In essence, Grant began operations outnumbered by more than a two to one ratio. His only chance was to beat the rebels in detail. In order to accomplish such a daunting task he would have to use time as his ally. Vicksburg could only be taken by moving rapidly.
As his forces moved east from Bruinsburg, Grant issued instructions to the 13th Corps quartermaster. "You will issue to the troops of this command, without provision returns, for their subsistence during the next five days three rations." 67 Grant also issued instructions to the corps commanders. "Chief quartermasters to seize, for the use of the army in the field during the ensuing campaign, such land transportation as may be necessary, belonging to the inhabitants of the country through which they may pass." 68
In essence, the men were told to live off the land. They were to carry only three days' rations. He was employing the lesson he learned from the experience at Holly Springs. This is further evidence that Grant was a fast learner and never failed to employ what he had learned.
Personal baggage was kept to a minimum. Not a tent or wagon was allowed to cross the Mississippi before all available troops had crossed. Grant's personal baggage at this time consisted of one toothbrush. He and his staff were with the advance using borrowed horses because their horses failed to reach them for several days.
By two o' clock on the morning of May 1st, McClernand's leading division had advanced eight miles east of Bruinsburg. Here the National forces first came in contact with the enemy, but darkness limited events to light skirmishing until dawn.
The Confederates were commanded by General Bowen who had brought with him the garrison of Grand Gulf, some seven or eight thousand men. Bowen's job was to check Grant's advance until reinforcements could arrive from Vicksburg. Bowen chose to give battle just west of Port Gibson along a series of ridges admirably suited for defense. The sight chosen was where the road to Port Gibson divided in two. Bowen deployed his forces across both roads forcing the attacking force to follow both roads which were separated by deep ravines.
The fighting began at dawn as McClernand put the divisions of Hovey, Carr and A. J. Smith on the left road and Osterhaus' division on the right road. Due to the terrain, the divisions on the left could not reinforce those on the right and vice versa. As soon as artillery fire was heard, Grant who was at Bruinsburg, started for the front. Grant arrived on the battlefield at ten o' clock and promptly inspected both flanks. He found McClernand's forces pushing vigorously against the rebel right, but Osterhaus' division had been stymied on the enemy left. Grant promptly ordered up two brigades of Logan's division. McPherson appeared on the scene and Grant directed him to have J. E. Smith's brigade join Osterhaus and try to flank the enemy. This occurred about noon on May 1st. Osterhaus attacked along the rebel front while McPherson’s brigades assaulted across the ravine. This combined attack dislodged the Southerners from their position and sent them scurrying toward Port Gibson. By sunset, the entire Confederate line was broken.
Grant's forces pursued the enemy during the evening until prudence dictated otherwise. Finally, the Union advance stopped within two miles of Port Gibson. The results of the Battle of Port Gibson were: Union dead - 131; wounded - 719; and missing - 341; for a total of 725.
The Battle of Port Gibson was a decided Union victory. The landing at Bruinsburg and subsequent movement inland had come as a big surprise for the rebel command. Bowen had hastily assembled his forces to confront Grant and had put up a stubborn defense against overwhelming Union superiority.
Battle of Raymond
Grant immediately sent a letter to Halleck announcing the results of the river crossing and the victory at Port Gibson.
GRAND GULF, MISS., May 3, 1863.
On the 29th of April, Admiral Porter attacked the fortifications at this place with seven iron-clads, commencing at eight o' clock A.M., and continuing until half past one, engaging them at very close quarters, many times not being more than one hundred yards from the enemy's guns. During this time, I had about ten thousand troops on board transports and barges, ready to land them, and carry the place by storm the moment the batteries bearing upon the river were silenced, so as to make the landing practicable. From the great elevation the enemy's batteries had, it proved entirely impracticable to silence them from the river; and when the gunboats were drawn off, I decided immediately upon landing my forces on the Louisiana shore, and march them across the point below Grand Gulf.
