The stage was set for the Battle of Cold Harbor which was forever known to Civil War historians as one of the most fruitless examples of meaningless death and destruction ever recorded. In fact, the name Cold Harbor is synonymous with Grant's reputation as a failed general. In reading many histories, the uneducated dabbler in history, must search deeply to uncover the truth among the morass of bombastic opinion.
The evening before the battle provided a glimpse of unmatched courage. Grant's headquarters had been moved to Old Cold Harbor to be near the place where the assault provided the greatest chance for success. That evening, Horace Porter was at the front passing last minute orders when he came upon men who appeared to be sewing up holes in their jackets, en masse. Upon closer examination of this strange spectacle, Porter found the men had actually written their names and addresses on slips of paper and were pinning them onto the backs of their coats. Back then the army did not provide the men with dog tags which enabled the dead to be identified, so these men were taking the opportunity beforehand, so their relatives could be notified if they met their fate. Such displays of courage are rare, yet these men believed in their cause so strongly they were willing to make the ultimate sacrifice.
At half-past four, the morning of June 3rd, the Union soldiers rose from their lines and began to advance. On Hancock's front, Barlow and Gibbon advanced in assaulting columns with Birney held in reserve. Barlow penetrated the first line of the rebels capturing several hundred prisoners and three pieces of artillery. As they struggled against the withering fire from the Confederates they were soon forced back out of their captured works. This short-lived success was as bright as it got on this day for the Federals. On Barlow's right, Gibbon was forced to advance through ravines and a swamp. One brigade was able to reach the enemy works, but the remainder of the division suffered heavily under a storm of fire from muskets and artillery.
Wright's corps was next to Hancock. His attack was a disaster from the first. Most of the corps was caught in such a cross fire that they could only advance a short distance before seeking shelter using anything available to scoop out a rifle pit in which to hide. One unit captured some outlying rifle pits, but no one approached the main line closer than two hundred and fifty yards.
Smith's attack ended as quickly as Wright's. Smith had hoped to use a ravine to shelter his advancing troops. As Smith's corps advanced and carried some of the enemy's rifle pits, they were caught in a blazing fire which caused the advance to come to a halt. While trying to regroup, Smith stopped, hoping for Wright to advance to protect his left flank. So Smith was stopped dead in his tracks with his command taking a severe shellacking.
Little progress, if any, was made on either Burnside's or Warren's fronts. For all intents and purposes, the battle of Cold Harbor was over within the first couple hours, even though fighting continued throughout the day. With most of the fighting over, Grant issued Meade the following orders.
NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.
The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General. 17
By 11 A.M., Grant started for the front to visit all the corps commanders in order to obtain their opinions concerning further action. None of the commanders were overly optimistic about any further success, so Grant wrote the following to Meade.
COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12:30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.
The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.
Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 18
During the remainder of the day, the National lines were strengthened. It came to Grant's attention that there were many dead and wounded between the lines, but due to the close proximity of the contending armies, no one could be attended to without a cessation of hostilities. Grant, immediately upon learning of the situation, wrote Lee the following message.
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.
GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding Confederate Army.
It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me.
U. S. GRANT
Lieut.-General 19
Lee received Grant's correspondence at 3 P.M. on June 5th. To his proposal, Lee replied that he "feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding and difficulty." 20 He went on to say : "I propose, therefore, instead that when either party desires to remove their dead or wounded a flag of truce be sent, as is customary." 21
This response was received within the Union lines at midnight on June 5th, but Grant did not receive it until the morning of June 6th. He responded at once with this message.
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.
GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of N. Va.
Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12M. and 3 P.M. to-day. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General. 22
Lee's response was less than conciliatory and somewhat severe in tone. Apparently what Lee was after was an admission by Grant of defeat. Lee responded: "I intended to say that I could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded between the armies in the way you proposed, but that when either army desires such permission, it should be asked for by a flag of truce, in the usual way. Until I receive a proposition from you on the subject, to which I can accede with propriety, I have directed any parties you may send under white flags, as mentioned in your letter, to be turned back." 23
When Grant received this letter in the afternoon of June 6th, he immediately responded acceding to Lee's desires.
COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.
GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army, N. Va.
The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application.
&nb
sp; U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General. 24
Lee finally agreed to the above proposition and proposed that 8 P.M. to 10 P.M. the night of June 6th, be set aside for that purpose. Regretfully, Grant did not receive this correspondence until after 11 P.M. that night.
Not being able to take advantage of the truce, he sent a letter to Lee the morning of June 7th.
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864.
10.30 A.M.
GEN. R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of N. Va.
I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10:45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. These officers and men have carelessly been brought through our lines to the rear, I have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route.
Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain, &c.,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 25
Lee responded the afternoon of June 7th, saying he was sorry for the confusion and suggesting that the hours of six to eight that night be used for the purpose. Anyone bearing white flags would be recognized as searching for the wounded. This was exactly the procedure Grant had proposed the morning of June 6th, which Lee had summarily rejected. Only two of the wounded were found alive. Many were sacrificed to accommodate Lee's ego.
