[399] 3rd. Before he sinned, or before he acquired knowledge, “erat autem uterque nudus, Adam scilicet et uxor eius, et non erubescebant” [“And they were both naked: to wit, Adam and his wife: and were not ashamed”]. (Genesis 2:25.) But as soon as Adam had eaten the fruit, “et aperti sunt oculi amborum: cumque cognovissent se esse nudos, consuerunt folia ficus et fecerunt sibi perizomata” [“and the eyes of them both were opened: and when they perceived themselves to be naked, they sewed together fig leaves, and made themselves aprons”]. (3:7.) And God said to them: “quis enim indicavit tibi quod nudus esses, nisi quod ex ligno de quo praeceperam tibi ne comederes, comedisti?” [“And who hath told thee that thou wast naked, but that thou hast eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?”]. (3:11.) These verses would seem to suggest numerous observations on natural law, which is supposedly innate. In essence it is clear (1) That the fall of man consisted in a fall from the natural, primitive state, because immediately after he had sinned, the man felt at odds with his nature, he was ashamed of his nakedness, or of the way he had been made. He felt shame and, as a consequence of that, duty, which did not exist before he was corrupted. (2) That this fall or corruption, instead of being that of reason itself, was, on the contrary, occasioned by knowledge, in that the man knew what he had not known before, and would not and should not have known, namely that he was naked. When they opened their eyes, as it says in Genesis, then they perceived that they were naked, and they were ashamed of their nature (contrary to what it had been [400] before), and they fell from their natural state, or were corrupted. So opening their eyes, and therefore perceiving, was the same thing as falling or being corrupted; and thus this fall was a fall of their nature, not of their reason or knowledge. (3) That in his natural state, man would have lived, like all other animals, without clothes. This is a serious blow, both to a presumed essential and inherent law of nature and to the presumed need, and primordial and substantial disposition, of man for society. Much of man’s need for mutual support, of a child’s need for parents over a long period of time, involves clothes. What is more, a great deal of man’s need to have certain skills, to be able to use his reason, concerns the need for clothing.
4th. As for society, not that primitive, tenuous society, common to animals as well, which I have defined above, but one that is fully formed, in need of laws, customs, rites, power and subjects, command and obedience, etc. etc., see what Christianity thinks about it, p. 112, paragraph 1, and p. 191, paragraph 2.
5th. Moses’s description of earthly paradise shows that the pleasures ordained for natural man in this life were the pleasures of this life, material, tangible, [401] and bodily pleasures, and thus happiness also. What’s more, God put Adam “in paradiso voluptatis ut operaretur et custodiret illum” [“into the paradise of pleasure, to dress it, and to keep it”]. (Genesis 2:15.) Therefore, although man was condemned after the Fall to work the land that was “cursed because of him” (3:17) and sent out of the garden of Eden (3:23) “ut operaretur terram de qua sumptus est” [“to till the earth from which he was taken”] (ibid.), this must be construed, in the context of Genesis, as meaning to work the land with the sweat of his brow, and thanklessly, and not that his life before sin and his happiness should consist of contemplation, and be inactive, in other words without outside and bodily works and activities, and pleasure in these works. In fact, who can fail to see that corrupted man (in other words man as he is today) has many more needs than other living beings, that he encounters many more obstacles in satisfying his needs, and therefore must work much harder to maintain himself? Toil born of hardship, commanded by reason and necessity, but repellent to nature, toil without pleasure, etc. Whereas other animals obtain what is necessary with little work and almost no hardship. They do not work the land, nor does the land produce for them “spinas et tribulos” [“thorns and thistles”] (3:18), that is, it does not stand in the way of their desires, but provides them spontaneously with what is necessary. And they reap and do not [402] sow. Here, I am referring to any food upon which they graze. Man, in his present state, needs clothes; they do not, but are born clothed by nature. Primitive society, such as is practiced also by the animals, and primitive reasoning, that is, the principle of knowledge that is common to all beings capable of choice, were ordained to meet the needs of man. Society as it is, reason as it has become, increases these needs beyond measure. The means of serving needs and satisfying them has become the father, and the cause, and the perennial and infinite source of needs. The natural needs of man would be very few indeed, like those of other animals, but society and reason increase the size and number of his needs exceedingly. This distinction between needs that are natural and those that are social or artificial (and not therefore inevitable in our state) formed the foundation of the sect of Cynics, who sought to show with their actions how few needs man naturally has. See the epitaph to Diogenes in Laertius.1 Man was therefore truly condemned to toil, and toil born of hardship. He was condemned to it, unlike other animals, and since he was condemned to it as I have described, it does not follow that his life before his corruption was necessarily one of inactivity, in other words that it should [403] have involved less activity and physical occupation than that of other animals.
