One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege operations.
I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc. belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I do not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.
I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the whole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish you could run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show to both armies that they are acting on a common plan. The weather is now cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your true friend,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 141
Grant immediately approved Sherman's proposal in a letter dated December 27, 1864.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 27, 1864. }
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military
Division of the Mississippi.
GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the next campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can, we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do it.
In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston. Your movement toward Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the South from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?
I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for present harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteen thousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee to retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or abandon them entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast. Of course I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my ability.
Without waiting further directions, then, you may make your preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now.
It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance.
From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communication with you there, by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, and to hear your plan, and about the time of starting.
Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah, and especially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens or Treasury agents, without orders of the War Department.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 142
Upon receiving Grant's approval for his proposed movement north, Sherman promptly set the wheels in motion to secure a foothold on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River. On January 2nd, Sherman sent a letter to Grant outlining how he intended to comply with his instructions. The letter included the following attachment enumerating his immediate plans for January.
[ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL.]
PROJECT FOR JANUARY.
1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of Broad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal Ferry, and mass the wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.
Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway toward Hardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corps about Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secure Sister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville.
In the meantime, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved to a safe place, easy to guard, and provision and wagons got ready for another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the head of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, by the 15th January.
2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading in the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance of forage and provisions. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15th January, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at or near Coosawhatchie about the same date. General Foster's troops to occupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon as Howard gets Pocotaligo.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 143
Grant and Sherman were in sync with regard to their plans for closing out the war. The only thing left for Grant was to issue orders for cooperative movements to be made aimed at limiting reinforcements to any force which could be gathered to inhibit the movements of Sherman. During the month of January, Grant issued the required orders necessary to fill in the gaps in the closing operations of the war.
General Schofield was ordered east from Tennessee to Wilmington, North Carolina, where he was instructed to move inland to cooperate with Sherman in his movement north. Schofield was to secure Wilmington for use as a base of supplies and for Sherman to fall back upon in case he met with disaster. All along the Atlantic coast, Yankee commanders were alerted to be on the watch in case Sherman should be forced to fall back for protection.
In the Shenandoah Valley, Sheridan was ordered to move south destroying the remaining factories and railroads and the James River Canal. Stoneman was sent east from Tennessee to break up communications in that part of the country. Thomas was ordered to send a large cavalry contingent under Wilson into Alabama. Canby was ordered to finally make the movement against the port of Mobile, Alabama, and from there toward Montgomery and Selma to destroy any remaining munitions factories.
All the above mentioned operations were designed to cooperate with Sherman's movement. Not only would they help destroy the Confederacy's remaining ability to wage war, but as he had planned in his similar movement in the spring of 1864, all these actions occurring at the same time would allow for little concentration in front of any one force.
As with so many of his plans, many of the cooperative movements failed to get off in a timely manner. So many times, Grant's subordinate generals let him down, for few could see things as clearly as he, but Sherman's part in the final movement got off without a hitch.
By mid-January, Sherman's army had crossed over the Savannah River and secured a lodgment on the north side. By January 15th, General Howard's corps had taken Pocotaligo, while Slocum's men occupied Hardeeville. On January 18th, General Slo
cum turned over the city of Savannah to General Foster.
Sherman and his staff left Savannah on January 21st en route to Beaufort, South Carolina. He arrived at Pocotaligo on January 25th, where he received communications from Slocum stating that he had difficulties getting his entire command across the Savannah River due to inordinately high water. For this reason, the movement was held up until February 1st. While waiting to continue his operation, Sherman received Grant's most recent correspondence bringing him up to date.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., Jan. 21, 1865.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Mil. Div. of the Mississippi.
GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23rd, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from whence he returned to Nashville to take a steamer for Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.
Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men.
Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.
If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two points, will move to the interior toward Goldsboro in co-operation with your movements. From either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gage of those roads.
There has been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.
All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of about thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about Richmond.
To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington or both. You can call for reinforcements.
This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General. 144
On February 1, 1865, Sherman's army commenced its final campaign. The army consisted of 60,000 men, 68 guns, and 2500 wagons. The first objective was Columbia, South Carolina, followed by Fayetteville, North Carolina, and finally, Goldsboro, North Carolina. This would put Sherman within striking distance of Lee's army and at the same time deprive Lee's army of one of their last areas where they could obtain subsistence. The route of advance was deliberately chosen to confuse the enemy as to their objective point. Following the route toward Columbia, Sherman could feint toward either Charleston or Augusta and his cavalry did threaten both points.
Opposing Sherman's army were cavalry contingents under Generals Wheeler and Hampton. The enemy occupied garrisons at both Charleston and Augusta figuring them to be the important destinations. These garrisons were too small to put up much resistance against a force such as Sherman's. The rebels were also moving what remained of Hood's army east to oppose Sherman. At best, all that remained to be scraped together from Hood's army was about 25,000 men.
One of the biggest obstacles Sherman would encounter on this march were the rivers. Each would have to be crossed and thus provide the enemy with opportunities to delay his advance.
Along the entire line of march in early February, Sherman's men frequently encountered rebel skirmishers, but no significant engagements occurred. By February 11th, the Union army found itself astride the Augusta and Charleston Railroad. They immediately set to work destroying the railroad and therefore, severed the lines of communication between the Confederate forces at Augusta and those at Charleston.
By February 14th, the Yankees had moved to within six to eight miles of Columbia where they had to cross the Congaree River before entering the city. The rebels tried to contest the crossing, but were no more than a nuisance to the Federals. On the 17th, as the National troops closed in on the city, town officials rode out to surrender the state capital to Sherman. Sherman was informed that Wade Hampton and General Beauregard had evacuated the city the previous day. Also, on the 16th, General Hardee evacuated Charleston, realizing he was surrounded on three sides by the Nationals and was cut off from reinforcements.
During the 17th of February, the Federals took control of the city. Later that evening a fire broke out and by the next morning two-thirds of Columbia lay in ruins. Sherman blamed the departing rebels, but the townsfolk blamed the Yankees. To them it was another reminder of the inhumane treatment the Yankees left in their wake.
While Sherman got off on schedule and advanced as planned, other commanders Grant had wanted to play a role in keeping the rebels from concentrating in Sherman's front, failed to perform as he had ordered. On January 18th, Grant had ordered Canby to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma. His task was to destroy war material, resources and munitions factories. By February 27th, after hearing nothing from his expedition, Grant wrote again to Canby exhorting him to action. In the meantime, he had sent Grierson to command Canby's cavalry and had drawn a large part of Thomas' army away from Thomas to reinforce Canby. Still Grant could not get Canby to move. This was a repeat of Thomas at Nashville. Finally, Grant had had enough, so he sent Canby this dispatch. "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed that none be sent. Thomas' army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North, where we already had the
troops. I expected your movements to be co-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior - to Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." 145
This was one of the harshest reprimands Grant ever issued to anyone, but he had little patience or tolerance for commanders who failed to act with celerity when such huge issues hung in the balance. Canby's movement eventually did get off but was ineffective with regard to aiding Sherman's march north.
In January, Grant had also ordered Thomas to cooperate with Sherman's movement by moving south into Georgia and Alabama, but to no one's great surprise, Thomas was unable to make a timely departure. Figuring Thomas unable to make an aggressive movement, he began dismantling his command, sending Schofield east to Wilmington and A. J. Smith south to Canby. On January 31st, Grant changed his orders to Thomas asking him to send General Stoneman on a raid toward Columbia, South Carolina to cooperate with Sherman.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 60