Grant telegraphed the following to Halleck on September 15th: "If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses Bear creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent the design either to go north, or to unite forces and attack here." 13
Grant formulated an ambitious plan to destroy Price's army and return to Corinth in time to defend it against an attack from Van Dorn.
Iuka was situated on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad about 20 miles southeast of Corinth. Grant ordered Rosecrans to move by way of Rienzi, which was about ten miles south of Corinth on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, to the east via the Jacinto road. He was to approach Iuka from the south and southwest. Rosecrans was to hold the Jacinto road with a small force and attack Iuka with the larger part of his force from the south on the Fulton road.
General Ord was directed by Grant to move east via rail and disembark at Burnsville which was about seven miles west of Iuka. He was then to move overland to approach Iuka from the northwest. Because the Tennessee River was located seven miles to the northeast of Iuka, Grant felt this provided an additional barrier to any retreating army. Therefore, Grant had Price boxed in with only one possible route of escape and that was to the east away from Van Dorn.
Grant hoped to catch Price's army between the two pincers. Grant also ordered Hurlbut to make a diversionary movement toward the south from Memphis. Remember, this entire strategy emanated from the mind of someone who the press had described as being slow, stolid and completely lacking in imagination.
Grant traveled with Ord to Burnsville where he would remain to coordinate the movements of both wings. He kept Ord in Burnsville until the last minute in case Van Dorn attacked Corinth.
Grant’s plan was excellent, but it proved difficult to execute. On September 18th, Ord and Grant moved by rail to Burnsville. Once there, Ord struck out toward the northeast to do his part. Rosecrans was to have moved earlier, so he would be in place by the morning of September 19th for the combined attack.
Ord advanced to within four miles of Iuka, where he encountered the enemy. An engagement ensued and when it ended Ord found himself in the proper position to commence the attack in the morning.
At midnight on September 18th, Grant received a dispatch from Rosecrans which greatly disappointed him. Rosecrans told him of delays encountered by his force, some of which were not yet in Jacinto, 22 miles from Iuka. Rosecrans went on to say that he believed his force could be in position near Iuka by 2 P.M. the next day.
Grant felt this an impossible task for Rosecrans to make a forced march and then go into battle, but nevertheless, forwarded the communication to Ord that night. Ord was further instructed to be ready to commence operations that afternoon upon hearing the sounds of Rosecrans' attack.
An incident worth relating occurred during this movement illustrating once again, Ulysses’ kind and considerate nature. The country surrounding Iuka was swampy. At one point, while he was riding along a narrow road beside Ord's marching column, Grant discovered that his horse was splattering mud all over the soldiers. He left the road to pick his way through the underbrush to avoid further splashing the troops. An Ohio private of the 81st Ohio Infantry later wrote that the men were ready to cheer him for this considerate act. He also stated that this "shows the kind of man on whose shoulders the greatest responsibilities were to be placed." 14
Imagine a man who displayed this kind of consideration for one of his employees in today's world. He would be extolled for this praiseworthy act and considered a man of the people. Many people recorded Grant performing such acts throughout his career. These incidents were not done for his glorification, but only out of the nature of the man. Would a person displaying such conduct be the type of person to commit untold numbers of soldiers to die needlessly? Yet history stresses places such as Cold Harbor, where Grant threw in troops to make frontal assaults in a needless effusion of blood. Such is his legacy.
As Grant suspected, Rosecrans did not get into position to make an attack on Price by 2 P.M. the afternoon of September 19th. By half-past four, Rosecrans arrived at Barnet's about five miles southwest of Iuka. Recall Grant's orders, which stated that Rosecrans was to hold the Jacinto road with a small force and move most of his men to the Fulton road to attack Price. Rosecrans failed to do this. Rosecrans approached Iuka on the Jacinto road to a point about two miles from the town where he encountered Price who checked his advance. Quite a fight developed with Rosecrans holding his own, even though he was outnumbered roughly 17,000 to 9000. The battle lasted until half-past ten the evening of the 19th. Rosecrans lost 736 men in killed and wounded most of which were out of Brigadier-General C. S. Hamilton's division which bore the brunt of the fighting.
