is shown by another highly significant detail. Milovic,
1 Since the war I have learnt of one place in Dalmatia where the Archduke
was expected to spend the night on his way to Bosnia, and where several youths,
entirely unconnected with any Bosnian organisation, at once resolved that he
should not leave it alive. This is by no means an isolated instance.
2
cf. article by Cubrilovic's third brother Branko, in Nova Evropa of 1 June,
1925.
149
the Prina fisherman who linked up the two " under-
ground " systems, fled in a panic to Serbia after the
murder, and appealed for help to Bozo Milanovic, presi-
dent of the local section of the Narodna Odbrana in
Sabac. But Milanovic received him roughly and refused
to harbour him. " You never told me what you were
at," he said. " Now you can go back and stand the
racket." Miiovié returned home, and was arrested and
eventually imprisoned at Möllersdorf, where he died from
neglect, following upon an operation rendered necessary
by ill usage.1
This little incident admirably illustrates the relative
positions of the Narodna Odbrana and the " Black
Hand," for it reveals the attitude of responsible members
of the former towards an act of terrorism. At one point
in the trial the Public Prosecutor pressed Princip for the
names of persons in Serbia privy to his designs, and
received the answer that " no one except Ciganovic and
ourselves knew." " Did no one of the Narodna Odbrana
know? " he was asked. " What about the major who
gave you weapons?" (i.e. Tankosic). " Tankosic had
nothing to do with the Narodna Odbrana," replied
Princip. " He was on very bad terms with it. His
share in the crime was his own personal affair, which has
nothing in common with Serbia." This merely confirms
what had long been known from other sources.»
In this connection it is important to lay stress upon
the independent attitude and pronounced views of all
the young men incriminated in the murder. Strongly
as we are bound to condemn their action, we are equally
bound to admit that from first to last they gloried in it,
unhesitatingly accepted the consequences, and repudiated
l The above story was told by him at the time to his fellow-prisoner Vaso
Cubrilovic (now Professor at one of the gymnasia of Sarajevo), who repeated it to
me. See also P. Slijepevic, " Omladina i Sarajevski Atentat " {Nova Evropa,
21 June, 1925, p. 546).
2 But which is carefully overlooked by the Ballplatz in 1914, and by Herr von
Wegerer to-day.
150
all idea of external influence. This proud and self-
conscious attitude never varied, even though some of
them were cruelly mishandled in prison, and on more
than one occasion were bespattered with mud by Tirolese
soldiers as they entered the court-house. Almost with-
out exception they affirmed their belief in Jugoslav Unity
as the motive of their action — some, like Popovic,
claiming to be equally Serb and Croat; others, like Vaso
Cubrilovic, refusing to admit any distinction between
the two; others, again, like Grabez, declaring that with
all of them " national belief " had taken the place of
religious conviction.1
Princip himself, who, according to eye-witnesses of
every shade of opinion, stood shoulders high above all
the rest for determination and clearness of conception,
provided two useful clues in the course of his evidence.
Asked by the President of the Court whether he had
said " that it was Serbia's moral duty, as the free portion
of the Jugoslavs, to liberate the unfree Jugoslavs/' he
replied, " Yes, but not now, because now Serbia is
exhausted" (after the two wars). Asked by the Public
Prosecutor how he could imagine, after the experience
of 1908 and 1912, that Austria-Hungary would remain
inactive in the face of such an outrage, he replied,
" Because the whole affair was our entirely private under-
taking, and not official, as the indictment says. Serbia
had nothing to do with it, and so cannot be responsible
for our deed." This statement, made some months after
the outbreak of war, unquestionably represents the real
mentality of the Bosnian youth. To them Serbia was
Piedmont, upon whom their future hopes rested; but
for that very reason they were eager to show their own
prowess, to prove that the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy
were worthy of their free kinsmen, holding that they
" who would be free, themselves must strike the blow. "
1 See Slijepcevic, " Jugoslovenstvo Sarajevskih Atentatora " (Nova Evropa,
1 June, 1925, pp. 489-502), consisting mainly of extracts írom the stenographic
reports of the trial.
