Bayle’s dictum, that reason is an instrument of destruction rather than construction,2 applies very well and in fact goes back to what I think I observed elsewhere [→Z 2705–15], namely that the progress of the human spirit since the renaissance, especially in these most recent times, has consisted and continues all the time to consist mainly, not in the discovery of positive truths, but substantially of negative ones. It consists, in other words, in knowing the falsity of what in the more or less distant past was thought to be certain, or else our ignorance about what we thought we knew—even though, faute de bien observer ou raisonner [for lack of close observation or reasoning] many such negative discoveries are taken for positive ones. And that the ancients, especially in metaphysics and moral philosophy, and also in politics (one of whose truest principles is that of as little interference as possible, as much liberty as possible), were either equal to or more advanced than us only because and insofar as they came before what are claimed to be [4193] discoveries and cognitions of positive truths, truths that we have slowly and painfully come to renounce and go on doing so, and to discover and know their falsity and be persuaded of it, and to promulgate and popularize such new discoveries.1 (Bologna, 1 September 1826.)
“῞Οτι δὲ αὐτὸς” (ὁ Λουκιανὸς) “τῶν μηδὲν ἦν ὅλως δοξαζόντων, καὶ τὸ τῆς βίβλου ἐπίγραμμα δίδωσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ ᾧδε,” etc. [“That he” (Lucian) “was himself one of those who believe in nothing, the heading of the book leads one to understand; in fact one reads thus, etc.”]. Photius, Bibliotheca, codex 128.2 —Dare a vedere, dare a conoscere, ad intendere [to lead somebody to see, to lead somebody to know, to understand], etc. See p. 4196, end.
For p. 4153. This passage in Agatharchides is a fresh example of what the critics observe or should observe in history, that is that very often the history of one nation has appropriated the facts, true or fictitious, told by the historians of another. Such is even the case with Suetonius, Octavius Caesar Augustus, ch. 94. “Auctor est Julius Marathus, ante paucos quam” (Augustus) “nasceretur menses, prodigium Romae factum publice, quo denuntiabatur regem populo romano naturam parturire; senatum exterritum censuisse ne quis illo anno genitus educaretur; eos qui gravidas uxores haberent, quod ad se quisque spem traheret, curasse ne senatusconsultum ad aerarium referretur” (“que le décret ne passât et ne fût mis dans les archives” La Harpe) [“On the authority of Julius Marathus, a few months before his” (Augustus’s) “birth, there was a miracle, declared to be a sign that nature would give birth to a king for the Roman people; and that in a state of alarm the senate decreed that no one born that year should live; and those senators with pregnant wives, who thought they might be honored in such a way, took care that the decree of the senate should not be registered in the treasury”].3 This little story is clearly akin to the one of Herod and the innocents, whichever of the two is the ainée [older]. And there is no shortage of similar examples in modern history, in fact there are more of them than ever. Among thousands, one can cite the adventure of the apple which Swiss historians attribute to William Tell, although formerly related by one Saxo Grammaticus,4 a Dane, who died 1204, and wrote in Latin a history of his nation, more than a century before the birth of Tell, who attributed the tale to a Dane, situating it in Denmark with other characters; who was probably not even its inventor, nor the history of Denmark the first to attribute it to itself. [4194] His Danish history has been published. (“Des dragons et des serpens monstrueux,” etc., a short treatise by Eusèbe Salverte in the Révue enciclopédique of Paris, tome 30, May and June, 1826, which is worth consulting in this regard.)1 (Bologna, 1826, 3 September, Sunday.) See pp. 4209, 4264, end.