Recall that Ord was supposed to attack when he heard the sounds from Rosecrans' attack. Neither Ord northwest of Iuka or Grant in Burnsville ever heard a sound of the battle due to a strong wind blowing from the northwest. Consequently, they were wondering what was keeping Rosecrans, while Rosecrans was hoping for relief from Ord. This was later to become known as an acoustic shadow and would occur on numerous occasions throughout the war.
At 10:30 P.M., Rosecrans sent the following message to Grant.
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, TWO MILES }
SOUTH OF IUKA, September 19,1862-10 1/2 P.M.}
"Major-General U. S. GRANT:
"GENERAL----We met the enemy in force just above this point. The engagement lasted several hours. We have lost two or three pieces of artillery. Firing was very heavy. You must attack in the morning and in force. The ground is horrid, unknown to us, and no room for development. Couldn't use our artillery at all; fired but few shots. Push in on to them until we can have time to do something. We will try to get a position on our right which will take Iuka.
"W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General." 15
Due to the broken and swampy country in this area, messengers were required to take circuitous routes with dispatches. Consequently Grant did not receive Rosecrans' dispatch until 8:35 A.M., the next morning.
Grant immediately sent word to Ord to assume the offensive, but prior to receiving word from Grant to attack, Ord had received intelligence about the battle from local negroes, and attacked on his own initiative. Resuming his attack on the morning of the 20th, Rosecrans encountered little resistance as he moved into Iuka.
Recall that Rosecrans failed to comply with Grant's instructions to enter the town on the Fulton road consequently, Price found the Fulton road uncovered and removed his troops during the night and early morning.
Grant arrived in Iuka about 9 A.M. in the morning and finding no one had arranged for pursuit of the enemy, promptly ordered Rosecrans to pursue with his entire command. Remember, Grant was chastised for not pursuing following Shiloh, yet this was his first action following this battle. Grant accompanied the pursuing force for a few miles, but as soon as he left Rosecrans, the latter went into bivouac. This was one of many times when a subordinate failed Grant.
The battle of Iuka was over and was a clear Union victory, but Grant's plan was foiled by his subordinate, Rosecrans. Rosecrans failed to cover the Fulton road, nor did he pursue the enemy as aggressively as Grant would have liked. If he had followed Grant's instructions, the Federals could have easily captured Price's entire army. The one obvious success of this operation was to prevent Price from crossing the Tennessee River to join Bragg's forces.
Battle of Corinth
Price joined Van Dorn in Ripley, Mississippi concentrating their forces. So the same state of affairs which existed for many weeks continued with Grant on the defensive, threatened now by the combined forces of Van Dorn and Price, totaling some 22,000 men.
It annoyed Grant that Rosecrans had allowed Price to escape nevertheless Rosecrans apparently had handled the battle well, so Grant moved him to Corinth in command of that strategic railroad junction.
On the 22nd of September, Grant received word of a large force of the enemy near Grand Junction, Tennessee threatening the most forward National posit
ion on the Mississippi Central Railroad at Bolivar. To counteract this thrust by the enemy, Grant ordered Ord to move to Bolivar and assume command of that place. Not knowing where Van Dorn would strike, but sensing he was threatening numerous positions, Grant moved his headquarters to Jackson to be in a more central location.
By the 1st of October, the enemy force threatening Bolivar was recalled by Van Dorn as he decided to concentrate his forces at Ripley, Mississippi. Grant concluded that Corinth would be the objective of any rebel attack and it was held by Rosecrans with a force of between 20,000 and 25,000 men.
The Confederate movement began as Van Dorn moved to a position northwest of Corinth, thus making the act of reinforcing the city more difficult. On October 2nd, the rebels attacked Rosecrans' skirmishers and drove them into the outer works of Corinth which Beauregard had built.
