In September, although Grant was ready to fight with the resources he had, he knew his forces were still weak, so he spent the month of October preparing his command for action. By the 1st of November he was ready. Training was over, it was time.
Battle of Belmont
"By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement."30
Grant was ready to move and the opportunity soon arose. On November 1, 1861, Grant was directed by Fremont to make a demonstration toward Columbus, Kentucky. "You are hereby directed to hold your command ready to march at an hour's notice, until further orders.....You are also directed to make demonstrations with your troops along both sides of the river towards Charleston, Norfolk and Blandville, and to keep your columns constantly moving back and forward against these places, without, however, attacking the enemy."31
To date, Grant had been ordered to attack no one. These orders obviously reflected Fremont's aggressive intentions and no one needed instruct Grant on how and when to be aggressive. He had been champing at the bit for months and with his superior indicating his intentions so boldly, all he needed was the opportunity, which seemed to present itself the very next day.
On November 2, Fremont informed Grant that there were 3,000 rebels under Jeff Thompson near Greenville, Missouri. Supposedly, Thompson's designs were to join Sterling Price in western Missouri to defeat Fremont, who had taken the field against Price, and drive the Federals from the state. Now Grant was instructed by Fremont to drive Thompson's forces into Arkansas, thereby preventing them from uniting with Price.
Accordingly, Grant dispatched Colonel Oglesby with four regiments from Commerce, Missouri toward the St. Francis River where Thompson was supposed to be concentrating. Headquarters had ordered Grant to assist "in driving Thompson into Arkansas."32 Characteristically, Grant ordered Oglesby to pursue Thompson wherever; "The object of the expedition is to destroy this force and the manner of doing it is left largely at your discretion."33 Half measures never set well with Grant. His emphasis was on the destruction of the enemies' forces, but as in all wars, events have their own timetable. On November 5th, Grant heard from headquarters again. This time headquarters stated that Polk was sending reinforcements to Price from Columbus. Fremont wanted these efforts stopped, so Grant was ordered to alter his plans and carry out his previous instructions concerning a demonstration against Columbus. A similar order was given to C. F. Smith in Paducah. W. H. L. Wallace’s regiment was dispatched to overtake Oglesby and redirect that force toward New Madrid, Missouri. Grant also directed C. F. Smith to move toward the rear of Columbus in an effort to detain any Confederate forces which were destined for Price.
Grant now had Oglesby's force moving toward New Madrid and Smith's force moving toward Columbus. It was time to put the last piece of the puzzle into place. Grant would move against Belmont himself giving the rebels much to contemplate.
On November 6, 1861, Grant set out for Belmont with 3114 men. His force consisted of five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. The two brigade commanders were Brigadier-General John McClernand and Colonel Henry Dougherty. The small force anchored the evening of November 6th near the Kentucky shore just nine miles south of Cairo. At 2 A. M. on the morning of November 7th, Grant received intelligence that Confederate troops had crossed from Columbus to Belmont on the 6th. This bit of intelligence completely altered the situation. Grant was supposed to make a demonstration, but now it appeared that the Confederates were planning to attack Oglesby's column. With Oglesby's column unknowingly heading in harm’s way, Grant was forced to act in the best interests of his command. He immediately changed his plans, as he was prone to do whenever the circumstances dictated a new course of action; he decided to attack Belmont at daylight on the 7th. The most he could hope to accomplish was to disrupt the movement against Oglesby.
At 6 A. M. on the 7th Grant’s small force steamed down river and landed three miles north of Belmont at Hunter's Point. This was safely out of range of the batteries of Columbus. Grant left one battalion to guard the transports and at 8 A. M. began marching his command toward the enemy. They had moved but one mile on the road to Belmont when they first came into contact with the enemy. By 9 A. M. both sides were fully engaged and for the next four hours a hot engagement took place. Both Grant's and Pillow's forces were of equal size, about 2800 men; but everywhere the Yankees drove the rebels from their camps and down to the river bank.
What happened next could only be attributed to the Federals lack of experience. Instead of pursuing the enemy and taking them prisoners, the Federals began to plunder the enemy's camps, while their officers made grand speeches about the Union cause. Meanwhile, Grant tried to restore order realizing there was still a dangerous enemy out there.
Polk, who was in command at Columbus, began sending steamboats full of reinforcements from Columbus to a spot on the Belmont side between Grant and his transports. In addition, the Confederate forces huddling under the river bank began making their way up the river to join the newly arrived reinforcements.
As order was restored to the ranks of the Federal forces, a gloomy feeling of desperation overcame the men. They felt they were surrounded and some thought that the only option left was surrender. This attitude elicited a characteristic response from Grant, "Well, if that is so, we must cut our way out as we cut our way in. We have whipped them once, and I think we can do it again."34 With such a display of cool determination, the chaos was over and once again the men were ready to do their commander's bidding.
The Federals immediately commenced their march back to the waiting transports. The enemy resistance this time was not nearly as stiff as it had been earlier. Many of the rebels once again sought shelter near the river bank, but Grant's force could afford no time to stop and take prisoners. The rebel reinforcements had landed and were disembarking. Grant knew that he must make haste in order to put the enemy's forces behind him.
