The plan kicked off on October 26th, when Hooker began marching east from Bridgeport. At 3 o' clock, the morning of October 27th, General Hazen led 1250 men of his brigade into the river and began their quiet float to Brown's Ferry. Hazen's men pulled over to shore at about five o' clock and quickly drove the defenders away. Before long, the remainder of Smith's force was over the river and by seven o' clock the Federals had control of the height commanding the ferry. By ten o' clock, the pontoon bridge was finished and the National forces had two bridges in place on either side of Moccasin Bend and possession of the western side at Brown's Ferry. By five o' clock, the evening of the 27th, two divisions of General Howard's corps arrived within one mile of Brown's Ferry, so the linkup was been made and the operation a success. Starvation had been averted at a total cost of six dead and thirty-two wounded or missing. The supply line or "cracker line" as it was called was open to Bridgeport. Within one week, the troops would be back on full rations. Only now did General Bragg, the Confederate commander, understand the significance of this movement. The siege had been broken and if his plan was to succeed, he would have to break this new supply line.
Wherever Grant went, action was sure to follow and Chattanooga was no exception. Within five days of his arrival on the scene, a supply line had been established and the siege had been broken. Bragg, however, was not about let this action go unchallenged. He ordered Longstreet to attack the Union forces and recover the position opposite Brown's Ferry. Shortly, after midnight, Longstreet attacked General Geary's division of Howard's corps at Wauhatchie. Longstreet's force made a lodgment on high ground at Geary's position, but before long Howard counterattacked with a second division. The fight lasted for over three hours and culminated in a notorious charge of pack mules which had gotten away from their drivers during the battle. The Confederates, thinking it was a cavalry charge, fled in a rout. The cracker line was open and not to be disturbed again.
Another problem Grant inherited when the Military Division of the Mississippi was created was that of General Burnside in Knoxville. Shortly after Grant's arrival in Chattanooga, he received a message from Halleck: "From advices received last night it is pretty certain that Ewell's corps, from 20,000 to 25,000 men, has left Lee's army and gone to Tennessee, probably by way of Abington. As Burnside will be obliged to move all his forces up the valley, you must guard against Bragg's entrance into East Tennessee, above Chattanooga." 50
This report was unfounded but for now Grant was in a quandary. He had no way to confront an additional mobile force of 20,000 men. The army he had at Chattanooga contained half-starved men and animals and was unable to go on the offensive. Knoxville and Burnside were to remain a thorn in Grant's side throughout the Chattanooga campaign, mostly because Grant was immobilized and prevented from taking action. The only possibility he had to counteract a move into east Tennessee by the Confederates was to try to expedite Sherman’s arrival. With this in mind, Grant sent Sherman the following message: "Drop everything east of Bear Creek and move with your entire force toward Stevenson until you receive further orders. The enemy are evidently moving a large force toward Cleveland and may break through our lines and move on Nashville, in which event your troops are the only forces at command that could beat them there. With your forces here before the enemy cross the Tennessee, we could turn their position so as to force them back and save the possibility of a move northward this winter." 51
By October 28th, Grant had things moving around Chattanooga; 1) the siege had been broken; 2) the supply line had been established; 3) Hooker had been moved and was now in a position to move in conjunction with Thomas's Army of the Cumberland; and 4) Sherman, with the Army of the Tennessee, had been urged to make all haste to Chattanooga. It would not be long before Grant would be able to go over to the offensive and drive Bragg deeper into Georgia. An attack on Bragg would be the best remedy for the plight of Burnside in Knoxville, but for now Burnside was on his own.
With events moving into high gear, Grant reported to Halleck the following on October 28th. "General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the Rebels give us one week more time I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations." 52
Long after the war, a veteran described how things got moving whenever Grant arrived on the scene. "You have no conception of the change in the army when Grant came. He opened up the cracker line and got a steamer through. We began to see things move. We felt that everything came from a plan. He came into the army quietly, no splendor, no airs, no staff. He used to go about alone. He began the campaign the moment he reached the field." 53
Amidst all the hustle and bustle, Grant was able to get off a letter to Julia on October 27th, describing the wretched conditions he found in Chattanooga when he arrived.
