One question which surfaced was, why did Grant go to Nashville? In the letter dated February 24th, his statement about "Secesh" being on its last legs typifies all his actions. He had been forbidden from going to Nashville, but he obviously had intelligence that the rebels were fleeing. Now with Nelson's troops available, he thought he would give the rebels an added shove to insure they left Nashville and all of Tennessee.
In the letter of February 26th, Grant stated precisely why he felt it necessary for him to go to Nashville and that was to confer with General Buell about the enemy's movements and what the Yankee armies were to do next.
Additionally, these two letters provide great insight into his character. At times during and after the war, Grant was called a "butcher". Yet in the letter of February 24th, not meant for anyone's eyes other than his wife's, he emphatically stated his disdain for terrible battles and the frightful results. He proposed that the best way to avoid those affairs was to keep continuous pressure on the enemy. A perfect way to force this result was to move Nelson's force to Nashville to insure the enemy's timely departure. He was absolutely correct in his estimation and this has repeatedly been demonstrated throughout history. The current military terminology is that speed kills. His type of warfare actually produced fewer casualties than protracted standoff.
The other insight into his personality is seen in the letter of the 26th. He stated unequivocally that whatever command he was given, higher or lower, he would do the best he could for the cause. He obviously was one of the great patriots in American history, ranking up there with Washington.
Grant went to Nashville on February 27th, but was only able to confer with Buell a short time before returning. Upon his return, he wrote to headquarters on the 28th: "I have just returned from Nashville this morning. My impression is, from all I can learn, the enemy have fallen back to Decatur or Chattanooga. I have informed General Cullum that General Buell ordered General Smith from Clarksville, to join him at Nashville." 13 On the 1st of March, Grant sent the following dispatch to headquarters. "I have informed the general commanding the department, generally through his chief of staff, every day since leaving Cairo, of my wants, what information was obtained of the enemy, etc." 14
Until March 1, 1862, nothing appeared to be amiss in the communications between Grant and Halleck. On the surface at least, there appeared to be no ill feelings generated between the two generals. The following is a telegram from Halleck dated March 1, 1862.
St. Louis, March 1, 1862.
General U. S. Grant, Fort Henry:
Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move your column up the Tennessee River. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river without very serious opposition. Avoid any general engagement with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should be strongly impressed upon the officers sent with the expedition from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some very discreet officer, should be selected for such commands. Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville and move on Paris. Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humboldt can reach Paris as easily by land as to return to the transports. This must depend on the character of the roads and the position of the enemy. All telegraph lines which can be reached must be cut. The gunboats will accompany the transports for their protection. Any loyal Tennesseeans, who desire it, may be enlisted and supplied with arms.
Competent officers should be left to command the garrisons of Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. I have indicated in general terms the object of this.
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 15
The telegram from Halleck never reached Grant, as well as many of Grant's messages to Halleck. It was discovered many years after the war that a southern sympathizer was indulging in sabotage at the southern terminus of the telegraph line. He was failing to deliver telegrams; consequently, both Grant and Halleck were out of touch and did not realize it.
Grant's apparent indifference and failure to obey Halleck's orders added more justification to Halleck's desire to rid himself of Grant. On March 1st, Halleck realized he was unaware of what was transpiring in Tennessee. This sudden shock, combined with his appeals for total command in the West, which had been refused, generated great wrath in Halleck. To make matters worse, rumors were reaching him of Union troops out of control in Tennessee, looting and spreading general malice among the locals.
Here was the perfect opportunity for Halleck to eliminate his potential rival, so he focused his wrath upon Grant. In Grant, Halleck saw disobedience for not obeying orders and an eagerness to fight which could cause defeat. These attributes, plus his own jealousy, provoked Halleck to send a vicious letter to McClellan impugning Grant's reputation.
On March 3rd, without requesting an explanation from Grant, he sent the following telegram to McClellan. "I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority, and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it, without any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency." 16
To this malicious diatribe, McClellan responded, by offering full support for whatever action Halleck deemed necessary. Disregarding Grant’s success, if someone had been accused of misconduct, one would be inclined to request to see the evidence. After all, this was a very successful major-general in question, not a captain or private. Nevertheless, McClellan responded immediately: "The future success of our cause, demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way. I appreciate the difficulties you have to encounter, and will be glad to relieve you from trouble as far as possible." 17
The behavior of Halleck and McClellan should raise red flags in the minds of anyone reading the above correspondence. In war, communications are often severed by the enemy, but for some reason this never occurred to either Halleck or McClellan. In the case of Halleck this was plausible because all his knowledge of war was from books not experience. McClellan, on the other hand had been in the Mexican War, so he should have considered this was a possibility in explaining Grant's lack of communication. One reason for not giving Grant the benefit of the doubt concerning the lack of communications hearkens back to what they possibly presupposed. The reader will recall Grant’s attempt to call on McClellan in Cincinnati with respect to obtaining a position on McClellan's staff and McClellan's rebuff by refusing to see him. Could it be both Halleck and McClellan assumed Grant had failed to communicate with his superior because he had resumed his old drinking habits.