Having arrived safely back at the transports, the men began to board the vessels. Meanwhile, Grant rode back toward the field of battle to see if there was time to evacuate the wounded who had been placed in nearby farmhouses. To his great surprise, the rear guard he posted to guard the transports had boarded with the rest of the men. This left Grant as the sole Union man on the field. By now the Confederates had closed to within fifty yards of Grant and the Confederate commander exhorted his men, "There, men is a Yankee, if you want to try your aim."35 Fortunately for Grant, the enemy was enamored with firing on the Yankee ships, so no one fired at him. This was as tough a pickle as Grant would find himself in the entire war.
Quickly, Grant moved back to the river bank and as horse and rider slid down the embankment, he yelled to the captain to cast off. He calmly rode aboard the ship being the last Union man to leave the battlefield.
Grant rapidly strode to the captain's room and threw himself on the sofa to catch his breath. Just as quickly he arose to go out on to the deck to observe the action. Instantly, after he arose, a musket ball pierced the room and struck the head of the sofa. His career almost ended before it began. The last transport was out of range of the Confederate guns by 5 P.M. that afternoon. The Battle of Belmont was over.
The results of the battle were inconclusive. Fuller described it as follows: "Such was Grant's first battle, and it cannot be said that his generalship was above that of an amateur, which is exactly what he then was."36
Grant lost 607 men in killed, wounded and missing, while the Confederates lost 642. When the Nationals first attacked, both sides were of equal strength, about 2800 men. As the Yankees were trying to cut their way out, there were over 7000 Rebels on the field. By the way battles were measured then; it is indisputable that the Confederates won the battle. They held the field at the onslaught and retained the field when the Yankees retreated. Viewed in a more contemporary light, the battle was probably a draw. The federal
forces brushed the Confederates aside on their way into Belmont and the Confederates were handled much the same by the Yankees on their way out. In addition, on their way out, the Nationals were confronting an ever increasing force. While in theory, the Confederates still held the field, in actuality, the Union men clearly outfought their opponents. Catton put it this way: "In plain fact the Federals at Belmont had outfought their enemies."37
On the question of whether this was a totally unnecessary battle, McFeely wrote the following: "But clearly he had already made the decision to attack when he left Cairo.....Grant had set out to fight and to take the fort--not to demonstrate."38 What this statement clearly implies and so McFeely states, is insubordination on the part of Grant. What McFeely offers as evidence of Grant's intentions is one snippet of a communication to Colonel Oglesby which occurred on November 6, 1861. It reads: "communicate with me at Belmont."39
In order to be insubordinate, Grant would have to knowingly violate his orders. On four separate occasions, Fremont had indicated his aggressive intentions. September 26, Fremont sent him a letter which read, "Should the enemy expose a weak point on either side of the river, you may inflict upon him a combined blow."40 On November 1, Fremont expressed his desire for Grant to make demonstrations against Columbus. On November 2, Fremont ordered Grant to send a force to assist, "in driving Thompson into Arkansas."41 On November 5, Fremont ordered an immediate demonstration against Columbus.
After the combined demonstrations of Grant and Smith were ordered, Grant sent Smith instructions dated November 5, 1861. Contained in these instructions are the following paragraphs. "I am now, under the same instructions, fitting out an expedition to menace Belmont, and will take all the force proper to spare from here, probably not more than three thousand men.
If you can make a demonstration towards Columbus at the same time with a portion of your command, it would probably keep the enemy from throwing over the river much more force than they now have there, and might enable me to drive those they now have out of Missouri. The principle point to gain is, to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear of those now out from this command."42
There can be no doubt from the above correspondence that Grant planned to "menace Belmont" or make a demonstration, not to attack the fort at Columbus. In the same correspondence he manifests his concern about the enemy falling upon Oglesby's command. He also expressed the thought of driving the enemy out of Missouri. His command had already been ordered specifically to do just that and Oglesby's movement was being conducted with such intent. Grant had already been given plenty of authority to rid the enemy from Missouri and he was complying exactly with his instructions from headquarters.
Grant moved on November 6th and he stated that at 2 A. M. on the morning of November 7th he received word that the enemy was moving troops across the Mississippi to Belmont in what he supposed was an effort to fall upon Oglesby's command. Being the on scene commander, he acted both logically and correctly to attack Belmont and relieve Oglesby. In fact, if he had not done precisely what he did, he could have been brought up at a court martial questioning why he did not come to the aid of Colonel Oglesby, when he had previous information indicating Oglesby's command might be jeopardized by such a surprise attack. If he had not acted, he would have been found to be derelict in his duty allowing the critics to criticize him in reverse.
The reader should keep in mind that Grant always changed his plans to meet any new circumstance which arose. His ability to adapt to change is one of the characteristics which placed him above all others. The reader might perceive that Grant was possibly the most aggressive general in the history of the world.
McFeely also stated that the very fact that Grant took over 3000 men with him indicated his intention to fight. This is easily dismissed because C. F. Smith also took thousands of men with him and he too only intended a demonstration. Anyone who has ever seen Columbus knows that 3000 men could in no way capture it, so it would have been a futile effort to attack such a strongly fortified position with such a small force.