151
Of Serbian official complicity the stenographic records
of the trial do not reveal even the faintest trace.1
It must be added that of all the various groups in
Serbia the politicians were the very last to attract the
sympathies of the new generation in Bosnia. The young
men looked to the Serbian army leaders, to the Serbian
peasant soldier, to the group of intellectuals at Belgrade
who were working for Jugoslav Unity in the purely
intellectual
sphere
(men
like
Skerlic,
Cvijic,
Bozo
Markovic, and others), and, lastly, the wilder of them
looked to the fanatics of the " Black Hand." But they
realised even at that date that Serbian government
circles,
and
notably
Mr.
Pasic
and
his
immediate
entourage,
had
no
comprehension
whatever
for
the
Jugoslav ideal, and looked at everything from a narrow
Serbian
and
Orthodox
angle.
This
fact
has
grown
steadily more apparent in the ten eventful years that
followed the murder, and to-day it is no accident that
the Pasic clique is still engaged in combating the Jugoslav
idea, while the survivors of the Bosnian revolutionary
movement,
as
confirmed
Jugoslavs,
find
themselves,
almost without exception, in the Opposition camp.
One last anecdote deserves to be quoted, as illustrating
the standpoint of the conspirators. A few weeks before
the murder the group in Sarajevo had decided to reveal
their intentions to Nikola Stojanovic, one of the most
active of the younger Bosnian Serb leaders,* but, on
learning that he was on the point of visiting Belgrade,
they at once changed their mind and kept the secret to
themselves, fearing (and quite rightly) that he would
1 The reports, as pub
lished during the war by Professor " Pharos " (an assumed
name), are very incomplete, and often inaccurate; their author is ignorant of
the very elements of the problem out of which the trial arose, and actually
onfuses the Jugoslav idea with a political party (p. 23). The full reports have
ever been published, partly because the original was removed from Sarajevo to
lenna and has therefore not been available to the Jugoslavs since the war. A
carbon copy has, however, recently been found in Sarajevo, and there is some
hope that they may soon be published in their entirety. They obviously provide
the
best
due
now
available
for
the
motives
of
the
conspirators.
Afterwards a. prominent member of the Jugoslav Committee abroad.
152
have warned the Serbian Government, and thus frustrated
their plans.1 To-day the unanimous view of " Young
Bosnia " may be summed up in the phrase of Mr.
Slijepcevic,2 " The Youth (of Bosnia) worked without
the Government (of Serbia), secretly from the Govern-
ment, and against the Government."·
Enough evidence has been accumulated above to show
that the theory of direct complicity on the part of the
Serbian
Government
is
preposterous
and
untenable.
It still remains to consider the highly important question
whether the Serbian Government had any inkling of
what was on foot, and could have prevented the crime
by timely warning. In view of its acute conflict with the
" Black Hand," it clearly could have learnt nothing
from that quarter, still less have had any share in the
plot. But there is reason to believe that Cabrinovic
talked indiscreetly when still in Belgrade/ and that
something came to the ears of the police.
In any case, the question has been raised afresh by an
extraordinary article written on the tenth anniversary
1
This I learnt both from Mr. Stojanovié himself and from the survivors of
the conspiracy.
2
Secretary of the Prosvjeta Society, and an intimate of the leading revolution-
arie s, though not himself a terrorist.
3
Omladina je radila bez Vlade, tajno od Vlade, i protiv Vlade (op. cit., Nova
Evr opa, p. 545).
4
Jevtic, op. cit., p. 30. Cabrinovic was the son of an Austrian police agent,
and , when the Belgrade police wished to expel him because his papers were not
in order, the Austro-Hungarian Consulate is alleged to have protested. This was
stated in Balkan of 1 July, 1914, and reproduced in the Austrian Press without
denial. On this basis a theory was evolved during the war that Cabrinovic and
Princip had no connection with each other, and that the former was an Austrian
agent
provocateur, or even planning murder in the interests of Vienna. This
theor
y,
however,
was
finally
exploded by Jevtié's pamphlet. The two youths
carefully avoided each other on the eve of the murder, but simply as an additional
precaution.
But th
e fact that Cabrinovié's father was an Austrian agent is true, and serves
as proof in quite another direction;
for it shows that nationalist and revolution-
ary sentiments had struck deep root even i
n the most doubtful soil.
Potiorek, with a view to discrediting Bilinski, assert ed in his first report to
Vienna that Cabrinovic had been expelled from Bosnia, but returned there in
1913, thanks to Bilinski's intervention. The first half of this is true, but the
second half appears to be a sheer invention, and is indignantly denied by Bilinski
in his Memoirs.
