Following upon the designs of the Council of 7 July, it
was decided that the Minister of War and the Chief of
General Staff should go on leave from Vienna on 11 July,
and Berchtold himself confided to Tschirschky that this
wras done "deliberately in order to allay any anxiety."1
In this he acted upon a memorandum of Baron Conrad,
who urged the need for avoiding any premature alarm
of their opponents, such as might give rise to precau-
tionary measures.1
Conrad himself has quite frankly
published in his Memoirs an account of his interview
with Berchtold as early as 8 July. It was then that the
decision to go on leave was actually taken, and it appears
that Berchtold had already fixed upon 22 July for the
presentation of an " ultimatum " to Serbia '
—
from
which it may be inferred that he was already confident
of converting or " rushing " Tisza. The consequences
of an invasion of Serbia and a war with R ussia were then
di
scussed, and Berchtold's concluding words were:
1 Tschirschky to Berlin, 10 July, D.D., i., No. 29, p. 50; confirmed by Conrad
himself in Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, ίν., ρ. 61.
2 D.A., i., No. 14
3 Conrad, op. cit., ív., p. 61-2.
203
" above all no measures which could betray us: nothing
must be done which could attract attention."
The Ballplatz Press Bureau naturally took care to
spread the news, and The Times correspondent, like many
others, duly fell into the trap. On 15 July he announces l
that not only Conrad and Krobatin but the two Ministers
of National Defence also have gone on leave, and he
definitely links up this fact with an improvement upon
the Viennese Bourse. Meanwhile, on 16 July, Szögyény
reports to Berchtold that the Italian Ambassador in
Berlin had been showing signs of " extreme anxiety,"
but that he was reassured — in other words, misled — on
learning that Krobatin and Conrad had left Vienna.'
It must be added that Berlin not merely regarded this
manner of duping Europe as very " clever,"* but itself
adopted similar methods. That invaluable witness, Herr
von Schoen, the Bavarian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin,
tells his own Government on 18 July that it was the
intention of Berlin to cite the Emperor's absence in
Norway and the leave of absence of Moltke and
Falkenhayn 1 as proofs that " it was just as much
surprised by Austria's action as the other Powers."1
That Berlin connived in other ways also at Vienna's
efforts to delude Europe is shown by an interesting press
incident. On 19 July the Official Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung
published
an
article
which
treated
Austria-
Hungary's demand for " clarification " (Tisza's phrase)
as warranted in the opinion of Europe, and then went
on as follows: " We associate ourselves with the hope
expressed in more than one quarter that a serious crisis
will be averted by the Serbian Government giving way
in good time." In any case the interests of Europe as
a whole " make it appear desirable and necessary that
any discussion between Austria-Hungary and Serbia
1 The Times of 16 July.
2 Szögyény to Berchtold. D.A., i., No. 23.
3 D.D., iv., Anhang iv., No. 2, p. 126.
4 He might have added Tirpitz.
5 ibid., p. 128; cf. also supra, pp. 179. 193 and infra, p. 238.
204
should remain localised." This article, which was of
course much commented upon throughout the European
press, exercised a depressing influence upon the Bourse
of Berlin and led The Times 1 to print its first really
alarmist headline. In point of fact, however, it had
been intended by the Wilhelmstrasse as a sedative, as
transpires from a telegram sent by Jagow to Tschirschky
on the previous day.2 In it he warns the Ambassador
that an article is to appear on the 19th, " mild in tone
out of consideration for European diplomacy," but that
it is not to be regarded in Vienna as " drawing back "
on the part of Germany. It is incidents such as
these that make it impossible to deny that Berlin
was
throughout
July
the
constant
accomplice
of
Vienna.
These are, however, merely isolated facts which chance
has left on record. Far more important and equally
deliberate were the steps which Berchtold took at almost
every European capital to delude those in authority and
prevent any possibility of intervention in favour of
peace. No survey of the Austro-Serbian dispute would
be complete without a reference to these manoeuvres,
and it will perhaps be more convenient to carry their
story right on to the date of the actual rupture with
Serbia before dealing with the Note itself and its reception
by the Serbian Government. It is obvious that a detailed
diplomatic analysis of the fatal " Twelve Days " would
lead far beyond the purpose of the present volume, but
if Serbia's position in the fatal quarrel that plunged half
the world in war is to be correctly estimated, it is essential
to marshal all those facts which reveal a definite design
of action rather than a mere drifting towards disaster.