Grant wrote in his memoirs, "I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nor did I intend anything of the kind when I started from Cairo."43 When Grant wrote his memoirs he was dying of cancer and the events he described had occurred between 20 and 25 years earlier. There are passages in his memoirs where he is mistaken. Given his state of health at the time, most people would kindly overlook those innocuous failures of memory, but one thing no one could ever question was Grant's veracity. The man was as honest as the day is long. He was truly a humble and modest man, a patriot with virtuous intentions. There are so few public personalities today who have these characteristics it is no wonder that some modern historians fail to believe that such a persona actually existed. To suggest that Grant would intentionally mislead the public to make himself appear better in history represents a failure to comprehend his personality. Henry Coppee put it best when he said that Grant, "betrayed no trust, falsified no word, violated no rights, manifested no tyranny, sought no personal aggrandizement, complained of no hardship, displayed no jealousy, oppressed no subordinate; but in whatever sphere, protected every interest, upheld his flag, and was ever known by his humanity, sagacity, courage, and honor."44 In addition, in his book Albert Richardson wrote the following about Grant. "His reputation for integrity and fairness was high and his observance of the truth so strict that he never indulged in the slightest exaggeration."45 Ulysses S. Grant could never knowingly tell a lie, therefore, when he said he did not "intend anything of the kind," it has to be taken at face value.
Grant learned two valuable lessons at Belmont. One was the importance of having a reserve and the other was the requirement of reconnoitering the field of battle. As Fuller said in his book, "it is easy to discover these errors now, but the extraordinary thing is that Grant himself discovered them at the time."46 By the time he found himself before Donelson, he had remedied both shortcomings.
Catton also felt that Grant gained something else from Belmont and that was "confidence in the fighting capacity of his volunteers."47 This may be true to a small degree, but it is the opinion of the author that Grant had already gained an appreciation for the fighting spirit of the volunteers during the Mexican War.
Now Belmont was history. His lessons learned, Grant was eager as ever to press the Union cause.
CHAPTER TWO
"The enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me"
November 8, 1861 - February 16, 1862
District of Cairo
While Grant was ready to get on with the war, other events were occurred which shaped the future direction of the war in the west. As discussed previously, the Confederates had established a strong line of defense running through Kentucky from Columbus to Bowling Green to the Cumberland Gap. These strongholds were established following the Confederate invasion of Kentucky and Grant's occupation of Paducah which occurred in September, 1861. Kentucky quickly abandoned her neutrality and joined the Union. President Lincoln used this declaration to promote a long held desire of his; to come to the aid of Union loyalists inhabiting the hill country of east Tennessee. Lincoln saw the value of initiating a campaign in this area. Not only could he aid the loyal people of east Tennessee and increase the available manpower for the North, but he could also disrupt the primary railroads of the Confederacy which ran through Chattanooga and Atlanta. Lincoln had not the faintest idea how to implement this program. He needed a military man who shared similar notions and he thought he knew just the man, George B. McClellan.
On November 1, 1861, General George McClellan replaced the aging General Winfield Scott as General-in-Chief. McClellan's plan was to attack Richmond by sea and by land. By agreeing with Lincoln on a campaign into east Tennessee, McClellan figured that forces operating against Knoxville and Chattanooga would siphon off forces from the defenses around Richmond.
No matter how attractive the plan appeared on the surface, it would be
unwise to inaugurate such a campaign while strong rebel forces remained in Missouri and west Tennessee. In preparation for this campaign, McClellan decided to remove General Fremont from his command. Replacing Fremont in command of the Department of Missouri was Major-General Henry Halleck. The Department of Missouri covered the states of Missouri and Arkansas and part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. General Halleck was to become Grant’s new superior and a man who was to color his career throughout the war.
The next step in McClellan's plan was to install his personal friend, Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell as commander of the Department of the Ohio with headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky. Buell relieved William Tecumseh Sherman who was sent to St. Louis. The Department of the Ohio encompassed the remainder of Kentucky and the State of Tennessee. McClellan's idea was for Buell to advance into east Tennessee leaving Halleck free to cover Buell's rear and flank. The problem created was the absence of a unified command structure. This is how the situation stood on the 9th of November as General Halleck assumed command of the Department of the Missouri.
It might be worthwhile to describe Grant's new boss, General Halleck. Halleck graduated from West Point prior to Grant's arrival and their paths never crossed during the Mexican War, so one might say that Grant knew of Halleck, but did not know him. Halleck left the army during the 1850's, as had Grant, but where Grant’s civilian career had been a failure, Halleck had become a very successful attorney. Halleck was scholarly and had written extensively on military strategy, but from a book perspective not from practical experience. Bruce Catton enunciated a very apt description of the man. "His book knowledge of strategy was unexcelled, he had a good understanding of the political pressures that must bear on all general officers in this war, and he was a solid, conscientious and very capable administrator. But what Halleck knew about war came out of books, and when the time came for action he would make war in a bookish manner. He was, in addition, waspish, petulant, gossipy, often rather pompous, and afflicted with the habit of passing the buck."1
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 3