At night the gunboats made another vigorous attack, and in the mean time, the transports safely ran the blockade, and on the following day, the whole force with me was transferred to Bruinsburg, the first point of land below Grand Gulf from where the interior can be reached, and the march immediately commenced on Port Gibson. General McClernand was in the advance, with the Thirteenth army corps. About two A.M. on the 1st of May, when about four miles from Port Gibson, he met the enemy. Some little skirmishing took place before daylight, but not to any great extent. The Thirteenth corps was followed by Logan's division of McPherson's corps, which reached the scene of action as soon as the last of the Thirteenth corps was out of the road. The fighting continued all day, and until after dark, over the most broken country I ever saw. The whole country is a series of irregular ridges, divided by deep and impracticable ravines, grown up with heavy timber, undergrowth, and cane. It was impossible to engage any considerable portion of our force at any one time. The enemy were driven, however, from point to point towards Port Gibson, until night closed in, under which, it was evident to me, they intended to retreat. The pursuit was continued after dark, until the enemy was again met by Logan's division, about two miles from Port Gibson. The nature of the country is such that further pursuit, in the dark, was not deemed prudent or advisable. On the 2d, our troops moved into the town, without finding any enemy except their wounded. The bridge across Bayou Pierre, about two miles from Port Gibson, on the Grand Gulf road, had been destroyed, and also the bridge immediately at Port Gibson, on the Vicksburg road. The enemy retreated over both these routes, leaving a battery and several regiments of infantry at the former, to prevent a reconstruction of the first bridge. One brigade, under General Stevenson, was detached to drive the enemy from this position, or occupy his attention, and a heavy detail set to work, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson and Captain Tresillian, to reconstruct the bridge over the other. This work was accomplished, a bridge and roadway (over a hundred and twenty feet long) made, and the whole of McPherson's two divisions marched over before night. This corps then marched to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, rebuilt a bridge over that stream, and was on the march by five and a half A.M. to-day. Soon after crossing the bayou, our troops were opened on by the enemy's artillery. It was soon demonstrated that this was only intended to cover the retreat of the main army. On arriving at Willow Springs, General McPherson was directed to hold the position from there to the Big Black with one division, and General McClernand, on his arrival, to join him in this duty. I immediately started for this place with one brigade of Logan's division and some cavalry (twenty men). The brigade of infantry was left about seven miles from here; contrabands and prisoners taken having stated that the last of the retreating enemy had passed that point. The woods, between here and the crossing of the Big Black, are evidently filled yet with the detachments of the enemy, and some artillery. I am in hopes many of them will be picked up by our forces.
Our loss will not exceed one hundred and fifty killed and five hundred wounded. The enemy's loss is probably about the same. We have, however, some five hundred of their men prisoners, and may pick up many more yet. Many stragglers, particularly from the Missouri troops, no doubt have fallen out, and will never join their regiments again.
The move by Bruinsburg undoubtedly took the enemy much by surprise. General Bowen's (the rebel commander) defence was a good one, and well carried out. My force, however, was too heavy for his, and composed of well-disciplined and hardy men, who knew no defeat and are not willing to learn what it is.
This army is in t
he finest health and spirits. Since leaving Milliken's bend they have marched as much by night as by day, through mud and rain, without tents or other baggage, and on irregular rations, without a complaint, and with less straggling than I have ever before witnessed. Where all have done so well, it would be out of place to make invidious distinction.
The country will supply all the forage required for anything like an active campaign, and the necessary fresh beef; other supplies will have to be drawn from Milliken's bend. This is a long and precarious route, but I have every confidence in succeeding in doing it.
Admiral Porter left here this morning for the mouth of the Red river. A letter from Admiral Farragut says that Banks has defeated Taylor, and captured about two thousand prisoners.
Colonel Grierson's raid from LaGrange through Mississippi has been the most successful thing of the kind since the breaking out of the rebellion. He was five miles south of Pontotoc on the 19th of April. The next place he turned up at was Newton, about thirty miles east of Jackson. From there he has gone south, touching at Hazelhurst, Bahala, and various places. The Southern papers and Southern people regard it as one of the most daring exploits of the war. I am told the whole state is full of men paroled by Grierson." 69
There were two reasons to include the above letter in its entirety. One was to demonstrate how Grant continually kept his superior informed of his actions. The other reason was, who better than Grant to expound on all the activities to date. His writing was so clear and concise one could tell exactly what happened day to day.
Grant had given the perfect synopsis of all that had transpired and kept Halleck informed by letter or telegram almost daily. Grant continued to stay in contact with Halleck, but from now on he would not be seeking anyone's approval, only notifying them what he had done.
The battle of Port Gibson had turned Grand Gulf and caused its evacuation. Although Port Gibson had been a decided triumph, Grant was displeased by McClernand’s performance. The victory appeared to be more the consequence of actions by Grant and McPherson than those of McClernand and his corps did most of the fighting. Grant lamented the fact that he could not count on one of his corps commanders to provide proper leadership.
Grant was at Grand Gulf on May 3rd, catching up on correspondence and attending to personal matters when he received word from Banks. He had previously promised Halleck and Banks that once in possession of Grand Gulf, he would send a corps to Banks to help in the reduction of Port Hudson and then the combined forces could turn their attention to Vicksburg. The letter from Banks stated he was now out of reach on the Red River and would not be back at Port Hudson prior to the 10th of May. This caused Grant to change his plans once again.
Fuller best described the dilemma Grant now faced. "Grant was now faced by a problem unique in the history of war. He was operating in an enemy's country with his enemy's main forces located between his base of supply at Memphis and his base of operations at Grand Gulf." 70
Grant knew all hope of success rested with celerity of movement in order to beat the enemy in detail. Therefore, on May 3rd, he decided it would be imprudent to wait for Banks, so he would operate alone against Vicksburg. He also realized as he moved farther inland from Grand Gulf his supply lines and communications could easily be cut. Therefore, Grant opted to sever all communications and cut loose from his base of operations at Grand Gulf. He immediately notified Washington of his intentions. He later wrote in his memoirs, "I knew well Halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success." 71
What Grant was attempting went entirely against the book; in fact, he completely threw away the book. It was unorthodox and if he failed he would be crucified by Halleck, the press and the public, but he had made up his mind and no one was in a position to stop him. When Sherman heard of his cutting loose from Grand Gulf, he sent Grant the following admonishment. "Stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons and then act as quickly as possible, for this road will be jammed as sure as life if you attempt to supply 50,000 men by one single road." 72 Grant responded at once with the following. "I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can and make the country furnish the balance.....A delay would give the enemy time to re-enforce and fortify. If Blair were up I believe we could be in Vicksburg in seven days." 73 Grant was light years ahead of Sherman in his thinking because he had no intention of using that road to supply him with anything, yet Sherman is always described as Grant's brilliant subordinate.
