—“Among unequals no society,” says Milton,1 etc. etc. See p. 3891. Now what is usually said about friendship and secondary societies among men, I transfer to, and it must be equally true about, the society of the human race generally [3807] considered. Of all the species of animals (also of other beings), the human is the one whose individuals are, not only by chance, but naturally, constantly, and inevitably, the most varied among themselves. Just as man is far more easily conformable than any other animal, and therefore more modifiable, every slightest circumstance, every slightest accident (whether individual or national, etc., whether physical or moral, etc.) is enough to produce between one man and another (and so between one nation and another) very notable differences. And just as the very slight variation of very slight circumstances and accidents is absolutely inevitable, so the diversity of human individuals which derives from it is also inevitable. Both are inevitable in all species of animals, but the second is much greater in man because little differences give rise to enormous differences, given that his supreme capacity for modification is extremely multifarious, and given the supreme delicacy and hence susceptibility of his nature with respect to other animals, as has been said. In the way in which the human species has become, because of its conformability, more different from all the other animal species and from each of them, more than any one of the latter is different from any other of them, the young man is more different from himself as a child than is any other decrepit animal from its newborn self; so that a man at different ages or in different circumstances, which may be natural or accidental, local, physical, moral, etc., native in influence, that is in birth, etc., or temporary, etc., voluntary or not, etc., can scarcely be called the same [3808] man, and the human race universally in different ages, or in different circumstances, natural or accidental, local, etc., can scarcely be called the same race; in the same way the individuals of our species are by the nature of that species a great deal more varied among themselves than are the individuals of any other species.1 That still happens, inevitably, and naturally, in natural man, in savage man, etc. And so, when we consider man in nature, we can conclude from this point of view also that the human species is less prepared for society than any other, because it is composed of individuals naturally more diverse among themselves, than are those of any other species. But just as society introduces and takes to the limit that inequality among men which one can see in states, in fortunes, in professions, etc., so it increases a thousandfold, inevitably promotes, and by its nature takes to the limit both physical and moral diversity, of faculties, inclinations, character, strength, body, etc. etc., of individuals, nations, times, various ages of an individual, etc. etc. It increases the natural and innate differences between one man and another, and other infinite and enormous differences which would not have existed in the natural state of man it necessarily and by its nature introduces and causes. It destroys thousands of correspondences and natural similarities between one man and another. Nature is a general and constant precept, independent of individual judgment, little subject to [3809] chance events (with respect to the dependence which the works, etc., of man have on chance events and circumstances), the same in all places, always the same with respect to each species, consistent in certain and eternal laws, etc. Society, the work of man, dependent on will which has no certain law, otherwise it would not be will, which is arbitrary, inconstant, variable according to the accidents and circumstances of the times, places, desires, the thousand things which cause it and determine its form and the mode of its being, not one in itself, because it has had and necessarily has infinite forms, and these are always variable and varied; not one in any of its forms, because in each of them there are a thousand varieties which necessarily differ one from another in the parts of which they are composed, who commands from who obeys, who advises from who is advised, etc. etc. In society man loses as far as is possible the impress of nature. Once this is lost, which is the only stable thing in the world, the only thing that is universal, or common to the race or species, there is no other rule, strand, precept, type, form, which might be stable and common, to which all individuals by matching themselves to it, all conform among themselves, etc. etc. Society does not just make men different and unequal among themselves, as they are in nature, but unlike. From which through this argument also one concludes that the essence and nature of society, especially human society, contains contradiction within itself, since human society naturally destroys its most necessary element, [3810] means, tie, bond of society, which is equality and mutual parity between the individuals who compose it; or we can say which increases through its own properties the natural disparity of its subjects, and it increases it to the same extent that it renders them completely incapable of mutual society, of that very society which has made them so different, in fact of every society, even the one which by nature would be possible and ordained for them and proper to them; in short, to return to the beginning of this discourse, it renders its subjects like those among whom there can naturally be “no society,” in fact it does more, because if society, according to Milton, is impossible between unequal beings, it makes them unlike each other. And in truth no animal less than man has any reason to call the individuals of its own species its like, nor has it more reason to treat them as unlike, and as individuals of a different species. Which man never fails to do. And the fact that he does it, as he ordinarily does, especially in society, is an extremely effective proof of what I have said above, etc. etc. (25–30 October 1823.)
