Castle prepared a flash message from the office of the U.S. defense attaché to COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO, the White House, and others. The date-time group on the message was 081414Z June 67, which was 1614 Sinai time and 1014 Washington time. The message was released about the time of its date-time group and was transmitted and received in Washington about thirty minutes later. The Castle message reached the Sixth Fleet before it was received in Washington. The message stated that the Israelis reported mistakenly attacking a U.S. ship at 1400 [Sinai time], that rescue efforts were under way, and that they apologized. Ambassador Barbour requested a helicopter from the Israel Foreign Ministry to fly Commander Castle to the site of the incident to attempt to identify the ship.38 The request was honored, and on his way out of the embassy door Castle invited Lt. Lynn Blasch, an assistant naval attaché, to accompany him. They were driven to Sde Dov Airport on the north side of Tel Aviv,39 where they were met by an Israel Air Force Sud-Aviation SA-321K Super-Frelon helicopter. They took off at about 1800 Sinai time and flew toward the last reported position of the ship. They arrived over the Liberty about 1840. It was twilight. There was no radio voice communication between the helicopter and the Liberty, as aircraft radios and ships’ radios do not normally use the same frequencies.
Commander McGonagle refused to halt the ship or to allow the helicopter to lower anyone onto the Liberty. After efforts to land or lower someone on board were rebuffed, the helicopter flew back to Sde Dov, arriving at about 1910.40 Castle returned to the U.S. embassy to find Ambassador Barbour waiting in the atrium, just inside the front entrance. This was unusual, as it was usually an attaché who was waiting at the door for the ambassador.41 Barbour told Castle that General Getty at National Military Command Center (NMCC) in Washington, D.C., wanted to talk to him. Castle called Getty at about 2300 Israel time and briefed the general on his helicopter flight to the Liberty.42
Chapter 6
IN THE AFTERMATH
While the air and sea attacks were taking place in the afternoon in the eastern Mediterranean, it was still the morning of June 8, 1967, in Washington, D.C. At the White House at 0949 eastern daylight time, 1549 Sinai time,1 President Johnson was in his bedroom with his press secretary, George Christian. He received a telephone call from Walt Whitman Rostow, his National Security Advisor. Rostow had been advised of a flash (highest-priority) voice message that had been received by telephone at the National Military Command Center at 0911 (1511 Sinai time) from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Europe (CINCEUR). Rostow was now informing the president of the message.
The message was, “Mr. President: We have a flash report from the Joint Reconnaissance Center [in the Pentagon] indicating that a U.S. ELINT (electronics intelligence) ship, the Liberty, has been torpedoed in the Mediterranean. The ship is located 60 to 100 miles north of Egypt. Reconnaissance aircraft are out from the Sixth Fleet. We have no knowledge of the submarine or surface vessel which committed this act. We shall keep you informed.”2 President Johnson hung up the telephone, turned to George Christian, and repeated Rostow’s words. He then looked Christian squarely in the eyes, became very grave, and said, “George, if this attack is by the Russians, this means war.”3
The Liberty had been attacked by aircraft at about 1400 (0800 EDT) and torpedoed at about 1435 (0835 EDT). At the time of the attack, the aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet were over 530 miles from the Liberty.
It was a busy day for the president, who had been working since 0745, when his breakfast tray was brought to his bedroom. He had already made or received eleven telephone calls, received a hotline message,4 and met with White House staff member Marvin Watson. Upon receiving the message about the attack on the Liberty, the president immediately ordered a meeting of his top Middle East advisers in the Situation Room in the basement of the West Wing of the White House. While the advisers were gathering, a launch of aircraft was dispatched by the Sixth Fleet to protect the Liberty. It is not clear if the message that stated, “Reconnaissance aircraft are out from the Sixth Fleet,” relayed by Rostow to the president, referred to aircraft already in the air or to the aircraft that were about to be launched. It is most likely that the reference was to the aircraft that were about to be launched or were already in the process of being launched when the message was sent. U.S. aircraft flying from the Sixth Fleet off Crete toward the Arab-Israeli war zone were a matter of urgent concern to Johnson.
