All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly.
It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.
All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General. 1
Later that morning Grant penned a letter to Halleck giving him his conclusions about the Wilderness.
Hd Qrs "Wilderness"
11 a.m. May 7. 1864.
By mail from Alexandria Va.
Maj Gen. H. W. Halleck,
Chief of Staff
We were engaged with the enemy nearly all day both on the 5th & 6th. Yesterday the enemy attacked our lines vigorously first at one point and then another from right to left. They were repulsed at all points before reaching our lines, except once during the afternoon on Hancock's front, and just after night on Sedgwick's front In the former instance they were promptly and handsomely repulsed. The latter, Milroy's old brigade, was attacked & gave way in the greatest confusion almost without resistance, carrying good troops with them. Had there been daylight the enemy could have injured us very much in the confusion that prevailed, they however instead of getting through the break, attacked Gen Wright's Div of Sedgwick's Corps & were beaten back.
Our losses to this time in killed, wounded & prisoners will not probably exceed 12.000. of whom an unusually large proportion are but slightly wounded. Among the killed we have to deplore the loss of Genls Wadsworth & Hays, Genls Getty & Bartlett wounded & Genls Seymour & Shaler taken prisoners. We have about 2.000 prisoners. They report Gen Jenkins killed & Longstreet wounded. I think the loss of the enemy must exceed ours, but this is only a guess based upon the fact that they attacked & were repulsed so often.
I wish you would send me all the information you have of Gen Sherman by Bull Run & also care of Genl Butler. Send by way of Bull Run all the information from the James River expedition.
At present we can claim no victory over the enemy, neither have they gained a single advantage.
Enemy pushed out of their fortifications to prevent their position being turned & have been sooner or later driven back in every instance.
Up to this hour enemy have not shown themselves in force within a mile of our lines.
U. S. GRANT
Lt Genl 2
There are a number of items of note in the above letter. Recall McFeely's criticisms of Grant from the preceding chapter about inept military strategy. Grant wrote the above letter on May 7, 1864, and in it he stated, "Enemy pushed out of their fortifications to prevent their position being turned." This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that Grant intended to flank Lee out of his Mine Run position and into the open field, yet doomsayers like McFeely continually insinuate that Grant knew only frontal assaults, lacked vision and strategy and consequently, was a butcher. Armed with the facts, it is difficult to see how anyone could come to such a conclusion without an ulterior motive.
On a number of occasions, Grant’s veracity has been questioned. Some felt he had forgotten things he when he wrote his memoirs due to age and illness. This is certainly possible. Others have questioned his truthfulness, indicating he told only what would make himself look the best. In this light, the first paragraph of the May 7th letter should be examined. It is important to note what Grant talked about compared to what he could have stressed. Grant could have told of Warren's advance on May 5th or Hancock's near success on May 6th. Instead, he concentrated on the Confederate near breakthrough the night of May 6th. In other words, he called the battle as best he saw it, not trying to paint an unrealistic impression of a dramatic Union success. As this author has stated repeatedly Grant’s veracity was legendary. It would have been difficult to catch him in a lie.
Contrast Grant's report of the battle to what Lee wrote to his Secretary of War on May 7th.
Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia
May 7, 1864.
GENL [JOHN B.] GORDON TURNED THE ENEMY'S EXTREME RIGHT YESTERDAY EVENING, & DROVE HIM FROM HIS RIFLE PITS. AMONG THE PRISONERS CAPTURED WERE GENLS [TRUMAN] SEYMOUR & [ALEXANDER] SHALER. A NUMBER OF ARMS WERE ALSO TAKEN. THE ENEMY HAS ABANDONED THE GERMANNA FORD ROAD, & REMOVED HIS PONTOON BRIDGE TOWARD ELY'S. THERE HAS BEEN NO ATTACK TODAY. ONLY SLIGHT SKIRMISHING ALONG THE LINES.
