Banks had just requested another division from Grant, but he refused sending him a copy of Halleck's request. Grant also informed Banks of the following: "This will necessarily prevent further reenforcements being sent from here to you, until word is heard from the general-in-chief. We must make no disposition of troops that will endanger the success of Rosecrans." 35
All the actions enumerated took place the day Grant first received Halleck's dispatch, September 22nd. On September 25th, he received Halleck's first telegram dated September 13th. He replied immediately to Halleck: "I will now send Sherman to West Tennessee, with two more divisions of his corps. This leaves one division of Sherman's corps here, but it is replaced by one of McPherson's, already above." 36
Grant was again working assiduously to support the cause. During the previous three months, he had willingly overseen the disintegration of his command from three corps to the remaining one. Most people in a position of power fight tooth and nail to retain the semblance of power. Grant always put his cause and country ahead of any personal ambitions.
Halleck suggested someone be sent to take charge of the force sent to Memphis. Grant sent Sherman feeling he was the best person suited for an independent command. Sherman, with six divisions in his command, was directed to move east from Memphis via Corinth, Tuscumbia and Decatur and repair the railroads as he moved. On the 27th of September, Sherman embarked in person for Memphis.
For now, it appeared the great combination of Grant and Sherman had come to a parting of the ways. When Grant sent Sherman to take command of this force, he believed Sherman was on his way to replace Rosecrans. He sent Sherman a letter which showed the true admiration and friendship that had developed between these two men. "I hope you will be in time to aid in giving the rebels the worst, or best thrashing they have had in this war. I have constantly had the feeling that I shall lose you from this command entirely. Of course I do not object to seeing your sphere of usefulness enlarged, and think it should have been enlarged long ago, having an eye to the public good alone. But it needs no assurance from me, general, that, taking a more selfish view, while I would heartily approve such a change, I would deeply regret it on my own account." 37
When Sherman arrived in Memphis, he heard that Grant had also been ordered north and wrote to Grant on October 14th, before the new Military Division had been created. "Accept the command of the great army of the center; don't hesitate. By your presence at Nashville you will unite all discordant elements, and impress the enemy in proportion. All success and honor to you!" 38
Unknown to Grant was that Rosecrans had suffered a severe thrashing at Chickamauga on September 19th and 20th, had retreated into Chattanooga and for all intents and purposes was besieged by the Confederates. In addition to the forces Grant was forwarding to Rosecrans, Halleck had added two corps from the Army of the Potomac under the command of General Joseph Hooker. These troops had embarked by train from Washington and arrived in Bridgeport, Alabama during the first few days of October.
In an effort to distract Confederate attention from the movements of Sherman, Grant ordered McPherson to make a demonstration toward Canton and Jackson, Mississippi. While Sherman was commencing his move, he was informed of the cooperative demonstration being made in his favor by McPherson.
On September 28th, Grant informed Halleck: "I am now ready for the field, or any duty I may be called on to perform." 39 On September 29th, Halleck telegraphed to Grant: "The enemy seems to have concentrated on Rosecrans all his available force from every direction. To meet him, it is necessary that all forces that can be spared in your department be sent to Rosecrans' assistance....An able commander like Sherman or McPherson should be selected. As soon as your health will permit, I think you should go to Nashville, and take the direction of this movement." 40
With the military situation in Tennessee apparently deteriorating, and Grant sensing he might be called upon to play a larger role, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson to Cairo to expedite the transmission of telegrams. This reduced the transit time between Washington and Vicksburg from ten days to five. This arrangement was concluded none too soon for on October 3, 1863, a telegram arrived in Cairo stating the following: "It is the wish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able he will come to Cairo and report by telegraph." 41
As soon as he received the above message, he was off, stopping in Columbus, Kentucky to report by telegraph on October 16th: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3rd directing me to report from Cairo was received at 11:30 on the 10th. Left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo." 42
Grant’s career and life were about to change. He was already a hero, but his scope of authority was about to be dramatically expanded. From here on out he would be viewed, by those alive at the time, as the savior of the Union and country.
Later on the 16th, he arrived in Cairo and sent the following dispatch: "I have just arrived, and report in pursuance with your instructions of the 3rd instant. My staff and headquarters are with me." 43 Halleck's response was received the morning of the October 17th. "You will immediately proceed to the Galt House, Louisville, Kentucky, where you will meet an officer of the War Department with your orders and instructions. You will take with you your staff, etc., for immediate operations in the field." 44
Grant left Cairo within two hours via rail en route to Louisville by way of Indianapolis. As his train was about to leave the station in Indianapolis, a messenger stopped the train and brought word that the Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see him. Stanton boarded Grant's train and immediately introduced himself to Grant's medical director Dr. E. D. Kittoe, whom he mistook for Grant. Once that matter was rectified he sat down with Grant and disclosed what he and Lincoln had in mind. As the train proceeded toward Louisville, Stanton informed Grant that the government was establishing a new Military Division which he was to command. The Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee were to be combined. In effect, Grant would be in charge of all military activities between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi with the exception of Banks’ command in New Orleans. Stanton handed Grant two orders bringing about this reorganization. The two orders were identical with one exception. One left the various commanders in their places, while the second relieved General Rosecrans from command and replaced him with General George Thomas. Grant chose the latter set of orders.