He and Kosygin had previously assured each other that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union intended to intervene in the Middle East war. There were many Soviet warships in the Mediterranean, including at least half a dozen intelligence-gathering vessels, and the United States knew that information about U.S. warplanes flying toward the Middle East war zone would arrive in the Kremlin in a very short time after takeoff. At 1100 Johnson approved a hotline message to Premier Kosygin, transmitted at 1117 Washington time, advising him that the planes were being sent to the scene where the Liberty had been torpedoed “to investigate.” The message stated, “We have just learned that U.S.S. Liberty, an auxiliary[,] has apparently been torpedoed by Israel Forces in error off Port Said. . . . We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of this flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that proper parties are informed.”5 Johnson was most anxious not to provide any provocation to the Soviets.
Johnson left his bedroom and arrived at the Oval Office at 1104 with George Christian and deputy press secretary Tom Johnson.6 They were met at the door by special presidential assistant Marvin Watson and immediately left the Oval Office for the Situation Room on the floor below.7 Johnson arrived at 1106 to find all the president’s men gathered together: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor Rostow, special adviser McGeorge Bundy, ambassador to the Soviet Union Lewellen Thompson, chair of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Clark Clifford, and the number-two man at the State Department, Nicholas Katzenbach.8
Until minutes before the president arrived in the Situation Room, little additional information had been received. The individuals gathered in the Situation Room were not aware of what President Johnson already knew. The atmosphere in the room was therefore extremely tense. Who was attacking a U.S. warship? Was it the Egyptians? A strong case could be made that it very well might have been the Egyptians, since they had broken diplomatic relations with the United States and accused the United States of helping Israel. Although it had lost nearly its entire force on the first day of the war, the Egyptian air force still had some MiGs flying, and the Egyptian navy had naval vessels. Was the Liberty being attacked by the Soviet Union? This was McNamara’s first conclusion,9 albeit not the conclusion of senior U.S. naval officers in the Sixth Fleet. Were the Soviets entering the conflict on the side of the Arabs? Was this the beginning of World War III? How should the United States respond? Could the situation in the Mediterranean escalate into a nuclear exchange?
In the Israel Air Force command center at the Kirya at about 1400 Sinai time (0800 in Washington, D.C.), the word was spreading that Israel Air Force jets were attacking an Egyptian ship off El Arish. As reports of fire and smoke billowing from the ship were heard over the air-control radio speakers, a state of euphoria broke out, and some of the staff in the command center began cheering. Abruptly, however, at about 1410 Sinai time, the euphoria turned to horror when the leader of Royal Flight reported markings on the bow of the ship to be in lettering other than Arabic and, especially, that the initial letter was a C. No one knew that he had made an error in his sighting, but everyone in the command center knew that Arab ships were marked in Arabic script and that therefore the ship could not be Egyptian. In addition, many were aware that the Soviets were operating at least half a dozen intelligence-gathering vessels off the coasts of Israel, Egypt, and Syria and that the call letters of some if not all of the Soviet ships began with the Cyrillic letter C.10 The gloom was deepened when the MTBs passed close to the Liberty follo
wing the torpedo attack and Ensign Yifrach observed a large flag hanging in the smoke that appeared to him to be red. Another MTB crewman misread the writing on Liberty’s stem as being in Russian. This information was reported to the navy command center in Stella Maris and passed on to the air force command center by telephone. The “dream war” was turning into a nightmare.
The immediate reaction of the officers assembled in the air force command center was that by attacking a Soviet ship, Israel had given the Soviet Union an excuse to intervene in the war on the losing Arab side. All the gains of the IDF would now be annulled by the intervention of Soviet military forces. Only a short while later, at 1520, the MTBs confirmed the identity of the ship as American rather than Soviet.11 By about 1530, after much confusion, the Israelis concluded that their navy had just torpedoed a U.S. Navy ship. According to Lt. Col. Michael Bloch, a foreign military liaison officer to attachés, “A huge wave of relief swept over the Kirya.”12 Ironically, it was much better news. It remained to order Bloch to inform the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv of the mistaken attack.