Chattanooga Tennessee
October 27th 1863.
Dear Julia:
The very hard ride over here and necessary exercise since to gain a full knowledge of location instead of making my injury worse has almost certainly cured me. I now walk without the use of a crutch or cane and mount my horse from the ground without difficulty. This is one of the wildest places you ever saw and without the use of rail-roads one of the most out-of-the way places. To give you an idea of its inaccessibility I have only to state the waggons with our baggage left Bridgeport, the present rail-road terminus, fifty miles distant by the road they have to travel, on the 23 inst. It is now 10 o' Clock at night of the 27th and they have not yet arrived and I hardly expect them to-morrow. Then too six-mule teams are not loaded with what two would easily pull on ordinary dirt roads. We have not consequently been able to start Messes.-Ross remained back at Nashville to lay in supplies but as he has not yet come up to Bridgeport I suspect he has had to go, or send, to Louisville for them. When they will get up is hard to surmise. I am making a desperate effort however to get possession of the river from here to Bridgeport and if I do it will facilitate bringing supplies very much.
There are but very few people here and those few will have to leave soon. People about Vicksburg have not seen War yet, or at least not the suffering brought on by war.
I have received no line from you yet. I feel very anxious to hear from the children. Tell Fred and Buck they must write at least one letter each week to you or me.
Kisses for yourself and Jess.
ULYS.
When do you think of starting on your trip to Ohio? You ought to start soon or you will not be able to go this Fall.
U. 54
In a second letter to Julia dated November 2nd, Grant made an interesting observation. "I see the papers again team with all sorts of rumors of the reason for changes. This time however I do not see myself abused. I do not know whether this is a good omen or not. I have been so accustomed to seeing at least a portion of the press against me that I rather feel lost when not attacked from some quarter." 55 It is comforting to realize the press views the military and its people today with the same jaundiced position it did 130 years ago.
The first week of November was shaping up as a challenge to Grant's leadership. One of his foremost problems was logistical in nature. He had broken the siege and opened the supply line, so the Army of the Cumberland was no longer in danger of starving, but this was not enough. In order to re-equip the army he needed more than thirty rail cars per day of supplies. In addition, he foresaw the possibility of having to supply Burnside's army via this route as well. To accomplish this task required two rail lines, but only one existed between Nashville and Chattanooga. Grant could have a second track laid next to the original rail line, but this presented a daunting task. Another option lay to the west of the Nashville and Chattanooga in the form of the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. This railroad had been mostly destroyed by guerrillas and lacked both rails and rail cars, but even in such woeful straits, provide
d a better alternative than double-tracking the Nashville and Chattanooga. If this road could be put in condition Grant would have a double track system capable of restoring the health and mobility of his forces in Chattanooga. He assigned Brigadier-General Grenville Dodge of Sherman's command to undertake the project. Dodge was an experienced railroad builder and attacked his job with a vengeance. He first took control of the railroad and set his men to work cutting trees for bridges and fuel for locomotives. Because he had no real railroad tools available, Dodge set his blacksmiths to making the necessary implements. What Dodge could not make, Grant had his railroad superintendent in Nashville supply from up north. Grant also had McPherson forward all the locomotives and rail cars he could spare from Vicksburg. Within forty days, Dodge had constructed 182 bridges and rebuilt 102 miles of road. Grant would no longer want for supplies demonstrating once again the ingenuity of Yankee craftsmen.