Grant had suggested this very combination one year earlier as the next logical progression. Though he had suggested this action, he had never proposed he should have command, but after many false starts and bungled operations, the logic of this proposal finally dawned upon the authorities in Washington and though Halleck still distrusted Grant, he gave in to Lincoln and Stanton. Grant now found himself in a somewhat unfamiliar position. Until now he had been forced to operate almost entirely under the directives from his superiors. As the commander of his own Military Division, he would be the one making the decisions and more importantly, he could move at his own speed.
Late the evening of October 17th, the train arrived in Louisville. Grant and Stanton spent the next two days conferring about various matters with the conference lasting until late on the 19th. When it adjourned Grant left the Galt House with Julia, who was accompanying him, to spend the evening with relatives who lived in Louisville. When Grant returned to the hotel, he found Stanton highly exercised. Stanton had received a telegram from Charles Dana, who was with Rosecrans at Chattanooga, stating that Rosecrans was on the verge of retreat. Stanton was doubly upset because not only may Chattanooga be evacuated, but he had been unable to find his new commander.
Grant characteristically took charge of the situation. He promptly wrote out the order assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. He then telegraphed the order relieving Rosecrans and placing Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland. Then Grant sent Thomas one additional wire. "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be the
re as soon as possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last and the prospect for keeping them up." 45
Thomas promptly responded with his famous reply. "Two hundred and four thousand four hundred and sixty-two rations in store-houses; ninety thousand to arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th--probably 300 wagons. I will hold the town till we starve." 46 It was clear from Thomas' response how grave the situation was. Not only was the Union army cut off on three sides by the enemy, but the siege was leading to the starvation of the entire force. There was only one nearly impassable wagon road open to the Nationals over which they had to depend for all their supplies. Even if the road had been a good one, it was not capable of handling the volume required. The situation was far worse than anyone had previously realized.
The next day Secretary Stanton departed for Washington, while Julia stayed in Louisville with relatives. On the morning of October 20th, Grant and his staff set off for Nashville. At Nashville, he was greeted by then Military Governor Andrew Johnson. Johnson made a speech of welcome to General Grant. All the while, Grant was literally scared to death that he would be forced to respond. Public speaking greatly distressed him in fact he may have been more comfortable being shot at by the enemy than standing in front of a crowd. When it came to public gatherings, Ulysses was incredibly shy. At any event, the crowd had heard enough and all Grant was forced to do was shake many hands.
During the remainder of the 20th, he began the minutiae of putting his new division in order. He telegraphed Burnside in Knoxville concerning fortifications; Admiral Porter in Cairo about Sherman's advance, requesting rations to meet Sherman at Eastport, but also for them to be convoyed by an accompanying gunboat; and Thomas suggesting the wagon-road to Bridgeport be put in order. Even though these were mere administrative duties, he paid attention to the smallest details.
The morning of October 21st, Grant and his staff left Nashville via train for Stevenson, Alabama. There he met General Rosecrans making his way north. They discussed the situation in Chattanooga and Rosecrans made some good suggestions. For the life of him, Grant could not figure out why Rosecrans had not carried out his suggestions. After Grant's arrival at Stevenson, General Oliver Howard, one of Hookers' corps commanders, came aboard Grant's car to pay his respects. Howard was widely known as "the Christian general", a thoroughly temperate man. Howard did not know Grant and was surprised how slight in stature he was. Rather than a pompous sort, Howard found Grant to be friendly and rather quiet. While Howard and Grant conversed, one of Hooker's aides came in and stated that General Hooker would be happy to entertain General Grant at his headquarters. Grant told the staff officer: "If General Hooker wishes to see me he will find me on this train." 47 Before long Hooker showed up at the train to pay his respects. Hooker had been commander of the Army of the Potomac and surely felt somewhat above his current position. Nevertheless, Grant knew an army could not have two commanders, so he felt compelled that General Hooker should come to him in order to settle the question of authority from the very first instant.
On the 21st, Grant made his way to Bridgeport where Howard had his command and spent the night with Howard in his plain tent. As they entered the tent, Grant spied a flask of whiskey hanging from the tent pole. Howard explained that the flask was left there by some other officer and he went on to state that, "I never drink." Grant replied, "Neither do I." Howard maintained years later that "his answer was not in sport." 48 Imagine that response emanating from someone who history has portrayed as a drunk. In fact, Ulysses S. Grant was a social drinker, when he drank, and nothing more. History has done a great disservice to his memory and record of accomplishments by portraying him in such an unfavorable light.
From Bridgeport, the party had to make their way via an old wagon road to Chattanooga. This road took them way out of their way, but was currently the only available means to make their way to Chattanooga, since the Confederates had cut all other approaches to the city. From the condition of this road Grant could see firsthand why the soldiers were starving in Chattanooga. The road was washed out in many places making it almost impossible to pass over on horseback let alone with a wagon. Strewn along the road were the bodies of starved mules and horses and the wreckage of an untold number of wagons. Finally, on October 23rd, Grant arrived in Chattanooga.