Grant knew he would have difficulty reinforcing Rosecrans, but this turn of events left him with an opportunity to exploit, an attack upon the enemy's rear. As the fighting intensified during the 3rd, Grant sent General McPherson to collect four regiments along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and proceed to reinforce Rosecrans. At the same time, Grant ordered Ord and Hurlbut to advance via Bolivar and come up on Van Dorn's rear. During the fighting on the 3rd, Van Dorn's forces made steady progress against Rosecrans and the latter was forced to fall back to the inner line of defenses which Grant had constructed during the summer.
The Confederates, flush from their success on the 3rd, renewed the attack the morning of October 4th. Apparently, Van Dorn was aware reinforcements were headed for Rosecrans, so his spirited attack may have been in an effort to dislodge Rosecrans before he could be reinforced. The attack was opened at 4:30 A.M. as one Union battery was lost, recaptured and lost again. The rebels penetrated the Yankee lines at that battery and soon there was fighting in the streets of Corinth. Rosecrans, himself, rallied the disorganized Federals and by noon, the Nationals had repulsed the rebels. The Union losses were 355 killed, 1841 wounded and 324 missing. On the Southern side, there were 473 killed, 1997 wounded and 1763 missing. This was one of the most hotly contested battles of the war considering the sizes of the opposing forces.
McPherson and his brigade arrived to reinforce Rosecrans at 4 P.M. Grant had previously notified Rosecrans that he was sending a force of some 4000 men to his assistance and if Rosecrans failed to push the enemy, these troops might find themselves in peril. Rosecrans now had fresh troops, McPherson's brigade, to lead the pursuit, but as at Iuka, he preferred to rest before pursuing.
Van Dorn spent the night at Chewalla, no more than ten miles from Corinth. On the morning of the 5th, Van Dorn continued his retreat, but found Ord and Hurlbut blocking his route at the bridge over the Hatchie River near Davis's Mills. Ord's forces drove the Confederates back, but were too few to attack, so Van Dorn was forced to turn south. He crossed the river at Crum's Mill, burned the bridge and retreated to Ripley.
On top of his late start to pursue the enemy, Rosecrans took the wrong road on the morning of the 5th. If he would have pursued the enemy the day before, Van Dorn's army would most certainly have been annihilated at Davis's Mills. This convinced Grant that Rosecrans' lacked the ability to command a large force. Grant finally ordered him to break off the pursuit at Jonesboro. Rosecrans protested Grant's order to halt so vigorously Grant submitted the question to Halleck, who let Grant decide the matter. Grant was sure Rosecrans would follow the enemy to Holly Springs where the enemy had reinforcements and fortifications which would change the equation immeasurably. Rosecrans could not comprehend the situation, but alas, obeyed orders and returned to Corinth.
The battle at Corinth was a decided Union victory, but Grant was disappointed with the results. In his mind, Rosecrans had needlessly allowed the enemy to escape capture, not once, but twice. To make matters worse, Rosecrans had failed to obey orders on a number of occasions and had argued with Grant during the pursuit of Van Dorn. In his memoirs, Grant had this to say about Rosecrans. "As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day." 16
Grant did not have to face the issue of relieving Rosecrans, for on October 24th, Rosecrans was named to succeed Buell as commander of the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans was promoted to major general as a reward for his victories at Iuka and Corinth. Grant said the following about the situation. "I was delighted at the promotion of General Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I at that time, credited him with possessing would show themselves." 17
It seems proper that Rosecrans should get all the glory for Iuka and Corinth. This is typical of the way historians and the government of 1862 viewed Grant. He received almost no recognition for conceiving and directing the movements during these two battles.
