On the 14th of May, Grant wanted to strike Lee on his right flank, east of Spotsylvania, but because of the heavy rains of the last few days, the corps of Warren and Wright, charged with making the march and assault on Lee's right flank, found the going impossible.
By May 15th, with the new disposition of Warren's and Wright's corps, the new battle line ran due north and south with Lee still opposite. The important point to note was the way was clear for Grant to move toward the James, for Lee was no longer between Grant and the river.
On May 16th, Grant wrote Halleck a letter which summed up the situation at that point.
NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.,
May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.:
We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success.
* * * * * * *
You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General. 20
It is worth noting that history has recorded Grant as winning predominantly because of his endless number of soldiers. The notion of Grant's limitless battalions is nothing but myth. General Humphreys, who was Meade's Chief of Staff and should therefore know, said after the war that War Department files showed 27,811 men sent to the Army of the Potomac between May 4th and June 12th. These numbers, as with all Federal records, contain all men including "present and absent" totals and those who were on extra duty. Indeed during that six week period, the army only received about 12,000 effective men. This total would have barely kept the army at full strength had there been no fighting. On top of this, during the fighting at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, the army sent back to Washington 4000 men who were not wounded, just sick. In essence, Grant was not maintaining the size of the army before battlefield casualties were counted. In addition, during the first two months of the campaign, the army lost 36 regiments of men whose three year term had expired. Not only did Grant not have unlimited manpower, his army was dwindling in size.
On the 17th, Generals Wright and Humphreys thought they saw the opening Grant had been seeking. When Lee extended his right to cover the move of Warren and Wright, they believed Lee had weakened his left which was at the old salient position. Grant thought this idea had merit and ordered an attack for the morning of May 18th. The night of the 17th, Hancock and Wright marched back to their old positions and attacked at 4 A.M., but Lee had moved his men back to reestablish the old line and the assault proved a dismal failure.
Later that day, Grant received more bad news. Sigel had been defeated at New Market and was retreating down the valley. Grant immediately ordered him relieved. Hunter's name was mentioned as a possible replacement and Grant approved. Out west, Banks had been defeated in Louisiana and Canby placed in his position before Grant could act. Butler had also been driven from Drury's Bluff, but he still was near Petersburg. This discouraging news arrived on top of the fruitless assault, but Grant was not disheartened. He promptly ordered another movement to the left to commence the evening of May 19th.
On May 18th, he issued the following orders to Meade.
NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA.,
May 18, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o' clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.
Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement.
U. S. GRANT 21
Grant was using the orders issued above to set a trap for Lee hoping to catch him outside of his entrenchments, but was Lee willing to take the bait.
So Grant closed out that chapter in the history of the Army of the Potomac and opted to inch inexorably closer to the James River. Lee could probably feel the noose tightening.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
"Lee's army is really whipped"
May 20, 1864 - June 3, 1864
Battle of North Anna
Grant's next flanking movement to attempt to bring Lee to battle commenced at 11 P.M. on the 20th of May. Hancock began the movement by pulling out of his position and marching toward Guiney's Station some ten miles southeast of Spotsylvania Court House. By nightfall on the 21st, Hancock's men had reached Milford, Virginia, six miles south of Guiney's Station. Warren's corps did not follow Hancock until 10 A.M., the morning of the 21st, so Hancock had a twelve hour head start on the remainder of the army. By the evening of the 21st, Grant's army was intentionally strung out for a distance of twenty miles. Hancock was at Milford, Warren at Guiney's Station and Wright and Burnside at Spotsylvania. Grant's headquarters were with Warren at Guiney's Station the night of the 21st. Grant was intentionally trying to entice Lee into striking part of his army in an effort to bring Lee to battle in the open field. Hancock was purposely being used as bait, but Lee would have no part of this entrapment.
Why did Lee not attack Hancock's dangling corps? The answer is simple he could not afford to take the chance. He may have been able to beat Hancock in detail before Grant could arrive with reinforcements, but this was not the same army that had attacked in the Wilderness. The Confederacy was running out of manpower, so Lee was forced to husband what strength remained. The only alternative which was left to him was to throw himself in Grant's path at every instance and prolong the war hoping the North would tire. By Lee fighting exclusively from entrenchments, he actually tipped the manpower odds in his favor. Grant had indeed fixed Lee.
