {Kriegsschuldfrage, June
1925), calmly ignores this and treats the " Black Hand " as " enjoying great
prestige -with the Serbian Government at the outbreak of war! " Two such funda-
mental misconceptions deprive him of the right to be taken seriously on the whole
question.
141
On the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind that
" Union or Death " had the support of many officers who
were not terrorists, and that Dimitrijevic only revealed
his real aims and secrets to a small inner ring of tried
conspirators. It has been alleged1 that as early as 1911
he had sent an emissary to Vienna with instructions to
attempt the life of Francis Joseph or Francis Ferdinand
but the individual selected was in a highly consumptive
state, and was never heard of again by the plotters in
Belgrade. Hence, though widely known for his love of
intrigue and reckless patriotism, " Apis," as Dimitrijevic
was popularly called, had not yet embarked upon terrorist
action, save for the encouragement given to Komitadji
bands during the Balkan campaigns; and this, of course,
falls rather under the category of guerrilla warfare. It was
among these band-leaders that " Apis " found his chief
assistant, a certain Voja Tankosic, who as a young
lieutenant had taken part in the murder plot of 1903.
Tankosic was not a man of high ability, but an ideal
instrument; for he could keep his own counsel, and
behind a calm and even insignificant exterior hid a savage
and ill-disciplined nature.«
His adventures in Macedonia had brought him a certain
notoriety and attracted to him some of the wilder students
in Belgrade. Among these were the two young Bosnians,
Princip and Cabrinovic, who were already deeply infected
by revolutionary doctrine, and whose abnormal state of
health rendered them apt pupils in terrorism. Tankosic
therefore provided them with weapons and trained them
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