would be a rash step, and would provoke a European
conflagration.
Lichnowsky,
in
repeating
this
to
his
colleague Mensdorff, expressed his own conviction that
the invasion of Serbia would drive Britain into the
opposite camp. Mensdorff himself had a similar con-
versation with Grey on the same day, in which the latter
again described the Note to Serbia as " the greatest
humiliation to which an independent State had ever
been subjected,"7 and insisted that "if Austria is bent
on war with Serbia under all circumstances, and assumes
1 In D.D., ii., No. 304. The document as presented by Sir Edward Goschen
bears the date 27 July, and appears to have only reached the Wilhelmstrasse
on 28 July!
2 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 36.
3 Unprinted British Documents, Nicolson to Grey, telegram and letter, 26 July.
4 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 43. Goschen to Grey, 27 July.
5 ibid, No. 67; Grey to Goschen, 28 July.
6 Mensdorff to Berchtold, 27 July; D.A., ii., No. 71.
7 Mensdorff to Berchtold, 27 July; D.A., No. 72; cf. supra, pp. 227-31.
267
that Russia will remain passive, she takes upon herself
a great risk."
Next day Grey again expressed great disappointment
at
Austria-Hungary's
attitude
to
the
Serbian
Note,
pled for the Conference, and deprecated any military
action against Serbia in the meantime, to which Mens-
dorff could only answer that he feared that it was already
too late.1 And he was right, for before evening he was
instructed by Berchtold to assure Grey that " Serbia's
conciliatory attitude was only apparent, and intended to
deceive Europe," that it offered " no kind of guarantee "
for the future,2 and that in any case hostilities could no
longer be prevented, because the Serbs had already
attacked the Monarchy.3 The peculiar perfidy of this
last statement will become clear in a moment, when we
consider how Berchtold won Francis Joseph for war.
Mensdorff's despatches make it quite clear that Berch-
told, when he rejected Germany's appeal, was fully alive
to the possible consequences, while from Lichnowsky
we learn that Mensdorff and his whole staff freely admitted
that Vienna's sole aim was " the subjection of Serbia."*
The real reason of their intransigent mood was once again
the attitude of Berlin. On 27 July Jagow conveyed to
Berchtold5 the warning that during the next few days
British proposals for mediation might be transmitted to
him through Berlin, but that he might rest fully assured
that Berlin, so far from identifying itself with them, was
quite definitely opposed to their being considered, and
merely handed them on, because a refusal would injure
relations between Berlin and London. In other words,
Berlin behind Grey's back was working to defeat his
efforts at pacification, and encouraging its ally in its
1 Berchtold to Szögyény, quoting Mensdorff, 28 July; D.A., ii., No. 81.
2 Berchtold to Mensdorff, 28 July; D.A., ii., No. 89.
3 28 July (really 1 a.m. 29 July), O.A., No. 90 — to be contrasted with the
form in which the same document appears in No. 41 of the Austro-Hungarian
Rotbuch (1915). 4 See also Tschirschky to Berlin, 28 July, D.D., ii., No. 313.
5 Lichnowsky to Berlin, 28 July; D.D., ii., No. 301.
6 Szögyény to Berchtold, 27 July; D.A., ii., No. 68.
268
warlike
intentions. Next day the Chancellor himself
prepared
the
German
Federal
Governments
for
the
possibility of a European war by arguing that Austria-
Hungary could not yield " unless she wants to abdicate
finally as a Great Power," and warning them that if
Russia should intervene Germany would throw her whole
strength upon the side of her ally.1
SAZONOV'S OVERTURES TO VIENNA
2. While Grey was struggling manfully, but in vain,
on the one hand to hold back Vienna and on the other to
win Berlin for joint mediation, Sazonov had recovered
from the excitement into which Berchtold's bombshell
had thrown him upon the morrow of Poincaré's departure,
was making every effort to avert war, and in particular
urged Belgrade to the utmost limit of concession.
On 26 July he saw the German Ambassador, who
found him " far calmer and more conciliatory "; and
he appealed "urgently" for Berlin's help in "building
a bridge " which would satisfy Vienna's legitimate
demands.1 He emphasised his eagerness for peace, but
also the impossibility of Russia allowing Austria-Hungary
to reduce Serbia to the position of a " vassal state."