6th. If Religion has then made reason and knowledge divine, preferred spirit over the senses, identified the perfection of man, unlike the brutes, in reason, if, in short, it has given reason pride of place over nature in man, none of this is incompatible with my system. Man was corrupt, that is, as I have shown, reason had risen above nature. And therefore man had become social, and therefore he had become unhappy, because reason prevailed, and thus his primitive nature was corrupted and spoiled, and he had fallen from his original perfection, which consisted of none other than his proper and primordial essence or condition. Experience shows that from this state of corruption man cannot turn back without a miracle. Reason also proves it, because what we have learned we cannot forget. In fact, the history of mankind shows nothing but a continual passage from one degree of civilization to another, then to an excess of civilization, finally to barbarism, and then back to the beginning.1 By barbarism I mean corruption, and not an absolutely primitive [404] and natural state, since this would not be barbarism. But history never shows us man precisely in this state. Rather, it shows us that man, in the condition to which he has been reduced, cannot enjoy greater happiness than in a state of middling civilization,1 where nature prevails, as far as is compatible with man’s reason already occupying a higher position than it did originally. This state is not absolutely natural, but is more or less what has been established by religion, as I will describe below. The absolutely natural state could not, therefore, return without a miracle. Talk of miracles is superhuman and forms no part of philosophy. Why man, corrupt as he is, has never regained, nor will regain, the purely natural state and the happiness that all other beings enjoy is explained in philosophical terms for the reason given. Even better in religious terms, for God, as punishment for sin, having condemned man to the unhappiness of the corruption derived from that sin, neither should nor would perform this miracle. Wishing to show him his mercy, and provide him with a perfection compatible with his punishment, that is, with his unhappiness, there was no other course than to perfect his reason, namely that part which had unalterably prevailed in man [405] owing to his disobedience, and which had caused his corruption. The perfection of reason is not exactly the perfection of man in absolute terms, but rather of man such as he is after his corruption. Because perfection in a being is none other than complete conformity with its primordial essence. Now, this primordial essence of man supposed and included the obedience of reason, which is quite the opposite of the perfection of reason. This perfection could not, therefore, be his happiness in this life, for it was not the perfection of his being. It could, therefore, constitute his happiness only in another life, where the nature of his being was in some way changed. Reason (especially in relation to
the other life) cannot be perfected except through revelation. It was therefore necessary for God to reveal to man his origin and his destiny, that destiny which he would have attained by remaining in his natural state, and which he would have attained together with earthly happiness. Whereas Christianity calls blessed those who weep, preaches suffering, makes it useful and necessary. In a word, it supposes unhappiness in this life to be essential, as a natural consequence [406] of the principles mentioned. But from these same principles it follows that the greatest happiness for man in this life, that is, the greatest, truest, and most complete comfort possible against natural unhappiness, is religion. Because (to summarize what has been said) absolutely human or primitive perfection, and therefore natural happiness, and therefore temporal happiness, is impossible for man after his corruption. Since reason, as the author of this corruption, has prevailed forever, the highest level that corrupt man can reach is the perfection of reason, which is today the greater part of him. The perfection of reason can lead only to the happiness of another life. Therefore, and even without this, the perfection of reason and knowledge cannot exist without revelation. Therefore, the best state of corrupted man is Religion, and since it is the best, that is, the state best suited for him, even though it supposes the unhappiness of this life, yet it contains the greatest comfort, and therefore the greatest happiness, and therefore the greatest possible perfection of man in this life. Thus, Religion fits admirably with my system, and is almost afforded new proof by it.
[407] 7th. The perfection of reason consists in knowing its inadequacy to make us happy, indeed, its intrinsic opposition to our happiness. See p. 304, paragraph 2. The full perfectibility of man is in knowing that he is in fact incapable of perfection, indeed, that, having been created almost perfectly by the hand of nature, by changing he can only change for the worse. But Religion confounds our reason, reveals its inadequacy, shows the corruption that it has introduced in man and the impossibility of its making us happy. Here then is the perfection of reason. Because man would not have known about these things in his primitive state, but, once reason prevailed, he could reach no greater perfection than to understand the impotence and harm of reason. The perfection of reason consists of calling man back, as far as possible, to his natural state, a return that, because it is made through the use of that very reason which corrupted man and is founded on that same corruptor, can no longer be equivalent to the natural state, or therefore to our primitive perfection, nor therefore can it provide us with that happiness which was ordained for us. But in spite of all this, as far as this life is concerned, it is the best condition that mankind can hope for. And this is how Religion infinitely favors [408] nature, as I have said on several other occasions. It establishes very many of those qualities that belonged to ancient peoples or those living closer to nature, gratifies our imagination with the idea of the infinite, preaches heroism, gives life, body, reason, and foundation to a thousand of those illusions which constitute the state of middling civilization, the happiest state of social and irredeemably corrupted man, the state in which as much is conceded to nature as is compatible with society. Observe indeed how a state of Christian people is in fact a state of middlingly civilized people. Life, activity, the pleasures of domestic life, heroism, sacrifices, public-spiritedness, public and private loyalty of individuals and nations, public and private virtues, the importance given to things, compassion and charity, etc. etc. All the illusions that elevated ancient peoples, and inspire children and young people, acquire life and force in Christianity.1 Example of Spain until 1820, its heroism against the French, etc.2 Its superstitions were themselves none other than illusions, and for that reason they were life. Observe further that all that is less than the middling state of civilization of a people is contrary to Christianity, or derives from the corruption of it, as in late antiquity, in Spain, etc. Because pure Christianity leads to, is indeed equivalent to, an adequate and just civilization, no more and no less than is proper to social man. On the other hand, observe that no population on this or that side of middling civilization has ever been Christian, and, vice versa, no truly Christian population has ever been [409] on one or the other side of middling civilization. Societies that were absolutely barbarous, or corrupt and, by way of corruption, barbarous, are civilized by Christianity and brought to that state of middling civilization. Example of barbarous peoples converted by the preaching of the Gospel. On the other hand, societies that are excessively civilized, and strictly rational (as also individuals), have never been Christian. Example of our times. Instead of the qualities described above, the distinctive features of these societies are egoism, death, tedium, indifference, inaction, public and private bad faith, the absence of all heroism, sacrifice, or virtue, of all illusion inspired by nature in the primitive state, or developed naturally in the social state, the absence of all illusion that forms the substance and reason of life and which, being inspired by nature, is confirmed by Christianity.