R. E. LEE 3
It is readily apparent from reading these two dispatches that they refer to the same event. Grant was an eternal optimist, but in his letter he attempted to paint a realistic picture of what occurred. Can the same be said of Lee's telegram? As one reads his papers from the war, one comes to the conclusion that nothing dangerous or serious rarely happened to Lee. Which general served his country better, the one who tried to paint a truthful and realistic picture of events or the one who tried to paint an optimistic picture of events? Grant was an extreme optimist, but his truthfulness is documented for all to see.
Horace Porter recalled another incident on May 7th which manifested Grant's veracity and humility. "While sitting at the mess-table taking breakfast, I asked the general-in-chief: 'In all your battles up to this time, where do you think your presence upon the field was most useful in the accomplishing of results?' He replied: 'Well, I don't know;' then, after a pause, 'perhaps at Shiloh.' I said: 'I think it was last night, when the attack was made on our right.' He did not follow up the subject, for he always spoke with great reluctance about anything which was distinctly personal to himself. The only way in which we could ever draw him out, and induce him to talk about events in his military career was to make some misstatement intentionally about an occurrence. His regard for truth was so great that his mind always rebelled against inaccuracies, and in his desire to correct the error he would go into an explanation of the facts, and in doing so would often be led to talk with freedom upon the subject." 4
With his orders issued, Grant and the army began another movement to the left late that evening. Grant stated in his memoirs his objectives in moving to Spotsylvania. "First, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field." 5
The situation which existed on May 7th, led to one of the stranger happenings of the war. Grant thought Lee was going to move toward Richmond in an effort to crush Butler's forces. Lee thought Grant's movement indicated he was retreating toward Fredericksburg, so Lee telegraphed Secretary of War James Seddon of such on May 8th. Consequently, Grant ordered his forces to move to Spotsylvania which would take Grant around Lee's right flank and supposedly place him between Lee and Richmond. Meanwhile, Lee made plans to move around Grant's left so he could attack Grant in flank as he supposedly moved toward Fredericksburg. In making these separate movements, both armies were inadvertently placed on a collision course with destiny.
Grant's movement south began about 4 P.M. as the wagon-trains moved out, while the infantry started its march about 8:30 P.M. Grant and Meade, along with the headquarters detachment, rode along the Brock Road, and soon passed by Hancock's corps. As they passed, Hancock's men began to realize Grant and the army was heading south and not retreating, so they sprang to their feet and began to cheer. A similar occurrence happened in Sedgwick's corps when it reached Chancellorsville and turned south. That night the Army of the Potomac learned a valuable lesson; while General Lee had intimidated many Northern generals, there was no turning back with Grant. Even for the common soldiers the beginning of the end was coming into view.
During the march toward Spotsylvania, the night of the 7th - 8th, the guide traveling with Grant's party inadvertently lost his way and soon the group was in quite a predicament. The guide discovered he had lost his bearings and the party was advancing in the wrong direction. It seems Gra
nt's party had moved uncomfortably close to the advancing Confederate army. The party was quickly placed in additional jeopardy by one of Grant's constitutional quirks. Grant possessed an extreme aversion to turning back once he had started for a destination. He would do anything to avoid retracing his steps. This was superstition on his part, but one he never overcame. This night was no different. The guide recommended turning back, which Grant resisted, but after pleading from the staff, he relented. Later, it was discovered that Anderson's corps (Longstreet) had been marching less than one mile away and Grant's party would surely have been captured if he had persisted. Grant carried this strange quirk with him his whole life.
As was stated before, Lee thought Grant was retreating toward Fredericksburg, so in an effort to be in a position to strike Grant in flank, he ordered General Anderson to withdraw his corps from the lines at the Wilderness and move to Spotsylvania. Anderson began his march at 11 P.M., and planned to rest his men once he reached the Shady Grove Church Road. When he reached that area he found the woods on fire and no place to make camp, so he kept his men on the move and by dawn they found themselves near Spotsylvania and totally by accident, ahead of the Federals.