Vomito as [to vomit] from vomo is itum [to vomit]. Arguto as [to prattle] and argutor aris [to prattle] from arguo is itum [to make clear, to prove], or from the adjective argutus [eloquent, cunning], which comes from it, etc. See Forcellini and the two following thoughts. (31 Oct. 1823.)
Participles in us of active verbs, etc., in an active sense, transitive or not, etc. See Forcellini under Odi isti osus [to hate], Exosus [detesting], Perosus [hating greatly], etc., and under Argutus. (31 Oct. 1823.)
True past participles which then become adjectives, etc. Argutus. (31 Oct. 1823.) See the previous thought.
[3811] Nouns ending in uosis, ualis, etc. See Forcellini under Cornuatus, cornuarius. (31 Oct. 1823.)
Positivized diminutives. Cornacchia (poetical cornice), corneja, corneille, for the positive cornix [crow]. Cornicula [little crow] is to be found in Horace. See Forcellini under Corniculans [horn-shaped] and corniculatus [horned] from corniculum [little horn] diminutive of cornu [horn], and the Crusca under cornicolare [made of horn], cornicolato, corniculato [horn-shaped], etc. To what was said elsewhere [→Z 2864] about flagellum [whip], add the verb formed from it, that is flagello as, while from flagrum [whip] they did not say flagrare. It is true that flagrum is instead thought to derive from flagrare [to flame, to burn] ardere [to burn], etc. From flabellum [fan] flabellare [to fan], but flabrum [breeze] does not give flabrare, which verb, although it exists, has a different meaning, etc. Fuseau [spindle, bobbin]. Figliolo (filiolus), figliuolanza [progeny], etc. To what has been said elsewhere about scabellum [footstool], etc., add the French escabeau and escabelle. (31 Oct. 1823.)
For p. 3797, margin.1 That is while indolence and ignorance of agriculture, etc., prevented or hampered them from sustaining themselves sufficiently from the fruits of the earth; indolence and cowardice and the lack of arms sufficient to face up to or to pursue, to tame or to catch up with animals that were swifter or stronger than man, or swifter and stronger at the same time, or even equally swift or strong, etc. etc.
For p. 3666. The oneness of origin in the human race is proved by the conformities of traditions, of religions, of opinions which are not natural, of mythologies, of certain customs, of certain dogmas, rites, etc., conformities and correspondences which can be found between peoples where there is no memory at all of any mutual commerce between them (up to the present moment) nor does one see how they come about, in peoples who are completely separated from others, as on very remote islands, etc., recently d
iscovered, and never, as far as men’s memories go, previously trodden by strangers, and where everything leads one to see that they never were trodden by strangers. [3812] Conformities, correspondences, singleness and sameness of origin that are now more now less self-evident, now more now less distorted, distant, slight, and difficult to recognize, as is natural after so many ages and such great diversification as has taken place in the various peoples, but not for that reason less true, nor less suitable to demonstrate our argument (since all that is needed is the slightest conformity which cannot be and cannot be thought to be accidental, to prove the oneness and sameness of the origin, etc.), and very frequently irrefutable, etc. As are those which critics have recognized, and are recognizing more and more between Indian mythology, etc., and Greek, etc., between Egyptian and Greek, etc., and those of a great many other ancient nations, etc. See Annali di scienze e lettere of Milan, January 1811, no. 13, vol. 5, p. 37, etc.1 You will find there observations that concur in demonstrating the oneness of the origin of many peoples, though the single root is generally completely unknown. Now from this oneness, and from that of others mentioned there, which are said to be of a different origin from the first but common between themselves (although in the same way they are commonly thought to be completely different in their root), one can, if not historically and through definite demonstrations or critical conjectures, certainly, however, philosophically, deduce the most remote oneness of origin both of the second group of peoples with respect to the first, and of all the peoples together. Some peoples branched off and divided off in times which are closer to us, or of whom more and better known records have come down to us. These peoples are generally considered as conforming in origin. Others in more distant times and of whom fewer and lesser known records have come down to us, were one and the same. These are not considered as conforming in origin except by the most erudite. Following this line of thought, it is argued that even [3813] where the oneness of origin cannot (at least so far) be seen in any way at all, it is notwithstanding no less true, although it is not seen either because of the greater distance of the times, or because of the absence of or small number of or obscurity of or slender knowledge of records, etc. The philosopher infers the general from the particular, the similar from the similar, the unknown from the known, and if not even the critic, much less does the philosopher need to show every particular by facts, or every general point with general facts or with all the particulars which fall under that general point, etc., but frequently shows the general very well with the particulars, and not with all the particulars, but with some of them, and the particulars with other particulars or with the general, etc. (31 Oct. 1823.)