There is doubtless much still hidden from us, perhaps
much that will never become known, but what has already
been revealed is amply sufficient for our purpose. Indeed,
it may be asserted that never before has the searchlight
1 21 July, " An Ominous Scare."
2 18 July, D.D., L, No. 70.
205
of history been able, so soon after the event, to penetrate
the obscure corners of a great diplomatic tragedy.
BERCHTOLD AND ST. PETERSBURG
In St. Petersburg itself the murder had created a
highly unwelcome situation; for not merely was Russian
official opinion peculiarly sensitive to such incidents, so
reminiscent of Russian internal conditions, but it was at
once felt to provide Austria-Hungary with the very sort
of pretext for aggression in the Balkans for which she had
been seeking, and of which it had been Russia's constant
aim to deprive her.
The first definite indication of the Russian attitude is
the friendly warning given by the Foreign Minister, Mr.
Sazonov,
to
the
Austro-Hungarian
Charge
d'Affaires,
Count Otto Czernin,1 as early as 5 July. His reference
to the constant Austrian press attacks upon Serbia and
their irritating effect upon Russian opinion led Count
Czernin to mention the possibility of his Government
instituting a search for the criminals on Serbian soil.
To this Sazonov rejoined, " No country has had to
suffer
more
than
Russia
from
crimes
prepared
on
foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in
any
country
whatsoever
the
procedure
with
which
your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such
a course."8 This argument goes to the root of the
whole matter and ought never to be lost sight of in any
consideration of Russia's action during the crisis.
As time passed, and apart from blustering articles in
the Austrian and Magyar press, no action of any kind
was taken in Vienna, St. Petersburg grew calmer and
reassured, and the chief centre of interest was the
approaching
visit
of
the
French
President.
Sazonov
himself took five days' leave on 14 July, and his two
1 Not to be confused with his kinsman, Count Ottokár Czernin, then Minister
in Bucarest, and afterwards Foreign Minister.
2 Paléologue to Viviani, 6 July; French Yellow Book, No. 10.
206
chief subordinates, Neratov and Trubetskoy, were also
out of town.
The Russian attitude was at this time made very
clear to King Charles of Roumania, who repeated it to
the German Charge d'Affaires in Bucarest.1 The idea
of war, Sazonov assured the King, was highly distasteful
to Russia, since it would involve the risk of " far too
many
internal
disturbances."
On
the
other
hand,
Russia could not possibly remain inactive in the event
of an Austro-Hungarian attack upon Serbia.1
On 18 July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count
Frederick Szápáry, had what appears to have been his
first
conversation
with
Sazonov
on
the
subject
of
Austro-Serbian relations, as affected by the murder. On
this occasion Sazonov expressed himself as " somewhat
disquieted " by the latest news from Vienna, but was
quite emphatic in his disbelief in Serbian official com-
plicity. Szápáry took shelter behind his ignorance of
the results of the Sarajevo enquiry, but stated that
" Vienna was convinced that the Serbian Government
would come to meet any possible demands on our part."2
To the German Ambassador Sazonov spoke much more
frankly, criticising the official tolerance of anti-Serb
excesses in Bosnia after the murder, denying the exist-
ence of any considerable " loyal population " in that
province — " except at most a few Moslems and
Catholics " — and insisting on the correct attitude of the
Serbian Government.« Pourtalès, in reporting this to
Berlin, emphasises the intense hostility of the Minister
towards
Austria-Hungary
and
the
increasing
Russian
contempt for that country. In a later conversation he
could not resist charging Sazonov to his face with
" irreconcilable blind hatred for Austria," to which the
1 Prince Waldburg to Berlin, n July, D.D., L, No. 41.
2 The same attitude was ascribed to Sazonov by the Roumanian statesman,
Mr. Take Jonescu, in conversation with Prince Lichnowsky in London on 23
July, Lichnowsky to Berlin, 23 July; D.D., i., No. 129.
3 Szápáry to Berchtold, 18 July; D.A., i., No. 25, p. 61.
4 Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 13 July, D.D., i., No. 53.