Meade and the Union advance reached Todd's Tavern about midnight. There he found two of Sheridan's cavalry divisions in bivouac. Sheridan's men had fought the Confederates at Todd's Tavern earlier that day. The two division commanders, Gregg and Merritt, had not received orders for the 8th, but Meade knew Warren's advance would soon be at Todd's Tavern. He also knew that J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry was somewhere on the Brock Road, so without consulting Sheridan, Meade issued his own orders to the two cavalry commanders. Gregg was sent to the southwest and told to hold the ground on the east side of the Po River at Corbin's Bridge. Merritt was instructed to move down the Brock Road and clear away any of Stuart's cavalry he should meet. He was then to send a brigade to hold the Block House Bridge. Merritt was also informed he was not to delay for a minute because an infantry corps was on its way to Spotsylvania Court House.
Eventually, the two cavalry divisions moved out and Warren's corps, which had to halt until the cavalry was out of the way, resumed its march toward Spotsylvania about six o' clock in the morning.
Wilson's division of cavalry, acting on orders from Sheridan, advanced on Spotsylvania from the north about 9 A.M., on the morning of May 8th, and encountered enemy cavalry, driving them through the town. As Wilson moved through Spotsylvania, he encountered rebel infantry and quickly had to retreat.
Merritt also moved according to orders and was now approaching Spotsylvania from the west along the Brock Road. Approaching to within one or two miles of the town, he met strong resistance from the enemy and sent back for help from Warren. The Confederate infantry, which the Yankees were engaging, were those of Anderson's corps which had arrived, but one hour ahead of the Federals. The two armies had collided, this time by accident, but more importantly, the Confederates had won the race to Spotsylvania. Warren sent a division to the aid of Merritt, but they, too, ran into rebel infantry and was forced to intrench near Alsop's Farm.
By noon, Warren reported to Meade that after successive attacks by his corps on the Confederate position at Alsop's, he could not take the position with the force he had. Apparently Warren felt his men were straggling from fatigue. Meade immediately ordered Sedgwick up to Warren's left and ordered an attack be made without delay, but the men were tired from the night march, so Meade got no early attack that day.
About noon, Grant and Meade established their respective headquarters near Piney Branch Church. Just after he set up headquarters, Grant got off a dispatch to Halleck: "The army commenced moving south at nine P.M. yesterday, and when closed up to the position assigned for the first day's march will stand thus: General Warren's corps at Spotsylvania Court House; Hancock's at Todd's Tavern; Sedgwick's on road from Piney Branch Church to Spotsylvania, and General Burnside at Alrich's. It is not yet demonstrated what the enemy will do, but the best of feeling prevails in this army and I feel at present no apprehension for the result.
My efforts will be to form a junction with General Butler as early as possible, and be prepared to meet any enemy interposing. The result of the three days fight at Old Wilderness was decidedly in our favor. The enemy having a strong entrenched position to fall back on when hard pressed, and the extensive train we have to cover, rendered it impossible to inflict the heavy blow on Lee's army I had hoped. My exact route to the James river I have not yet definitely marked out." 6
Notice Grant reiterated his intention of going to the James River. Another statement Grant made in this message again displayed his ever-present optimistic attitude. He said the fighting to date "was decidedly in our favor." This is one time where Grant's optimism exaggerated the situation. It is easy for someone to look at the situation 150 years later and state that, strategically, the Wilderness was a decided Union victory, but for someone to make that statement two days after conclusion of the battle was premature. It was impossible for Grant to come to that conclusion on May 8, 1864, unless he was clairvoyant. Indeed, Grant was correct and would receive confirmation of his beliefs at Spotsylvania, but his optimism got the best of him in making that statement at that time.
Shortly after headquarters was established, a drum corps was passed by and catching sight of the general broke into a popular Negro camp-meeting song. "Every one began to laugh and Rawlins cried, 'Good for the drummers!' What's the fun?' inquired the general. 'Why,' was the reply, 'they are playing, Ain't I glad to get out ob de wilderness!' The general smiled at the ready wit of the musicians, and said, 'Well, with me a musical joke always requires explanation. I know only two tunes: one is Yankee Doodle, and the other isn't." 7 Grant was completely tone-deaf.