The love of life, the pleasure of intense sensations, of the aspect of life, etc., of which things elsewhere [→Z 1988–90, 2017–18, 2415, 2433–34, 2499], is consistently found in animals. Nature is life. It is existence. It itself loves life, it endeavors to bring about life in every way, and in every one of its operations it is directed toward life. Because it exists and lives. If life were death, it would not. To be dead is a contradiction in terms. If in any way it were directed toward death, if in any way it endeavored to bring about death, it would be directing and endeavoring against itself. If it did not endeavor with every ounce of strength to bring about life, if it did not love life as much as it is possible to love it, and if life were not all the more dear to nature, as it is greater and more intense and to a greater degree, nature would not love itself (see p. 3785, beginning), it would not endeavor to bring about itself or its own good, or it would not love itself as much as it can (an impossibility), nor would it love its greatest [3814] possible good, and it would not endeavor to bring about its greatest possible good (all things which equally, as they are in individuals and in the species, etc., are impossible in nature). That which we call nature is principally none other than the existence, the state of being, the life, sensory or not, of things. Therefore there can be no thing or purpose more natural, nor more naturally appealing and desirable and sought after, than existence and life, which is almost one and the same thing as nature itself, nor can there be a more natural nor naturally greater love than that of life. (Happiness is only the perfection, the completion, and the proper state of life, according to its diverse proper character in the diverse kinds of things which exist. Therefore in some way it is life or existence itself, since in some way unhappiness is the same as death, or nonlife, because it is life not in accordance with its state of being, and imperfect life, etc. Therefore nature, which is life, is also happiness.) And therefore it is necessary for things which exist to love and search after the greatest life possible for each of them. And pleasure is none other than life, etc. And life is necessarily pleasure, and a greater pleasure, the greater and more intense that life is. Life generally is one and the same thing as nature, life divided into its particulars is one and the same thing as its respective existing subjects. Therefore each being, in loving life, loves itself: and so it cannot not love it, and not love it to the highest degree possible. The being which exists cannot strictly speaking love death (insofar as death is concerned with it), it cannot be directed toward it, it cannot endeavor to bring it about, it cannot not hate it as much as it can, in any instant of its own being, for the same reason that it cannot [3815] hate itself, endeavor to bring about, love its own injury, be directed toward its own injury, cannot not hate it above everything else and as much as it can, cannot not love itself, not only above everything else, but as much as it is ever possible to love. So that man, animal, etc., loves intense sensations, etc. etc., and experiences pleasure from them, because he loves himself. (31 Oct. 1823.)
To my remarks on avvisare [to inform], divisare [to plan] [→Z 2844, 3005], etc., add the French deviser [to converse]. (31 Oct. 1823.)