Commander Castle’s flash message date-time group 081414Z (1614 Sinai/1014 EDT) was received by the White House shortly before 1100 EDT/1700 Sinai.13 The message from Castle was rushed to the Situation Room. Before the message reached the White House and made its way to the Situation Room, a tense debate was taking place. Both Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara told this author of the extreme concern of all the men in that room. Then the president told them of the Castle message. In an instant the mood changed. It was Israel that had been the attacker. The United States was not at war. The Soviets were not involved. The issue of a nuclear exchange was not on the table. According to Rusk, “A wave of relief swept through the situation room.”14 With relief, McNamara called the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon and ordered a message sent that canceled the previous JCS “use of force” authorization.15 The aircraft had already been recalled by the Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Martin, who had received the Castle message at 1028 Washington time, almost half an hour before it was received at the White House.16 President Johnson left the meeting at 1145 and at 1246 joined President Hastings Kamuzu Banda of the Republic of Malawi in the Oval Office as a prelude to a state luncheon.
When Vice Admiral Martin, Commander, Sixth Fleet, first received word of the attack on the Liberty on June 8, he was on the cruiser Little Rock, at sea in the eastern Mediterranean near Crete. The Little Rock was steaming in formation with two U.S. aircraft carriers, the America and the Saratoga, within the defense screens provided by their destroyer squadrons. Alongside the U.S. formation was the Soviet warship to which Vice Admiral Martin had sent his demand to stop harassing the Sixth Fleet twenty-four hours before. Not only the Americans but also the Soviets were now able to hear Liberty’s voice transmissions and were aware of the attack on a U.S. ship taking place about 530 nautical miles away. Neither had any additional information about the attack. Each force eyed the other, and the Americans wondered if it was time to open fire.
Stewart M. Harris, a twenty-five-year-old lieutenant (junior grade) serving at the time as the Destroyer Squadron 12 communications officer on board the destroyer Davis (DD 937), remembers two heavily armed U.S. Navy A-1 aircraft flying in a racetrack pattern over the Soviet destroyer that was steaming along with the carrier Saratoga.17 The Americans and the Soviets were facing each other eyeball to eyeball, with guns loaded, although there is no documentation that either force went to battle stations.18 Harry J. Stathos, an embarked United Press International reporter, had the following message, date-time group 082041Z June 67, transmitted as news copy by the USS America on his behalf: “Shortly after the attack occurred at about 3 p.m. (1500 GMT), Task Force Sixty of the Sixth Fleet, which has been operating in the eastern Mediterranean during the Middle East crisis, was ordered into condition two, a high state of combat readiness.” Suddenly a copy of the message from Commander Castle to the White House was received at the communications center on the Little Rock. Cdr. Francis M. “Frank” Snyder, the Sixth Fleet communications officer, told this author, “A wave of relief rolled over the Sixth Fleet headquarters upon learning that the attackers of the Liberty were Israeli and not Soviet or Egyptian.19
At the American embassy in Cairo, the atmosphere on that day was also very tense. Following the accusations by President Nasser that U.S. military planes had assisted Israel in the attack on Egypt, the U.S. embassy was under siege by street mobs, and newly arrived Ambassador Richard Nolte did not know whether the government of Egypt would continue to use the Egyptian army or police to protect the U.S. embassy. Richard B. Parker was then a political counselor at the embassy and worked closely with Ambassador Nolte and the deputy chief of mission, David Nes. The initial word of the attack on the Liberty off the coast of Sinai sent chills through the Cairo embassy staff, who were certain the attackers were not Egyptian and therefore initially presumed they were Soviet. When the word was received that the attackers were Israeli, according to Parker, “A wave of relief swept through the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.”20
The United States publicly disclosed that the attackers of the Liberty were Israeli on June 8, 1967, through a press release by the Public Affairs Office of the Department of Defense.21 The disclosure willy-nilly admitted that a U.S. warship described as “a U.S. Navy Technical Research Ship” was within eyeball distance from the war rather than over a hundred miles away, as the United States had told the world from the United Nations two days before.
Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, had told the Security Council on June 6 that the U.S. ships were hundreds of miles from the combat area. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense had issued a news release on June 5 and another on June 6 that concluded with the statement, “The Sixth Fleet carriers and their aircraft have been several hundred miles from the scene of the fighting.”22 The United States, anxious to avoid possible Soviet intervention in the hostilities, was urging a hands-off policy for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Most likely Arthur Goldberg had no idea that the Liberty was en route to the Sinai coast when he made the statement.
As a result of the Liberty incident, the United States now had the proverbial egg on its face. Its previous statements were demonstrated not to be true, and the United States now had a lot of explaining to do to both the Arabs and the Soviets. Word that the Liberty had sailed from Rota, Spain, to the combat area—information that was included in the June 8 U.S. Department of Defense press release—generated an inquiry from the highest levels of the Spanish government, which was very much concerned that Spain might be seen as supporting U.S. efforts on behalf of Israel and against the Arabs. An article with the byline Ross Nark appeared in the June 9, 1967, edition of the Madrid newspaper El Alcazar and claimed the Liberty was based at Rota. The Spanish government was advised by the U.S. embassy in Madrid that the Liberty had called at Rota only for refueling. The Spanish government was “gratified” by the reply. Nevertheless the U.S. embassy in Madrid advised the U.S. Secretary of State in a telegram with “immediate” precedence, “Request Dept caution official USG [U.S. government] spoxesmen [sic] observe greatest care in any references to Spain during current M.E. crises. Walker.”23
The first political casualty of the incident in the United States was the longtime warm relationship between Eugene V. Rostow, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, and Clark Clifford, the chair of the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On June 9 very few of the details of the incident were known. Investigations had just begun, and the feelings of the members of the National Security Council already were not in accord. At a National Security Council meeting on June 9, 1967, Clifford urged that the United States treat Israel the same way it would have treated the Soviet Union or Arabs if either of the latter had attacked the Liberty.24 Eugene Rostow was outraged at Clifford’s suggestion that the United States should treat a country that it supported in the same manner that it would treat a
country with which relations had been severed or a country with which it had a merely formal relationship.25
President Johnson immediately assigned Clifford the task of investigating the incident and reporting back to him. Clifford conducted his investigation without staff and relied primarily on the Department of Defense for his fact finding. Over a month later, after reviewing materials provided by the Defense Department, he concluded that the attack was not an intentional attack on a ship known by the Israelis to be a U.S. ship. Clifford’s report was couched in very strong language and was extremely critical of the Israeli military. The report remained secret until October 25, 1995, when both the report and the cover letter transmitting it from Clifford to W. W. Rostow were declassified.26 The transmittal letter from W. W. Rostow to the president remained classified until June 25, 1998.
In the transmittal letter, which was declassified at the request of this author under the Freedom of Information Act, W. W. Rostow advised the president that “it [the report] is based on the study of literally thousands of pages of evidence.” It is difficult to understand why this letter remained classified thirty-one years after the event. It is also difficult to understand why Clifford took such a strong position on how to treat Israel in view of the fact that he was always considered a friend of Israel. While serving as executive assistant to President Harry Truman in 1948, Clifford had bumped heads with both Secretary of State General George Marshall and Dean Rusk (who worked for the Department of State but did not yet have a title), who advised Truman not to recognize the state of Israel on the declaration of its independence by David Ben-Gurion. In fact, when this author interviewed Dean Rusk in 1989 and discussed the Clifford report and the fact that Clifford had concluded that the attack on the Liberty was not an intentional attack on a U.S. ship, Rusk commented, “I would have expected him to side with the Zionists.”27 In spite of Clifford’s ultimate conclusion in his report in favor of Israel, the relationship between Eugene Rostow and Clifford remained chilly.
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