Badeau displayed keen insight about the essence of Grant and why most people overlooked his exceptional qualities. "The truth is, that Grant's extreme simplicity of behavior and directness of expression imposed on various officers, both above and below him. They thought him a good, plain man, who had blundered into one or two successes, and, who, therefore, could not be immediately removed; but they deemed it unnecessary to regard his judgment, or to count upon his ability. His superiors made their plans invariably without consulting him, and his subordinates sometimes sought to carry out their own campaigns, in opposition or indifference to his orders, not doubting, that, with their superior intelligence, they could conceive and execute triumphs which would excuse or even vindicate their course. It is impossible to understand the early history of the war, without taking it into account, that neither the government nor its important commanders gave Grant credit for intellectual ability or military genius.
His other qualities were also rated low. Because he was patient, some thought impossible to provoke him; and because of his calmness, it was supposed that he was stolid. In battle, or in campaigning, he did not seem to care or consider so much what the enemy was doing as what he himself meant to do; and this trait, to enthusiastic and even brilliant soldiers, appeared inexplicable. A great commander, it was imagined, should be nervous, excitable, inspiring his men and captivating his soldiers; calling private soldiers by their names, making eloquent addresses in the field, and waving his drawn sword in battle. Great commanders had done all these things, and won; and many men, who could do all these things, fancied themselves therefore great commanders. Others imagined wisdom to consist in science alone; they sought success in learned and elaborate plans, requiring months to develop when the enemy was immediately before them; they maneuvered when it was time to fight; they intrenched when they should have attacked, and studied their books when the field should have been their only problem.
Grant was like none of these. If he possessed acquirements, he appeared unconscious of them; he made no allusion to the schools, and never hesitated to transgress their rules, when the occasion seemed to him to demand it. So, he neither won men's hearts by blandishments, nor affected their imaginations by brilliancy of behavior; nor did he seem profound, to those who are impressed only by a display of learning. All these things should be appreciated by those who seek to understand his character or career." 18
At Donelson, Grant wanted Foote to send gunboats above the fort, attacking the enemy from the rear, cutting off escape from the fort and allowing unrestricted shelling of the fort. At Iuka, he wanted Rosecrans to attack Price's rear and assure capture of the entire force. At Corinth, he had Ord in position to menace Van Dorn's rear and then when Van Dorn retreated, Rosecrans was ordered to attack Van Dorn's rear again in an attempt to surround and capture that army.
At Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Petersburg and Appomattox, Grant displayed the same strategy over and over.
In exhibiting this behavior, Grant manifested a brilliant mastery of military science. Strategically, an attack upon the enemy's rear is sound because it threatens the enemy's base of operations. Tactically,
a rear attack is sound because the rear is vulnerable, lightly defended and most easily exploited if one can attain that position.
Grant's plans at both Iuka and Corinth were well developed and conceived and he never received the recognition deserved for those plans. He easily could have captured both enemy forces which possibly would have made those two victories more significant in history. As happened many times throughout the war, his subordinates failed him.
With the combined victories at Iuka, Corinth, Perryville and Antietam, the Confederate offensive was stopped. Now the Federals would retake the initiative, at least in Grant's jurisdiction, but before he could begin an offensive, he would need reinforcements. One detail conspicuous to everyone during the battles of Iuka and Corinth was the Union's lack of strength in the western theater due to their previous dispersion of forces.
It was beginning to dawn on the government that if they wanted action, Grant was their man. In consequence, Halleck began ordering reinforcements to Grant’s command and on October 25, 1862, Grant was made a department commander over the Department of the Tennessee. His new command covered western Kentucky and Tennessee all the way up to and including Cairo. In addition, he commanded as much territory as he could obtain in northern Mississippi.
On October 26th, Grant wrote a note to Halleck suggesting the abandonment of much of the territory in favor of a thrust down the Mississippi Central Railroad. The object of the movement would be the evacuation and capture of Vicksburg. On November 2nd, Grant was ready to move.
CHAPTER SEVEN
"I was on dry ground on the same side
of the river with the enemy"
October 26, 1862 - July 4, 1863
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 17