In the previous chapter, Grant's losses and reinforcements were examined. Records reveal that during the six weeks following May 4th, Grant received twelve thousand effective men. By the time Grant began his latest movement Lee had received 2500 men from Breckinridge and 7000 from Beauregard, almost 10,000 new men. It is worthwhile, for comparison sake, to examine the relative strength of the two armies at this point. Grant began the campaign with approximately 120,000 men and Lee approximately 75,000 or a 1 to 1.6 ratio in favor of Grant. By May 20th, Grant had lost approximately 33,000 men in casualties and had received about 6000 reinforcements for a new aggregate size of about 93,000 men. Lee had lost about 20,000 men in casualties, but had been reinforced by about 10,000 men for an aggregate size of 65,000. This still left Grant with an advantage, but it had been reduced from 1.6 to 1 to 1.4 to 1. In essence, Lee had better odds now than at the beginning of the campaign.
It is interesting to note the role reversal which had occurred by Lee functioning solely on the defensive. In Grant's original instructions to Meade, he said, "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." But now the situation had changed to wherever Meade went, Lee would try to get there first.
The Army of the Potomac was now blazing trails in more ways than one. Not only was it venturing into new territory by retaining the initiative and maintaining the offensive, but it was also venturing into new ter
ritory never before seen by this army. They had moved out of the heavily forested areas into expanses of lush vegetation and rolling hills. Not only was the terrain brightening up the men's day, but their continuous advancing lifted the men's spirits. Now they felt that every movement was being done according to an overall plan. There was no more reacting to Lee, the men could plainly see that Lee was reacting to them. No matter what the rebel papers said or naysayers said about the casualties, it did not take a genius to figure out that Grant was advancing and Lee retreating.
Much has been written on how Lee was the better general and how Grant won only by sheer numbers, which has already been shown to be false. Even historians who have examined this question objectively, such as Fuller, have questioned whether Grant had outmaneuvered Lee in the movement to the North Anna. Fuller, indeed, came to the same conclusion as this author as to why Lee would not attack Grant, but he also went on to say Lee had not been outgeneraled by maneuver but by his losses in manpower which could not be made good. In this opinion, this author must disagree.
Lee wrote a letter to Jefferson Davis dated May 22, 1864, at 5 A.M. Enclosed in this letter are the following statements. "The enemy night before last commenced to withdraw from his position & to move towards Bowling Green. The movement was not discovered until after daylight, & in a wooded country like that in which we have been operating, where nothing is known beyond what can be ascertained by feeling, a day's march can always be gained. The enemy left in his trenches the usual amount of force visible, & the reports of his movement were so vague & conflicting that it required some time to sift the truth. It appeared however that he was endeavoring to place the Mattapony River between him & our army, which secured his flank, & by rapid movements to join his cavalry under [General Philip] Sheridan to attack Richmond. I therefore thought it safest to move to the Annas [North Anna and South Anna Rivers] to intercept his march, and to be within easy reach of Richmond. As soon therefore as his forces in my front could be disposed of, I withdrew the army from its position, & with two corps arrived here this morning." 1
The above letter clearly showed that Lee was reacting to Grant's movement which he failed to anticipate. In fact, Lee was offering an excuse to Jefferson Davis as to why he had been unable to anticipate Grant's next move. Lee also made a statement in his letter to Davis that he thought Grant was on his way to join Sheridan in an attack upon Richmond. It was obvious Lee had not the faintest idea what Grant's intentions were. Lee wrote to James Seddon at 9:30 A.M. on May 22nd, stating: "I have learned as yet nothing of the movements of the enemy east of the Mattapony." 2 As late as the morning of May 22nd, Lee was still unsure of Grant's intentions and could not ascertain his movements east of the Mattapony. Yet, Dowdey and Manarin, in their book, The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee, state, "As Lee anticipated the movement by the way of the naval base, and as Grant (with Sheridan off on his raid) lacked sufficient cavalry to screen his operations, Lee was waiting for him at the North Anna River, again squarely across his path." 3
How could anyone claim Lee had anticipated Grant when it is crystal clear from Lee's own letter to Davis that Grant got a ten hour head start; Lee was unaware of this move, which he admitted in the letter; and was completely in the dark as to Grant's destination. Contrast this move with Grant's upon Spotsylvania. There Lee was confused as to Grant's intentions, but Lee did anticipate that, whether Grant was retreating or advancing, he needed to get to Spotsylvania. At Spotsylvania, Lee did anticipate Grant, but on the way to the Annas he plainly did not. This author firmly believes Grant not only outgeneraled Lee in this move because of the losses Lee had suffered, but it is evident from the correspondence, that Grant had outgeneraled Lee by maneuver as well.