On November 4th, Grant faced another threat. He had been hoping to buy time before everything was in place to go over on the offensive. Bragg had failed to recapture Wauhatchie thereby, allowing Grant to break the siege, but Bragg was not done threatening Grant's position. Bragg knew Burnside's position in east Tennessee was tenuous at best due to the lack of supplies. He also knew Sherman was on his way to Chattanooga. Acting on a proposal from Jefferson Davis, Bragg devised a plan to send General Longstreet and about 12,000 men on a mission to drive Burnside out of east Tennessee and return to Chattanooga before Sherman could arrive. In essence, Bragg wanted Longstreet to beat Burnside in detail and return. The problem was Bragg was sending 12,000 up against the 25,000 men in Burnside's army who were holding entrenched positions. The plan was doomed from the start, but nevertheless, on November 4th, he sent away his best commander and 12,000 men weakening his position immensely.
One hundred and fifty years later it is easy to ponder how stupid this move was, but at that time the move caused great consternation in both Washington and Chattanooga. In Washington, the authorities had worried constantly about the state of affairs in east Tennessee, concerned both for Burnside's army and the loyal Union population in that part of the state. This move served only to increase their anxiety. In Chattanooga, Grant had one more problem with which to contend. Grant’s primary concern was his lack of intelligence about the size of Longstreet’s force. Washington, being in a state of panic, over Burnside's safety, continued to urge Grant to do something to relieve Burnside. Grant knew immediately of Longstreet's movement, so after conferring with General Thomas, on November 7th, he issued Thomas orders which he hoped would cause Bragg to recall Longstreet. "The news is of such a nature, that it becomes an imperative duty for your force to draw attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. I deem the best movement to attack the enemy to be, an attack on the northern end of Missionary ridge, with all the force you can bring to bear against it; and when that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary ridge is in our possession; rations to be carried in haversacks. Where there are not horses to move the artillery, mules must be taken from the teams, or horses from ambulances; or, if necessary, officers dismounted, and their horses taken. Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into execution. The movement should not be made a moment later than to-morrow morning." 56 This operation would get Thomas's troops out of Chattanooga and allow them to move against the railroad which was Bragg's supply line. If the move succeeded, Bragg's lifeline would be cut and he would be forced to retreat into Georgia. It was hoped this move would force Bragg to recall Longstreet and thereby relieve pressure on Burnside.
After Grant issued Thomas his orders on November 7th, he telegraphed Halleck about the proposed operation. "In addition to the forces threatening Burnside from the east, there is but little doubt that Longstreet is moving to join them. I have ordered Thomas to attack the north end of Missionary ridge, and, when that is carried, to threaten or attack the enemy's line of communications between Cleveland and Dalton. This movement will be made by Monday morning. I expect Sherman will reach Huntsville to-day." 57 Also, on the 7th, Grant notified Burnside of the impending attack. "I have ordered an immediate move from here to carry Missionary ridge, and to threaten or attack the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. This must have the effect to draw the enemy back from your western front." 58
For once in his military career, Grant let his eternal optimism get the best of him. Grant was always eager to go on the offensive against the enemy, but now it finally hit home just how desperate the condition of the Army of the Cumberland was. Grant knew Thomas's forces were immobilized, but this was an emergency and emergencies called for extraordinary actions.
General Thomas responded to Grant's order by declaring his total inability to move until relieved by Sherman. One thing was for certain and that was George Thomas never moved until he was ready and no amount of persuasion could change his mind. After hearing Thomas's response, Grant reported to Halleck on November 8th that an attack was out of the question until Sherman arrived. That evening he gave Burnside the same news promising an attack whenever Sherman arrived.
Burnside was on his own for now which made Washington even more anxious. After all, it had been less than one year since Burnside's disastrous attack on Fredericksburg. For now all Grant could provide Burnside was encouragement. For his part, Burnside was very optimistic about holding out as long as his ammunition held.
The first few weeks Grant spent in Chattanooga were one of the more frustrating times he spent during the war. During this spell of forced inactivity, Grant hinted to Halleck how he felt: "I have never felt such restlessness before as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumberland." 59 Bragg's detachment of Longstreet, presented Grant with a tantalizing opportunity. If only he could attack, he might possibly destroy or capture Bragg's entire army. This would make possible an unhindered advance upon Mobile! The possibilities were endless; he could shorten the war; but, alas, he may as well have been on the moon. Indeed, his spirit was willing, but the flesh was weak. All Grant could do was make preparations for the attack and wait on Sherman.