He went at once to Thomas's headquarters arriving there about 9:30 P.M. and promptly telegraphed the following message to Halleck: "Have just arrived. I will write to-morrow. Please approve order placing Sherman in command of the Department of the Tennessee, with headquarters in the field." 49
Grant’s reception by Thomas in Chattanooga appeared to be somewhat less than cordial. Speculation has been made that the relationship between General Grant and General Thomas had cooled while serving under Halleck during the first movement against Corinth. Thomas had been placed over Grant's command and Grant had been elevated to a totally meaningless position. Grant always thought Thomas was a good general, just slow in his movements. Grant showed up rain-soaked and covered with mud, but no one offered him a change of clothing or something to eat. When someone finally brought this to Thomas's attention, he directed his staff to put things in order. Grant was offered dry clothing and a bedroom, but preferred to just warm himself by the fire. It appears doubtful that this was an intentional slight on the part of Thomas, but rather inattention to detail displayed by a rather stoic individual. After Grant's arrival, most of the general officers came by to pay their respects and greet their new commander. Throughout the evening, they discussed the current situation around Chattanooga. Grant found there were plans in place to relieve the intolerable supply conditions and the next morning would view firsthand what had to be done to turn the existing situation in his favor. Already going through his mind was how he could become the aggressor instead of the defender.
Chattanooga lies about two miles north of the Tennessee and Georgia border. The strategic importance of Chattanooga stemmed from the railroad lines which passed through the city. The city is situated at the northern end of a valley through which the Chattanooga Creek runs. On the east side of the valley Missionary Ridge rises some three or four hundred feet above the town. To the west of the valley lies Lookout Mountain which rises over one thousand feet above the Tennessee River and town. Just before reaching the town, the Tennessee River makes an abrupt 180 degree turn at the end of Lookout Mountain. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad ran along the edge of the river directly beneath Lookout Mountain on its way into Chattanooga. With the enemy holding Lookout Mountain, one can visualize the difficulty in supplying the city.
The Confederate line of intrenchments ran from the northern end of Missionary Ridge, along the crest of the ridge for quite a distance to the south, across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain. The enemy also had troops posted at Lookout Valley just to the west of the mountain and on Raccoon Mountain which was north of Lookout Mountain. The rebels had placed troops down to the edge of the Tennessee River which allowed them to cover the road on the north bank of the Tennessee rendering it totally useless for the Nationals. Consequently, Chattanooga was invested on three sides unable to use the railroad, the river or the most convenient road to supply the army. Unless another route of supply was opened soon, the army would have to evacuate the city or starve.
This state of affairs is what greeted Grant as he toured the area the morning of October 24th. Besides Grant's staff, he took Generals Thomas and Smith along on the inspection. General W. F. "Baldy" Smith was Thomas's chief engineer. Smith had already developed a scheme to break the siege and allow supplies to begin reaching the beleaguered army. Thomas had already approved the plan, so Grant was being shown the Confederate positions and how the plan was to be implemented.
As mentioned earlier, the Tennessee River makes a 180 degree turn just west of Chattanooga. This turn in the river created a point of land called Moccasin Bend. Hidden from the enemy's view was a little used road which
ran across the river from Chattanooga to a place called Brown's Ferry. Brown's Ferry was only one mile from Chattanooga via this road and the crossing there would be out of range of the Confederate artillery on Lookout Mountain. From opposite Brown's Ferry, this road wound its way through a gap in Raccoon Mountain and came out again on the Tennessee River on the north side of Raccoon Mountain at a place called Kelly's Ferry. The rebels held Raccoon Mountain with a small force figuring they had Grant's army contained within the town of Chattanooga.
Smith's plan was this; because Longstreet had posted most of his corps along Lookout Mountain, Smith felt he could float a brigade down the river in pontoon boats from Chattanooga during the night, in dead silence, and embark across the river from Brown's Ferry and seize the company of infantry the rebels had posted there. In addition, Smith planned to march another brigade across Moccasin Bend and, while the first brigade secured a beachhead, the other brigade would build a pontoon bridge across the river. Once the Confederate opposition was overcome, and the bridge built, the Federals would have a secure line of supplies from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry and the rebels would be unable to interfere.
Grant immediately approved the plan and Thomas and Smith set off to make the necessary preparations. After his inspection was complete, Grant went back to his new headquarters to insure the remaining parts of the plan were arranged. Hooker was ordered to move from Bridgeport via Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a division, was to move via the north side of the Tennessee until opposite Whitesides, cross the river and hold the road after Hooker had passed. General Smith was to place 1800 men under General Hazen, along with sixty pontoon boats, and Hazen was to float down the river to Brown's Ferry and secure the beachhead. Smith himself would take 2200 men with the material to construct the bridge and march across Moccasin Bend to Brown's Ferry.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 31