None of the historians who have written about Grant seemed to find anything unusual about the situation presented in the above correspondence. This is inconceivable. This correspondence reflects an indictment against Grant featuring allegations with no evidence requested. Without evidence, the general-in chief of the United States authorized the arrest of the suspected culprit. In the United States, a person is innocent until proven guilty, but in this case an arrest was authorized with no evidence at all. Lincoln had suspended the writ of habeas corpus in 1861 due to the war, but one could hardly imagine Ulysses S. Gran
t being a dangerous subversive.
If this was not bad enough, Halleck had more to say on March 4th. He sent to McClellan the following dispatch: "A rumor has just reached me that since the taking of Fort Donelson General Grant has resumed his former bad habits. If so, it will account for his neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee. I think Smith will restore order and discipline." 18
It is clear from these communications that Henry Halleck was totally unfit for high command and for McClellan to believe such unsubstantiated poppycock showed him for what he was, a pompous, windbag.
Finally, on March 4th, Halleck gave Grant the bad news, which must have landed on him like a ton of bricks. On that day Halleck sent him the following wire: "You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?" 19
Grant was never one to run from a fight and in his response to Halleck dated March 5th, he presented a thoroughly subordinate yet eloquent defense of his actions. "Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. Troops will be sent under command of Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared a different plan, intending General Smith to command the forces which should go to Paris and Humboldt, while I would command the expedition upon Eastport, Corinth, and Jackson, in person. I am not aware of ever having disobeyed any order from your headquarters----certainly never intended such a thing. I have reported almost daily the condition of my command, and reported every position occupied. I have not, however, been able to get returns from all the troops, from which to consolidate a return for departmental headquarters. All have come in except from General Smith's command at Clarksville----five small regiments of infantry and two companies of artillery. The general has probably been unable to get his in consequence of being ordered to Nashville by General Buell. General Smith has been relieved by General Buell and was ordered immediately to the Tennessee by me.
As soon as I was notified that General Smith had been ordered to Nashville I reported the fact and sent a copy of Buell's order. My reports have nearly all been made to General Cullum, chief of staff, and it may be that many of them were not thought of sufficient importance to forward more than a telegraphic synopsis of.
In conclusion I will say that you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in every particular to the very best of my ability." 20 & 21
Three details stand out in the correspondence between Grant and Halleck. One is Halleck's total unawareness of the most elementary details in this theater of operations which was not Grant's fault. He told Grant to remain at Fort Henry, yet Fort Henry was under six feet of water; a minor, but eye-opening detail displaying Halleck's ignorance of the situation. The second detail was Halleck's complaint about Grant's failure to report his returns. It must have been enlightening for Halleck to read Grant's response when he stated that all the returns had been reported except those of General Smith. Here Halleck was placing in command the commander who had failed to do the very thing for which Grant was being accused. The last significant detail was how Grant handled the situation of Smith's missing returns versus Halleck's handling of Grant's case with McClellan. Halleck's correspondence with McClellan about Grant has already been examined. In one, Halleck mentioned censure and in the other, he mentioned arrest. Contrast the behavior of Halleck and McClellan with Grant’s common sense approach regarding Smith's failure to report his returns. Grant adroitly pointed out to Halleck that in war, things happen, which probably came as a huge surprise to Halleck. In essence, Grant understood how circumstances change in war, while Halleck understood only what he had read in textbooks.
If Halleck left matters alone the incident may have been closed and he may have gotten what he wanted, Smith in command with Grant marginalized. Not one to let things lie, Halleck tried to impress upon Grant who was in charge and how lucky Grant was to still have a position. Halleck telegraphed Grant on March 6th, the following: "General McClellan directs that you report to me daily the number and position of the forces under your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to report the strength of your command, has created great dissatisfaction, and seriously interfered with military plans. Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much that I was advised to arrest you on your return." 22
What Grant did not know about was Halleck's boasting to Washington that if they gave him the troops he would make things happen in the West. All he needed was more forces. Consequently, McClellan asked Halleck for the total number of forces in his department which he was unable to furnish. Grant was receiving the blame for not providing the most up to date returns and therefore, holding up the war effort. This was one giant fiasco of buck passing and the buck stopped at Grant's feet.