Tiberius’s conduct in control of the empire, not only affable in the beginning, indulgent, moderate, but even humble, in short more than civilis [civilized] (see Suetonius, Tiberius, chs. 24–33), his difficulties in accepting control of the empire, etc., compared with his tyrannical conduct afterward, are attributed to deep-seated political calculation, dissembling, and pretense. I cannot see anything false or contrived in his behavior. Tiberius certainly, unlike Caesar, had a timid nature. Unlike Caesar too who right from his youth was always improving himself, and afterward training his mind and character to ever greater things; and unlike Augustus who even as a young man saw himself as head of state, Tiberius, born away from the public eye, and having spent his youth and maturity being suspected by Augustus and his relatives, and in no small danger from them as well (he spent eight years in quiet seclusion in Rhodes to avoid it or to reduce it), had neither the temper nor the character fitted for power when fortune placed it in his hands. For that reason in the beginning he was modest, in fact shy and humble, even after he was free of all fear, as Suetonius expressly says (ch. 26); see p. 4197, paragraph 6—and in this there was no dissembling. All I can see is a man used to giving in to others, used to being afraid and to avoiding giving offense who, now in a position of power, still has the habit of being afraid and avoiding trouble. He lost the habit over time, with his continuing experience of power and of the subjection, in fact, abjection, of others. This is not showing himself in his true light; this is a change in his character and nature, through a change in circumstances. [4195] Tiberius was certainly a bad man, because he was despicable, and weak. See p. 4197, paragraph 7. This was the reason power would turn him into a tyrant, because his nature was such that the influence of rule would inevitably make him a bad ruler. But there is no simulation here. I have never been either a ruler or bad. Yet never receiving the esteem of others and always subject to others until a mature age; realizing that circumstances made me equal to many and superior to some; from being at the start very indulgent and humble with my inferiors, afterwards I became a little hard to please, a little intolerant of them, φιλόνεικος, μεμψίμοιρος [quarrelsome, resentful], and even with my equals a little chagrin [aggrieved], and more reluctant to pardon an offense, any small failing on their part, more resentful, more quick to bear a grudge, more eager for at least some small petty revenge, etc. If my nature had been bad, I would have become the more intolerant the more I later achieved superiority, when I was of an age when it is less easy to become accustomed to it. We are all inclined to suppose in men, ancient and modern, absent and present, known and unknown, both in their actions and conduct, some political calculation, artifice, continual pretense, and some hidden motive. But believe me there is in the world much less political calculation, much less duplicity, fewer hidden motives, less intrigue, less scheming, less artifice, and more sincerity and truth than you believe. (1) Men of talent (the indispensable basis for such behavior) are more rare than you think. (2) Even men most persuaded of the necessity and usefulness of artifice in human society, and the most prepared and willing to use it, do not have the patience to do so often, to keep up the pretense, to conceal and to dissimulate for too long. (3) Conduct which is calculated and constantly directed toward some end or other, is more imaginary than real, because every man is naturally inconstant, in his tastes, desires, opinions, in everything; contradictory [4196] and inconsistent in his actions, especially, etc.; operates against his own principles; acts against his own interests, etc. (4) Finally nature however it is fought against, however much we want to believe it overcome, can still, and does operate in the world, much more than you think. Now nature is the opposite of artifice: pretense tends to conceal nature, but it shows through all the time, despite every rule, every intent, all discipline. (Bologna, 3 Sept., Sunday, 1826.) In any case the atrocious cruelty Tiberius openly used afterward, and much of it without any intended point, but just to please and satisfy his tastes and his mind, show that the heart of Tiberius was more despicable than duplicitous by nature, and in holding power it had become more malevolent than calculating.1 (Bologna, 4 Sept. 1826.)
When I speak [→Z 1230, 3003] of repo, repto, inerpicare [to creep, to clamber up], etc., observe that the Latins
have erepo as well. Suetonius, Tiberius, ch. 60. See Forcellini. Irrepo, subrepo, adrepo, etc.
Gerere–belligerare [to manage, to wage war], morigerare [to be indulgent to], famigeratus [renowned], etc. Laevo as–laevigo [to make smooth].
“κέχρηται δὲ” (῾Ηρόδοτος) “μυθολογίαις καὶ παρεκβάσεσι πολλαῖς, δι' ὧν αὐτῷ ἡ κατὰ διάνοιαν γλυκύτης διαῤῥεῖ” (per quae sensus ipsi atque sententiae dulcedo fluit. Schottus), “εἰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας κατάληψιν καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον αὐτῆς καὶ κατάλληλον” (convenientem ita Photius usurpare solitus hanc vocem, et ita reddit Schottus) “τύπον ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ἐπισκοτεῖ, οὐκ ἐθελούσης τῆς ἀληθείας μύθοις αὐτῆς ἀμαυροῦσθαι τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, οὐδὲ πλέον τοῦ προσήκοντος ἀποπλανᾶσθαι ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν” (digressionibus) [“He” (Herodotus) “has used fables and numerous digressions, through which flows sweetness of feeling and meaning. However, if we consider what history should be, and the particular forms appropriate” (convenientem: Photius normally uses this word, and this is the way Schottus translates it) “to the genre, these elements are sometimes the cause of a certain obscurity: the truth should not have myths altering its exactitude or yield more than is necessary to the detours of digression”]. Photius, Bibliotheca, codex 60.2 (Bologna, 5 Sept. 1826.)
