THE
LIBERTY INCIDENT
REVEALED
A JAY CRISTOL
THE
LIBERTY INCIDENT
REVEALED
THE DEFINITIVE ACCOUNT
OF THE 1967 ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE U.S. NAVY SPY SHIP
Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 2013 by A Jay Cristol
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cristol, A. Jay
[Liberty incident.]
The Liberty incident revealed : the definitive account of the 1967 Israeli attack on the U.S. Navy spy ship / A. Jay Cristol.—[Revised and expanded edition]
pages cm
Previously published: The Liberty incident : the 1967 Israeli attack on the U.S. Navy spy ship / A. Jay Cristol. Washington, D.C. : Brassey’s, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-61251-387-4 (ebook)1.Israel-Arab War, 1967—Naval operations. 2.Liberty (Ship) I. Cristol, A. Jay, date II. Title.
DS127.6.N3C74 2013
956.04’6—dc23
2013016521
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).
212019181716151413987654321
First printing
To the memory of Adm. Isaac C. Kidd Jr., U.S. Navy, and Vice Adm. Donald D. Engen, U.S. Navy—giants in the history of the U.S. Navy
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations
Preface to the Second Edition
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1Roll In on Target
Chapter 2The Two-Month Crisis
Chapter 3Why Was the Liberty in Harm’s Way?
Chapter 4The Liberty Targeted
Chapter 5The Air and Sea Attacks
Chapter 6In the Aftermath
Chapter 7Friendly Fire Kills
Chapter 8Survivors’ Perceptions
Chapter 9Conspiracy Theories
Chapter 10Tall Tales vs. Reality
Chapter 11Did Dayan Order It?
Chapter 12America Investigates
Chapter 13Israel Investigates
Chapter 14Television’s Perspective
Chapter 15Red Herrings and Myths
Chapter 16Confirmation: National Security Agency Intercepts
Chapter 17Confirmation: The Mythical Submarine
Chapter 18Confirmation: Department of State
Chapter 19Confirmation: Court of Inquiry Audiotapes
Chapter 20Confirmation: NSA 1995 Historian’s Analysis
Chapter 21Final Analysis
Epilogue to the First Edition, by Ernest C. Castle
In Memoriam
Appendix 1: Official Reports of the Liberty Incident
Appendix 2: Israel Air Force and NSA Audiotapes: Compared
Appendix 3: Memo, Director NSA: Bravo “Crayon” Report, NR2149, Aftermath of Israeli Attack on USS Liberty 8 June 1967
Notes
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
Selected Bibliography
Index
ILLUSTRATIONS
Plotting map showing the projected track of the Liberty
Mediterranean Sea map showing the U.S. 6th Fleet and British warship deployment
Situation map on the day of the attack
Air Attack Kursa
Air Attack Royal
USS Liberty under way
MTB Torpedo Attack
Attack profile of a Mirage IIIC
What does a pilot see?
Gun-camera photos taken during the attack
Captain McGonagle’s Medal of Honor citation
Capt. William L. McGonagle
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan eating lunch on the road to Hebron
Moshe Dayan’s wristwatch
Liberty and El Quseir silhouettes
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
When I began this research project some twenty-seven years ago I thought, perhaps naively, that by collecting hard original evidence, analyzing it, and publishing it I would answer the question of whether or not the attack on the USS Liberty was a premeditated act by Israel against a U.S. warship or a tragic case of mistaken identity and “friendly fire.” Sadly, I have learned over the years that there are many persons and entities who, pursuing their own agendas, are not even remotely interested in facts or truth and are concerned only with using this sad story as a means to attack and try to undermine the outstanding special relationship between the United States and Israel.
When the first edition of The Liberty Incident was published in 2002, there remained unanswered questions about audiotapes intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA) that were alleged by some to contain absolute proof that the Israeli attack had been premeditated. My subsequent Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the National Security Agency resulted in the release of those tapes. They are now available on the NSA website (www.nsa.gov), and one may listen to the tapes in the original Hebrew or review their preliminary and final translations. The NSA tapes and the Israel Air Force tapes may be compared in appendix 2 of this book.