On the same day2 Sazonov had a conversation with
Szápáry which, according to the latter's report, must
have been exceedingly cordial.* The Ambassador denied
all idea of Austria-Hungary's aggressive designs in the
Balkans, or of an Austro-German preventive war against
Russia, represented Berchtold's action as one of " self-
preservation " against hostile propaganda, and re-echoed
the views expressed by Sir Edward Grey as to the terrible
consequences of an European war. To this Sazonov
1 D.D., ii., No. 307.
2 Pourtalès to Berlin, 26 July; D.D., i., No. 217.
3 Or on 27 July. There is a discrepancy on this point, for Szápáry 's report
of the conversation is dated as leaving St. Petersburg at 2.15 p.m. on 27 July
(D.A., ii., No. 73), whereas Pourtalès' summary of the same conversation is dated
10.10 p.m. on 26 July {D.D., i., p. 233).
4Szápáry to Berchtold (D.A., ii., No. 73).
269
responded by the assurance that the Tsar and his whole
Cabinet held similar views about Austria-Hungary, and
that the " old rancunes " which existed in Russia against
the Dual Monarchy were dying down. " As regards
the Slavs," he added, "he no doubt ought not to say
this to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, but he had
no feelings whatever for the Balkan Slavs," who were
" for Russia a heavy burden," to a degree that Vienna
could hardly conceive! 1
He next criticised the Note as " not fortunate in form,"
and, while admitting seven out of the ten demands to
be acceptable, took exception to points 4 and 5, arguing
that " consular intervention " in the enquiries should
be sufficient, and that to demand the wholesale dismissal
of officers without proofs adduced was to expose King
Peter to the danger of assassination. The Ambassador
very neatly retorted that such an argument was the best
justification of Vienna's attitude towards Serbia, but
Sazonov simply insisted that the Karagjorgjevic were
the last possible dynasty in Serbia, and that it was a
general interest to
avoid " anarchical convulsions " on
the
Hungarian
frontier.
He
ended
by
arguing
that
the question of the Note could be settled by changes of
wording, and suggested mediation by the King of Italy
or by King George. Szápáry, in transmitting Sazonov's
warm assurances, remarks that " Russian policy has
moved a long way in two days " — first abrupt rejection,
then sitting in judgment upon Vienna, then a plea for
" Europeanisation " of the dispute, and at last recognition
of the legitimate character of Vienna's claims and a search
for mediators. It is clear that Szápáry was greatly
impressed by Sazonov's attitude, though at the same time
warning his chief of parallel activities in Russian military
circles. His colleague Pourtalès was also impressed,
1 On 28 July Prince Trubetskoy (soon afterwards appointed Russian Minister
to Serbia) assured General Chelius, the German Military Attaché, " We don't
at all love the Serbs." Chelius to Berlin, D.D., ii., No. 337. William II's
comment on this is " Regicides " (Königs-und Fürstenmörder).
270
but in his report to Berlin treated the conversation as
a proof that Sazonov had " somewhat lost his nerve,
and was looking for ways of escape," x perhaps as a result
of news from Paris and London.
Here was the real opportunity for pacific effort, which,
indeed, Sazonov on his part promptly followed up by
instructing Shebeko to call upon Berchtold and suggest
a continuance of this friendly discussion, either in Vienna
or once more through Szápáry in St. Petersburg.2 But
Berchtold declined, on the double ground that public
opinion in Hungary and in Austria* would not under-
stand, and that Serbia had mobilised, and had even
opened hostilities on the Hungarian frontier, " though
Austria-Hungary had waited three days longer/ ' We have
already seen that this delay was due solely to Conrad's
desire to have the longest possible period for concentration,
and that the politicians both in Vienna and Berlin regarded
it with equal regret and embarrassment.
It is true that Berchtold had, late on 27 July, conveyed
to Sazonov and to the Marquis Carlotti4 an assurance
that, so long as war remained localised between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia, the former " did not intend to make
any territorial conquests."5 But, with this solitary excep-
tion, Berchtold showed no desire to conciliate Russia, and
allowed very hopeful overtures to lapse. Direct contact
between St. Petersburg and Vienna was not immediately
lost, but it is clear from these documents, not accessible at
the time, that both Berchtold and his Berlin advisers lacked
the will to peace, and that only a miracle could now have
averted the catastrophe. On the other hand, such eager
and cordial overtures on Sazonov's part deserve special
emphasis, as showing the Russian Government's genuine
desire for peace at a moment when power had by no means
passed into military hands.
1 D.D., i., No. 238.
2 This we learn írom Berchtold's own telegram of 28 July to Szâpâry. D.A.,
ii., No. 95.