For p. 2928, end. We still have, though with different meanings, intenso [intense] and intento [intent on]. (intensità, etc.) See the French and Spanish words. In Latin, intensus [tight, violent] is very rare. See Forcellini, Tensus [to extend] is found in more modern writers. For Extensus, etc., and the other compounds, see the entries on them in Forcellini. (1 Nov. 1823.)
As I have conjectured elsewhere [→Z 1276] on the basis of σῦκον [fig], in Greek too, as so often in Latin, the rough breathing sometimes changes to s. E.g., from ἃλς [salt, the sea], comes σαλεύω [to shake a great deal], etc. See the Lexicons. Hence in Latin sal, salum, etc., from the same word. (1 Nov. 1823.)
To what I said [→Z 1108] in the theory of continuatives to show that sector aris [to follow] is a contraction of secutor, add persector aris [to pursue], which in fact the French have as persécuter, we have perseguitare, and the Spanish if I am not mistaken, persecutar. (1 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3036, margin. Periurus, that is qui peieravit, or periuravit [one who swore falsely], seems to be none other than a contraction of periuratus (which can also be found, as too can peieratus, in a passive sense), as coniuratus, qui coniuravit [one who swore together]; iuratus, qui iuravit [one who swore], etc. (iuratus also has a passive meaning: not though periurus). (1 Nov. 1823.)
[3816] Participles in us active or neuter in meaning, etc. Periurus [perjured (person)]. See the preceding thought. (1 Nov. 1823.) Giurato, juré [sworn; jury], etc.
For p. 2779. The opposite of φὼρ fur [thief], etc. (1 Nov. 1823.)
Positivized diminutives. Libella [level] (Italian livella, livello, French niveau, Spanish if I am not mistaken, nivel; livellare, etc., niveler, etc. etc.) for libra which is in fact used with the same meaning. See Forcellini. Circulus [circle] (circulo as, circularis, etc. etc.) for circus, an obsolete word, etc. (though it can still be found) except in the sense of Roman amphitheater, etc. etc. See Forcellini. (2 Nov. 1823.)
Mestare, rimestare [to stir], etc., from misceo‒mixtus or mistus, as if mistare or mixtare. See Glossary, French and Spanish dictionaries, etc. (2 Nov., All Souls’ Day, 1823.) French expulser from expellere–expulsus, as from pello–pulsus [to beat, to push], pulso as [to pus
h], etc. See Forcellini under expulso and expulsatus. (2 Nov., All Souls’ Day, 1823.)
For p. 3067. In the same way, in Voltaire’s time and thereabouts (when the only European literature was, one might say, French, though it was already much in decline, for Italian and Spanish were dead, German not yet born, or a mere child, or entirely French, English had almost come to a stop, or was French as well, but had already lost the leaders of that Anglo-French school, that is Pope, Addison,1 etc., and I’m talking here about literature not about sciences and philosophy, in which the English were flourishing even then), epistles and poems addressed either by Voltaire himself or by other French poets to the princes of Sweden, Russia, Germany, etc., or composed in their honor, or about them, or about their business, or about events, etc., were read, applauded, sought after, propagated, provided subject matter for discussion in the various courts and capitals, and in the other courts of Europe, etc., and by their respective princes, etc. (leaving aside also the king and the court [3817] and the capital, and almost the whole kingdom, of Prussia, which was completely French, etc.). Likewise with other works in verse or prose, by Frenchmen or written in French, works of literature and poetry, as well as philosophy, etc. So that the Italian language in the period mentioned earlier used to occupy not only the position which French occupies at present, but also that which it occupied when French literature itself was the only literature, by virtue both of its spread and its universality, and of its reputation, dignity, good taste, and the attention which was generally paid to it. This similarity can also be seen by the way in which not only was the French language so greatly appreciated, above all other languages, in the courts, as it was in the 18th century and still is, but so was French literature, which it is no longer except on equal terms with the other modern literatures (among which today Italian cannot be included any more than Spanish). (2 Nov., All Souls’ Day, 1823.)
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