8th. The said perfection of reason relates to this life. But reason cannot be perfect unless it relates to the next life. Because we are called back to nature, as we must be, and to natural illusions, by reason, it can mean nothing other than that we are convinced of those illusions. Once they are known, how would we return to them, unless [410] we were convinced once more that they were true? A return through reason that is achieved not through reasoning but by will alone can only be vain, unstable, and transient, like that of modern sentimental philosophers,1 who, trying as hard as they can to recapture lost illusions, manage at most to do so for a short moment and spend the rest of their lives in coldness, indifference, and death. Therefore, once we have known illusions for what they are, we cannot return to them, that is, convince ourselves of them anew, unless we know that they are true. But they are not true except with regard to God and to another life. With regard to God, who is the personification of virtue, beauty, etc.: virtue as substance, not phantasm, as in the order of created things. With regard to another life, where hope will be fulfilled, virtue and heroism rewarded, etc., where, in short, illusions will no longer be illusions but reality. Therefore, the perfection of reason (with regard to this life as much as to the next, because I have shown that perfection in regard to this life depends upon perfection in regard to the next) consists formally in the knowledge of another world. In this knowledge, therefore, consists the perfection, and hence the happiness, of corrupted mankind. Therefore, corrupt man could not be perfected or made happy without revelation, that is, without Religion. And thus it has been rigorously [411] demonstrated and argued how corrupted man has need of that knowledge, which was contrary to the nature of primitive man; and how Christianity, which makes reason and knowledge divine, does not stand in opposition to my system, which makes nature, the enemy of reason and knowledge, divine.
9th. Experience confirms that man, in the condition to which he has been reduced, cannot be solidly and lastingly happy (to the extent that he can be happy here below) except in a religious (but truly religious) state, one, that is, that gives body and truth to illusions, without which there is no happiness, but which, once known by reason, can no longer seem true to men, as they seem to other living beings, except in the relationship and foundation and reality that they are assumed to have in another life. The ancient Religions, Mohammedanism, sects of every kind, and all those beliefs that have given life to peoples and societies, and induced them to act, also contributed to this effect. Consider in this respect all that I have said elsewhere [→Z 125, 215, 285, 329–30, 362–63] about the need for persuasion in order to carry out actions, and persuasion that has the appearance of illusion and passion, etc. For being persuaded that all is nothingness does not lead to action. And to be persuaded that things are things cannot [412] have foundation or reason, except in the idea and persuasion of another life.1 But this must persuade us. Therefore, religion must persuade us, and we cannot remain indifferent about its quality and truth. Otherwise, if Religion is regarded and followed as if it
were any of the other illusions, it will no longer be a persuasion, and all the other illusions, as much as this one, will once again have no foundation, and so will no longer be able to lead us toward lasting action, toward perfection and happiness. This is why Religion is to be found at the cradle of all peoples, this is why empires or states that are founded upon or maintained by religious convictions are destroyed by philosophy, this is why the decline of Rome accompanied the decline of its Religion, etc. etc. See other thoughts. Because when Religious beliefs are weakened or disappear, the principle of action is weakened or disappears, in other words the belief in illusions or that persuasion of the reality of things, which can have no reality and importance except in relation to another life. And in the same way, when a Religion that creates those illusions disappears, that particular state of a people disappears as well, and its replacement by another Religion does not bring about a return to that state but, instead, changes it. And this is what happened with Christianity in relation to paganism in Rome. Because when man believes [413] (not knows, but believes) differently, he acts differently. It is therefore justified, indeed admirable, that the ancient Greek and Roman statesmen always jealously held on to their ancient beliefs, and when these perished, their state must and did perish, too.
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