Finally, about five o' clock, Warren made an attack upon the Confederate position at Alsop's farm. By this time Ewell's corps had arrived on the scene to help Anderson and Warren attacked with only one division, so nothing was accomplished.
Later on May 8th, Sheridan and Meade had a heated argument over Meade's earlier orders given to Gregg and Merritt. Sheridan was clearly insubordinate and Meade took the incident to Grant. Sheridan had told Meade if left to himself, he would go out and whip J. E. B. Stuart. When Grant heard this, he had Meade write orders to that effect sending Sheridan out to attack the Confederate cavalry. Grant always appreciated aggressive behavior, but he was definitely wrong to side with Sheridan on that occasion. Meade had no choice but to issue orders to the two cavalry commanders, but by siding with Sheridan, he undermined Meade's authority.
May 9th, was to prove a day of preparations. Lee was blocking Grant's proposed movement, so nothing was left, but to do battle. Lee was firmly entrenched, so Grant had been unsuccessful in bringing Lee out into the open, but from all indications, it was obvious to Grant he had succeeded in his intended purpose of fixing Lee. It was evident from Lee's position at Spotsylvania he could no longer fight except from behind fixed fortifications. This removed much of Lee's vaunted mobility.
If Lee was itching for a fight he came to the right person, so Grant and Meade began moving all their forces to Spotsylvania. During the morning of May 9th, it was discovered that Early's corps (Hill) had been withdrawn by Lee from Hancock's front, so Hancock was instructed to move toward Spotsylvania.
As the day wore on the two armies found themselves gathering strength opposite one another. Lee's position was one of strength in the shape of a triangle allowing easy reinforcement of either side of his lines. Anderson had Lee's left extending to the Po River and covering the Brock Road. Ewell held the center of the line and consequently, the pinnacle of the triangle. Jubal Early held Lee's right flank covering the town of Spotsylvania Court House.
Along Grant's lines, Warren occupied his right covering the Brock Road. Sedgwick was on Warren's left opposite the center of Lee's line and Burnside was on Grant's left. Hancock was moving up from Todd's Tavern.
By now, Grant realized Lee was no longer capable of confrontin
g him in the open field, so in order to continue to keep pressure on Lee he would have to maintain the offensive role by himself. He could attempt to maneuver Lee out of his position, but he did not want to drive Lee back upon Butler's forces before he had a chance to weaken Lee farther.
Grant's original plan of attack at Spotsylvania was to hold Lee's right flank by Burnside attacking along his front. He planned to hold the remainder of Lee's lines by Warren's and Sedgwick's corps attacking along their fronts. While these holding operations took place Hancock was to advance and come in against Lee's left and rear, Grant's old standby - the rear attack.
While everything was being prepared during the morning of the 9th, Grant was out visiting the front lines. Shortly after holding a conference with General Sedgwick, as Grant's party was moving along the line, word reached Grant that Sedgwick had just been killed by a sharpshooter. Grant was shocked by the news and said, "His loss to this army is greater than the loss of a whole division of troops." Brigadier-General Horatio Wright was named to succeed Sedgwick as commander of the Sixth Corps.
Throughout the day of the 9th, both Lee and Grant were maneuvering for advantage. As Hancock's forces moved into position, Lee perceived the threat and during the evening of May 9th, moved two divisions of Early's corps over to the left in support of Anderson's corps. Consequently, as Hancock advanced on the morning of the 10th, he found Lee's forces so strongly entrenched he could make little progress. Therefore, Grant was forced to change his plans once again. Believing Lee had strengthened his left, he must have weakened other places in his lines, so Grant ordered an assault on Lee's center for later on the afternoon of the 10th. The attack was to be made by Wright's and Warren's corps with three divisions of Hancock's corps. Hancock was to be in control of the entire assaulting force.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 40