Grant The Forgotten Hero

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by Charles Henry Vessey


  R. E. LEE

  General 155

  The above was a significant admission on the part of the Confederacy that they were in desperate straits and General Lee was authorized to secure peace on just about any terms. The terms Lincoln had laid out to Stephens were well known and removing the two principle personalities, Davis and Lincoln, would have no effect on the outcome.

  Grant realized the importance of Lee's message and realizing he could not treat on political questions immediately sent the message off to Secretary of War Stanton. He explained the meeting of Ord and Longstreet and concluded his telegram with this: "I have not returned any reply but promised to do so at noon tomorrow. I respectfully request instructions." 156

  Soon a response came back to City Point from the authorities in Washington. "The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for the capitulation of Gen. Lee's army, or on some minor, and purely military, matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands; and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your military advantages." 157

  The war would continue to its ultimate conclusion. Grant and Lincoln would see it through to the bitter end together.

  Meanwhile, Sherman spent little time in Columbia before moving on ever closer to Lee. By the 20th of February, Sherman's army moved out of Columbia toward Winnsboro. On March 3rd, his army entered Cheraw, South Carolina, and remained there until March 6th, when the army finished crossing the Pedee River. The swollen rivers caused his army more delay than any resistance of the enemy.

  With the entire army over the Pedee River, Sherman made straightway for Fayetteville, North Carolina. On March 11th, he entered Fayetteville and prepared to rest his army for a couple of days while his engineers laid pontoon bridges across the Cape Fear River. At Fayetteville, Sherman was able to open communications to the North via Wilmington. Sherman instantly got off letters to Stanton, Grant, Halleck, Schofield and others delineating his progress to date. Sherman ordered Terry at Wilmington and Schofield at Newbern to move immediately upon Goldsboro to effect a rendezvous about March 20th.

  By March 15th, Sherman's army was over the Cape Fear River and set out for Goldsboro some sixty miles to the east. On the 16th, General Hardee stopped his retreat long enough to entrench near Averysboro. A sharp engagement began, but Hardee was soon flanked and forced to retreat.

  As Sherman approached Goldsboro, Slocum's corps ran head long into Johnston's entire army at Bentonville on March 19th. Johnston had formed his battle lines in the shape of a V similar to what Lee had done at Spotsylvania. Sherman deployed Slocum against one leg and Howard against the other. These deployments occupied most all of the 19th.

  Having received word from Terry and Schofield that they were close at hand, Sherman held his position on the 20th. On the 21st, there was fighting along Johnston's extreme left flank during the afternoon, but by dawn on the 22nd, the rebels had vanished. Total losses for the Union during the three day battle were 1604, while losses for the rebels totaled 2343.

  On March 23rd, the rendezvous of Sherman's, Schofield's and Terry's forces was affected at Goldsboro, North Carolina. There was no longer any fear for Sherman's fate. The combined army he now commanded could deal with Lee even if he succeeded in combining with Johnston. Sherman's feat had truly been magnificent. His army had marched 425 miles in 50 days over winter roads, across swollen rivers, and all in the face of a resisting enemy.

  Upon arriving in Goldsboro, Sherman found Lieutenant Dunn of General Grant's staff with a letter in response to Sherman's letter of March 12th. Grant's letter was a perfect synopsis of how events had transpired and where everything stood as of the middle of March, 1865.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}

  CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865. }

  Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military

  Division of the Mississippi.

  GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just received. I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but I have felt great anxiety to know just how were progressing. I knew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you, you would come out safely somewhere.

  To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of the greatest importance. Butler came near losing that prize to us. But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I do not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for the country as the capture of Fort Fisher. Butler may not see it in that light.

  Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have been attempting to get something done in the West, both to cooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness there--to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reenforce Canby, so that he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior. With all I have said, he had not moved at last advices. Canby was sending a cavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg toward Selma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the same point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February as possible. He telegraphed me that he would not be off by that date. He has not yet started, or had not at last advices. I ordered him to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina, to be there about the time you would reach Columbia. He would either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would have succeeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material, which you could not reach. At that time the Richmond papers were full of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts of movements in West North Carolina. I supposed all the time it was Stoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that Stoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops in North Carolina, were Kirk's forces! In order that Stoneman might get off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men would be sufficient for him to take. In the mean time I had directed Sheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in the mountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on and destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal. Time advanced, until he set the 28th of February for starting. I informed Thomas, and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg, to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as possible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the 12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he (Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon as possible.

  Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as heard. I am looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since about the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited from publishing accounts of army movements. We are left to our own resources, therefore, for information. You will see from the papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bears this will tell you all.

  Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of none going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but I think no division or brigade. The determination seems to be to hold Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient to leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), and move out with plenty to whip his whole army. But the roads are entirely impassable. Until they improve, I shall content myself with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts to evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over--think I will--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are the last avenues left to the enemy.

  Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. I have stopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, except those from Illinois.

  Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, and afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I have ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap
, and to fortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can. He has accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville, and has been ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of the Virginia line. I told him to get ready for a campaign toward Lynchburg, if it became necessary. He never can make one there or elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else to take his troops and come east or go toward Rome, whichever may be necessary. I do not believe either will.

  When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your back upon the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against any thing the enemy can do. Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannot get there with force enough to touch you. His army is now demoralized and deserting very fast, both to us and to their homes. A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if we did not follow.

  Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now on their way to join you. If more reenforcements are necessary, I will send them. My notion is, that you should get Raleigh as soon as possible, and hold the railroad from there back. This may take more force than you now have.

  From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to the enemy, without keeping up communications with the rear.

  Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces from Wilmington and Newbern, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 158

  In the above letter, it is interesting to note Grant's feelings about Thomas. Grant has been criticized thoroughly over the years for not giving Thomas enough credit for all he did. The author finds Grant's opinions about Thomas neither unjust nor harsh. Thomas' actions or lack thereof, speak for themselves. Thomas was courageous, patriotic, and a great defensive general, but he lacked initiative on the offense. Grant's judgment of Thomas was entirely accurate and honest.

  Another point mentioned in the letter to Sherman was Grant’s concern that Lee and his army might elude him and escape to the hills and become guerrillas. This was one of his most anxious times during the war for that reason. The roads were not good enough to make large movements to prevent such a move on the part of Lee. He wanted to end the war where he was and greatly feared a guerilla army terrorizing the general populace.

  The Confederacy was in its final agony. In order to pave the way for an attempt to unite with General Johnston and attack Sherman before Grant could intervene, Lee planned an attack to relieve some pressure on his lines and allow him the opportunity to escape. It was Lee's last offensive and it was made by General John Gordon on Fort Stedman on March 25th. The rebel attack completely surprised the Federals capturing the fort and opening a large gap on either side of the fort. Later in the day, the Nationals counterattacked and retook possession of all that was lost. Union losses totaled 1150, while the Southerners lost 4000 men. Lee's fate appeared sealed.

  On March 26th, Lee wrote an analysis of his impossible situation in a letter to Jefferson Davis.

  Headquarters, Confederate States Armies

  March 26, 1865

  Mr. President:

  My despatch of yesterday to the Secretary of War will have informed you of the attack made upon a portion of the enemy's lines around Petersburg, and the result which attended it. I have been unwilling to hazard any portion of the troops in an assault upon fortified positions, preferring to reserve their strength for the struggle which must soon commence, but I was induced to assume the offensive from the belief that the point assailed could be carried without much loss, and the hope that by the seizure of the redoubts in the rear of the enemy's line, I could sweep along his entrenchments to the south, so that if I could not cause their abandonment, Genl Grant would at least be obliged so to curtail his lines, that upon the approach of Genl Sherman, I might be able to hold our position with a portion of the troops, and with a select body unite with Genl Johnston and give him battle. If successful, I would then be able to return to my position, and if successful I should be in no worse condition, as I should be compelled to withdraw from James River if I quietly awaited his approach. But although the assault upon the fortified works at Hare's Hill was bravely accomplished, the redoubts commanding the line of entrenchments were found enclosed and strongly manned, so that an attempt to carry them must have been attended with great hazards, and even if accomplished, would have caused a great sacrifice of life in the presence of the large reserves which the enemy was hurrying into position. I therefore determined to withdraw the troops, and it was in retiring that they suffered the greatest loss, the extent of which has not yet been reported.

  I fear now it will be impossible to prevent a junction between Grant and Sherman, nor do I deem it prudent that this army should maintain its position until the latter shall approach too near. Genl Johnston reports that the returns of his force of the 24th instant gave his effective infantry thirteen thousand five hundred. He must therefore have lost, after his concentration at Smithfield about eight thousand men. This could hardly have resulted from the casualties of battle, and I fear must be the effect of desertion. Should this prove to be the case, I can not reasonably expect him to bring across the Roanoke more than ten thousand infantry, a force that will add so little strength to this army as not to make it more than a match for Sherman, with whom to risk a battle in the presence of Grant's army, would hardly seem justifiable. Genl Johnston estimates Genl Sherman's army, since its union with Schofield and the troops that were previously in N. Carolina, at sixty thousand. I have no correct data upon which to form an estimate of the strength of Genl Grant's army. Taking their own account, it would exceed a hundred thousand, and I fear it is not under eighty thousand. Their two armies united would therefore exceed ours by nearly a hundred thousand. If Genl Grant wishes to unite Sherman with him without a battle, the latter after crossing the Roanoke has only to take an easterly direction towards Sussex, while the former moving two days march towards Weldon, provided I moved out to intercept Sherman, would render it impossible for me to strike him without fighting both armies.

  I have thought it proper to make the above statement to Your Excellency of the condition of affairs, knowing that you will do whatever may be in your power to give relief.

  I am with great respect, your obt servt

  R. E. LEE

  Genl 159

  From the tone of the above letter, it is rather obvious that Lee felt a junction with Johnston unlikely and if it succeeded of dubious results.

  The pincers were close to being shut with the two primary Confederate armies in their jaws. Once these were gone, the life of the Confederacy would be forever snuffed out.

  Sherman reached Goldsboro on March 23rd and Sheridan returned to the Army of the Potomac on March 27th. Lee made his last attack on the March 25th. Prior to the last two events, Grant wrote out his orders for the general movement to close out the war. He and Lee had both been waiting for dry roads in order to make their moves and the time was now close. His orders for the final move were issued on March 24, 1865.

  CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

  March 24, 1865.

  "GENERAL:--On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddie Court House.

  "The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Pot
omac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

  "General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James.

  "The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six to eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

 

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