As with many of his periods of inactivity, legend grew up about his drinking. While, Washington no longer paid any attention to these stories and they no longer had any effect on his career, they were still dredged up as part of the Grant legend.
William S. McFeely grasped a portion of this legend took it out of context and proclaimed once again Grant got drunk. To quote McFeely: "Once again, Grant did drink, and once again he sobered up and went back to the other activities of war." 60 He even referred to Catton's book, Grant Takes Command but McFeely also took Catton's information out of context and sensationalized it.
What Catton had to say about the episode provides the perfect explanation and the entire truth about the incident in question when examined in context. Catton explained the episode as follows. "Working all of this out took the entire day, and Sherman stayed over night in Chattanooga. Next day was November 16, and Sherman went back to Bridgeport to get his part of the job organized; and on this day too, John Rawlins wrote a sad letter to Emma Hurlbut:'.....matters have changed, and the necessity of my presence here made almost absolute, by the free use of intoxicating liquors at Headquarters, which last night's developments showed me had reached to the General commanding. I am the only one here (his wife not being with him) who can stay it in that direction and prevent evil consequences resulting from it. I had hoped, but it appears vainly, that his New Orleans experience would prevent him ever again indulging with his worst enemy.'
Even more doleful, attaining misty heights of melancholy eloquence, was a letter Rawlins wrote on the same day to Grant himself.
'I appeal to you, in the name of everything a friend, an honest man and a lover of his country holds dear,' he wrote, 'to immediately desist from further tasting of liquors of any kind
no matter by whom asked or under what circumstances.' If Grant did not desist, said Rawlins, 'the bitterest imprecations of an outraged and deceived people' would descend on him, because 'in all humanity or heaven there is no voice of palliation or excuse' for a general who got drunk at a time like this. Rawlins pointed out that not since Washington crossed the Delaware 'with his bare-footed patriots to the attack of Trenton' had so much responsibility rested on any American as now rested on Grant. He asserted that 'two more nights like the last will find you prostrated on a sick bed unfit for duty,' and he urged him 'for the sake of my bleeding country and your own honor' to abstain from drink hereafter.
Altogether, a moving indictment; resting, as it happens, upon nothing at all. Dedicated Rawlins had his facts wrong. It is rarely possible to prove a negative in a case of this kind; but here it can be shown that the lapse Rawlins was lamenting so emotionally had not taken place. The episode is worth examining briefly simply because it throws a strange new light on the dreary old triangle of Grant, Rawlins and whiskey.
What happened was this. On November 13 Grant got a visitor; a civilian from Pennsylvania, one William W. Smith, a cousin of Grant's wife Julia, and a man with whom Grant had been intimate since the old days in Missouri. At Grant's invitation Smith had come down to Chattanooga in the amiable hope that he might be able to see a battle. Smith sent his baggage on ahead. It contained, among other things, a little gift which Grant's mother, Hannah Grant, had asked him to take to her son--a bottle of Kentucky wine, which Smith picked up when he stopped to visit Hannah Grant in Covington on his way south. It also contained, for the use of other ranks, several bottles of whiskey, carefully hidden beneath bottles of pickles and ketchup and boxes of cigars. Smith had dinner that night at Grant's table: plain fare, roast beef and boiled potatoes and bread and butter, with Grant carving like any good family man. After dinner Smith played euchre with friends on the staff, and for a time Grant stood behind his chair, making comments on his cards and the way he played them after the age-old manner of onlookers at card games. Amongst those present was a Colonel Clark Lagow, who had been one of Grant's aides from the early part of the war but who seems to have outlived his usefulness; two weeks earlier Dana wrote to Stanton recommending that he be mustered out, saying that Grant was willing to get rid of him, and in his diary that night Smith wrote that "Lagow's friends are pretty lively larks.'
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 32