Although the tapes clearly establish that the Israeli armed forces believed they were attacking a hostile ship, anti-Israel sources now insist that the NSA tapes are fraudulent and are part of a conspiracy between the National Security Agency and this author to deceive the American public!
In 2004, less than a year after I obtained the release of the above tapes, the U.S. Department of State held in Washington, D.C., a conference in connection with the release of Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. I was invited to deliver a lecture at that conference, which was moderated by Dr. Marc Susser, the historian of the Department of State. Dr. David Robarge, of the Central Intelligence Agency history staff; Dr. David Hatch, a historian for the National Security Agency; Dr. Michael Oren, then a scholar at Shalem Institute in Jerusalem and now Israel’s ambassador to the United States; author James Bamford; and Dr. Charles Smith of the University of Arizona, as commentator, were on the panel with me.
As indicated below, in chapter 18, the U.S. State Department in its summary of the USS Liberty incident unequivocally concluded that the attack was a tragic mistake. Since then, it has been claimed that the State Department is a coconspirator with the National Security Agency and this author!
Thereafter, in October 2009, I was invited to appear on a panel at the National Security Agency and present a paper on the Liberty incident. My paper urged the National Security Agency to make an affirmative statement that the attack was a case of mistaken identity, but the National Security Agency, for reasons that remain known only to it, continues to decline to state publicly a position on the issue. This is rather strange, in view of the NSA’s own conclusions in its 1981 document “Attack on a SIGINT Collector the U.S.S. Liberty” that “the knowledge that the tragedy resulted not only from Israeli miscalculation but also from faulty U.S. communications practices was even more difficult to accept” and “while these reports revealed some confusion on the part of the pilots concerning the nationality of the ship, they tended to rule out any thesis that the Israeli Navy and Air Force deliberately attacked a ship they knew to be American.”
Furthermore, the historian for the National Security Agency, Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, in his histor
y of the agency, clearly states that the attack was a tragic mistake. I have been unable to find or obtain any internal NSA document suggesting that the attack was a premeditated one against an American warship. The strongest negative statement on the issue within the NSA was made by Louis W. Tordello, who served as deputy director from 1956 to 1974. On July 5, 1967, in an interim decision, Judge Yeshayahu Yerushalmi, a judge on the Military Court of Appeals, in his capacity as examining judge under section 283 of the Israel Military Justice Law of 1955, ruled, “It appears to me, prima facie, that offenses of negligence may have been committed.” The hearing was adjourned and reconvened, and it concluded on July 21, 1967, after testimony of thirty-four witnesses and receipt in evidence of fourteen documents. A final decision was rendered on July 21, 1967. Page 41 of the 1981 NSA report states, “When NSA’s Deputy Director read the decision of the Israeli Defense Forces preliminary inquiry, he summed up his personal feelings [emphasis added] on the subject by calling it ‘a nice whitewash.’” He was displeased with the Israel examining judge’s ruling: “I hold that there is no sufficient amount of prima facie evidence justifying committing anyone for trial.” However, Tordello never provided any evidence in contradiction of the tragic mistake theory.
In 2002, after the publication of the first edition of this book, the Israel Air Force conducted a study of the incident. It did not contain anything not previously released except an annotation that the Israeli air force and navy had coordinated meetings to establish procedures to prevent similar tragic mistakes from occurring again.
It seems quite clear to this author that the shadow of the Liberty incident continues to haunt the Israel Navy. On January 3, 2002, Israeli naval commandos in the Red Sea captured an old ship named the Karine A that was being operated by the Palestinian Authority and attempting to transport fifty tons of weapons manufactured in Iran and Russia to the Gaza Strip. It is significant that the go-ahead for the actual seizure of the ship was not approved until the Israel Defense Force chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, personally flew over the ship, observed it, and confirmed that it was the target ship. Likewise, on March 15, 2011, when the Israeli navy captured the Victoria, another ship attempting to smuggle Iranian-supplied arms to Gaza, the actual seizure of the ship was not approved until its identity had been confirmed by the very highest authority in the Israeli military and the prime minister had approved the operation.