3 He refers to the two in this significant order.
4 Italian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.
5 O.A., ii., No. 75(i)
271
The real criticism to which Sazonov is open is not that
he worked for war, but, on the contrary, that his keen
anxiety to avoid war led him to make a whole series of
suggestions or proposals which were not always clearly
thought out, and which, following in rapid succession,
misled both friend or foe as to his real intentions. On
24 July he wired to Strandtmann, the Russian Charge
d'Affaires at Nis, that " it would perhaps be better "
that in the event of an invasion by Austria the Serbs
should offer no resistance whatever, " but should retire
and issue an appeal to the Powers."1 On the 25th he
repeated this to Sir George Buchanan,2 and suggested
that Russia should stand aside and leave the question
in the hands of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.
It was this which led Grey to propose the Conference
à quatre. On the 26th he suggests British and Italian
collaboration with Austria-Hungary in order to end the
tension. On the 27th he is in favour of direct conversa-
tion with Vienna, but at the same time he transmits to
Grey through Buchanan a somewhat incoherent scheme
for close co-operation between the Ministers of the Powers
in Belgrade. They are " to interchange all information
which any one of them might receive with regard to any
Serbian machinations or plots directed against Austria.
In the event of such information reaching them, they
should be empowered to exercise pressure on the Serbian
Government with a
view to preventing such plots
maturing. While there should be no question of their
being invested with the character of an international
commission, the Ministers would be able, by co-operating
together, to maintain close supervision over any anti-
Austrian movements.3
1 How the War Began {Russian Foreign Official Diary), p. 86.
2 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 17, Buchanan to Grey.
3 Unprinted British Documents, Buchanan to Grey, telegram despatched 27,
received 28 July (see portion omitted from version printed as No. 55 of British
Diplomatic Correspondence in 1914).
272
All this, and, still more, his overtures to Berchtold,
show Sazonov's goodwill, though they explain why
Grey
is
"
not
quite
clear
as
to
what
Sazonov
proposes."1 They are not the actions of a Minister
working
for war. But Sazonov was not a strong
man, and by 28 July he seems to have given up
hope, for on that day he assured Sir George Buchanan
" that the only way to avert war was for His Majesty's
Government to let it be clearly known that they would
join France and Russia."
BERCHTOLD DECEIVES FRANCIS JOSEPH
3. There remained for Berchtold the crowning infamy
of securing his sovereign's final consent to war under
false pretences.
Already on 24 July Tisza urged strongly upon Berchtold
the need for an immediate Austro-Hungarian mobilisa-
tion, if the Serbian Answer was not satisfactory,1 and
next day he pressed this view in greater detail upon
Francis Joseph himself. " The slightest hesitation or
irresolution," he argued, " would gravely compromise
the Monarchy's reputation for energy and capacity for
action . . . and would be attended by positively
disastrous results."2 In point of fact, eight Army Corps
were mobilised that same evening. Conrad would have
liked to po
stpone actual military operations till mobilisa-
tion was complete on 12 August, but Berchtold made it
clear to him that the diplomatic situation would not
allow this, and that a declaration of war was necessary
in order to put a stop to " various influences " in favour
of peace.»
The news of Serbia's rejection of the ultimatum and
1 Unprinted British Documents Grey to Buchanan, 28 July.
2 ibid., Buchanan to Grey, 28 July.
3 D.A., ii., No. 21.
4 " Vortrag" of 25 July. This document I owe to the kindness of a foreign
diplomatic friend.
5 Conrad, op. cit., iv., pp. 131-2.
273
Giesl's departure was brought to Francis Joseph at Ischl
by one of his adjutants, Baron Margutti; and the latter
has given a vivid and detailed account of the old man's
emotion. " Also doch! " (" So it has come after all ")
were his first words, showing that he had to the last
hoped and believed that a rupture would be avoided.
Then, after an interval, he added, half to himself, " Well,
the rupture of diplomatic relations does not yet mean
war.1
On 27 July Berchtold visited Francis Joseph at Ischl,
in order to win him finally for war upon Serbia. After
admitting that the Serbian Answer was " very skilfully
drafted," and, " though quite worthless in content, was
conciliatory in form he added the significant warning
that
the
Entente
would
probably
"
make
another
attempt to solve the conflict peacefully, unless a clear
situation is created by the declaration of war."2 As a
conclusive argument for action, he informed the Emperor
that there had already been an armed skirmish at
Temeskubin, in which Serbian troops had been the
aggressors, opening fire from Danube steamers; and
this was also cited in the formal declaration addressed
to Serbia, as affording additional provocation.3 This
produced the desired effect. On the morning of 28 July
Francis Joseph, who had long regarded war as the sole
means of exit from an impossible situation3 but had
none the less instinctively shrunk from the decision,
gave his signature, and the declaration of war was at
once transmitted to Serbia. But in reality the alleged
skirmish at Temeskubin had not taken place, and the
1 Margutti, Vom Altem Kaiser, p. 404.
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