Egesta–Segesta.3 See Forcellini.
For p. 4193. “Εστι δὲ ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ” (Αἰσχίνῃ τῷ ῥήτορι) “ὥσπερ αὐτοφυὴς καὶ αὐτοσχέδιος, οὐ τοσοῦτον διδοὺς ἀποθαυμάζειν τὴν τέχνην τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὅσον τὴν φύσιν” [“His eloquence” (referring to Aeschines the orator) “is in a certain sense spontaneous and improvised, leading one to admire in him less the art of his oratory than his natural gifts”]. Photius, Bibliotheca, codex 61.4 See p. 4208.
[4197] Subire Tiberim, “remonter le Tibre” [to go back up the Tiber]. Suetonius, Claudius, ch. 38.1
Positivized diminutive adjectives. Bimulus, trimulus, quadrimulus [only two, three, four years old]. See Forcellini.
Conspiratus for qui conspiravit, or conspirat [who conspired, conspires], Suetonius, Galba, ch. 19, Domitian, ch. 17.
Rasitare [to shave]. Suetonius, Otho, last chapter, i.e., 12.
Εξ ἀρχῆς da capo [from the beginning], for di nuovo [again], etc. Mentioned elsewhere [→Z 4083, 4117, 4124]. One also says αὖθις ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς [again from the beginning, anew]. See, for example Suetonius, Vespasian, ch. 23. “᾿Επὰν ἀποθάνῃς, αὖθις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔσῃ” [“after you are dead, you would be anew”]. Menander in Stobaeus, discourse 104, περὶ τῶν παρ' ἀξίαν εὐτυχούντων [“On those who achieve fortune beyond their deserts”].2
For p. 4194. —he himself at the same time attributes his moderation at the beginning of his rule to political calculation and duplicity (ch. 57).3
For p. 4195. Theodorus of Gadara, his rhetoric master in youth, “subinde in obiurgando appellabat eum ‘πηλὸν αἵματι πεφυραμένον’” [“directly afterward by way of reproof called him ‘mud mixed with blood’”]. Suetonius, ch. 57. And Suetonius himself calls his character “saeva ac lenta natura” [“naturally cruel and sullen”]. (Ibid., beginning.)
That men have found and put into operation ways of fighting, subjugating, making use and service of the rest of animate and inanimate nature, is not at all strange. But that they have found and use the arts and rules of fighting and defeating other men, that those arts are explained to all men, and all equally learn them and use them, or they can learn and use them, that has something absurd about it. Because if two men are equally skillful at fencing, how does their art help them? What advantage over the other does either of them have? Would it not amount to the same if they both knew nothing about fencing, or if they fought one another with their natural skills? See p. 4214. A book on, a discovery in Tactics or strategy or poliorcetics,4 etc., published and expounded for common use, what purpose does it serve? If friend and enemy learn it equally well, each with more skill and effort than before, they are in exactly the same position in relation to one another as they were. The cultivation of these arts, or sciences if you like, the encouragement of their [4198] increase, and much more the diffusion of the culture and knowledge of them, is the most pointless and strange thing ever. It is literally the method of obtaining with effort and expense what can be obtained without either effort or expense, of doing something artificially and making art necessary when nature sufficed, and when by the artificial method one does not obtain any advantage at all over the natural one. In short it is the method of multiplying and complicating the wheels and springs of a watch, and of doing with more the same as could be done and was already being done with less. The same can be said about politics, about Machiavellianism, etc.,1 and all the arts invented to fight and to overcome our fellows. (Bologna, 10 Sept. 1826.)