This second edition is based on all of the evidence that has now been declassified, including what the National Security Agency describes as its remaining papers on the Liberty incident, finally declassified on June 6, 2007. The NSA issued a press release on June 6, 2007 that stated, “NSA/CSS Releases Documents relating to the 8 June 1967 Attack on the USS Liberty—In recognition of the 40th anniversary of the attack on the U.S. Navy ship USS Liberty, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) has finalized the review of all remaining material [emphasis added] relative to the attack and published this material on NSA website at www.nsa.gov. This additional release adds to the collection of documents, audio recordings, and transcripts previously posted to the site on 02 July 2005.” All of the facts are now available for review. A quarter of a century of intensive research in Israel and the United States, including in all relevant archives (both classified and declassified documents) and interviews with all then-living individuals directly involved in the incident, has made the factual and documentary record clear.
Nevertheless the official records, facts, and truth are of no interest or concern to persons and organizations motivated by hidden agendas, who wish to keep alive conspiracy theories, or who are trying to feed sensations.
This author attests that the conclusions of this book are the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
April 2013
A Jay Cristol
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
What originally began as a short walk turned into a twenty-seven-year odyssey. Along the way I met many people in the United States, Israel, England, and Egypt who have been of invaluable help in the research and preparation of this manuscript. Not only did they contribute to my research, but most also became my friends. My sincere thanks go out to all of them.
In the United States
Curt Civin, MD, Regina Greenwell, Cdr. Richard Holzknecht, Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, Adm. Jerome L. Johnson, Cdr. Tom Krupp, Ivy Lapides, John Long, Robert S. McNamara, Ambassador Richard B. Parker, Ambassador Dwight Porter, Dean Rusk, Carl F. Salans, Capt. Frank Snyder, Rear Adm. Paul E. Tobin Jr., Wright Walden.
In Israel
Rear Adm. Ami Ayalon, Maj. Gen. Avihu Ben-Nun, Rear Adm. Abraham Ashur, Lt. Col. Michael Bloch, Moshe Fogel, Capt. Ari Gavish, Gila Gerson, Hirsh Goodman, Lt. Col. Matti Greenberg, Eitan Haber, Uri Meretz, Gen. Uzi Narkis, Pinchas Pinchasy, David Rubinger, Meir Shamgar, Commo. Chaim Shaked, Rear Adm. Paul Shulman, Ambassador Michael Shiloh, Col. Joel Singer, Rear Adm. Biny Telem, Judge Yeshayahu Yerulshalmi, Aharon Yifrach, Dan Pattir, Mark Regev.
In Egypt
Maj. Gen. A. Z. M. H. Abdin, Maj. Gen. Ahmed M. Halim, Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem.
In England
Rex Bloomstein, Mary Horworth, Adrian Pennick.
USS Liberty Crew Members
Capt. William L. McGonagle, Cdr. Maurice H. Bennett, Lt. George Golden, Communications Technician First Class Joe Lentini, Signalman Second Class Russell O. David, Seaman Stephen J. Richard.
Special Thanks
Adm. Isaac C. Kidd Jr., USN, Vice Adm. Donald D. Engen, USN, Capt. Ernest C. Castle, USN, John Hadden, Norman Polmar, Christina Davidson, Michael Weeks, Joann Rosoff, Rick Russell, Dr. Haim Shaked, Dr. Vendulka Kubalkova, Mitchil Debach, Maxine Schwartz, Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Brig. Gen. Oded Erez, Rear Adm. Michael Ram, Rear Adm. David Ben-Bashat, Vice Adm. Eli Marom (Chiny), Rear Adm. Shlomo Erell, Rear Adm. Yechezkel Mashita Mor, Capt. Yaacov Nitzan, Col. Danny Shapira, Col. Raanan Gissin, Lt. Col. Danny Grossman, Juval Aviv, Maj. Gen. Iftach Spector, Royal Flight leader, Michael Shuldinger, Arthur Hertz, David Horan, Karen Horan, Cheryl Kaplan, Barbara Cargill, Jennifer Rolph, Lisa Walsh, Greg Koldys, William Cassidy, Glenn Lapides, Olga Cusell, Louise Bauer, Jill Bauer, Stephen M. Cristol, and David A. Cristol.