207
Minister rejoined, " Hate does not correspond with my
character, and so I do not hate Austria, but I despise
her."1
When he next met Sazonov, a week later, the latter was
already highly alarmed, as a result of reports from London,
Paris and Rome, and if Pourtalès is to be believed, the
conversation took a very animated turn, the Foreign
Minister denouncing in particular the dangerous policy
of Forgách and Tisza and the warlike aims of the Clerical
group round the late Archduke, and again insisting
upon " the entirely correct behaviour of the Belgrade
Government."1
He
warned
the
Ambassador
that
" Austria-Hungary, if absolutely bent on disturbing the
peace, must not forget that she would have to reckon
with Europe," and that Russia would not tolerate a
" humiliation " of Serbia, or indeed an ultimatum to
her. This, and similar language employed towards the
Italian Ambassador, Marquis Carlotti,3 was duly re-
ported to Berlin, which was thus fully warned of the
extreme danger of Russian intervention if Vienna could
not be restrained. But of restraining influence there
was less question than ever, and the running comments
of William upon Szápáry's telegram4 show, on the
contrary, real irritation at the possibility of restraint.5
On 20 July, Szápáry received the text of the Note to
Serbia, and the covering Note for the Powers6 and the
verbal comments with which he was to place it in Sazonov's
hands on the morning of the 24th.7 With this secret
explosive in his breast he attended President Poincaré's
reception of the diplomatic corps on 21 July, and in
reply to an enquiry regarding Austro-Serbian relations
1 Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 25 July, D.D., L, No. 204.
2 ibid., Pourtaks to Bethmann Hollweg, 21 July, D.D., i.. No. 120.
3 ibid., p. 141.
4 ibid., pp. 138-41.
5 e.g. on Sazonov's phrase, " there must in no case be any question of an
ultimatum," William comments with obvious satisfaction, " is already there 1 "
(ist bereits da!), ibid., p. 141.
6 D.A., i., No. 29.
7 D.A., i., No. 30 (5).
208
had the effrontery to declare that Vienna " regarded the
situation with calm, being convinced that Serbia would
not reject what we should have to ask."1
Poincaré's question as to the nature of these demands
he evaded by the grossly dishonest statement that " the
enquiry was still proceeding and he knew nothing as to
its result." The President's arguments against holding
official Serbia responsible for what had happened and
his attempt to draw analogies from the murder of Carnot
and similar events, Szápáry treats as " tactless " and
"
threatening
in
tone,"
strongly
contrasting
with
Sazonov's " reserved and cautious attitude." Pourtalès
also reports to Berlin1 his colleague Szápáry's impres-
sion that " Poincaré is inciting here to a conflict with the
Triple Alliance," but adds his own view that on the
contrary the President's remarks were due to the prompt-
ing of Sazonov, who was engaged ona" policy of bluff."
; Poincaré on his part was unfavourably impressed, and
suspected that Szápáry had received orders to be silent,
and that Austria-Hungary was preparing a coup de
theâtre.*
The French guests left St. Petersburg on the night of
the 23rd, before news of the delivery of the Note in
Belgrade at six could reach St. Petersburg; and it was
not till the next morning that Szápáry, according to
instructions,
communicated
it
to
Sazonov.
Austria-
Hungary, the
Ambassador assured him,
"
felt
free
from all feeling of disfavour (Missgunst) and ill-will
towards Serbia," and indeed had, during the crisis of
1912, made it possible by a " genial and disinterested
attitude " for Serbia to double her territory.4 Her sole
object was to protect the Monarchy against " insurrec-
tionary miasmas " from the neighbouring Kingdom and
to check their tolerance by the Serbian Government.
1 Szápáry to Berchtold, July 21, D.A., i., No. 45.
2 23 July, D.D., i., No. 134.
3Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars, i., p. 10.
4 D.A., i., No. 30 (5); Berchtold's instructions to Szápáry.
209
The Ballplatz had accumulated ample evidence to prove
the connection between the murder and Belgrade, and
to render further forbearance impossible, and it now
relied on Russia's solidarity in action to repress regicide
and anarchy.
Statements
so
conventional
and
so
obviously
at
variance with the facts could hardly have produced a
favourable effect at any time, but coming as they did
only a few hours after the President's departure, they
supplied
additional
evidence
of
Berchtold's
duplicity,
and above all, of his eagerness to handicap Russia by
making effective consultation with her Western ally
impossible.
If Sazonov had known what we know to-day — that so
far from establishing Serbian complicity the Ballplatz
had had in its possession since 13 July the admission of
its own official investigator that that complicity was
not merely hard to establish but definitely improbable —
his indignation might have been even greater. A further
proof of duplicity, also not yet in Sazonov's hands at the
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