If in time the invention, e.g., of lightning conductors (which now we must agree are hardly of much use), becomes more solidly based and extensive, more reliable, more worthy of attention, and more generally used; if aerostatic balloons, and aeronautics2 acquire a certain degree of science, and become more common, and utility becomes part of them (which now it is not), etc.; if so many other modern discoveries, like those of steam navigation, telegraphs, etc., find applications and improvements so as to change the face of civilized life, which does not seem unlikely; and if eventually other new discoveries compete to do that; then certainly men in a thousand years’ time, will call the present age scarcely civilized, they will say that we were living in continual and extreme fear and hardship, they will find it hard to understand how people could lead and bear their lives being continually exposed to the danger of storms, lightning, etc., navigate at sea with such risk of sinking, trade [4199] and communicate with distant lands when air navigation was unknown or imperfect, the use of telegraphs, etc., they will look in wonder at how slow our present means of communication are, how unreliable, etc. And yet we have no sense of, we are not aware of how impossible or difficult the life that will be attributed to us is; we think we have a fairly comfortable life, that we communicate with one another fairly easily and quickly, that we have plenty of comforts and pleasures, in fact that we live in a century of refinement and luxury. Now believe me that exactly the same thoughts were in the minds of those men who lived before the use of fire, navigation, etc. etc., those men that we, especially in this century, with our grandiose rhetorical arguments declare were exposed to continual danger, continual and immense discomfort, ferocious animals, bad weather, hunger, thirst; continually trembling and shaking with fear, and surrounded perpetually by suffering, etc. And believe me that what I reflect on above is the perfect solution to the ridiculous problem we make for ourselves—how could men ever live in that state; how could anyone ever live before this or that invention.1 (Bologna, 10 September, Sunday, 1826.)
Hail protectors, lightning conductors, etc. Photius, Bibliotheca, codex 72, analyzing Ctesias’s τὰ ᾿Ινδικὰ [History of India], and speaking about a spring that Ctesias said was in India, without indicating exactly where, says among other things: “καὶ” (λέγει Κτησίας) “περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ πυθμένι τῆς κρήνης σιδήρου, ἐξ οὗ καὶ δύο ξίφη Κτησίας φησὶν ἐσχηκέναι, ἓν παρὰ βασιλέως” (᾿Αρταξέρξου τοῦ Μνήμονος ἐπικληθέντος), “καὶ ἓν παρὰ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως μητρὸς Παρυσάτιδος” (ἧς ἰατρὸς γέγονεν ὁ Κτησίας) “φησὶ δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι πηγνύμενος ἐν τῇ γῇ, νέφους καὶ χαλάζης καὶ πρηστήρων [4200] ἐστὶν ἀπο�
�ρόπαιος. καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν ταῦτα φησὶ, βασιλέως δὶς ποιήσαντος” [“On the iron, which is found at the bottom of this spring, Ctesias relates that he possessed two swords made out of it, one from the king” (Artaxerxes, nicknamed Mnemon), “the other from Parysatis the mother of the king” (of whom Ctesias was the doctor). “The iron has this power, that when it is thrust in the ground it wards off cloud, hail, and storms. He says that he himself twice saw the king do this”].1 “De ferro, quod in huius fontis fundo reperitur; ex quo duos se habuisse aliquando gladios ipse Ctesias commemorat; unum a rege (in the margin: Artaxerxe, τῷ Mnemone), alterum a Parysatide regis ipsius matre sibi donatum. Ferri autem huius eam esse vim, ut in terram depactum nebulas, et grandines, turbinesque avertat. Hoc semel se iterumque vidisse, cum rex ipse eius rei periculum faceret.” Translated by Andreas Schottus. (Bologna, 1826, 12 September.)
Inesorato, etc., for inesorabile [inexorable].
“καὶ τροπαῖς μὲν κέχρηται” (Εὐνάπιος ἐν χρονικῇ ἱστορίᾳ) “παραβόλως, ὅπερ ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας οὐ θέλει νόμος” [“He” (Eunapius in his Chronological history) “makes use of figures of speech daringly, which the rules of historical writing do not allow”]. “Tropos ad haec praeter modum adhibet, quod historiae lex vetat.” (Schottus) Photius, Bibliotheca, Codex 77.2
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