Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly on his front. The force will be commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.
Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers.
These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.
Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. I immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.
There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.
Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.
If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.
U. S. GRANT
Lieutenant-General 17
There are a number of noteworthy observations in the above letter to Meade. As stated earlier, Grant mentioned the James River three times and City Point once in this letter. To Grant's detractors, who said he lacked strategic insight this clearly manifested his intentions one month prior to the kickoff of the campaign. If he could not defeat Lee en route, he would try to seize Petersburg and starve Lee's army to death.
In the book, The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee, the authors made statements on two separate occasions about Grant's lack of maneuver. "Grant had moved aggressively, without feints or maneuver, in the apparent intention of overwhelming Lee." 18 Later they again made a similar statement. "Grant's campaign has usually been described as a series of crablike flanking movements, but this is not strictly accurate." 19 These statements, no doubt, were designed to portray Grant, once again, as stolid, slow, lacking the capacity of a great strategist and tactician. Once more, the message is reiterated that Grant only made frontal assaults. The old distortion of Grant as a "butcher" or "hammerer" is dredged up once again. Yet in Grant's letter to Meade, written one month before the campaign began, he referred over and over again to turning Lee's flanks.
Sherman's offensive against Johnston between Chattanooga and Atlanta is viewed as a masterful display of flanking movements. Yet, when there is overwhelming written documentation delineating Grant's intentions to maneuver against Lee's flanks, these are ignored so the legend of Grant as a butcher can be maintained. What is the difference between the flanking movements of Sherman and Grant? Both demonstrated excellent tactical knowledge, but for the desire of some who want to rewrite history, Grant's reputation is besmirched.
The last detail worth noting in Grant's orders to Meade is the sentence "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." 20 This sentence simplifies and embodies Grant's entire strategy in the upcoming campaign. In order to keep Lee from being able to send reinforcements elsewhere or from being able to make a raid on the North, Meade's army would have to fix Lee's position. If Grant could beat him in a battle, he would do so, but if not, he would hold tight to Lee's army not allowing him the opportunity to move against any of the other Union contingents, especially Sherman. Grant had faith from the beginning of the campaign that Sherman would be the one to come up against Lee's rear and finish the war.
Grant was entirely successful in his attempt to hold tight to Lee. In essence, Grant removed Lee as a factor in the war during the final eleven months of the war. Except for Lee's dispatch of Jubal Early for his raid upon Washington, Lee was unable to reinforce anyone nor able to make an attack on the North like Antietam or Gettysburg. Although Lee was able to send Early against Washington, the raid amounted to nothing because Grant was able to send a force there to repel it. Lee had hoped to get Grant to relax his hold on the Army of Northern Virginia. With a lesser general, Lee may have succeeded, but with Ulysses S. Grant, he did not even come close. As Grant's letter to Meade shows, he never intended to relax his grip for one second until the war was over and he never did.
As the campaign approached, Grant decided which direction he would take against Lee. By moving against Lee's left, the Army of the Potomac would have to carry all its supplies and be reliant on long supply lines which were capable of being disrupted. By moving against Lee's right, Grant could hug the Virginia coast and rely on the naval superiority of the Union for its supplies. This would require fewer wagons and fewer men to guard supply lines which were much shorter.
By the middle of April, Grant's plans were well developed and all that remained were the final preparations to insure nothing had been overlooked. Since the war, many historians have criticized his spring campaign and all the associated bloodletting. As Grant pointed out in his memoirs, many suggested a move against Richmond via the Chesapeake Bay. This proposed strategy missed the point of Grant's campaign entirely. Grant wanted Lee's army and if he could not capture it, he wanted it beaten so badly it could threaten no one. By moving toward Richmond by sea, Lee's army would be fresh and could be detached as an invasion force or to reinforce other armies.
Prior to the commencement of the campaign, Grant was able to visit Washington weekly to brief the Secretary of War and the President on final preparations for the spring campaign. During one of these visits, Grant stepped on the toes of the Secretary of War. In preparing the armies for the spring offensive, Grant had been stripping underutilized forces from every place he could and sending them to the front where they could be of value in the campaign. After one such instance, Secretary Stanton expressed displeasure at Grant for removing so many men from the Washington fortifications. "I think I rank you in this matter, Mr. Secretary," said Grant. "We shall have to see Mr. Lincoln about that," Stanton replied.