It is difficult to conceive of anyone ever criticizing U.S. Grant of holding up the war effort; after all he usually is criticized for never seeing a fortification he did not want to assault. In fact, Halleck criticized Grant in his letter to McClellan telling him Grant had gone to Nashville without orders. The clear implication was that he was pushing the war too quickly. In the last correspondence he was accused of not reporting his returns, therefore, holding up the war. Halleck's arguments are both illogical and contradictory.
Regarding Halleck's telegram of March 6th, Grant wrote in his memoirs the following. "This was the first I knew of his objecting to my going to Nashville. That place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." Nashville is west of the Cumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place." 23
Feeling he had done nothing wrong, and angered by the tone of Halleck's impudent messages, Grant responded directly, without backing down. On March 7th he sent this response. "Your dispatch of yesterday just received. I did all I could to get you returns of the strength of my command. Every move I made was reported daily to your chief of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly posted. I have done my very best to obey orders, and to carry out the interests of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not wish in any way to impede the success of our arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo, to keep you informed of my position, and it is no fault of mine if you have not received my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly intended for the good of the service, and not to gratify any desire of my own. Believing sincerely that I must have enemies between you and myself, who are trying to impair my usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from further duty in the department." 24
In the above letter, Grant deduced that someone was out to get him, but it was not until years after the war when Adam Badeau was doing his research for his books on Grant, that he discovered the person who was trying to get him shelved was none other than Halleck. Grant displayed considerable political savvy in the incident referenced above. When he sent his response to Halleck, he also sent a copy of his correspondence to Congressman Washburne. If this smear campaign continued, the congressman could be relied upon to put the issue before the President.
The discord between the two generals persisted. Halleck was not the type of individual to let someone else get the last word, so he shot back a response to Grant on March 8th. "You are mistaken. There is no enemy between you and me. There is no letter of yours stating the number and position of your command since capture of Fort Donelson. General McClellan has asked for it repeatedly with reference to ulterior movements, but I could not give him the information. He is out of all patience waiting for it. Answer by telegraph in general terms." 25
Being ever so subordinate, Grant answered at once. Infantry present for duty--35,147; cavalry present for duty--3169; artillery present for duty--1231 men and 54 pieces. There were about 25,000 men on
the expedition with Smith; while 5700 more had just landed above Fort Henry. The remainder was stationed at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Clarksville. Also, included were 1829 men in a new division under Sherman.
Grant, however, was not about to remain under suspicion. Perhaps he hearkened back to his troubled years during the 1850's when nothing he did seemed to go right. Now he was successful and he was not about to let his success slip away. He quickly returned to the debate. On March 9th, he replied: "Your dispatch of yesterday just received. I will do all in my power to advance the expedition now started. You had better chance of knowing my strength whilst surrounding Fort Donelson than I had. Troops were reporting daily, by your orders, and immediately assigned to brigades. There were no orders received from you until the 28th February to make out returns, and I made every effort to get them in as early as possible. I have always been ready to move anywhere, regardless of consequences to myself, but with a disposition to take the best care of the troops under my command. I renew my application to be relieved from further duty." 26
Note in the last two dispatches to Halleck how Grant was willing to sacrifice himself for his cause and country. He also expressed a strong desire to take the best care of his troops, not to sacrifice them needlessly, which, of course, is entirely contrary to what has been written about him in history.
The matter appeared to have run its course by March 10th, but unbeknownst to Grant, word of the dispute had reached the White House. Lincoln, by now, was exasperated by McClellan's failure to move, so effective March 11th, McClellan was removed as general-in-chief and placed in command of the Army of the Potomac. A new general-in-chief had not been named, but Halleck was given what he had desired, command of all the forces in the West.
While Lincoln and Stanton were fed up with McClellan, they were very pleased with what they saw in Grant. Along with Halleck's increased responsibilities came a strident, formal telegram on March 10th, from Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General of the Army. "It has been reported that soon after the battle of Fort Donelson Brigadier General Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President the Secretary of War desires you to ascertain and report whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and, if so, for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his force; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and, if so, what." 27 In other words, the War Department was telling Halleck to put up or shut up. If this did not put Halleck in a fix, what happened next surely did.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 9