The last sentence in the above quotation is significant because Grant viewed speed as the most important aspect of the operation. To one supply officer he wrote, "every day's delay is worth two thousand men to the enemy." 74 To Sherman, on May 3rd, Grant wrote, "It is unnecessary for me to remind you of the overwhelming importance of celerity in your movements." 75 To Hurlbut on May 5th: "Send Lauman's division to Milliken's Bend.....Let them move by brigades as fast as transportation can be gotten." 76 To the commissary at Grand Gulf: "There must be no delay on account of either lack of energy or formality," load up "regardless of requisitions or provision returns." 77 Everything surrounding him was a bustle of activity. Grant was following the adage he coined at Fort Donelson "the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me."
After he had decided to pull out of Grand Gulf he had to decide on what route to take. Most people would probably opt for a direct route toward Vicksburg, but Grant was well aware of the large rebel force at or near Vicksburg. His intelligence had confirmed another enemy force gathering east or northeast of Vicksburg. If he plowed straight on to Vicksburg he might be caught between these forces which might outnumber his own.
The movement Grant decided upon was his old standby maneuver ---the rear attack. Grant elected to press on to the northeast toward Jackson. He would not be caught between the two forces; rather he could beat in detail anyone opposing him on the way. He felt that by aiming at the one force toward the northeast, he possibly could keep the two opposing forces from combining. He would destroy the railroad at Jackson and thus interrupt any possible reinforcements from that quarter. He felt he could do all this before Pemberton could march out from Vicksburg. Marching to the northeast, would also surprise the enemy. This would be the last direction from which they would expect him to come. People talk about Lee's audacity, but this plan was incredible.
The plan was not something Grant just happened upon, it was well conceived. The distance from Bruinsburg to Jackson was approximately seventy miles, yet Grant hugged the Big Black River for about forty-five miles. This accomplished two things. It guarded his left flank from a surprise attack by Pemberton's forces which may be marching out from Vicksburg and it confused Pemberton as to his real intentions. By this route, Grant could threaten Vicksburg and Jackson equally causing the enemy to defend both and confusing them as to his actual objective. By following this route, Grant would be two-thirds of the way to Jackson before he had to reveal his true intentions. Pemberton was entirely baffled. On May 4th, Grant had McPherson and McClernand make demonstrations as if their intentions were to cross the Big Black and move on Vicksburg. These diversions were again designed to fool the enemy.
By May 6th, Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf. He had his entire corps over the Mississippi the next day. General Grant now had approximately 40,000 men with him. Facing him were between 30,000 and 40,000 men strewn out between Vicksburg and Jackson, but unlike Grant, who had concentrated his force, Pemberton had few of his forces concentrated and was exactly in position to be beaten in detail as Grant had foreseen. Grant knew many of his opponents during the war from his previous service time, so he knew their abilities or lack thereof.
By May 12th, Grant's most forward position was that of General McPherson who was at Raymond, Mississippi. There, at about
three-thirty in the morning, as Logan's division moved toward Raymond, he encountered the enemy. Three miles west of Raymond the enemy pickets began to contest McPherson's advance. McPherson deployed two regiments along both sides of the Raymond road and continued to move forward. By eleven o' clock, the National force came upon the main body of rebels about two miles west of Raymond. The Confederate force, under the command of General Gregg, consisted of about five thousand troops. These troops were part of the reinforcements Pemberton had requested from Port Hudson.
McPherson advanced as far as he could until he came to a bridge. The enemy was positioned on the opposite side of the bridge to contest the crossing. The Confederates had placed two batteries of artillery to cover all the approaches to the bridge. In addition, rebel infantry were placed on a hill overlooking the road and in ravines at the base of the hill.
McPherson reconnoitered the positions and sent word to move all of Logan's division to the front. By two o' clock P.M., McPherson had his forces posted on both sides of the road and the advance was ordered. Soon both forces became hotly engaged, but McPherson's greater numbers began to take their toll. McPherson outnumbered Gregg by a two to one ratio. The Confederates were quickly routed with McPherson in hot pursuit, but the deep ravines and heavy underbrush made the pursuit difficult. The Yankees entered the town of Raymond at five P.M. on May 12th. The Confederates passed through Raymond without stopping on their way to Jackson. It now appeared Grant had been successful in separating this force from concentrating with the remainder of Pemberton's army.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 24