153
of the war by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic, then President of
the Skupstina, and at the time of the murder Minister of
Education in the Pasic Cabinet.1 " I do not remember
whether it was at the end of May or beginning of June," he
tells us, " that one day Mr. Pasic said to us that certain per-
sons (neki) were preparing to go to Sarajevo and murder
Francis Ferdinand, who was about to go there and be
solemnly received on St. Vitus's Day." He adds that
the criminals belonged to a secretly organised group of
Bosnian students in Belgrade, that the Minister of the
Interior, Mr. Protic, with the approval of his colleagues,
gave orders to the frontier authorities on the Drina to
prevent the young men from crossing, but that the
" authorities " (the inverted commas are his), being
themselves in the plot, passed them over, and told
Belgrade that it was too late. Later on he describes his
alarm and horror on receiving by telephone the first news
from Sarajevo: " Though I knew what was being prepared
there, yet, as I held the receiver, it was as though someone
had unexpectedly dealt me a heavy blow." The whole
article is WTitten in a careless, naïve, and reminiscent
vein, and its author seems to be blissfully unaware how
damning are his admissions, if they are to be taken
literally — as we are surely entitled to do when a politician
of real prominence writes on a subject which vitally
concerns his country's honour and his own.
The reader is at once tempted to enquire whether
Belgrade may not have taken steps to warn Vienna of
the projected plot, in which case Serbia would be fully
absolved from all blame; and it may be remembered that
rumours of such a warning were circulated immediately
after the murder.2 It is indeed true that Mr. J. M. Jovanovic,
the Serbian Minister in Vienna, who was too well informed
n°t to be alarmed at the situation in the Southern
provinces, went on his own initiative to Bilinski, in the
1
Krv
Slovenstva
{Blood
of
Slavdom),
Belgrade,
1924.
2 It first occurs in an interview given by Mr. Spalajkovié to Novoye Vremya
June or 1july). It was officially denied by the Ballplatz on 3 July.
154
first week of June, and urged upon him the inadvisability
of the Archduke's visit to Sarajevo on Vidovdan, since
it would inevitably be regarded by all Serbs on both
sides of the frontier as an act of provocation. It has
sometimes been asserted that Jovanovic on 18 June
received official instructions from Pasic to convey a
warning to the Ballplatz, but I have the most explicit
assurances on the part of Mr. Jovanovic himself that
no such instructions were ever received or acted upon.1
There thus rests upon Belgrade the onus of proving
either that the information at its disposal was much
more vague than Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic would have us
believe, or that it conveyed an adequate warning of the
danger in some way of which no record has yet reached us.
Central Europe, in Britain, and in America, Belgrade
has allowed nearly nine months to pass without issuing
any official statement of any kind. A Blue Book was
promised in April, but nothing more has been heard of it.
The matter can hardly rest here. Public opinion in
Europe and America is more interested than ever in
the problem of responsibility for the Great War, and is
entitled to demand a full and detailed explanation from
Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic and from his chief Mr. Pasic.
1 The statement first occurs in the late M. Ernest Denis' La Grande Serbie
(1916) p. 277, and must have come to him from some Serbian official source.
It is given in full detail in an article of the Wiener Sonn und Montags-Zeitung of
23 July, 1924, on the authority of Mr. George Josimovié, who was secretary at
the Serbian Legation in Vienna at the time of the murder. I am, however,
assured by Mr. Josimovic himself that he never made any such statement, and
that the facts contained in it are entirely false. There is good reason to believe
that the article was written by the notorious Leopold Mandl, who for nearly two
decades has led the official Austrian Press campaign against Serbia, and now
continues it simultaneously in the Reichspost, the chief organ of the Christian
Socialist Party in Vienna, and in La Federation Balcanique, a monthly Communist
paper maintained in Vienna by the Russian Soviet Government!
2 Bilinski himself, in his Memoirs, is silent as to any such warning. He also
expressly denies having warned the Emperor against the Archduke's visit; " for
I had no reason to interfere in this military journey." It is, of course, clear that
Bilinski's mind, as he writes, is concentrated above all upon the conflict between
military and civil to which we have already referred in the text. Baron Rummers-
kirch, then Master of the Archduke's household, has also denied that Bilinski
ever came to him with such a story, and, though there is an obvious motive for
such a denial, it is probably true.
155
Failing that, it will henceforth be necessary for the
historian, while exposing the aggressive Balkan policy
of the Ballplatz and emphasising the criminal negligence
of the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia, to convict
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