A Very Special Acknowledgment
To my beloved wife, Elly. Without her patience, understanding, and help, this book could not have been completed.
Chapter 1
ROLL IN ON TARGET
Kursa Flight leader glanced over his left shoulder to keep his eyes on the target as he rolled his Mirage IIICJ to a heading of 100°.1 The plane rolled out of the turn with its nose pointing to the tiny gray ship on the surface of the Mediterranean Sea almost ten thousand feet below.
His right thumb pushed forward on the electric trim tab, easing the nose down into a dive and positioning the ship in the center of the ring of the gun sight projected on his windscreen. With only the smallest of smooth corrections, he flew the crosshairs on the sight to line up on the bridge of the ship. In the dive the plane accelerated to nearly six hundred miles per hour,2 and he reduced the throttle ever so slightly to prevent the plane from buffeting against the edge of the sonic barrier. Under the circumstances, there was no need to go supersonic. He was descending toward the target, closing at the rate of a half mile every three seconds. Automatically his left hand let go of the throttle and flipped on the master armament switch. His hand then moved to the gun selector switch located next to it. His right hand continued to steady the stick while his feet lightly stabilized the rudder, continuing to hold the crosshairs on the target.
Without conscious thought, the index finger on his right hand slipped under the trigger safety guard, pushed it up, and found the trigger. As he approached to within one mile of the ship, which was about six seconds from the target, he slightly increased the pressure on the trigger to actuate the gun camera His eyes quickly searched for any sign of antiaircraft fire coming from the ship. He saw none. The structure of the attack was perfect. The target ship was steering
westerly into the sun, which was at his back. His wingman was a short distance behind him in an identical pattern. The moment was now.
His two DEFA 5–52 30 mm guns began firing a steady burst of over nineteen rounds per second from each barrel.3 He had never fired at a ship before, but something out of his past, the memory of his father being lost at sea on a ship, gave him an eerie sensation. He was transfixed in awe and horror as he thought he saw the incredible damage being caused by his gunfire. Attack doctrine dictates releasing or firing your weapon and pulling up at once to avoid being struck by your own exploding or ricocheting ordnance or fixating on the target and flying into it while counting your hits. The margin for error was only three seconds, during which the Mirage would travel almost half a mile.
He heard his wingman shout over the radio, “Look out for the masts!” He abruptly applied back pressure on the stick, pulling heavy g-forces as he hurtled skyward and began a steep left turn to reposition his aircraft for a second run. As he passed abeam of the ship, he noticed a huge fire and a great pall of black smoke spewing straight up from the ship. His target was the United States Ship Liberty (GTR 5).
Commencing at 1358 local time on June 8, 1967,4 the Liberty, a U.S. intelligence-gathering ship, was attacked by Israeli air, and later by naval, forces while steaming the Mediterranean in international waters some twelve to fourteen miles off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula in the vicinity of the town of El Arish. Prior to the start of the third Arab-Israeli War in June 1967, known in the West as the Six Day War, the Sinai had been controlled by the United Arab Republic (Egypt). By the fourth day of the war, Israeli armor had swept through the Sinai, and Israeli tanks were on the banks of the Suez Canal. At the time of the attack, Israel controlled El Arish and the military airfield located just south of the town. The attack had concluded by 1440.
This event has been the subject of at least ten official investigations by the U.S. government and three official investigations by the Israeli government, and it has been the subject of five television productions. It is mentioned in more than a hundred books, several of which have been devoted entirely to the event, while others have dedicated chapters to it. Many more make mention of it. More than thirty years later, the incident still finds its way into numerous magazine stories, newspaper articles, and letters to the editor.
The Liberty Incident Revealed Page 1