As the Army of the Potomac was making the move toward the Annas, it is interesting to observe the feeling pervading the army. Even after two gruesome battles, the men took note of Grant's maneuvering, which later historians refused to recognize. One officer in Warren's corps wrote his wife: "By continual, persistent, generally unsuccessful assaults, charges, and by skilled maneuvering, Gen. Grant worried out the enemy and forced him to fall back to Spots. C. H., and then by flanking him when too much exhausted and demoralized to fight in an open field he forced him back of the North Anna." 4 An officer in Hancock's corps stated much the same thing. "There was an idea that we were still advancing, that there was a plan that would be carried out successfully.....When we reached the North Anna I think the general feeling was that we should roll on, like a wave, up to the very gates of Richmond." 5
By the morning of the 22nd, Burnside and Wright had both made it to Guiney's Station. Warren was due west of Milford at Harris's Store, while Hancock remained at Milford.
After Lee discovered Grant's army missing from his front, he set his army in motion for Hanover Junction. Some of Lee's cavalry had discovered Hancock's corps at Guiney's Station, so Lee once again made all haste to interpose his army between Grant's and Richmond. Ewell's corps arrived at Hanover Junction at about midday on the 22nd, followed by Anderson. Hill's corps arrived there on the morning of May 23rd. Once again Lee was able to demonstrate the value of interior lines.
The night of May 22nd, Grant issued the following orders for the next day.
NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac,
Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dan Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be found.
The 2nd corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps.
The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.
Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General. 6
On May 23rd, Warren's and Wright's corps moved to Jericho Ford on the North Anna. Warren arrived in the afternoon and by 5 P.M. his entire corps had crossed the river and was entrenching. Before his corps was firmly entrenched, Warren was attacked by Hill's corps. It was a brief, but severe fight which ended in the rebels being repulsed. The Federals held several hundred prisoners when the contest ended. By nightfall, Wright's corps had arrived, but remained on the north side of the river.
Hancock's corps moved on the 23rd, to the wooden bridge just east of Ox Ford. They arrived at dusk and found the bridge guarded with Confederates entrenched on the north side of the bridge. Hancock quickly dispatched two brigades, one each to the right and left, which routed the enemy. The Confederates retreated, but Hancock did not cross until the next morning due to the late hour. Hancock also captured several hundred prisoners in this skirmish.
Burnside's corps was to be placed between Warren and Wright's position and Hancock's position, so he moved by the road which took him to Ox Ford. He arrived too late in the evening to cross the North Anna.
The morning of May 24th, Hancock crossed the river and formed a line facing nearly west. Wright crossed at Jericho and formed on Warren's right. Burnside attempted to cross at Ox Ford but found Lee's army entrenched and in an exceptionally strong position. Lee had taken a position similar to the one he took at Spotsylvania in the shape of an inverted v with the apex resting at Ox Ford. Burnside was unable to cross the river, so Grant sent one division of the Ninth Corps across Quarle's Ford to reinforce Warren and Wright and another division to Hancock. During the move to reinforce Warren, Crittenden's force was seve
rely attacked by Hill when crossing the river and suffered heavy casualties. The remainder of Burnside's corps remained north of the river. Later on the 24th, Sheridan finally rejoined the Army of the Potomac adding significantly to its ability to be used as a decoy and in reconnaissance. Grant also decided to place Burnside's corps officially in the Army of the Potomac. This meant less administrative work for him because now all orders would go through Meade.
Grant now found himself was a very precarious position. His army was divided into three separate pieces. The distance separating the most distant wings of Grant's army was only six miles as the crow flies, but to move via the roads and crossings about the North Anna would require marching an entire day. Lee, on the other hand, had all his men within three miles of one another, so he was in an outstanding position to destroy one of Grant's wings. Why did he not attack?
One alibi offered by many was that Lee was sick on May 24th or he would have attacked. If this was the case why did Lee fail to attack Grant's exposed flanks on May 25th? The answer is all too apparent. To do so would entail Lee attacking Grant's entrenched positions. Even if successful, Lee could not have absorbed the heavy losses which would have occurred. In short, the reason Lee did not avail himself of this enticing possibility was the same reason he had not attacked Hancock when he was offered as bait. Lee just did not have the available resources to make any losses good.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 42