So off to the White House they went, secretary of war and general-in-chief, where the secretary explained the point at issue. President Lincoln replied: "You and I, Mr. Stanton, have been trying to boss this job, and we have not succeeded very well in it. We have sent across the mountains for Mr. Grant, as Mrs. Grant calls him, to relieve us, and I think we had better leave him alone to do as he pleases." 21
Grant's position was firmly established and the White House was going to support him all the way. With the administration's full support and Grant making his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, he hoped to keep the politicians at least at arm's length and from interfering with the operations of the army as much as possible.
During this springtime of new responsibilities and grave crisis for the country, Adam Badeau
, of Grant's staff, asked him one day if he felt the position, overwhelming, and the task at hand, insurmountable. Grant's response typifies the quiet confidence and self-assurance he possessed in his own abilities. "He answered in simple terms that he was perfectly certain of success; that he felt now as he had felt at Donelson, and Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, when the dangers, though less in extent, were equally alarming. He had no fear of not doing all that he was put in his place to do. He did not know, he said, how long it might be before he accomplished his task, nor what interruptions or obstacles might intervene, but of its eventual accomplishment no shadow of a doubt ever seemed to cross his mind. This confidence never deserted him." 22
As the campaign approached, Grant's orders had been issued; the decision on the direction the Army of the Potomac would take had been made; and final preparations were being completed. As mentioned earlier, Grant envisioned the ultimate positions to be gained by the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James under General Butler.
Grant planned to move by his left permitting easy supply of the army and allowing for constant communication with Butler's army. From day one, he planned to bring the two armies together to act as a unit.
Grant expected Lee to fall back to the intrenchments around Richmond and because of this he Grant felt the actions of the Federal forces would result in a siege of Richmond.
Before the spring campaign commenced Grant wrote to Meade discussing this very situation. "Should a siege of Richmond become necessary, ammunition and equipments can be got from the arsenals at Washington and Fort Monroe." 23 During a discussion of the upcoming campaign one night, Grant rose from his seat, stepped to a map hanging on a wall and with his finger pointed to the fortifications around Richmond and Petersburg and stated: "When my troops are there, Richmond is mine. Lee must retreat or surrender." 24
On April 18th, he sent Butler further explanation of his plans. "With the forces here I shall fight Lee between here and Richmond, if he will stand. Should Lee, however, fall back into Richmond, I will follow up and make a junction with your army on the James river." 25 To Burnside, Grant wrote: "When we get once established on the James river there will be no further necessity of occupying the road south of Bull Run." 26 Finally, to Halleck on April 29th, he wrote: "Should Lee fall back within his fortifications at Richmond, either before or after giving battle, I will form a junction with Butler and the two forces will draw supplies from the James river." 27
Fuller stated: "As events testify, few generals have been so clearsighted as Grant." 28 Has history ever witnessed a general with such incredible foresight? Critics have demeaned Grant's lack of maneuver, or lack of strategy, but as history records, Grant's campaign developed precisely as he had predicted weeks in advance. Usually plans do not survive the first contact with the enemy. Absolutely uncanny! As discussed earlier, it was easy to look at a map and pick out the most strategic spot, (e. g. Petersburg), but envisioning what must be done on a map and actually bringing the operation to fruition is something entirely different.
As May approached, the fickle press was beginning to harp about Grant's inaction. Many people wondered aloud if he was up to the test of the rebel's greatest general, but Grant paid no attention to the naysayers, keeping his eyes focused upon his objective--Lee's army. By the last week of April, everything was set including the date for the movement of the Army of the Potomac--Wednesday, May 4, 1864.
On May 1st, Grant received a letter from Abraham Lincoln which showed the level of esteem the President had developed for the General.
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, April 30, 1864.}
"Lieutenant-General GRANT:
"Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way, my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or the capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it.
"And now with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you.
"Yours very truly,
"A. LINCOLN." 29
Grant responded in his own self-effacing manner destroying, in advance, any potential alibis in case things did not go well.
"HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}
CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VIRGINIA, May 1, 1864.}
"THE PRESIDENT:
"Your very kind letter of yesterday is just received. The confidence you express for the future and satisfaction for the past in my military administration is acknowledged with pride. It shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint--have never expressed or implied a complaint against the administration or the Secretary of War, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. And since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and the importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you.
"Very truly, your obedient servant,
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General." 30
The Army of the Potomac went into action as planned on May 4th. The grand movement commenced about midnight the night of May 3rd - May 4th. Grant would no longer allow himself to be put on the defensive with extended periods of inactivity. From now to the end of the war, he meant to apply continuous pressure on the rebel forces.
During the night, Sheridan's cavalry advanced and seized Ely's Ford and Germanna Ford. After the cavalry drove away the enemy's pickets, they began laying two pontoon bridges at each ford. By six o' clock the morning of May 4th, the bridges were laid and the cavalry had secured the south bank of the Rapidan.
General Meade joined the movement at about 5 o' clock, while General Grant and his staff started from their headquarters at about 8 A.M. The advance was in two columns along two different roads. Warren was on the most westerly road headed toward Germanna Ford closely followed by Sedgwick. Hancock took the road to the east headed for Ely's Ford.
About noon Grant arrived at Germanna Ford and crossed to the south side of the Rapidan. There, his staff established a temporary headquarters in a dilapidated old house on a hill overlooking the river. As he gazed at Sedgwick's troops crossing the river below a reporter stepped up to him and asked, "General Grant about how long will it take you to get to Richmond?" To which Grant immediately replied, "I will agree to be there in about four days--that is, if General Lee becomes a party to the agreement; but if he objects, the trip will undoubtedly be prolonged." 31
Because Grant is almost always depicted as wearing a dour expression and because he was such a quiet individual, most people have gotten the impression that he rarely laughed or made a joke, but, in reality, Ulysses enjoyed a good joke as much as anyone. As can be seen in the above story concerning the reporter, Grant could make a joke even at a time of great stress and anxiety.
About 1 P.M., word was received from Meade's headquarters that one of Lee's messages had been intercepted showing Lee was moving to meet Grant's advance. Lee's message read: "We are moving. Had I not better move D. and D. toward New Verdierville? (Signed) R." 32 Given this intercepted message, Grant immediately penned a message and sent it off to Burnside. "Make forced marches until you reach this place. Start your troops now in the rear the moment they can be got off and require them to make a night march." 33
The remainder of the day passed uneventfully wi
th the army going into bivouac on the south side of the Rapidan by sundown. That night Meade came over to Grant's headquarters and the two spent the night conversing about the events of the day and plans for tomorrow. As the two generals talked, telegrams were received from Washington saying Sherman, Butler and Sigel had all advanced according to schedule.
That same evening another conversation was being held in the Confederate camp. This story was relayed to Horace Porter by General Longstreet some years after the war. While at Lee's headquarters, an officer present spoke very confidently about being able to "whip with all ease the western general who was to confront them, at which Longstreet said: 'Do you know Grant?' 'No,' the officer replied. 'I was in the corps of cadets with him at West Point for three years, I was present at his wedding, I served in the same army with him in Mexico, I have observed his methods of warfare in the West, and I tell you that we cannot afford to underrate him and the army he now commands. We must make up our minds to get into line of battle and to stay there; for that man will fight us every day and every hour till the end of this war. In order to whip him we must outmaneuver him, and husband our strength as best we can.'" 34
The above passage proves Longstreet understood Grant very well and appreciated his abilities. Grant apparently had given some thought to Lee's famous skills of maneuver and surprise attacks, for he had given Meade instructions which basically said to stick like glue to Lee. In the end, Grant obviated Longstreet's advice and Lee's skills concerning maneuver, because the only one doing any maneuvering was Grant. Lee was gripped in such a tight vice he was unable to exercise his vaunted abilities.
Little did Longstreet realize how correct his opinion was, but the next day the Confederates would begin to realize the truth of his words. That night, the Army of the Potomac slept south of the Rapidan. The next day would mark the beginning of the end of the Confederacy, for as Longstreet said, Grant was about to begin fighting them every day until the end of the war.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 38