History records Grant as a barbarian because he refused to ask for a suspension of hostilities. Therefore he was responsible for the deaths of the wounded. How could anyone make such a statement when the record is clear from the official correspondence presented? Grant did everything he could to speed formalities and bring relief to the wounded. If anything, it was Lee's intransigence demanding an admission of defeat which allowed untold numbers of wounded to die needlessly.
During the battle of Cold Harbor, the Federals lost about 7000 men of which 1100 were killed, most within the first ten minutes of fighting. The Confederates lost far less, about 1500 men. As far as the significance of this battle goes, its reputation far outweighs the actual losses. Cold Harbor could hardly compare with the casualties of Shiloh, Antietam, Gettysburg, Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville, yet the name Cold Harbor still sends chills down the spines of many Civil War historians. Why has the name of Cold Harbor been magnified to such dizzying heights?
At the time Cold Harbor occurred, the reasons were political. Some of the reasons were probably due to Grant's own success. Doomsayers were quick to point to the casualty lists from the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, but anyone with any acumen could easily see Grant was advancing and Lee retreating. In other words, people could see that Grant was being successful in his continuous prosecution of the war therefore; because of this success people were appalled at this seemingly disastrous defeat. After all, 7000 casualties in ten minutes was elevating the fighting to a new level. People thought Grant was close to bringing the war to a termination, and at this juncture were not prepared for the results of Cold Harbor.
In addition to the North seeking a speedy resolution to the war, the Presidential election of 1864 was not far off and it seemed that if the Union forces could not affect a victory soon, Lincoln's re-election was doomed. On top of this, the war was becoming frightfully expensive at four million dollars per day. To the novices, Cold Harbor represented Grant's, Waterloo.
Today, the reason Cold Harbor represents a tragic episode in American history is that it confirms in many minds, the reputation that still surrounds Grant as a "butcher" or "hammerer." It has been established throughout this book that Grant's reputation has been besmirched. In its place should be substituted his true record as possibly the greatest general in the history of the world.
Was Grant perfect? No. Did he make mistakes? Yes. In his memoirs, he bemoaned the assault at Cold Harbor. He said: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22nd of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side." 26
In the above statement, two character traits of Grant's are manifested. One is his continued honesty and the other is his sincere condolence at the useless sacrifice of blood. Indeed, Ulysses has been portrayed as one who had no compassion, yet the above statement exudes both sorrow and regret. He was altogether honest in his appraisal that at Cold Harbor the Confederates got the better of it. Neither of those statements evinces any barbaric behavior, but history still portrays him as a "butcher" of men.
Grant had his reasons for making the attack.
1) There was an opening on Lee's right flank on June 1st. Grant attempted to exploit it but did not have quite the force needed to assure victory. He ordered Hancock to make a forced march so as to be in position the morning of June 2nd, but as always seemed to happen to the Army of the Potomac, they were slow and not quite up to the task. The opening Grant saw was real but it evaporated before it could exploited.
2) He knew the North was growing weary of war but felt it would be wrong not to make one more effort before he crossed the James. He knew after he crossed the James it would become a siege lasting many months.
3) His previous assaults had proven successful and gave him hope that this one would also. (Donelson, Jackson, Black River Bridge, Chattanooga and Spotsylvania)
4) The cost of the war was growing and a speedy termination would be welcomed.
5) The season was fast approaching where many would die of disease while waiting out a siege in a camp.
6) There was a possibility Europe would recognize the Confederacy.
7) 1864 was an election year and continued stalemate might cause Lincoln to lose the White House to a pacifist
Based on the above, Grant made his decision to attack. One may not agree with his decision, but that is easy to see knowing the results and analyzing the situation 150 years later. The opportunity to win the war was apparently there on June 2nd, but as was so often the case with the Army of the Potomac, particularly the generals, the army was just not up to the task.
Was Grant wrong for making the attack on June 3, 1864? Yes, but his apology speaks for itself.
Cold Harbor was history. Nothing could be undone, so Grant began preparations to cross the James.
CHAPTER TWELVE
"I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy"
June 4, 1864 - June 18, 1864
Crossing the James
The topography around Cold Harbor was swampy with many rivers traversing the peninsula. This was the same area where McClellan spent so much time two years previous in his campaign against Richmond. Many in the Army of the Potomac were very familiar with the country which aided Grant in his new plan.
Grant now faced quite an undertaking to affect a crossing of the James. He would have to cross the James and the Chickahominy Rivers. In addition, he would have to withdraw from his positions quietly to avoid alerting Lee. This alone would prove difficult because at some places the opposing troops were only between thirty and forty yards apart.
Grant was forced to consider these problems plus contemplate what Lee would do
if he found out about the movement toward the James. If Lee learned of Grant’s movements he might be able to attack Butler and crush the Army of the James, or dispatch a force to fall upon Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg. All these thoughts were being contemplated by Grant as he made preparations for his next move.
On June 5th, Grant sent Halleck a letter outlining his proposed movement.
COLD HARBOR, June 5, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army,
Washington, D.C.
A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.
I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that I have designed outside of the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 44